The
impeachment of Chief Justice Shirani Bandaranayake in Sri Lanka has drawn
significant international attention to President Rajapaksa’s government.
Concerns about his model of functioning and its implications on the basic
principles of democracy have been raised.
Justice Bandaranayake’s
impeachment and her post subsequently being filled by the government’s senior
legal adviser Mohan Peiris, reflects Rajapaksa’s post-war strategy: “My way or
the highway”. After dislodging the Tigers and neutralising former Army Chief
Sarath Fonseka, as well as eventually silencing the most powerful institution –
the army, the President conclusively proved his absolute dominance by impeaching
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
Establishing Supremacy Over
Democratic Institutions: Rajapaksa StyleThere were no surprises when
Rajapaksa ratified the Parliament’s impeachment motion, moved by the SLFP-UPFA
combine, instead of referring to the expert committee. Just as was the case when
he pushed for the proposed legislation of the Divi Neguma Bill that would
reportedly increase the resources of the Colombo government, particularly the
President’s brother Basil Rajapaksa’s powerful economic development ministry.
This deed seems the latest proverbial nail on the potential challenger – the
judiciary – to his “autocratic” reign. Notably, the judiciary was the only
institution that was, perhaps, out of Rajapaksa’s supremacy up until now. It
also sends a clear message to the rest that dissent is not taken lightly and
that nothing perceived as a threat or act leading to the erosion of Rajapaksa’s
power will be tolerated. Indeed, it is a well-calculated move. Rajapaksa knows
that the legal fraternity is fragile and the opposition is weak and divided, as
opposed to his own popularity in south Sri Lanka. Hence he was assured that the
impeachment of the Chief Justice would not unleash a reaction on the lines of
what was witnessed in Pakistan when its Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry was
sacked.
Impeachment and International CriticismThe impeachment
process against Justice Bandaranayake, however, drew intense criticism from the
local and international media, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and
the global community. The media has described the government’s act as
“frightening”, “predetermined”, “unfair”, and an “illegal attempt to ensure a
servile judiciary”. The ICJ, in particular, criticized the Sri Lankan government
by stating it did not ‘adhere to fundamental principles of due process and fair
trial’. The US State Department alleged that the impeachment raised ‘serious
questions about the separation of powers in Sri Lanka, which is a fundamental
tenet of a healthy democracy’. Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper openly
stated that the impeachment process appeared to him ‘to be highly politicized
and lacking transparency and respect for the guarantees of due process and fair
trial’.
Critics have also warned that the sacking of the Chief Justice
could trigger a constitutional crisis and may damage what remains of Sri Lanka’s
democracy.
The Probability and Nature of ImplicationsIs this a
game changer in Sri Lankan politics? Considering the present situation in Sri
Lanka, where President Rajapaksa enjoys unchallenged public popularity having
learnt to manage the “big-powers” tactically, the possible consequences of the
impeachment appear few.
Amongst the probable implications for Rajapaksa’s
government, the foremost may be disunity with the judiciary in due course, as
they may need to heed to the regime or else face the music, perhaps even
contributing to institutional putrefaction. On the contrary, the legal
fraternity, particularly the senior judges minus the newly appointed Chief
Justice, may also take a radical position on certain government policies when
they come up for legal review. This might include the case of the impeachment of
the Chief Justice, which may heighten the clash between the executive and the
judiciary.
Second, the international community may scale up their voices
against Sri Lanka on the grounds of human rights violations etc., such as at the
U.N. Human Rights Council when Sri Lanka’s compliance with a US-sponsored
resolution is considered again in March 2013.
Third, with the next
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) scheduled for October 2013 in
Sri Lanka, leaders of commonwealth nations may refuse to attend it or may seek a
change in venue; Canada’s blunt response to the impeachment being a case in
point.
Finally, the undermining of an independent judiciary and democracy
with the sacking of the Chief Justice may perhaps have an impact on foreign
investment in Sri Lanka. Concerns being raised by the US, the UK, Canada, the
European Union, and the United Nations on these issues significantly flag the
possibility.
International scrutiny and embargos may send tough messages
to President Rajapaksa who is keen to further Sri Lanka's image overseas to
attract more investment, and to undo the controversy surrounding alleged war
crimes. However, in the absence of sanctions being implemented on Sri Lanka, and
no warnings being issued by the international community to its citizens on
travelling to the island nation; as also with the continued support of the
Chinese, the repercussions may not hurt the government although they may
embarrass the Rajapaksas. Interestingly, the Rajapakas had projected all their
adversaries - from foreign powers to Gen. Fonseka and now Justice Bandaranayake
- as the opponents of the State or the State’s interests. Until there is a major
disillusion among the Sinhalese either on the issue of increasing unemployment
or price inflation, the Rajapaksas perhaps would enjoy absolute power and the
country may not witness any significant game changing moment.
