Provincial Elections: Mahinda Doesn’t Care One Hoot For Local
By Kumar David -
Prof. Kumar David
Statistics is a dangerous game and electoral statistics are quicksand, hence I will draw only the broadest conclusions from the outcome of the threeProvincial Council elections of September 8. The first impression and one that is valid is that Mahinda Rajapaksa’s UPFA has held its ground in the Sinhalese heartland – what are the implications of this for the next three to four years up to the next presidential elections? The second outcome is that the TNA (strictly it was the Illangai Thamil Arasu Katchi – ITAK – that contested alone) has emerged as the principal representative of the Tamil people of the East. What does that say about the Northern Province? And thirdly, what does the UPFA’s sucess imply for the apparently paradoxical wave of anti-government sentiment that is sweeping across the Colombo classes (bourgeoisie, elite and fixed income working and middle classes)? What are the real qualitative changes implied and hidden in these results and to what extent do these results matter so far as medium term political fundamentals are concerned? I will mull over these questions.
The basic statistics are mandatory; the UPFA took 60% of the vote in the Anuradhapura, Polonnaruwa, Kegalle and Ratnapura Districts, which along with the Southern Province – which did no go to elections – constitutes the Sinhalese heartland. The UNP was able to garner only 35% in each of these districts. Does this say it all; is the Sinhala-Buddhist petty bourgeoisie still rock solid with the government? In the main yes, but with reservations. What reservations?
I believe that the percentage poll at between 60-65% is on the low side even for a PC election though I have not had time to search through the statistics of all previous PC elections. If some 5-10% more than usual refrained from voting, it is likely to be opposition voters who realiszed that theirs was a lost cause. In any case, in Sri Lanka, the ruling party invariably wins provincial and local government elections. This is the opposite of the experience in Europe and America where by-elections are an opportunity for people to express dissent. Lanka’s contrarian behaviour is to do with the profound corruption of a public whose main interest is to be on the government’s side and be well positioned to extract favours.
There is also the need to compare voting trends – but should we compare with the 2008 PC polls in the middle of the war or the 2010 parliamentary poll when the UPFA was riding high on a wave of victorious post-war jingoism? Let’s do both. In 2008, the UPFA share was 56% and 59% in the NCP and Sabaragamuga respectively, and the UNP 38% and 41%, respectively. In round number we can then say that the UPFA has improved by about 3%, and UNP declined by about 5%, in 2012, if the 2008 PC elections are used as a benchmark.
Comparison with the 2010 parliamentary vote in the same group of districts indicates an opposite trend. At that election the UPFA polled 66% in the electorates of these districts and provinces while the UNP took about 30%. Hence we can conclude that the UPFA has lost and the UNP gained about 5% in the 2012 PC poll, if the 2010 parliamentary poll is used as a benchmark.
Comparison with the 2010 parliamentary vote in the same group of districts indicates an opposite trend. At that election the UPFA polled 66% in the electorates of these districts and provinces while the UNP took about 30%. Hence we can conclude that the UPFA has lost and the UNP gained about 5% in the 2012 PC poll, if the 2010 parliamentary poll is used as a benchmark.
In summary, in respect of the Sinhalese heartland, we can say that the UPFA vote rose from 58% in 2008 to 66% in 2010 and fell back to 60% in 2012. The UNP share of the vote fell from 39% in 2008, to 31% 2010, but recovered to 35% in 2012. The broad conclusion is that the UNP has recovered about half the ground that it lost between 2008 and 2010, during the past two years.
