Process of Reconciliation in the Sri Lankan Context – Part I
By Lynn Ockersz-March 3, 2019, 10:26 pm
(Text of a paper presented by the writer at an international forum titled 'Questions of Memory, Justice and Reconciliation in Societies Post Conflict' , conducted by the International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Colombo, from September 11-14, 2017.)
The post-independence history of Sri Lanka is characterized strikingly by failure on the part of Sri Lankan governments and the representatives of the Tamil people and other relevant stakeholders to take efforts launched by them to manage the ethnic conflict to their logical conclusion. It is the Lankan state that bears the greatest responsibility for these failures by virtue of its position and power to push through any consensual agreements it arrives at with other major parties to the conflict. On the one hand, the state seemed to be lacking the required will to implement in full the major agreements arrived at since 1948. Since all such major efforts at resolving the conflict invariably provoked major opposition to them from hard line opinion on both sides of the ethnic divide, successive governments chose to act with regrettable hesitation and caution on the matter of implementing any agreements, lest they proved politically costly. Southern votes proved more valuable than ethnic accord, on most occasions. Besides, both major political parties of the South, the UNP and the SLFP, invariably resorted to opportunistic politics on the question of supporting peace processes launched by governments formed by either party. Rather than incur the perceived displeasure of Southern hardline opinion in particular, they chose not to associate themselves in earnest with ethnic peace efforts. Such opportunistic stances too contributed towards the undermining of efforts aimed at managing the conflict. Considerable statesmanship is required to break through this recurring vicious circle in local politics. One cannot see this happening in the near future, but some short and medium term confidence-building measures could be launched by governments to bring about a pro-peace political culture. Another development of significance is the jettisoning currently of the advocacy of a political solution to the conflict on the part of the government and major Southern political parties and actors. In what amounts to a paradigm and policy shift among these quarters it is reconciliation and not a political solution that is seen as vital on the conflict resolution front now. It is as if the military defeat of the LTTE in 2009 has made a political solution unnecessary.
Enter: reconciliation
At present it is a matter of befuddlement as to what the Lankan polity takes the term ‘reconciliation’ to exactly mean. It seems that all major stakeholders to the conflict are making free use of the term without analyzing its essential meaning and the policy implications that arise from its use. In the ordinary sense of the word, reconciliation means the ending of antagonisms between parties to a conflict and the acceptance of each other by these parties in a bond of friendship. However, pronouncements by sections of the present government some time back that the post-war process of reconciliation in Sri Lanka should take as its model the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, make the unqualified use of the term ‘reconciliation’ in the Sri Lankan context highly problematic and contentious.
An examination of the essential character of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission would reveal why this is so. It is of importance to note that the South African exercise was inspired by the Christian values of love and forgiveness. Under the guidance of Bishop Desmond Tutu the post-apartheid, national unity government of the mid-nineties in South Africa accepted the policy position that the apartheid era perpetrators of crimes against humanity, attached to state law-and-order agencies in particular, should be pardoned by the new government if they admitted to their crimes in open court and sought pardon from the relatives of the victims of the crimes committed by them. Those war criminals who accepted this procedure, thus, won a reprieve from the state and enjoyed the opportunity of reintegrating with the wider society. Bishop Tutu summed-up the philosophy behind the Truth and Reconciliation Commission when he pronounced that ‘There is No Future without Forgiveness’, Tutu (1990)
Accordingly, if the intention of the present Lankan government is to replicate a reconciliation process in Sri Lanka entirely on the basis of the South African model, forgiveness or compassion would need to be at its heart. In the South African perspective, it is the application of love and compassion by the aggrieved and the owning up of crimes by aggressors that could bring healing to conflict-ridden societies and if Sri Lanka too is seeking healing and ethnic accord it would need to do likewise.
However, considering the imprecision and vagueness with which the term ‘reconciliation’ is used in the Sri Lankan context, one is left to wonder what form a reconciliation mechanism would assume locally, if at all ‘reconciliation’ in the South African sense is intended to be practised in Sri Lanka.
This conceptual confusion is going unaddressed by the Lankan state and other sections seeking a country free of ethnic discord. If the current administration clarifies that the way forward would be a 'reconciliation' process minus essential inputs from the South African experience, the path would be cleared for continuing to forge ahead towards a political settlement. But what would tend to confuse the observer is the absence currently in Southern Sri Lankan public discourse of the need for a political settlement. Accordingly, 'Whither Sri Lanka's reconciliation process?', becomes a highly valid poser. A correlated and equally vital question is, what is exactly meant by 'reconciliation' in the Lankan context, since it is going undefined and vague.
In the face of these questions the local authorities could very well point to the current constitution-making process under the aegis of the Constituent Assembly put in place almost immediately after the coming to power of the present government. They could make out that what amounts to a political solution is in the process of being worked out in the Constituent Assembly (CA). However, there is no guarantee that what we would eventually have is a whole new constitution. A member of the steering committee of the CA when interviewed by this writer for the newspaper for which he works left the question open as to whether what we would have is a new Constitution or 'mega amendments' to the existing 1978 hybrid Constitution.
'All matters of relevance are under discussion in the numerous bodies that have been established to work towards a new constitutional dispensation and it is not possible to state anything definite right now', this writer was given to understand. However, it is hoped to wind up the process before the end of this year.
Will we have powers for Provincial Councils beyond those provided under the 13 th amendment to the Constitution? The steering committee member answering this poser said that very meaningful and substantive discussions have taken place with important members of the Provincial Councils, particularly those of Southern Sri Lanka, but he refused 'to place a label on it.' Apparently, maximum empowerment of the PCs is being sought, but within a unitary constitution.
Meanwhile, the TNA and other democratic Tamil political formations are eager to see a results-oriented and swift constitution-making process. They have even sounded out India on these issues and have been assured of Indian cooperation.
Tamil apprehensions on this score are justified considering the great disappointments of the past. One would recall that barely anything substantial by way of resolving outstanding Tamil grievances came out of the SWRD-Chelvanayakam pact (1957) and the Dudley-Chelvanayakam pact (1965), to take just two examples of the immediate post-independence decades. A constitutional blueprint earmarked as the 'Year 2000 Constitution' and brought out by the Chandrika administration of subsequent times was put to the torch in parliament by some of its critics in the Opposition. What guarantees could democratic Tamil political formations have that the results this time around would be any different? After all, this could be another time-buying exercise by the Sri Lankan political centre.
With parliamentary elections due in about just two years, it is to be wondered whether the present coalition government would take up the profound challenge of espousing a just solution to the ethnic conflict, and that too by way of a new constitution. The historical record, as mentioned, is riddled by failures on the part of the main parties to the conflict to forge ahead towards an equitable settlement. Governments, in particular, tended not to act in good faith on this score. Over the decades, they have undermined or pulled out of peace efforts in the face of extremist opposition to their initiatives. On most occasions, votes proved much more important than just resolutions of the conflict.
As could be seen, the current constitution-making effort too is up against stiff Southern opposition. Already, it is being seen as paving the way for a federal state by some hard line elements. Sections of the so-called Joint Opposition too are lending their voices to these cries of 'foul'. All this is happening, when even a draft chapter of the new Constitution has not seen the light of day. Besides, declarations by no less a quarter than the TNA leadership that they are for a unitary Sri Lanka have failed to impress opposition elements; not even demonstrations by them that they are supportive of Sri Lanka's national flag.
Therefore, an acid test awaits the government. Does it have the courage of its convictions to prove that it is for a just solution to the conflict or would it cave in to hard line sentiment and fritter away another valuable opportunity for ethnic accord? Hopefully, cynics would be proved wrong by the state on this crucial challenge.
If the government is aiming 'at playing for time', it would find itself in a dilemma which would be painful in the extreme. Thus far, the West has virtually gone along with the government in its handling of war crimes accountability and linked issues. This enabled government leaders to speak smugly of the support they have been receiving from the international community, in contrast to the Mahinda Rajapaksa regime which incurred the wrath of the West. But to what extent would the West be tolerant of the government's seeming 'time-buying' tactics? This is emerging as a major issue.
If a statement issued by UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Counter-terrorism Ben Emmerson at the end of a visit by him to Sri Lanka in July is anything to go by, the patience of the West with Sri Lanka seems to be growing thin. Referring to UN Human Rights Council Resolution 30/1 of 2015, jointly sponsored by the US and Sri Lanka, and connected issues, the statement said, among other things:
'Yet, two years on, and already four months into a two-year extension granted to the government by the Human Rights Council, progress in achieving the key goals set out in the Resolution is not only slow, but seems to have ground to a virtual halt. None of the measures so far adopted to fulfill Sri Lanka's transitional justice commitments are adequate to ensure real progress, and there is little evidence that perpetrators of war crimes committed by members of the Sri Lankan armed forces are being brought to justice,'
The government ought to see such statements as the proverbial 'Writing on the Wall' and engage in concrete and swift conflict-settlement efforts. But how courageously would it stand up to local opposition to such exertions, with elections looming? Progressive opinion in this country is watching the state keenly.
However, even in the case of the pronouncements of these visiting dignitaries, one could notice an avoidance of the question of a political settlement to the conflict. Instead, there are strong references to government assurances, in the case of Emmerson, to setting up a 'Truth and Reconciliation Commission' and 'an Office of the Special Prosecutor to bring criminal charges against those involved in the most serious atrocities committed on both sides of the conflict.'
The conceptual confusion referred to in relation to reconciliation and its connection, if any, to a political settlement, as ordinarily understood, tends to be aggravated by the official speaking of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the prosecution of those accused of war crimes, in the same breath virtually and in the same context. If this writer recollects right, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission did not differentiate between minor and grave offences committed by law enforcers and other offenders. The Commission was open to both categories of offenders.
If the Lankan government has chosen the path of Truth and Reconciliation in the South African sense it cannot at the same time consent to special tribunals to try those accused of 'grave' war crimes. This proves the point of this writer that by speaking of a 'Truth and Reconciliation Commission' the state has confused the issues under scrutiny.. This is a consequence of not understanding the South African mechanism comprehensively, which has strong religious overtones. But this writer is clear on the point that all accused of war crimes should be brought to justice.
The Lankan state is obliged to clarify once and for all what it means precisely when it uses the term 'reconciliation' in the local context. Is it synonymous with the phrase 'political solution' or otherwise? This will enable all stakeholders in the Lankan peace context to give their work clearer direction and purpose. (To be continued)
