Arrogance Of Power: The Southern Polity – The UNP
Rajan Hoole
The Indo-Lanka Accord and Sri Lanka’s Fault Lines: July 1987 – Part – 5
Rather than the SLFP or the JVP, it was the utter irresponsibility of the UNP which prepared the ground for the anti-Indian frenzy. It had first gone about cultivating anti-Indian sentiment and then capped it by default on the ethnic issue, thus creating conditions for the arrival of the Indian Army. Prime Minister Premadasa was chief among those responsible for the post- Accord wrecking process. As Prime Minister at that time, he must bear direct responsibility for the July 1983 violence, which brought India into this country. As for dealing with India, his populist anti-Indian approach where he tried to gain political capital through being rude to every Indian emissary beginning with Narasimha Rao and G. Parthasarathy, was most unhelpful. It was a senior member of the Government passing the buck.
From the first All-Party Conference (APC) with TULF participation in January 1984, Premadasa insisted on the preservation of unitary status and stated that the Government could go no further than District Development Councils. The APC reached a crucial stage when on 14th December 1984, Jayewardene presented a draft proposal allowing for DDCs in a province to merge into a provincial council through a referendum in each district. In practice, this would have proved cosmetic in the East since colonisation had made heavy inroads into the ethnic balance.
Even this was unacceptable to Premadasa who indicated his opposition by attacking India as a stumbling block to peace. Mathew went further and got sacked from the Cabinet. The result was more violence in the country and in July 1985, the Government was forced to talk directly to the TULF and all the militant groups in Thimpu. The latter had been opposed to the APCs.
When the Accord was to be signed on 29th July, Premadasa opposed the Accord and he with Athulathmudali boycotted the ceremonies after Rajiv Gandhi’s arrival – in an act of shutting the stable door after the horse had bolted, so as to salvage something for themselves personally.
The key ministers supporting the Accord were Gamini Dissanayake, Finance Minister Ronnie de Mel, Justice Minister Nissanka Wijeratne and Foreign Minister A.C.S Hameed. Those who opposed it at the cabinet meeting of 15th July 1987 were Gamini Jayasuriya, Athulathmudali, Ranil Wickremasinghe, Ranjit Atapattu, E.L.B. Hurulle and M.H. Mohamed. Dissanayake and J.N. Dixit, the Indian High Commissioner, are credited with being the principal architects of the Accord. In return for the North-East being merged into one provincial council and Sri Lanka not doing anything adverse to India’s interests, India was to oversee the disarming of Tamil militants and the ending of the militancy.
Premadasa, who had conveniently been away on a foreign trip, arrived in time for the final cabinet meeting on 27th July. He opposed the Accord and was supported by Jayasuriya and Wickremasinghe. However, when Jayewardene stood firm on going ahead, only Jayasuriya resigned. Jayewardene who had undated resignation letters of UNP MPs in his possession and, thanks to the Referendum, a steam-roller majority in parliament, was to have his way. Even on the matter of whether the 13th Amendment introducing Provincial Councils required a nation-wide referendum, Jayewardene had a Supreme Court that would be reluctant to oppose him in toto. Had he done this in 1985 or earlier, the course of the Accord would have been less stormy. But in July 1987 the battle lines within the party were drawn. The presidential elections were due at the end of 1988 and the JVP had built itself up as a potent source of terror. Read More
*From Rajan Hoole‘s “Sri Lanka: Arrogance of Power - Myth, Decadence and Murder”. Thanks to Rajan for giving us permission to republish. To read earlier parts click here
