The UN Internal Review Panel Report And Sri Lanka’s Urgent Need For Accountability
By Thiruni Kelegama -January 17, 2013
The Report of the United Nations’ Internal Review Panel1 was released one year after Sri Lanka’s self-appointed commission of inquiry, the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission, submitted its findings to President Mahinda Rajapaksa. The LLRC was established in May 2010 to investigate events between the February 2002 ceasefire with the LTTE and the end of the conflict in May 2009 and make recommendations aimed at ethnic reconciliation. When the LLRC Report was submitted, it was assumed that it was merely going to clear the government of any accountability, especially in relation to allegations of violations of International Humanitarian Law during the final military offensive against the LTTE in 2009. The outcome was, however, an unsuccessful attempt to bury questions of war crimes, with the LLRC Report stating that even though the military gave highest priority to protecting civilians, many had been killed, albeit accidentally. This was a step forward as it clearly contradicted the Government of Sri Lanka’s (GoSL) previous stance insisting that there were no civilian casualties.2Given the prevarication on the part of the GoSL with regard to the implementations of the recommendations put forth by the LLRC, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) passed a resolution in March 2012 titled “Promoting Reconciliation and Accountability in Sri Lanka”. Although one of the results of the UNHRC resolution was the formulation of the “National Action Plan”, it did nothing to change the country’s culture of impunity and the fact that the government continues to resist any independent investigation into alleged war crimes or other human rights violations. This situation and the recently concluded Universal Periodic Review (UPR) session on Sri Lanka of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights have raised many difficult questions for those interested in genuine peace and reconciliation in the country. The GoSL has consistently rejected suggestions that it allow an international role in human rights monitoring and accountability efforts, both in the context of the first UPR in 2008 and subsequently as well when calls for an independent international investigation into alleged war crimes intensified. Three and a half years since the final battle was fought and won, the GoSL continues to be evasive. Against this backdrop, the release of the Petrie Report has refocused international attention on the deteriorating human rights situation in Sri Lanka.
During the internal conflict that started in Sri Lanka three decades ago, several UN agencies, along with various other Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOS) and international non-governmental organizations (INGOS), were based in the war-torn North and East, serving people affected in the conflict zone. The situation provided ample opportunity for these international organisations to attain an insiders’ view and a better understanding of the difficulties faced by civilians living in these areas, while providing them with much needed aid. It has been widely reported that towards the end of the war, on the directive of Sri Lanka’s Defence Ministry, the UN agencies as well as the other local and international organisations were compelled to leave the areas demarcated as the war zone, in spite of the large number of civilian demonstrations pleading with the UN agencies to stay because of the protection their presence would ensure. The Petrie Report asserts that the closure of offices and the subsequent withdrawal of UN agencies from the war-affected regions represent a failure on the part of the UN to “…act within the scope of institutional mandates to meet protection responsibilities” (pp. 27).
Produced by a panel appointed by the UN Secretary General and headed by Charles Petrie, the report draws on almost 7000 internal documents. Its final conclusion is the damning fact that UN agencies failed to ensure the safety of innocent civilians. A key revelation of the report is that UN staff members were in possession of reliable information showing that the GoSL was responsible for the majority of the deaths. The report reveals that two-thirds of the killings were inside safe zones unilaterally declared by the Sri Lankan government, purportedly to protect civilians. It states that “Numerous UN communications said that civilians were being killed in artillery shelling, but they failed to mention that reports most often indicated the shelling in question was from Government forces” (pp. 20), Moreover, “From as early as 6 February 2009, the SLA (Sri Lankan Army) continuously shelled within areas that became the second NFZ (No Fire Zone), from all directions, including land, sea and air. It is estimated that there were between 300,000 and 330,000 civilians in that small area” (pp. 11).
Summing up the UN’s failures, the Report points out how the UN’s acts of omission and commission unwittingly served the GoSL’s agenda, and thus exacerbating the humanitarian catastrophe. It states:
Read MoreSeen together, the failure of the UN to adequately counter the government’s underestimation of population numbers in the Wanni [warzone], the failure to adequately confront the government on its obstructions to humanitarian assistance, the unwillingness of the UN in UNHQ and Colombo to address government responsibility for attacks that were killing civilians, and the tone and content of UN communications with the government on these issues, collectively amounted to a failure by the UN to act within the scope of institutional mandates to meet protection responsibilities (pp. 27).
