The Coming Of The Indian Army
By Rajan Hoole -December 17, 2013
Rajan Hoole
The Indo-Lanka Accord and Sri Lanka’s Fault Lines: July 1987 – Part – 6
There is still a lack of clarity about the arrival of a large contingent of the Indian Army in Sri Lanka. Mrs. Bandaranaike, the SLFP, MEP and their extremist allies held that the arrival of the Indian troops was an attack on Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and a manifestation of Indian expansionism. In theory, the implementation of the Accord only required a small contingent of Indian troops as observers to oversee the surrender of arms by Tamil groups and the setting up of the Interim Council. It then seemed inconceivable that the LTTE would cause serious problems that would plunge the Tamil people into a crisis after securing a political settlement that was unimaginable only a few months earlier. There was also no purpose in India forcing Sri Lanka to accept the stationing of a large number of Indian troops on a temporary basis for an unspecified goal and with no legal foundation.
Ronnie de Mel, who was then Finance Minister, said at a meeting in Eheliyagoda on 1st November 1988, supporting Mrs. Bandaranaike for president, that Jayewardene had asked the Indian Government for 3000 Indian troops after consulting his service chiefs. This he did because he was in a difficult position owing to anticipated violence in the South. This assessment on Jayewardene’s part is also implicit in the discussions recorded in former Indian High Commissioner J.N. Dixit’s Assignment Colombo.
The question about Indian troops was posed to Hector Abhayawardana, a leading member of the LSSP, which supported the Accord. He responded, “The Indian troops came here at Jayewardene’s request. There is absolutely no doubt about it. Jayewardene was unhappy about India pushing him to reach a political solution. But in July 1987 he recognised that he could not face problems on three fronts – the SLFP and allies, the JVP, and the LTTE. That is why he asked for Indian troops to look after the North-East.”
He described the SLFP’s position on the matter as sheer opportunism and acknowledged that during the 1971 JVP insurgency when his party and the Communist Party were in a coalition government with the SLFP, Indian troops had guarded key installations in Sri Lanka. He added, “India then offered to help us and we and the Communist Party urged Prime Minister Mrs. Bandaranaike to get all the help she could. We had no problem about getting help from India. In allying with the JVP in July 1987, the SLFP was not looking any further than bringing down Jayewardene.”
The same Indian Air Force flights which brought Indian troops to Palaly, transported Sri Lankan troops from Palaly to Colombo before flying back to India.
The Left and Other Pro-Accord Sections
The main Left parties – the LSSP, CP, NSSP and SLMP – and several activist groups in Colombo such as the Movement for Inter-Racial Justice and Equality and individuals such as Godfrey Goonetilleke, to their credit, supported the Accord publicly for the political solution it offered the ethnic question. The price they paid for this principled position was to become isolated and be subject to death threats and the patriotic venom of the JVP. The CP, LSSP, NSSP and SLMP contested the first Provincial Council elections in the seven Southern provinces in April 1988 as the United Socialist Alliance. Read More
*From Rajan Hoole‘s “Sri Lanka: Arrogance of Power - Myth, Decadence and Murder”. Thanks to Rajan for giving us permission to republish. To read earlier parts click here
