72 Years After Independence: Challenge Of Promoting Pluralism Amidst Majoritarianism!
Lukman Harees
The myth of independence is the sole idea that resonates with all Sri Lankans, regardless of their age, gender and ethnicity; one national narrative that binds them together. The strong sense of independence has even historically served to legitimise many discriminatory policies initiated and adopted by many Post-Independence governments. In this context, if there is one lesson Sri Lankans should learn from the past, it is that the inclusion of the myth of independence in their national narrative has to be done with great care. For 72 years after Independence and 10+ years after cessation of the ethnic war, have the people of Sri Lanka let their political leaders lead them along a blind garden path by making themselves the ‘boiling frogs’ over time, thereby ‘the hopes of yesterday…have become fast evaporating fantasies’, as author S.J. Thambiah once wrote. The boiling frog story incidentally is often used as a metaphor for the inability or unwillingness of people to react to or be aware of challenges that arise gradually rather than suddenly. Asia’s oldest democracy most certainly deserves better.
Sri Lanka was colonized for almost 450 years, first by the Portuguese, and then the Dutch and British. When Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) achieved Independence in 1948, it appeared to be one of Asia’s most promising new nations. However, this rosy picture was somewhat deceptive too. For instance, author O.H. Oliver noted: Ceylon reacquired its independence only in 1948, after being under European rule for nearly five centuries. Its civilization is old and probably more resistant to change than would be a younger and less integrated culture’. Thus, even after 7 decades, this Island nation has not progressed in qualitative terms, worse off than many of its’ neighbours; thanks to a political leadership corrupt to the core, maintained by a slavish electorate. A Paradise Isle renowned for its beauty, thus became equally defined by its hate; a place far more compact than the Balkans yet cleaved by more divisions: ethnic, religious and class. Can Sri Lanka Heal Its Divisions and move forward? Yes; provided there is a paradigm shift in our collective thinking as a nation!
Peter Kloos in ‘Democracy, Civil War and the Demise of the Trias Politica in Sri Lanka’, queries ‘So how does one explain the transformation from a promising democracy in the 1940s to the state of the present?’ and continues, “the introduction of the majoritarian model of democracy rule in Sri Lanka chosen already during the late-colonial period paved the way for political forms that were undemocratic in the moral sense of the term. Far-reaching decisions regarding the political process are based on political expediency rather than on fundamental discussions of democratic rule”.
Author Neil DeVotta in an article in Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics (2014) stressed this further thus, ‘Among states that gained independence following World War II, Sri Lanka was widely considered to have a good chance of succeeding democratically. This promise was sundered when successive leaders embraced ethnocentric policies, …which contributed to civil war and adversely affected the country’s institutions – including the island’s political parties. The attendant political decay has not only led to mal-governance and democratic regression, it has pushed the country in an authoritarian direction. Sri Lanka thus represents a classic case of how ethnocentrism can undermine democratic institutions and of the long-term negative consequences’.
Inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic dynamics in multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies are complicated too, and Sri Lanka is no different. It is a fact of history that much of Sri Lanka’s Post-Independent history has been marred by sectarian tensions. Political elites play a leading role in determining a country’s political development and the belief that Senanayake (DSS)could be trusted to treat minorities fairly influenced both the Tamils and British in how they approached independence. British short sightedness, misplaced and displaced trust among elites, the ethnocentric policies adopted after DSS rooted in linguistic nationalism, political opportunism, and the hardening of attitudes on both sides of the political and ethnic divide, as ethnic tensions transmogrified into terrorism and war crimes ensured pluralism did not become a reality in Post- Independence Ceylon or Sri Lanka.
Majoritarianism has been the bane of Sri Lanka and was the basis for a nearly three decade long Civil War. Well known historian K. M. De Silva (1998. Reaping the Whirlwind: Ethnic Conflict, Ethnic Politics in Sri Lanka ) wrote that the island’s Civil War could be considered a conflict between “a [Sinhalese] majority with a minority complex, and a [Tamil] minority with a … majority complex”. This self-imposed isolation, when coupled with Mahawamsa notions, led to viewing pluralism pejoratively and framing majoritarianism as an entitlement. Politicians and other ethnic entrepreneurs have deftly manipulated such fears.. As DeVotta says, ‘while political parties and leaders have alternated in power in post-independence Sri Lanka, Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism has consistently triumphed, and this at the expense of pluralism and democracy. Instituting pluralism, and thereby trying to regain the island’s democratic promise, necessitates accepting and learning from the mistakes committed. Yet, the communal trajectory that post-independence Sri Lanka adopted has emboldened Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists. Sri Lanka did have many opportunities to change the island’s “hardware” and thereby control the manner in which ethno-religious and cultural sentiments were fanned’.
With these fears fully embedded in the majority’s psyche, and State policies supporting it fully institutionalized, trying to alter this will be counterproductive and may only further complicate minorities’ position in the island. With the Sinhalese and Buddhists being a clear majority, it was imperative for politicians to pay heed to the majority community’s preferences. Moreover, today, there is an elected government built upon the triumph of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism, blessed by a fair section of the Maha Sangha, and to be fair, the equation has moved more towards further institutionalization of majoritarian attitudes in state craft. Thus, a paradigm shift in the way people think and act is needed and a realization on all sides is imperative that governments can only promote policies supporting pluralism, in ways that do not threaten the majoritarianism now in place.
At the moment, several countries around the world are witnessing the phenomenon of the majority community feeling irrationally threatened by minorities. But in South Asia, this phenomenon has existed for decades and culminated in violence against minorities, threatening the diversity in these countries (India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka). To understand why this trend has persisted in South Asia, Arjun Appadurai’s seminal book The Fear of Small Numbers: An Essay on the Geography of Anger provides valuable insight. Appadurai states that hatred of minorities is a process that takes decades to materialize. The idea of a majority and a minority emerges through national censuses, “in the process of developing ideas of numbers, representation, and electoral franchise” in a modern nation state. This creates space for the formation of an “us vs. them” narrative.
