The Army: The Years 1984 – July 1987
Dr. Rajan Hoole
The Army’s involvement in establishing the Weli Oya settlement in the Mullaitivu District and the subsequent dirty war to uproot Tamil villages in the East, both with the participation of the Mossad, placed it in a very difficult situation. These projects were clearly in breach of International Law and the Geneva Conventions. It made the Government’s programme among the Tamils appear in the likeness of Israeli aggression into Palestinian territory. This had grave political consequences through legitimising Tamil claims to nationhood as a people separated from the Sri Lankan State, as demonstrated by its actions. Indirectly, it had grave military consequences.
By this time, the war was in the hands of amateur politicians and amateur military strategists. Ravi Jayewardene would have denied any credit for being among the former since he probably did not understand the political consequences of what he was doing. Lalith Athulathmudali read copiously on guerrilla warfare and reportedly thought he had what it takes to win. Another structure – the Joint Operations Command – was imposed and the control of the war was given to the JOC chief. By bringing handpicked retired military officers into positions, who moreover served at the will and pleasure of politicians, political control of the machine was all but complete. Another strategy in this control was the offer of plum diplomatic postings to favourite service chiefs after retirement.
During this period massacres of civilians with complete impunity and the uprooting of civilians simply by going into a village and opening fire or by aerial attacks on peasants harvesting paddy became the norm. Apart from the Cabinet, those who headed the JOC must take full responsibility for implementing this policy.
Briefing the President of the intended battle plan
Thus following the Anuradhapura massacre, ‘Bull’ Weeratunge was packed off to Canada as high commissioner, while Cyril Ranatunge, a retired brigadier selected by Ravi Jayewardene, was made JOC chief after promoting him to lieutenant general. With the JOC head now effectively more powerful than the army commander, it became unnecessary for the Government to indulge in further manoeuvres with a view to appointing army commanders to its liking. Major General Nalin Seneviratne succeeded Weeratunge as army commander, but references to him in the Press were rare compared with those to the JOC chief. In reports of Operation Liberation, the Army’s major operation in 1987, the Army Commander was almost completely overshadowed. Read More
