Constitutional Reform: Wijeyadasa’s Errors
By Nihal Jayawickrama –21November 2017
The lengthy article by Dr Wijeyadasa Rajapakshe PC on constitutional reform published in the newspapers recently appears to contain several errors of fact and of law. I have no wish to argue with the former Minister of Justice on his views on the legality of the current constitutional reform process in which he participated until his removal from office. However, any debate should proceed upon the basis of accurate information and correct statements of the law.
The Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council 1946 granted full self-government to Ceylon based upon a draft constitution that had been approved in the State Council by 51 votes to 3, including the affirmative votes of members belonging to the Tamil, Muslim and Burgher communities. That Constitution provided for a Governor, and established a House of Representatives and a Senate. The Ceylon Independence Act 1947, enacted by the Parliament of the United Kingdom and the Ceylon (Independence) Order in Council 1947, both of which came into force on 4 February 1948, granted “Dominion Status” to Ceylon. From that day, Ceylon was “fully independent”, except that the Queen was the Head of State and was represented in Ceylon by the Governor-General who was appointed in consultation with, and thereafter acted on the advice of, the Prime Minister of Ceylon.
This is a misinterpretation of the law. Section 29 of the 1946 Constitution stated explicitly that “Parliament may amend or repeal any of the provisions of this Order”. The exceptions were that “(a) no law could prohibit or restrict the free exercise of any religion; (b) make persons of any community or religion liable to disabilities or restrictions to which persons of other communities or religions were not made liable; (c) confer on persons of any community or religion any privilege or advantage which was not conferred on persons of other communities or religions; or (d) alter the constitution of any religious body except with the consent of the governing authority of that body”. That restriction on legislative power was the compact between the majority and the minority communities, and the basis upon which Independence was granted to Ceylon. It was the condition precedent to Independence. Subject to that restriction, Parliament had the power to repeal and replace every other provision of the Constitution. The power to “amend or repeal” necessarily includes the power to replace. In fact, in 1970, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was replaced by our own Court of Final Appeal, and in 1971 Parliament abolished one of its constituent units, the Senate, and chose not to replace it with another second chamber.
This is not a correct statement of fact. The Common Programme drawn up by the SLFP, LSSP and CP in early 1968, in anticipation of forming a government at the next general election, stated quite explicitly that “A Constituent Assembly will be established, and a new Constitution will be introduced. This Constitution will declare Ceylon to be a free, sovereign and independent Republic”. There was no legal impediment to Parliament enacting the necessary legislation to declare Ceylon to be a Republic, a course which several other Commonwealth countries had already followed. Nor was there any legal impediment to Parliament establishing a Constituent Assembly as India had done. However, Dr Colvin R de Silva refused to consider the perfectly practical option of terminating Ceylon’s link with the British Crown through the powers conferred on Parliament by the British Crown. He argued that freedom should be asserted by a free people through a body constituted outside the legal order established by the British Crown. This was a principled stand by one of the twentieth century’s greatest lawyers who had consistently refused to apply for “silk” since he had no wish to be one of “Her Majesty’s Counsel Learned in the Law”. That exercise in autochthony – in establishing a new legal order that sprang from our own native soil – was a bold, idealistic, exciting, even romantic, experience not only for those of us who steered it through possible legal pitfalls, but also for a great many constitutional lawyers and academics worldwide for whom this legal revolution was a rare precedent.
This is a complete misstatement of facts. Following the July 1970 ceremonial meeting at the Navarangahala of the elected members of the House of Representatives at which they constituted themselves as the Constituent Assembly, it was resolved that all future meetings would be held in the parliamentary chamber. Nearly two years later, following the final meeting of the Constituent Assembly, at which the draft constitution was adopted by 119 votes to 16, the members (including those from the UNP who had voted against) adjourned to the Navarangahala. There, at the auspicious time of 12.43 pm, the President of the Assembly, Stanley Tillekeratne, certified the adoption and enactment of the new constitution by the Constituent Assembly. Immediately thereafter, Mrs Bandaranaike took her oath of office as Prime Minister. She then nominated William Gopallawa as the President of the Republic, whereupon he took his oath of office. The focus then shifted to President’s House (until then, Queen’s House) where superior court judges, ministers, permanent secretaries and service commanders took their oaths of office. Ceylon ceased to exist, and in its place the Republic of Sri Lanka arose. The new constitution was never submitted to Parliament.
5. Dr.WR: “When Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranaike and Mr J.R. Jayewardene wanted to enact new constitutions in 1970 and 1977 respectively, they did not seek advice of any overseas experts or spend public funds in millions on expert advice. If the members of the legislature are not competent or have capacity to make the laws necessitated for the country, what is the use of maintaining such a Parliament?”.
None of our constitutions were “drafted” by members of the legislature. The drafting history of the 1946 Constitution is too well known to require recounting here. The 1972 Constitution was drafted by a 12-member Drafting Committee consisting of lawyers, academics and political scientists (in which I had the privilege to serve), and thereafter channelled through a Ministerial Sub-Committee and a Steering and Subjects Committee to the Constituent Assembly. The Assembly then divided itself into eleven committees, with each committee examining a chapter in detail and receiving oral public representations, after which the Drafting Committee prepared the final draft for submission to the Assembly. The 1978 Constitution was also drafted by “experts” (believed at the time to have included Gamini Dissanayake and Mark Fernando). It was tabled at the final meeting of a Select Committee of the National State Assembly that had been appointed to consider the revision of the 1972 Constitution. The Committee had held several meetings, some of which I attended as an advisor to the Opposition Members on it, Mrs Bandaranaike and Maithripala Senanayake. It had heard oral representations, and then considered draft revisions, including a new chapter on fundamental rights that I prepared for submission by the SLFP. Much to our astonishment, it became apparent that what the government had in mind was not the revision of the existing constitution through the Select Committee, but its repeal and replacement by a wholly new constitution prepared outside the Select Committee.
