The Politics Of Persuasion – An Evaluation
By 
Ana Pararajasingham
“Politics is about power. Power is about people” ~ James Margach, The Anatomy of Power (1979)
Although, it is just over eight years since the armed conflict between the Sri Lankan state and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was brought to an end, the root cause that gave rise to the brutal war remains unresolved. Nor has been there any progress in addressing the consequences of the armed conflict. Significant parts of the Tamil homeland are under army occupation; an investigation to identify the perpetrators of war crimes is yet to commence and Tamil political prisoners continue to languish in jails where torture is routine. Meanwhile, the spectre of ‘disappearances’ haunt the Tamil people as former LTTE fighters and those suspected to have had links to the organisation are systemically hunted down.
Background
Not surprisingly, the demise of the LTTE resulted in Tamil leadership coming to reside with the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), which, since its inception in 2001, had worked in tandem with the LTTE. In the wake of the LTTE’s defeat, the TNA adopted what has been described as a ‘pragmatic approach’ to deal with the Sri Lankan Government by basing its demand on the premise that the Government is likely to concede ‘little’ rather than more. The party therefore sought to frame its demand within the concept of shared sovereignty coupled with a gradualist approach to improve on its initital demands. These demands were based on the 13th amendment to the Sri Lankan constitution introduced under the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of 1987. As this amendment included a clause that called for certain powers to be devolved to a single entity dominated by Tamil speakers, it required the merger of the Tamil dominated Northern and Eastern Provinces into a single unit-the Northeast Province. However, in 2006, this particular clause was deemed ultra vires by the Sri Lankan Supreme Court which ordered that the Northeast Province be demerged into a Northern and Eastern Province.
More to the point, the 13th amendment is inherently incapable of devolving any real power to the Provincial Council because it contains a provision that ensures ultimate political power resides not with the Chief Minister or the Provincial Councillors but with the Governor of the Province-an appointee of the President. The role of the Chief Minister is limited ‘to ‘aid and advice’ the Provincial Governor in the exercise of his functions. Hence, the characterisation of the 13th amendment as ‘a constitutional sleight of hand.’ Other inadequacies of the 13th amendment stem from several subjects being kept out of even the Provincial Governor’s powers, let alone the Provincial Council.
Well aware of the limitations of the 13th amendment, the TNA sought to rely on the goodwill of the Sri Lankan state, India and the US-led-West to realise its goals by improving on the 13th amendment. Presumably, these included addressing the matter of political power being exercised by Colombo via the Governor and expanding the subjects coming under the purview of the Provincial Council.
In early 2010, some members of the TNA broke away from the party arguing that the party was not being true to its ideals and had forfeited its principles. The breakaway group called itself the Tamil National People’s Front (TNPF) and rejected the 13th amendment as a starting point for any negotiations. The terminology used by the TNA and TNPF were similar, they both emphasised self-determination. However, the TNPF did not compromise on earlier positions taken by Tamil political parties within the confines of the sixth amendment to the Sri Lankan constitution precluding Tamil independence. TNPF’s demand therefore was for a new constitution on the basis that Sri Lanka comprises two nations. More importantly, TNPF subscribed to the view that since the Tamil people’s struggle for self-determination had been exploited by the international actors (the US-led West, India and China) to further their own interests, Sri Lanka’s Tamils should take advantage of this to secure a truly federalist constitution. In an interview, the leader of the TNPF, Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam, went on to expand on this theme by suggesting that the Tamil people need to formulate a foreign policy of their own to deal with the international actors.
Not surprisingly, the international actors (India and the West) found TNA’s stand helpful because it made it easier for them to manage Colombo, their primary objective. Although TNPF’s grasp of the international dimensions underpinning the conflict was accurate, the party was ineffective in communicating its policies.
