Militarisation As Panacea: Development And Reconciliation In Post-War Sri Lanka
Ambika
Satkunanathan
Is it possible to secure the dignity, rights
and well-being of a conflict-affected population by incorporating them into a
military juggernaut that is dominating all spheres of life in Sri Lanka, while
demanding the servility and unquestioning loyalty of all?
The
creeping militarization of Sri Lanka which followed the end of armed conflict in
2009 has now, four years later, become normalised and entrenched. During the
years of the war the impact of militarization was felt mainly in the North and
East. However, following the end of the war, systematic militarization has been
taking place throughout the country. Its impact on the lives of those in
conflict-affected areas is visible and severe. Driving through Kilinochchi,
Mullaitivu and Vavuniya gives the lie to repeated denials by the government
there is a heavy military presence in the North, particularly in comparison to
other parts of the country. For instance, the camps of the
22nd Battalion, Gajaba Regiment, 574 Brigade, 682 Brigade, 681
Brigade, 591 Brigade, 59 Division, 14th Battalion, 68 Division, HQ
571 Brigade, 573 Brigade, 561 Brigade and 682 Brigade are just a few that are
visible to any visitor to the area.
To
borrow Cynthia
Enloe’s definition, ‘Militarization is the step-by-step process by which
something becomes controlled by, dependent on, or derives its value from the
military as an institution or militaristic criteria.’ As she reminds us ‘What
has been militarized can be demilitarized. What has been demilitarized can be
remilitarised’. Examining the process of militarization currently under way in
Sri Lanka Enloe’s observation that ‘Militarization does not occur simply in the
obvious places but can transform the meanings and uses of people, things and
ideas located far from bombs or camouflaged fatigues;’ is particularly relevant,
because in Sri Lanka one has to look beyond the visible and most obvious to
understand the rapid militarization that has taken place since the end of the
war.
Security-development
nexus
Militarization
in the North is taking place in complex ways at multiple levels. In addition to
the noticeable physical presence of the camp or civil affairs office, it is the
military’s involvement in the civil administration,development
activities and commercial
activities[1] that
is the gravest cause for concern. As early as 2009, signalling the increased involvement
of the military in post-war development, the Northern
Security Forces Commander stated that with the elimination of terror in the
north, ‘security forces in the North will be engaged in a new role of developing
the region’. The military began to play an active role in development
activities, to the point where permission to implement projects or development
work was subject to authorisation by the military, and official permission to
travel into the Vanni to work was refused to certain individuals deemed to be a
threat to national security.
While
the government now claims that civil administration in the North is once again
in charge of development activities, the website of the Ministry of Defence
(MOD) continues to post stories about the role of the armed forces in
development activities. For instance, according to an
article posted in November 2012 on the MOD website, ‘Under the government’s
expedited northern development programme, the Army is extensively involved in a
number of infrastructure development projects including road reconstruction,
infrastructure development and housing’.
The
government may
argue that the military is merely ‘assisting’ the civil administration to
rebuild the north, or is being utilised to implement activities launched by
other ministries. But the fact that a committee in the North that came together
to prepare development plans for 2013 was
convened at the Headquarters of 55 Division in Vettilaikerny and chaired by
the commanding officer is illustrative of the unequal and uneven balance of
power between the military and civil administration. The existence of a weak
civil administration as a result of armed conflict is used to justify military
involvement in, and even take over of activities and duties performed by civil
authorities not only in the North but also in other parts of the country. For
instance, it wasreported that
due to the failure of the Colombo Municipal Council (CMC) to manage
Viharamahadevi Park in the centre of the city, the Urban Development Authority
(UDA), which is within the purview of the MOD, has placed the park under the
supervision of the Navy. Instead of strengthening civil administration and
dealing with allegations of corruption in the public service, the government
uses allegations of corruption and a weak administrative service to justify the
military’s involvement.
Entrenchment
of militarization
The
militarization of civil administration has been internalised both by government
officials and the public to the extent that in January 2011, when a number of
abductions and extra-judicial killings took place in the Jaffna peninsula
causing panic amongst the population, the Government Agent of Jaffna promptly met with the army
commander of the area to discuss the security situation rather than with the
police. In response to the deteriorating security situation, the police and army
launched joint patrols in Jaffna and reportedly stepped
upsurveillance. It was also the army, rather than the police, that held
public meetings in Jaffna on enhancing security in the area, and requested
the public to complain to the nearest army camp if they received extortion
threats.
More
recently, in November 2012, following the police and army breaking up a
gathering of students who were protesting against the military entering the
premises of Jaffna University and the men’s and women’s hostels and assaulting
students – the Vice Chancellor (VC) of the University met with the Jaffna
Commander to request the withdrawal of the army from the vicinity of the
premises. Although it was claimed that the army was called in to assist the
police, it was the army commander who made the decision regarding withdrawal
rather than the police. The MOD
site further reported that ‘SF-J Commander requested the VC not to allow any
outsiders other than undergraduates and academic and non-academic staff onto the
University premises without prior permission either from the VC or the
Registrar, to which all agreed’.
Mirroring
this, in the south of the country, following the riots at the Welikada prison in
the outskirts of Colombo in November 2012, the Commissioner-General of Prisons
urged the Ministry of Defence to take
over the administration of the prisons. Since 2009, the public and
diplomatic services too have seen an influx of former military officers
appointed to key positions. The Governors of the Northern and Eastern Provinces
are both former military personnel, as is the Government Agent of
Trincomalee.
Charity
and gratitude vs. rights and dignity
The
army’s encroachment into civilian space to exercise further control over the
population, particularly children and youth, is illustrated by its involvement
in the education sector in the North by engaging in philanthropic initiatives,
with the MOD website replete with
stories about the army’s activities which range from providing scholarships
and distributing books to students. More recently, visitors to Kilinochchi and
Mullaitivu are told that the Civil Security Department (CSD) is managing
pre-schools in the area. While this is supposed to constitute paying the
salaries of teachers and monitoring the administration of the school, it will no
doubt also involve decision-making regarding curriculum and activities held at
the school. Further, reportedly, 103 military personnel are teaching the
Sinhala language in schools in Kilinochchi.
As
Enloe states, ‘Militarization does not just happen: it requires decisions, many
decisions, decisions made by both civilians and people in uniform’. Likewise, in
Sri Lanka, the fact that private citizens and corporate entities provide
donations to the aforementioned army’s welfare programmes rather than working
with local community and social service groups illustrates
the entrenchment and normalisation of militarization.
A
disturbing aspect of the army’s philanthropic initiatives is the indication that
they appear to view these as part of a charitable impulse dedicated to a
population which in turn is expected to show servility and gratitude. This is
demonstrated by phrases – such as, ‘grateful beneficiaries’, ‘charitable deed’
‘this act of benevolence by the security forces have (sic) brought great joy to
the children’ - used by both military officials and the MOD in speaking or
writing about these activities.
In
many instances the normalisation of militarization is aided by the dire economic
circumstances of the conflict affected people, who due to lack of other
livelihood opportunities take up employment with different sectors of the
military machinery, such as the CSD which recently employed a large number of
persons in Kilinochchi in agricultural farms which ironically were previously
managed by the LTTE. It should be noted that instead of providing viable
livelihood options to the conflict affected, the states appears to be offering
opportunities mainly in the defence industry to those living in the former LTTE
controlled areas.
The
capturing of civilian space is supported by the ever-growing number of entities
that are part of the defence complex, such as the Media Centre for National
Security (MCNS), the Civil Security Department (CSD) and the Civil Defence Force
(CDF). This structure is bolstered by the more public and even interventionist
role played by military officials in a manner unseen in the past, such as
military commanders making public
statements on a number of issues ranging from the laws under which civilians
will be prosecuted for certain offences to the behaviour expected of students of
Jaffna University.
Militarization
also appears to be an important component of the government’s post-war
reconciliation strategy. This process seeks to reconcile with the Tamil
community and include them in the social fabric of Sri Lanka through the
re-militarization of the northern population. Cadet corps are being
established in schools, leadership training programmes for school students
are held with
the involvement of the army, school tours areorganised by the
army, youth are encouraged to join
the CDF, and women
are recruited into the army.
While
there have been a number of allegations made in relation to these recruitment
campaigns, including forced recruitment and sexual violence against women
recruits, which have been denied by the state, the main question to ask is if it
is possible to secure the dignity, rights and physical and socio-economic
well-being of the conflict-affected population by incorporating them into a
military juggernaut that is encroaching and dominating all spheres of life in
Sri Lanka, while demanding the servility and unquestioning loyalty of all?
The
main concern is that there is little understanding amongst the general
population of the dangers of military encroachment into civilian affairs.
Instead, a culture and narrative in which the army is being firmly placed as an
integral actor in all aspects of governance in Sri Lanka is being created. For
instance, in an article that appeared in the Sunday Leader on 3 March 2013, an
army officer responded to allegations of military interference in civilian
affairs by declaring that ‘these are baseless accusations made by certain
parties who want the people to be distant from the forces as they do not want
harmony’. Any challenges to this narrative would be considered anti-national and
traitorous.
*This
was first published on Open Democracy at opendemocracy
