Peace for the World

Peace for the World
First democratic leader of Justice the Godfather of the Sri Lankan Tamil Struggle: Honourable Samuel James Veluppillai Chelvanayakam

Sunday, August 4, 2013

“Who watches the watchmen?” Reforming Sri Lanka’s Detention Centres

Photo by Lakruwan Wanniarachchi/AFP/Getty Images, via Asia Society
100607_srilanka_oped
Groundviews
-4 Aug, 2013Rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-militants or “terrorists” as they are more often termed, following the blanket approach that is being taken post 9/11, is still a new concept in the field of counterinsurgency. The plethora of state military actions against nationalist seditions, rebel groups, paramilitaries and other non state militaries have ensured that in a short period there has been a rapid increase in the number of detention centres and rehabilitation programmes for these cadres worldwide.  And Sri Lanka is no exception in this matter.

Sri Lanka ended its three decade long civil war with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in May 2009. This was an unprecedented military victory, where not only was the LTTE’s top military and political leadership killed, but its forces crushed and territory ravaged. After the end of the war the state and its leadership began to advertise their successes regarding the war and rehabilitation of suspected militants. This was soon accompanied by domestic and international criticism regarding human rights violations and lack of adherence to international humanitarian law during the last months of war and after. Sri Lanka has, so far, managed to side step many of these demands made by the international community at the UNHRC resolutions.[1]
Pressures have mounted once again, however, as the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOG) approaches closer and member nations have stepped up their demands on the Sri Lankan leadership to restore its commitments to human rights and a sustainable plan of action towards reconciliation. It is at this juncture that it seems pertinent to revaluate the ongoing rehabilitation and reintegration programme of ex-militants spearheaded by the government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) to see how far it has succeeded and understand the implications of its limitations. This article will try to underscore the terms under which such strategies should be evaluated in the Sri Lankan context, and identify what can be done to rectify the inadequacies of these policies.   Continue reading »