Institutional Implications Of The JSS And Black July
By Rajan Hoole -
Sri Lanka’s Black July – Part 24
What appears on the surface as a good reason against the violence of July 1983 being organised comes from persons who knew the prominent cabinet members well, say as journalists. It is pointed out that there were rival factions within the UNP engaged in bitter power struggles. For this reason, it is argued, they were thoroughly incapable of sitting down together and planning something so scandalous and full of dangerous repercussions as the July 1983 violence. Could one for example imagine arch- rivals Premadasa, Gamini Dissanayake and Athulathmudali having got together and planned the violence? How much co-operation could one expect from similar aspirants in the present government? Read More
To be continued..
Part four - Sri Lanka’s Black July: The Cover Up
Part five - 30th July 1983: The Second Naxalite Plot
Part seven - Black July: Thondaman & Muttetuwegama
Part nine - Tamil Merchants In The Pettah – Post July 1983
Part eleven - Sri Lanka’s Black July: The Question Of Numbers
Part fourteen - Circumstances Leading To The Magistrate’s Inquest
Part fifteen - Welikade Prison: The Second Massacre: 27th July 1983
Part seventeen - Welikade Prison Massacres: Postscript
Part eighteen - July 1983: Planned By The State Or Spontaneous Mob Action?
Part nineteen - July 1983: Ranil Wickremasinghe Followed Cyril Mathew
Part twenty one – Events Of 24th July: What Were The Army’s Orders?
Part twenty two - Black July: Further Evidence Of Advance Planning
Part twenty three - Black July: The JSS Goon Squad Regime
*From Rajan Hoole‘s “Sri Lanka: Arrogance of Power - Myth, Decadence and Murder”. Thanks to Rajan for giving us permission to republish. To be continued..
