A Presidency Under Threat: Indulgences Without Principle
When I began this series, over four months ago, the title may have seemed excessive. And even my good friend Dayan Jayatilleka thought I was being unduly pessimistic about the President’s pulling power when I said that the UNP would poll at least 40% in Badulla. But the results there have shown that the threat is even more serious than I had thought.
Over the next few weeks I will explore how the threat might be averted. But I suspect that that will serve no purpose, for Basil Rajapaksa, who may be the only one of the decision makers who reads what I write, would by then have dragooned the President into having an early election. He did this in 2009 when, as the President then put it to me – with a hint of contempt I think for what he deemed the amateur nature of our advice – only Gota and I told him not to have the Presidential election so soon. Read More
The Uva Vote: Looking Back And Looking Ahead

A realistic assessment of the Uva result is called for in order to make any predictions regarding the outcome of a future election. What explains the Uva result?
Needless to say that joining of two factions within the UNP had a tremendous impact on the election campaign. Sajith Premadasa’s re-entry into the electoral fray definitively stirred the complacent UNP constituency. The regime’s waning popularity as a consequence of the rising cost of living seems to clearly have influenced the vote. However, one could hardly ignore the overwhelming appeal the young and charismatic UNP’s chief ministerial candidate Harin Fernando had on the constituency. Essentially, an electorate swayed by charismatic leadership was captivated by Harin through his well designed electoral campaign. Without a doubt, Harin had been able to attract the anti-government sentiment that was expressed as a protest vote for the JVP and the DNA in the Southern and Western provincial council elections in March this year. This explains the decline in the vote for the JVP and the DNA in Uva. The singular focus of a united UNP effort had a crystallizing effect on the campaign. Whilst the UNP collectively focused its full thrust on Uva campaign, the UPFA campaign seems to have been weakened by internal divisions. Post-Uva murmurs tell us that SLFP heavyweights wilfully abstained from putting their strength behind the campaign ofShashindra Rajapksa. A formidable electoral victory for Sashindra, in their view, would have been a reaffirmation of the electoral indispensability of the Rajapaksa family, which is hardly a victory for the SLFP at this point.