The ‘Tamil Nadu Factor in China’s Naval Basing Ambitions in Sri Lanka
China’s capabilities for
naval force projection in the Indian Ocean are dependent on closer Sino-Sri
Lankan relations, relations not benefitting India given long-standing
Sino-Indian disputes. The Sino-Indo-Sri Lankan geostrategic relationship, in
turn, is curiously dependent on the political influence of domestic Tamils in
New Delhi. Tamils living in India, motivated by continuing animosities over Sri
Lankan Tamil rights, are complicating New Delhi’s policies towards Colombo by
narrowing India’s Sri Lanka foreign policy options. Hence, domestic political
dynamics are compromising India’s ability to counter China’s deepening
relationship with Sri Lanka, including the Chinese navy’s utilization of the new
port at Hambantota, Sri Lanka, thereby ultimately impacting the balance of naval
forces in the Indian Ocean.
The state of Tamil Nadu is
in southeast India, separated from Sri Lanka by the narrow Palk Strait. It is a
large and economically important state.[2] US
Secretary of State Clinton acknowledged Tamil Nadu’s political importance by a
2011 visit.[3] The
majority of the state’s residents are ethnic Tamil Hindus, compatriots of the
suppressed Tamil minority in Sri Lanka.
Sri Lanka lies directly
north of the busiest shipping routes in the Indian Ocean, routes supporting both
Indian and Chinese industrialization and growth. Eighty percent of China’s
hydrocarbon imports from the Middle East pass within 50 nautical miles of the
island.[4] Chinese
trade with South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) nations
through the Indian Ocean littoral increased from approximately $3.0 billion in
1995 to over $65 billion in 2008.[5]Chinese
trade with Africa reached $160 billion in 2011, up 60% over 2009.[6] This
trade all flows past Sri Lanka’s southern coast.
China
is now the largest foreign aid provider to Sri Lanka, rising from 17.7% of
foreign aid commitments and credits in 2007 to 44.2% in 2009.[7] China
has pledged more than $3 billion for infrastructure development, maintenance and
other projects.[8]
To
counter China’s increasing influence, India has deployed Airborne Warning and
Control Systems and Agni-III missiles with a range of 3,500 km in its northern
region. Additionally, the Indian Navy has plans to base an aircraft carrier in
the Bay of Bengal, north of Sri Lanka.[9] For
its part China is pursuing a “string of pearls” strategy by strengthening
facilities and access arrangements in the Indian Ocean, including new ports on
the Pakistani coast at Gwadar, Chittagong in Bangladesh, and Hambantota in Sri
Lanka.[10]
China’s
activities in Sri Lanka indicate that China, according to one Indian naval
officer, is ready to “drop anchor at India’s southern doorstep.”[11] The
port at Hambantota in southern Sri Lanka is being constructed and funded by
China. Hambantota’s three wharves lining the interior turning basin are each
approximately one- quarter mile in length, comparable to the single wharf
constructed at Gwadar, Pakistan and to the longest wharf at US Naval Station
Norfolk. This basin will be capable of handling three Panamax or two Capesize
merchant ships. They also offer sufficient space to dock Kiev-class sized
aircraft carriers like those currently being developed and deployed by
China.
Two
political parties—the DMK (Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam) and the AIADMK (All India
Anna Dravid Munnetra Kazhagam)—dominate Tamil Nadu politics. Each competes for
votes by the degree to which they support Tamil nationalism and rights, both in
India and Sri Lanka. The DMK is a critical coalition member of the governing,
but shaky, United Party Alliance (UPA) in New Delhi.[12] The
UPA holds only 262 of 500 seats in the lower house of Parliament. The DMK
accounts for 18 of those seats.[13]DMK
members have a history of joining and departing coalitions. DMK’s withdrawal
from the UPA would reduce the UPA’s seats to below the 251 seats required for a
majority, possibly forcing early elections.[14] Harvard
University history professor Sugata Bose noted: “It is inconceivable that India
could have a stable central government without the support of the Tamil in
India”.[15] Paikiasothy
Saravanamuttu, from the Centre for Policy Alternatives (Colombo) has said that
India’s policy alternatives towards Sri Lanka are limited by “…the signal fact
that…the political pressure from Tamil Nadu exerted on politicians in New Delhi,
India must strive to support Sri Lanka’s Tamils, even as it competes with China
and Pakistan for friendship with Colombo’s Sinhalese authorities.”[16]
India’s
response choices to gradually deepening Sino-Sri Lankan relations are limited.
It can stay the current course; which means do nothing, likely resulting in the
gradual capture of Sri Lanka into a tighter Chinese orbit and the eventual
visiting, perhaps even basing, of Chinese naval assets in Hambantota. The
second is to present a more belligerent face towards Sri Lanka and its Chinese
benefactors. That could accelerate Sri Lanka’s move towards China in an effort
to offset India’s grasp for regional hegemony. The third would be to
aggressively develop closer relations with the Sri Lankan government through a
dramatic expansion of aid, cultural exchange and economic integration (including
a long-planned bridge across the Palk Strait). However, given the strong ant-Sri
Lanka government sentiments in Tamil Nadu and the disproportionate leverage held
by Tamil Nadu coalition members in New Delhi, this is highly unlikely to occur
within this election cycle. Hence the domestic political complications imposed
on New Delhi by the Tamil Nadu political faction is heightening the likelihood
that Chinese warships will be visiting or based in southern Sri Lanka in the
near future.