India’s new foreign policy demands responses from Sri Lanka
Dr Kamal Wickremasinghe
The decision by India to vote for the US resolution against Sri Lanka at the UN Human Rights Council sessions in Geneva in March 2012 surprised many foreign policy pundits. The Indian decision to vote for the resolution, albeit a much diluted version of the original, marked a significant deviation from the usual Indian stance of not voting for resolutions critical of individual member countries, as well as from ‘standing by’ Sri Lanka during attacks by neo-colonial powers at UN
forums.
The changed stance of India has been variously attributed to causes ranging from Indian domestic politics to Sonia Gandhi’s reaction to seeing the photos of the dead family of the dreaded terrorist lynchpin; the possible influence of the appointment of Ranjan Mathai as foreign secretary in August 2011 was not among the factors being considered.
A comprehensive overview of the new foreign policy agenda for India recently spelt out by the Indian Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai during the release of a book titled India’s Neighbourhood Challenges in the Next Two Decades, at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), shows that the UN vote against Sri Lanka was the first indication that under Mathai, the Indian foreign policy was beginning to head in a significantly new direction. Other policy ‘reversals’ since the UN vote on Sri Lanka, such as the issue of Iranian oil purchases following the US ‘sanctions,’ confirms such a view.
Critics argue that Ranjan Mathai’s new vision for India essentially reflects a new US defence strategy outlined by the US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta (formerly the Director of the CIA) at IDSA just six months ago. The former US ambassador to Sri Lanka, Robert O. Blake, who after Sri Lanka became the assistant secretary for South Asian Affairs at the US State Department is considered one of the chief architects of the new US policy.
The important aspect of Mathai’s new policy approach to South Asia from a Sri Lankan point of view is that, as the March events forestalled, Sri Lanka’s considerations to dealing with India, China and the UN agencies are going to be further complicated by the US neocon establishment’s new friend within the ‘bowels’ of the Indian foreign policy establishment.
Consequence
In drawing the links between the ‘new’ US and Indian policies toward South Asia, the cornerstone of the new US foreign policy is what Panetta called a “rebalancing” toward the Asia-Pacific region: in plain English this means an expansion of US military presence in the Indian Ocean region and South Asia. Defence cooperation with India is a key component of this expansion, due to the “strong commitment to a set of principles that help maintain international security and prosperity” India shared with the US as providing the basis for such cooperation.
Panetta also referred to other joint US-Indian common concerns relating to security challenges – from violent extremism and terrorism to piracy on the high seas and from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to regional instability. Panetta had decided on a forward-looking defence partnership, and a plan for advancing it “month-by-month and year-by-year.”
Those who are familiar with US policy pronouncements on bilateral and multilateral alliances including war coalitions find nothing new or unusual about waffle such as “our two nations may not agree on the solution to every challenge facing us,” and “we share the same values, the same challenges and threats,” etc.
However, the contextual statement that the US seeks – the cooperation of India for a “vision of a just, stable, and peaceful regional order” should cause concern among Sri Lankan foreign policy circles; this is because there is a real likelihood that a ‘new’ Indian foreign policy synchronized with the new US designs for the South Asian region has the potential to being used as a cat’s paw: one possible consequence of such deception could be further friction in the relationship between India and Sri Lanka.
It is obvious that the US has found a ‘friend’ within the system who could influence the direction of Indian foreign policy, possibly in the coming decades. Mathai’s career history shows that he is ‘favoured’ by the US, and the feeling, by all accounts is mutual.
The 60 year old RanjanMathai, a Keralite and a graduate of the University of Poona is a veteran of nearly 40 years in the Indian Foreign Service with postings as ambassador almost exclusively in western capitals and client states such as Israel (1998 to 2001) and Qatar (2001 to 2005). He has also served as deputy high commissioner to the UK (2005 to 2007) and as the ambassador to France (2007-2011). He has previously served in Colombo, Washington, Tehran and Brussels, and has served as Head of a division dealing with India’s relations with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Maldives.
Minefield
Ranjan Mathai sounds ideologically, completely persuaded by the US rhetoric: his primary premise that the geo-political situation in India’s neighbourhood would change drastically in the next two decades and will present a “challenging” environment reflects a US-like rationalization of the need for an aggressive stance in international relations; this is most untypical of the traditional Indian approach.
The countries of the region, after all, are minions such as Sri Lanka, Bangalesh, Bhutan and Nepal who can hardly challenge India. Mathai also appears to have adopted the typical US propaganda lines such as “the dividing line between terrorists and trans-nationals is disappearing,” and “access to technology is increasing the dangers that we face.”
The new priority the proposed policy promises to place on the role of domestic factors in framing foreign policy is likely to have major repercussions on many of India’s relations with its tiny neighbours. The ‘wild card’ of Tamil Nadu politics, currently being dealt with sensibly, and on most occasions effectively, by the central government is likely to assume new and dangerous proportions under the new policy.
The first glimpses of the ‘new’ foreign policy template for India appears to borrow from largely discredited US foreign policy paradigms that view the world as a ‘minefield’ that poses unknown dangers and challenging policy environment that require armed responses – usually self-fulfilling prophesies.
The world has been ill-served by military adventures based on such irrational principles promoted by vested interests. Nor has globalization been the reality or success to the extent Mr. Mathai appears to place emphasis on. India’s foreign policy towards its neighbourhood needs to take into consideration its strong historical influence on the region and the on-going links.
As has been requested by Mr. Mathai, the new proposed policy framework needs to be debated regionally and provided feedback on by regional countries: Sri Lanka needs to inform India that a foreign policy based on the traditional Indian philosophy of non-violence is likely to serve India’s interests as well as those of the countries of the region best.
India’s adoption of a foreign policy based on an American model of economic exploitation, shadow boxing and weapons manufacture will be most unwelcome by the region. Sri Lanka needs to voice its opinion vigorously because our interests are likely to be adversely affected.
Dr Kamal WickremasingheThe decision by India to vote for the US resolution against Sri Lanka at the UN Human Rights Council sessions in Geneva in March 2012 surprised many foreign policy pundits. The Indian decision to vote for the resolution, albeit a much diluted version of the original, marked a significant deviation from the usual Indian stance of not voting for resolutions critical of individual member countries, as well as from ‘standing by’ Sri Lanka during attacks by neo-colonial powers at UN
forums.The changed stance of India has been variously attributed to causes ranging from Indian domestic politics to Sonia Gandhi’s reaction to seeing the photos of the dead family of the dreaded terrorist lynchpin; the possible influence of the appointment of Ranjan Mathai as foreign secretary in August 2011 was not among the factors being considered.
A comprehensive overview of the new foreign policy agenda for India recently spelt out by the Indian Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai during the release of a book titled India’s Neighbourhood Challenges in the Next Two Decades, at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), shows that the UN vote against Sri Lanka was the first indication that under Mathai, the Indian foreign policy was beginning to head in a significantly new direction. Other policy ‘reversals’ since the UN vote on Sri Lanka, such as the issue of Iranian oil purchases following the US ‘sanctions,’ confirms such a view.
Critics argue that Ranjan Mathai’s new vision for India essentially reflects a new US defence strategy outlined by the US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta (formerly the Director of the CIA) at IDSA just six months ago. The former US ambassador to Sri Lanka, Robert O. Blake, who after Sri Lanka became the assistant secretary for South Asian Affairs at the US State Department is considered one of the chief architects of the new US policy.
The important aspect of Mathai’s new policy approach to South Asia from a Sri Lankan point of view is that, as the March events forestalled, Sri Lanka’s considerations to dealing with India, China and the UN agencies are going to be further complicated by the US neocon establishment’s new friend within the ‘bowels’ of the Indian foreign policy establishment.
Consequence
In drawing the links between the ‘new’ US and Indian policies toward South Asia, the cornerstone of the new US foreign policy is what Panetta called a “rebalancing” toward the Asia-Pacific region: in plain English this means an expansion of US military presence in the Indian Ocean region and South Asia. Defence cooperation with India is a key component of this expansion, due to the “strong commitment to a set of principles that help maintain international security and prosperity” India shared with the US as providing the basis for such cooperation.
Panetta also referred to other joint US-Indian common concerns relating to security challenges – from violent extremism and terrorism to piracy on the high seas and from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to regional instability. Panetta had decided on a forward-looking defence partnership, and a plan for advancing it “month-by-month and year-by-year.”
Those who are familiar with US policy pronouncements on bilateral and multilateral alliances including war coalitions find nothing new or unusual about waffle such as “our two nations may not agree on the solution to every challenge facing us,” and “we share the same values, the same challenges and threats,” etc.
However, the contextual statement that the US seeks – the cooperation of India for a “vision of a just, stable, and peaceful regional order” should cause concern among Sri Lankan foreign policy circles; this is because there is a real likelihood that a ‘new’ Indian foreign policy synchronized with the new US designs for the South Asian region has the potential to being used as a cat’s paw: one possible consequence of such deception could be further friction in the relationship between India and Sri Lanka.
It is obvious that the US has found a ‘friend’ within the system who could influence the direction of Indian foreign policy, possibly in the coming decades. Mathai’s career history shows that he is ‘favoured’ by the US, and the feeling, by all accounts is mutual.
The 60 year old RanjanMathai, a Keralite and a graduate of the University of Poona is a veteran of nearly 40 years in the Indian Foreign Service with postings as ambassador almost exclusively in western capitals and client states such as Israel (1998 to 2001) and Qatar (2001 to 2005). He has also served as deputy high commissioner to the UK (2005 to 2007) and as the ambassador to France (2007-2011). He has previously served in Colombo, Washington, Tehran and Brussels, and has served as Head of a division dealing with India’s relations with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Maldives.
Minefield
Ranjan Mathai sounds ideologically, completely persuaded by the US rhetoric: his primary premise that the geo-political situation in India’s neighbourhood would change drastically in the next two decades and will present a “challenging” environment reflects a US-like rationalization of the need for an aggressive stance in international relations; this is most untypical of the traditional Indian approach.
The countries of the region, after all, are minions such as Sri Lanka, Bangalesh, Bhutan and Nepal who can hardly challenge India. Mathai also appears to have adopted the typical US propaganda lines such as “the dividing line between terrorists and trans-nationals is disappearing,” and “access to technology is increasing the dangers that we face.”
The new priority the proposed policy promises to place on the role of domestic factors in framing foreign policy is likely to have major repercussions on many of India’s relations with its tiny neighbours. The ‘wild card’ of Tamil Nadu politics, currently being dealt with sensibly, and on most occasions effectively, by the central government is likely to assume new and dangerous proportions under the new policy.
The first glimpses of the ‘new’ foreign policy template for India appears to borrow from largely discredited US foreign policy paradigms that view the world as a ‘minefield’ that poses unknown dangers and challenging policy environment that require armed responses – usually self-fulfilling prophesies.
The world has been ill-served by military adventures based on such irrational principles promoted by vested interests. Nor has globalization been the reality or success to the extent Mr. Mathai appears to place emphasis on. India’s foreign policy towards its neighbourhood needs to take into consideration its strong historical influence on the region and the on-going links.
As has been requested by Mr. Mathai, the new proposed policy framework needs to be debated regionally and provided feedback on by regional countries: Sri Lanka needs to inform India that a foreign policy based on the traditional Indian philosophy of non-violence is likely to serve India’s interests as well as those of the countries of the region best.
India’s adoption of a foreign policy based on an American model of economic exploitation, shadow boxing and weapons manufacture will be most unwelcome by the region. Sri Lanka needs to voice its opinion vigorously because our interests are likely to be adversely affected.
