Viewing Fundamentalist Orientation From Indian Narratives
Austin Fernando
Recently I read two articles (read here and here) by my friend Dr. W.A Wijewardena (Daily FT and Colombo Telegraph), which cautioned to keep fundamentalists in check or suffer impediments to liberty and social progress. Since he touched upon Hindutva experiences, I attempt supplementing him with a few insights on Hindutva experiences in India along with comparable Sri Lankan experiences to endorse these dangers.
Hindutva of India and Majoritarianism in Sri Lanka
In both our countries religions and cultures are integrated- Buddhism, Hindu or Islam. While Hindutva monopolizes in India, according to Wijewardena in Sri Lanka the ‘de facto theocracy’ leads, an indirect reference to the majoritarian Sinhala-Buddhist narrative, as currently practiced. However, in Sri Lanka other religious leaders also influence governmental actions selectively. It is ‘shared theocracy!’
Being a majority Hindu community, the focus becomes Hinduism and its appurtenant institutions and moreover ideological interactions that existed and exist. Muslims also have their conceptualism.
Hindu- Buddhist integration
According to Encyclopedia of Hinduism, Hindutva is defined as the ideology of the “culture of the Hindu race,” where Hinduism is but an element and “Hindu dharma is a religion practiced by Hindus as well as Sikhs and Buddhists”. Hindu practices, culture, rituals etc. have also reached Sri Lankan psyche and practices. Buddhists have adjusted their faith in line with Hindu Kovil practices.
In India, over time Hindu nationalism has evolved, which is collectively referred to as the expression of social and political thought, based on the native spiritual and cultural traditions of the subcontinent. The Hindu ideology has inspired the Indian independence movement, armed struggles, coercive politics, and in non-violent protests. Presently it has widened its scope to a much greater cultural renaissance movement and the most powerful motivator of Indian politics.
The Sri Lankan political history also has similar connections to nationalism but have not created ‘Buddhist nationalism.’ Sort of Buddhist nationalism showed-off its strength though, when the SWRD Bandaranaike government assumed power, starting a cultural revival. The outputs like making Sinhalese the official language, establishment of a Ministry of Cultural Affairs, prominence to indigenous contributions like Ayurveda, Buddha Jayanthi celebrations, literary revival, popularizing a national dress etc. can be considered its symbolic evidence.
Components energizing Hindutva
An essay on how Hindutva evolved is in Shashi Tharoor’s book ‘Why I am a Hindu’ in which the Chapter on ‘Hinduism and the Politics of Hindutva’ highlights Hindutva evolution.
(I) Leaders
According to literature, the Indian Hindutva narrative has evolved on the thinking of several pioneer Hindu leaders like VD Savarkar, MS Golwalkar, Pandit DD Upadhyaya et al. who conceptualized, motivated, wrote and lectured on Hindutva.
Whether Sri Lanka has such caliber personalities after Anagarika Dharmapala, Ven Migettuvewatte Gunananada Thero, Ven. Hikkaduwe Sri Sumangala Theros et al is an issue. Comparatively lesser known Sinhala Buddhist nationalist thinking and actions have been pursued in recent times by Ven Gangodawila Soma, Ven Galagoda Aththe Gnanasara, Ven Athuraliye Ratana Theros et al.
The latter group is incomparable with the abovementioned ‘religious’ nationalists. Anyway, they wielded influence with governments, but now seen moving away complaining the inaction of the incumbent Rajapaksa government against Muslim extremism (i.e. closing Madrasas, combatting Islamic extremism).
(II) Institutions
The Hindutva narrative was taken as the cue for religious and even political achievements in India. Before the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) endorsed Hindutva as its power base, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) was founded in 1925 by Dr. KB Hedgewar. Sri Lanka lacked such old-timer organizational arrangements.
According to literature Hedgewar believed that the British rule works because Hindus lacked unity, valor and a civic character. Thus, he recruited energetic Hindu youth and taught them paramilitary techniques. He created awareness of India’s glorious Hindu past to attract the members in a religious communion. This continues even to date with Rama-plays staged during Diwali festival or in Kumbh Mela celebrations. The saffron flag of Shivaji, the Bhagwa Dhwaj, was used as the emblem for the new organization.
The Sri Lankan reformers lagged in institution-building for ‘religious’ nationalism, though we had Anagarika Dharmapala’s Mahabodhi Society of India. It led to religious revival but was not a confrontational organization like the RSS. Of course, Anagarika Dharmapala legally confronted Hindu leaders in India (e.g. Mahantha) who were roadblocking him, but was no political leader, though he spoke out to fight colonial behavior. In Sri Lanka the nationalist exercises were multi-ethnic, multi-religious and hence multi-cultural.
(III) Complementing approaches
The RSS’s public tasks involved protecting Hindu pilgrims at festivals and observances in major Hindu temples. Even today, volunteers serve selected temples. It arranged for training of “pracharaks” (Incidentally Prime Minister Modi started as a pracharak.) and asked volunteers to become Sadhus first, dedicating themselves to the cause of the RSS, giving it the character of a ‘Hindu Sect.’ The RSS thus gained recognition to propagate the ideology of Hindutva and provide “new physical strength” to Hindus.
In India RSS was supplemented by other parallel political approaches. Political programs were in place with Gandhiji leading the way. Hedgewar opposed some Gandhian programs like Gandhiji’s stance on the Indian Muslims. He believed that “it was imperative that they stood up valiantly in defense of Hindu life and honor.” When Hindus were organizing RSS, naturally Muslims also mobilized themselves, probably in defense of Muslim lives and honor, which can happen in another scenario too. Muslims also turned their anger towards Hindus and violence broke out that killed many Muslims.
Millions became members of RSS and Sri Lankan organizations did not have such clientele, but nameboards such as Mahason Balakaya, Ravana Balaya, Sinhale etc. They did not have leaders like LK Advani or Narendra Modi, though proxy political support is claimed and not ruled out. We saw violent activities (e.g. Digana) organized by fly by night organizations with no national image. Since they were not openly attached to political parties a political connotation cannot be made clearly as between the RSS and BJP.
The violence in India was different. There were clashes in Nagpur (in 1927), Godhra train burning (2002) killing 59 Hindus, followed by Gujarat riots (killing 790 Muslims, 254 Hindus, and 223 missing: official figures). In the 2019-2020 violence in Indian cities and universities, names of student RSS members of Akhil Bharatiya Vidya Parishad and leaders like Adhitya Yogi, the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh were tagged. In certain instances (e.g. Jamilia and Jawaharlal Nehru Universities, and Delhi where 53 were killed in four days), Police complicity was also alleged. The threat is repetition of such in Sri Lanka, with similar fundamentalist incidents happening.
Sri Lanka did not proceed on RSS footsteps. We had clergy who led the “revolution” in 1956 but sans an organization like the RSS that continued to influence political decisions. However, when issues arose (e.g. Sinhala being made official language), inclusive of July 1983, spontaneous heavy violence happened despite the absence of an RSS type organization.
(IV) Name dropping
The RSS leaders did not even spare Gandhiji when it suited, as seen in the quote in ‘R.S.S. A Vision in Action.’
“My own experiences but confirm the opinion that the Mussalman as a rule is a bully, and the Hindu is a coward; where there are cowards there will always be bullies.” In that pithy statement Gandhiji had indirectly given a warning to the Hindus that they should give up their cowardice, if they had to end Muslim aggressiveness.”
In Sri Lanka such aggressive labeling of national leaders to promote confrontations is less. Nor do we find organizations like RSS publicly provoking confrontations. It has become the forte of some priests and youth bloggers who even plan to contest parliamentary elections. If elected they may establish a platform for confrontations, as happened in 1956 with persons like KMP Rajaratna orchestrating anti-Tamil sentiments. Among the minority groups too we find similar individuals.
Here, names of Muslim political leaders are freely dropped as supporters of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Muslim international terror bandwagon. It must be noted that some Muslim activists’ and religious leaders’ behavior also had been questionable and would have provoked confrontation; of course, undeserved by the victims.
