Monday, May 6, 2019

Clean, practical solutions to Sri Lanka's energy crisis - I

We have shown that solar power, the least polluting form of energy after hydro-power, has a high potential in Sri Lanka for FIRM electric power and to meet the expected power shortage. However, solar energy is not the only option available to Sri Lanka. In a continuation of this article, we address the enormous potential for biomass energy, and also show how it can be used to re-vitalize ailing agricultural sectors like coconut, rubber etc.

By Chandre Dharmawardana-May 6, 2019, 8:05 am

Minister of Power and Energy Ravi Karunanayake is reported to have taken the initiative to contact French and Canadian agencies over Sri Lanka's grave energy crisis. The Minister has even explored awarding a Turkish company a tender to provide electricity from two power-ships. A sense of desperation is clear from reports that the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) officials offered alms to the Sri Maha Bodhi and appealed the gods to cause rains and fill the hydro-electricity reservoirs! Some rain has come, and the Easter bombings have intervened. And yet, the power crisis continues.

The CEB should have turned to the Sun God and solar energy sooner, but even now it is claimed that solar energy cannot provide "firm power" (continuous power). CEB planners have also ignored energy generation from the vast biomass available in Sri Lanka, considering it to be small potatoes. Given these assumptions, the CEB planners concluded correctly that a combination of hydro-power and large installations of coal-power is the optimal answer to Sri Lanka's energy needs. Such large-scale approaches to power need long-range planning and a FIRM commitment to the plans till completion.

While coal power is one of the most polluting types of energy, Sri Lanka is already ringed in the north by dozens of Tamil-Nadu coal plants. Sri Lanka's largest contribution to noxious fumes comes from burning over 60,000 barrels of diesel, motor and other fossil fuels a day. Even so, Sri Lanka's per capita emissions are a tenth of most western countries, and well managed coal-power plants can be run with a much reduced threat to the environment. So, contrary to the claims of the so-called "environmental lobby", the pollution from the proposed coal plants is arguably irrelevant to the total picture, as cleaner and AFFORDABLE alternatives were unavailable. This was the basis of the CEB long-ranged plan.

The Rajapaksa government adhered to the CEB plans and delivered continuous power from 2005 to 2014, electrified the whole country, and brought down tariffs by 25% when the Lakvijaya coal-power plant opened in Norochcholai – a name derived from "Horagolla", ironically evoking a salubrious clump of "Hora" trees! Unfortunately, Lakvijaya bears stark testimony to the CEB's incapacity to meet even minimal environmental standards, and in endangering the health of the local people. Hence the cancellation of the proposed coal powered plant in Sampura (located in the ancient "Somapura" historic area, see https://dh-web.org/place.names/) before it became another horror story is fortunate for Sri Lanka.

In the following we point out that fossil power is NOT NEEDED and that there are inexpensive non-polluting options that can be implemented RAPIDLY, unlike commissioning thermal or hydro-electric installations. Sri Lanka spent some $5 billion per year a few years ago, and still spends nearly $3 billion per year at current lower oil prices. However, the country can be largely FREE of such a burden.

Here we show how solar energy can give firm power WITHOUT batteries or alternators. We show how whole agricultural sectors that are now ailing can be re-booted inexpensively to become vibrant bio-energy sectors, while vitalizing them. The potential is vast enough to meet Sri Lanka's needs for decades to come, and even to sell to the Indian continent using a cable link, breaking the isolation of Sri Lanka's power grid.

Floating Solar Arrays

In 2009, just after the end of the Eelam war, Prof. Epasinghe (a Presidential adviser) and I met the then President Mahinda Rajapaksa, and discussed this very question of future power needs. I was given the opportunity to address some officials of the Presidential Secretariat and show a film on solar energy. One of my proposals was the possibility of using floating solar arrays positioned in reservoirs, with the power generated STORED AS WATER in the reservoir itself, instead of in batteries.

Power is stored by pumping the water back into reservoir, or just saving the equivalent amount of water that otherwise flow into a turbine, if the reservoir is equipped with generators. The resulting power is rendered when needed by the turbines as firm alternating current. Those were new ideas at the time. The talk can be accessed even today at: (https:/dh-web.org/place.names/posts/dev-tech.ppt).

Of course, solar panels were quite expensive in 2009, but our projections showed solar panels to become competitive soon. When the Rajapaksa government raised the price of electric power on May Day in 2013, I hailed it as a great step forward in making an equitable playing field for solar (see my article in Island, May 7th 2013). Other proposals suitable for Sri Lanka that I made included energy from biomass, and a call for electric trains instead of motor ways. Unfortunately, suggestions by scientists are rarely accepted by politicians.

So I was happy that a 100 MW floating solar array will be launched on the Maduru Oya reservoir, a decade after my suggestion. However, the proposal is still technically less satisfactory than my proposal, which needed no batteries to store the electricity and no alternators. If, say 200-250 hectare of the Randenigala reservoir were covered by solar panels, some 200 MW may be produced per hour when the sun shines. The solar power so produced can be fed into the grid and, assuming a head of 100 meters, some 800 cubic meters per hour can be saved IN THE RESERVOIR, for use after sunset. No batteries are needed! The cost, even inclusive of the floater, is incredibly low since the installation amortizes over a life of about 20 years.

The saving is much more, as emphasized in my talk in 2009. Some 35% of the water in a reservoir is lost by evaporation in a tropical climate. If 25% of the reservoir is covered, the solar panels shield the water from the sun's heat during the day and from the wind, both day and night. Assuming 400GWh of annual power generation at Randenigala, a potential 120GWh is "lost" to evaporation. The mere presence of the solar panels saves 30 GWh of power! Applying that to all the suitable reservoirs, the floating arrays save some 300GWh per year -equal to one Laxapana - by just being there!

The presence of solar panels discourages the growth of algae in the water. The environmental advantages compensate the disadvantages as long as we do not exceed 25% coverage. The panels should be distributed in an environmentally optimal manner. While floating panels are more expensive than fixed land panels, it avoids tricky negotiations for renting roofs of consumers. No clearance of land is needed for floating arrays. However, given some six million homes in Sri Lanka, most without roof-top solar panels, the claim that solar energy is not a viable option for Sri Lanka is false.

However, solar energy is not the only option available to Sri Lanka. In a continuation of this article, we address the potential for biomass and also shows how it can be used to re-vitalize ailing agricultural sectors like coconut and rubber.

(To be continued.)

[The Author was a past-Professor of Chemistry and a Vice-Chancellor of the SJP University in the 1970s. He is currently a Professor of Physics in Canada.]

ICC: Stand up to the superpower

Palestinians stand on the rubble of a home in Beit Hanoun, northern Gaza Strip, in November 2014. Eight members of the Wahdan family were killed in an airstrike on the home during Israel’s 51-day assault on Gaza earlier that year.

Anne PaqActiveStills

Susan Power -1 May 2019

The International Criminal Court recently delivered a shock ruling.

The ICC’s pre-trial judges decided unanimously against opening an investigation into war crimes in Afghanistan.

Opening an investigation would not serve the “interests of justice,” according to the judges.

Yet is hard to see how the judges have themselves served the interests of justice. They have denied any redress to victims of atrocities.

The decision was made despite the clear findings of an assessment by Fatou Bensouda, the ICC’s chief prosecutor. She concluded there was a “reasonable basis to believe” that war crimes had been committed by the US military, the CIA, the Taliban and Afghan state forces.

In a statement, the pre-trial judges argued that an investigation must be carried out “within a reasonable timeframe.” The evidence they had considered related to violence perpetrated from May 2003 onwards. And the ICC’s overall mandate is limited to crimes committed since July 2002.

The judges’ position is something of an anomaly. Under international law, no statute of limitations should apply to war crimes or crimes against humanity.

Justice takes time

Furthermore, the pursuit of international justice takes time.

That was demonstrated in the case of the former Yugoslavia.

The Bosnian Serb political leader Radovan Karadžić was arrested in 2008 – 13 years after he was first indictedfor war crimes by an international tribunal.

It took until March 2016 – 21 years after the initial indictment – until he was found guilty.

Another reason cited by the ICC’s pre-trial judges for their decision was that it was difficult to gauge “the prospects of securing meaningful cooperation from the relevant authorities.”

Without doubt, that was a reference to the US.

The world’s only military superpower has refused to join and has been openly hostile towards the court. Among the evidence brought before the court’s judges was that torture and rape had occurred in detention facilities run by the CIA in Afghanistan.

Donald Trump, the US president, claimed the judges’ decision as a “major international victory.” Rather than concentrating on the Afghan situation, Trump implicitly told the ICC to end its deliberations on whether Israel should be prosecuted for attacks on Palestinians.

“Any attempt to target American, Israeli or allied personnel for prosecution will be met with a swift and vigorous response,” Trump warned.

Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister, had a similar response. He welcomed the decision by the ICC’s judges as “an act that has far-reaching influence with regard to the conduct of the international system in relation to the State of Israel.”

The decision follows a number of coercive measures introduced by the Trump administration to shield both US and Israeli nationals from prosecution before the ICC.

Last year, the US closed the Palestine Liberation Organization’s office in Washington. The closure was, in the State Department’s words, “consistent with” concerns about Palestinian calls for Israel to be prosecuted by the ICC.

In March, Mike Pompeo, the US secretary of state, announced that a visa ban would be imposed on ICC prosecutors. Visa restrictions “may also be used to deter ICC efforts to pursue allied personnel, including Israelis, without allies’ consent,” Pompeo said.

The following month, the US confirmed it had revoked the entry visa of Fatou Bensouda, the ICC’s chief prosecutor.

Hard cases

For more than seven decades, Israel has been pursuing a project of ethnic cleansing against the Palestinians. As well as providing billions of dollars in annual military aid to Israel, the US has used its veto at the UN Security Council to protect Israel from being held accountable.

Knowing that there is no price to pay for its crimes, Israel has developed an apartheid system that has become increasingly extreme.

Over the past 12 months, it has placed legislation on its statute books, explicitly stating that the right of self-determination in Israel is “unique to the Jewish people.” By definition, Palestinian citizens of Israel are accorded a lesser status.

Palestinians living under Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza are being contained behind checkpoints, watchtowers and walls. All of historic Palestine is affected by Israel’s policies.

In 1980, Israel illegally annexed East Jerusalem. Today, its government appears intent on annexing most of the West Bank. Netanyahu even made a pledge to do so during his campaign for re-election.

Israel’s colonialist project encompasses a range of crimes: willful killing, the destruction and theft of property, pillage, persecution and apartheid. All of these are crimes that fall within the ICC’s purview.

By ensuring a thorough investigation, the ICC could begin to deliver accountability for Israel’s crimes and justice for the Palestinians.

Human rights workers, lawyers and victims of war crimes put their lives at risk by gathering evidence for submission to the ICC. They do so in the genuine quest for justice and a belief in the rule of law.

If it is to survive, the ICC must take on hard cases. It must stand up to the superpower.

Susan Power is head of legal research and advocacy at Al-Haq, a Palestinian human rights organization based in Ramallah, occupied West Bank.

David Cronin contributed research.

It’s Time for Saudi Arabia to Stop Exporting Extremism

Trump should not waste his opportunity to begin repairing Wahhabism’s trail of wreckage.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, left, and U.S. President Donald Trump meet in the White House on March 20, 2018. MANDEL NGAN/AFP/GETTY IMAGES

BY JOHN HANNAH

| MAY 3, 2019, 7:03 PM

Here’s a sobering fact: Even after the destruction of the Islamic State’s territorial caliphate in Iraq and Syria, there are today more jihadis fighting in more countries than there were on Sept. 11, 2001. The horrific Easter Sunday bombings in Sri Lanka last month are simply exhibit A. The harsh reality is that despite the United States’ important successes in killing terrorists on the battlefield and preventing another 9/11-scale attack, the problem of radical Islamist terrorism is not shrinking. On the contrary, it has steadily morphed and metastasized. After nearly 18 years, and enormous expenditures and loss of life, the United States still has no proven strategy for reducing the number of young Muslims around the world susceptible to jihadism.

It’s been clear to U.S. policymakers for years that hard power alone—military action to kill terrorists and disrupt terrorist plots—is not by itself a winning formula. While necessary for long-term success, hard power on its own is simply insufficient. Also essential is a strategy for combating the extremist ideology that serves as the central building block of jihadism—the totalitarian, intolerant, ultraconservative interpretations of Islam that systematically dehumanize all those holding different beliefs, both Muslim and non-Muslim alike. Killing terrorists has proven a relatively straightforward task. Killing the state of mind—the idea that helps radicalize and then, in far too many instances, weaponize young Muslims to kill nonbelievers—has been a vastly more difficult undertaking.

Since 9/11, successive U.S. presidents have acknowledged the centrality of the ideological war. President George W. Bush spoke about the importance of the battle of ideas and the need to win hearts and minds among pious Muslims. President Barack Obama called it countering violent extremism. President Donald Trump (though too often guilty of incendiary and counterproductive language that impugned all Muslims) made the struggle against radical Islamism a signature of his presidential campaign. As president, he promised to “combat the violent, extreme, and twisted ideologies that purport to justify the murder of innocent victims.” His first national security advisor, Michael Flynn, wroteextensively about the need to “wag[e] an ideological war against radical Islam.” On his first foreign trip as president, Trump went to Saudi Arabia, the beating heart of Wahhabism—the harsh, absolutist religious creed that helped seed the worldviews of al Qaeda and the Islamic State—and publicly demanded that the Saudis and other leaders of Muslim-majority countries “Drive [the extremists] out. Drive them out of your places of worship. Drive them out of your communities. Drive them out of your holy land, and drive them out of this earth.”

Important and necessary words, for sure. But by themselves, just words. Yes, each of the post-9/11 U.S. administrations made earnest attempts to establish policies and programs to weaken and undermine terrorist ideologies. But as the number of recruits signing up for jihadism’s global insurgency has steadily expanded, the inadequacy of these efforts is apparent. By nearly all accounts, the U.S. approach has been a jumble: disjointed, inconsistent, underfunded, and lacking leadership, coordination, and sustained high-level political support. Though accurate reporting is extremely hard to come by, there’s no doubt that U.S. spending to combat the ideology of Islamist extremism has made up but a tiny fraction of what’s been spent on the broader fight against terrorism—1 or 2 percent would be a generous estimate. In a speech in 2018, Lt. Gen. Michael Nagata, the senior official in charge of strategic planning at the National Counterterrorism Center, stressed that the resources devoted to fighting components of terrorism on and off the battlefield were badly out of balance. In a 2019 study commissioned by the Department of Homeland Security, the Rand Corp. pointed to a conclusion about U.S. efforts to prevent domestic terrorism that applies equally well to its counterextremism efforts worldwide: “more talk than action.”

One important example concerns what Trump discussed in Riyadh back in 2017: the need for America’s Muslim partners to take the lead in defeating the ideology of Islamist extremism. Or more importantly, the need for a handful of states, first and foremost Saudi Arabia, to get out of the business of exporting supremacist versions of the faith around the world. Yet you’d be hard-pressed to find Trump ever speaking publicly about the issue again. Instead, his demands of the Saudis rapidly shifted to shorter-term, more transactional issues like buying ever-greater quantities of U.S. weapons, keeping oil prices low, and supporting what in all likelihood will be a stillborn plan for Middle East peace. Holding the kingdom’s feet to the fire when it comes to unraveling the catastrophic damage that Wahhabism’s export has systematically inflicted on Muslim communities globally for at least two generations—the ideological tinder, if you will, for the jihadi fire that the United States has been battling for 20 years—has largely fallen by the wayside as a U.S. priority.

That’s particularly unfortunate, because Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has himself claimed since late 2017 that Riyadh is now determined to destroy the extremist ideology that it did so much, for so long, to promote. To the crown prince’s credit, it hasn’t all been lip service. At home, he’s reeled in the kingdom’s once all-powerful religious police and locked up some extremist clerics. Abroad, the Muslim World League, once the tip of the Saudi spear for exporting Wahhabism, recently surrendered its lease to the Grand Mosque of Brussels after Belgian authorities charged it with propagating extremism. And the league’s head, Mohammed al-Issa, a cleric and former justice minister, has made a series of remarkable statements in what appears to be a sincere one-man campaign to promote moderation—including condemning Holocaust denial, promising to visit Auschwitz, and telling Muslim minority communities to “embrace the nations they live in,” strictly obey national laws, and positively integrate into society. In direct contravention of decades of Wahhabi proselytizing, Issa recently wrote, “It makes no sense to separate Muslim children and youth from the rest of society or to cloister them away in Islamic private schools.”

But Wahhabism’s trail of wreckage runs deep and wide. It will take much more than a few op-eds by a single Saudi cleric to make a dent in the damage that’s been done. Last month, two potent reminders were on vivid display. In the run-up to Indonesia’s national
elections, several reports detailed the troubling expansion of Saudi-backed Wahhabism in the world’s most populous Muslim-majority country, which is shifting its politics rightward and dangerously degrading longstanding national traditions of pluralism and tolerance. And in the aftermath of the Easter attacks in Sri Lanka, article after article described the inroads that Wahhabism had made over decades, generating serious fractures within Sri Lanka’s Muslim community and establishing a fertile breeding ground for the kind of violent extremists who perpetrated the bombings.

Importantly, over the past several months, a small band of U.S. officials within the State Department’s Counterterrorism Bureau and the National Security Council’s counterterrorism directorate have sought to refocus U.S. policy on combating extremist proselytization by foreign states—starting with the Saudis, but also including the troubling activities of countries including Qatar, Turkey, and Iran. As I learned in recent conversations, the issue has become a regular item on their agenda for discussions with counterterrorism colleagues from Europe and Canada that constitute a forum referred to as “the like-minded group.” Greater information-sharing about the export of Islamic radicalism by the Saudis and others is being encouraged, as is the development of common diplomatic approaches to combat it. U.S. counterterrorism officials have also begun the process of directly engaging the Saudis on the issue—in particular by asking them to take action against a handful of individuals in countries outside the Middle East, mostly extremist preachers, who are believed to be operating with some degree of Saudi backing.

But relegating such a critical effort to narrow counterterrorism channels would be woefully inadequate to the scope of the challenge. The failure to prioritize the ideological war has been the perennial Achilles’ heel of U.S. strategy. A talking point on ending the export of extremism needs to be a standard feature, not simply of intermittent counterterrorism exchanges among midlevel officials, but of every U.S. diplomatic interaction with the Saudis, starting with the president and extending downward through his cabinet across the entire U.S. government. An even better mark of seriousness would be for Trump to put Mohammed bin Salman’s bona fides to the test by establishing a high-level U.S.-Saudi working group to put into practice the crown prince’s professed commitment to moderation. U.S. Vice President Mike Pence, with his long-standing interest in issues surrounding religious freedom, could be designated to co-chair such an effort alongside Mohammed bin Salman—ensuring that both sides had the stature to mobilize all elements of their governments and hold them accountable for results.

Getting serious about stopping the export of extremism means making it an intelligence priority as well. Remarkably, if Trump were to ask the vast U.S. intelligence community to provide him with a comprehensive list of all Saudi-affiliated mosques, schools, madrassas, universities, and community centers around the world, he’d largely be met with blank stares. Ditto if he wanted a list of radical preachers worldwide who were on the Saudi payroll. Or a chart showing how many versions of the Quran containing hate-filled Wahhabi commentaries were still being exported around the world by Saudi publishing houses. Even more worrisome is that the same gap in granular knowledge almost certainly extends to Saudi-related proselytization within the United States as well. Nearly eighteen years after 15 of the kingdom’s nationals helped perpetrate the murder of nearly 3,000 people on U.S. soil, the lack of this kind of hard data that U.S. diplomats could use to confront the Saudis, hold them to account, and measure progress over time is almost inexcusable. The same goes for the activities of other countries, especially Qatar, Turkey, and Iran.
Making the export of extremism a collection priority should also apply to the State Department. In every country with a significant Muslim population, there should be at least one political officer at the U.S. Embassy whose job responsibilities include regular reporting on foreign proselytization efforts and their impact on local communities.

Congress, too, has an important role to play in pressing the executive branch to make the ideological war a real priority. Holding hearings to highlight the importance of ending the export of Islamist extremism, especially by U.S. partners, would be an excellent start. Expert witnesses could provide important information and insight on the continuing size and scope of the challenge. Administration officials could be called to explain in detail what the U.S. strategy is for dealing with the threat. Serious consideration should also be given to possible legislation that would require the administration to report annually on the role of foreign states in propagating Islamic extremism, U.S. efforts to combat such activity, and the progress being made to reduce it.

Getting Saudi Arabia and other countries out of the business of exporting extremism once and for all is an odd issue: While nearly everyone has agreed for nearly 20 years that the problem directly threatens U.S. national security, no one ever seems to really do anything about it. Lots of rhetoric. Very little action. As the United States prepares to enter the third decade of its ongoing campaign against terrorism, that failed approach should finally change—especially with a de facto leader in Riyadh who, despite his many well-known shortcomings, has openly declared a commitment to put the propagation of religious radicalism in the kingdom’s rearview mirror. For their part, U.S.
policymakers should seize upon this as an open invitation for high-level diplomatic engagement to hold the crown prince to account while helping him achieve his stated goals. Especially at a time when Trump and Congress have repeatedly been at loggerheads over policy toward Saudi Arabia, the opportunity to work together to get the kingdom on the right side of this all-important ideological war should not go to waste.

Taliban kill 13 in attack on police headquarters in northern Afghanistan

Smoke rises from the site of an attack in Pul-e-Khumri city, Baghlan province, Afghanistan May 5, 2019. REUTERS/Stringer NO RESALES. NO ARCHIVES.

Abdul Qadir Sediqi, Rupam Jain-MAY 5, 2019

KABUL (Reuters) - Afghan forces battled for hours against Taliban insurgents who stormed a police headquarters in the northern city of Pul-e-Khumri, after a suicide bomber blew up his explosive-laden car, killing at least 13 people, officials said on Sunday.

A Taliban militant detonated his Humvee vehicle at the entrance of the police office before a group of eight attackers armed with machine guns rushed in the building, two Afghan officials said.

“Thirteen policemen were killed and 35 others injured,” said Nasrat Rahimi, a spokesman at the Interior Ministry in Kabul, adding that 20 civilians were also wounded.

“The complex attack on Baghlan police headquarters has ended with the death of all nine attackers, including the suicide bomber,” he said.

The Taliban, which is seeking to restore strict Islamic rule and expel foreign forces from Afghanistan, claimed responsibility for the attack in a busy area of the city with many other residential and commercial buildings.

Taliban fighters frequently capture U.S.-made armored Humvee vehicles from Afghan forces to load with explosives and use as car bombs to breach military fortifications.

Abdul Aleem Ghafari, deputy provincial health director in Pul-e-Khumri, said women and children were among those killed by the blast.

Sunday’s raid was the latest in a series of high-profile attacks that have killed and wounded hundreds of civilians in Afghanistan this year and put heavy pressure on the Western-backed government of President Ashraf Ghani.

INCREASED ATTACKS

The Taliban have stepped up attacks on security installations, even as they hold sixth rounds of direct talks with U.S. officials to end the war in Afghanistan.

This week, the group rejected appeals made last week by Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and the U.S. special envoy for peace in Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, to declare a ceasefire in the 17-year conflict.

Afghan-born U.S. diplomat Khalilzad is leading the talks with the Taliban in Doha to pursue a deal that would bring the withdrawal of foreign forces in return for Taliban security guarantees.

“All sides agreeing to reduce violence is a necessary step toward achieving that outcome and the morally responsible choice to make. We stand ready,” Khalilzad wrote on Twitter on Saturday.
Khalilzad’s comments came a day after Ghani said he was prepared to call an “immediate” and “permanent” ceasefire.

The Taliban said they will not lay down their arms ahead of the holy month of Ramadan and rejected to hold talks with the Afghan government which they consider an illegitimate “puppet” regime.
Direct talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban collapsed in 2015.

“A ceasefire will only get discussed once a deal about foreign force withdrawal gets finalized,” Suhail Shaheen, the Taliban’s Doha-based political spokesman, told Reuters.

About 45,000 Afghan security forces have been killed since Ghani took office in September 2014.
The hardline Islamists group now holds sway over more territory than at any point since its ousting by U.S.-led troops after the Sept. 11 attacks on the United States in 2001.

Afghan special forces arrive at the site of an attack in Pul-e-Khumri, Baghlan province, Afghanistan May 5, 2019. REUTERS/Stringer

The Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan consists of 17,000 troops, about half of them from the United States. A smaller number of U.S. troops operate in Afghanistan under a counter-terrorism mission.

The United Nations’ top official in Afghanistan, Tadamichi Yamamoto, on Sunday, called on all parties to halt the fighting before Ramadan.

PAKISTAN’S SUPPORT

On Sunday, Ghani spoke with Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan to secure fresh backing to hold direct talks with the Taliban, hours after Afghanistan’s foreign ministry summoned a senior Pakistani diplomat over cross-border clashes between Pakistani and Afghan troops.

Relations between neighbors, Afghanistan and Pakistan have been plagued by mistrust and at times hostility since Pakistan’s independence in 1947.

For years, Afghanistan and the United States have accused Pakistan of supporting the Taliban as a way for Pakistan to limit the influence of its old rival, India, in Afghanistan.
Pakistan denies that.

Pakistan’s role in the ongoing peace negotiations is a delicate one, with Islamabad seeking to avoid showcasing any kind of broad influence over the Taliban.

Khan’s office in a statement said the two leaders exchanged views on matters relating to peace, security, and prosperity in Afghanistan and the region.

“The Prime Minister (Imran Khan) underlined that Pakistan will spare no effort to advance the common objectives of building peace in Afghanistan and having a fruitful bilateral relationship between the two brotherly countries,” it stated.

Ghani is expected to travel to Pakistan, but travel dates were not made public.

Palestine in Pictures: April 2019

A Palestinian protester hurls a stone towards Israeli occupation forces during confrontations that followed a weekly demonstration against the expropriation of Palestinian land by Israel in the village of Kfar Qaddum, near the West Bank city of Nablus, on 19 April.
Shadi Jarar’ahAPA images

1 May 2019

Six Palestinians were killed by Israeli occupation forces and settlers during the month of April, or died from wounds sustained previously.

Muhammad Ali Dar Adwan, 23, was killed during a raid on Kufr Aqab, a neighborhood of East Jerusalem in the West Bank, in the early hours of 2 April. Video shows that Dar Adwan came under heavy gunfire as he ran away from soldiers.

That same day, Faris Yusif Faris Abu Hijris, 26, died from injuries he sustained two days earlier when he was shot in the stomach during a protest in Khan Younis, southern Gaza, marking the Great March of Return’s one-year anniversary.

Two additional Palestinians were shot and fatally wounded by Israeli soldiers along the Gaza-Israel boundary during the month.

Maysara Mousa Suleiman Abu Shalouf, 15, died after he was shot in the stomach as he approached the northern boundary fence during Great March of Return protests on 12 April.

Ishaq Ishteiwi, 16, died in Israeli detention on 13 April from wounds sustained 10 days earlier, while he and two friends attempted to cross into Israel.

Executed by settlers

On 3 April, Muhammad Abd al-Fattah, 23, was shot and killed by Israeli settlers on a road in the northern West Bank.

Abd al-Fattah had thrown stones in the direction of passing Israeli cars when a driver opened fire at him. The driver got out of his car and fired several more times at Abd al-Fattah, and was joined by another Israeli driver who also fired on the young man at close range.

Israeli forces made no attempts to arrest the men who killed Abd al-Fattah and instead destroyed video footage “to ensure that the truth never comes to light and the shooters would not face any charges or be held accountable in any way,” the human rights group B’Tselem stated.

On 27 April, Omar Yunis, 20, died while being detained in an Israeli hospital from injuries sustained a week earlier after he was shot by Israeli Border Police at the Zaatara junction in the northern West Bank. Israel claims that Yunis had attempted to stab a Border Police combatant.

Forty-two Palestinians have died by Israeli fire during the year. Three Israelis were killed by Palestinians during the same period, though Palestinian factions have repudiated Israel’s claims of a nationalist motive for an Israeli woman’s killing by a Palestinian man in February.

Also during the month of April, a Palestinian laborer from the West Bank died while being arrested by police on suspicion of illegally entering Israel.

In Gaza on 13 April, Muhammad Hadayed, 18, died after he was shot by members of an armed faction near the southern boundary with Israel. Hadayed was traveling in a car with his father and they drove past the faction’s checkpoint without stopping. The fighters fired at the car after it didn’t stop, and Hadayed sustained two bullet wounds in the back.

Tear gas fired in schools

On 9 April, Israeli forces fired multiple tear gas canisters inside a school compound in Hebron during confrontations between soldiers and Palestinians in the area. “As a result, a total of 350 Palestinians, the majority of them students, required treatment after inhaling gas,” the UN monitoring group OCHA stated.

A school in Qalandiya refugee camp near the West Bank city of Ramallah was evacuated later in the month due to Israeli-fired tear gas during confrontations.

OCHA stated that this year it has “recorded 104 incidents where Israeli settlers killed or injured Palestinians or damaged Palestinian property, including over 2,500 trees, marking a 53 percent increase in the number of incidents compared with 2018.”

Israel allowed 500 Christian Palestinians to leave Gaza to celebrate Easter in Jerusalem, relenting to criticism after initially granting permits to only 200 out of 1,200 Christians in the territory. Those initial 200 permits would have allowed Palestinian Christians in Gaza aged 55 or older to leave only to Jordan, rather than Jerusalem or the rest of the West Bank.

On 30 April, Israel announced that it had reduced the permitted fishing areas off of Gaza’s coast to six nautical miles. The collective punishment measure was imposed after a rocket was fired from Gaza toward Israel, falling into the sea.

Israel had extended the permitted fishing zone to 15 nautical miles in southern Gaza on 1 April as part of a ceasefire agreement – the first time the zone was extended to this distance since the signing of the Oslo accords by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization more than 25 years ago. That agreement stipulates that Palestinians be allowed to fish 20 nautical miles from Gaza’s coast.

“Israel shrinks and expands Gaza’s fishing zone regularly, often as a punitive measure, causing great uncertainty and insecurity,” the human rights group Gisha stated.

Israeli forces regularly use live fire against Gaza fishers to enforce the restriction measures.

Israeli forces demolish a Palestinian home in East Jerusalem’s Shuafat refugee camp on the pretext that it was built without a permit, which are nearly impossible for Palestinians in the city to obtain, on 2 April. An Israeli settlement is seen opposite of the concrete barrier.
Afif AmeraWAFA

Muslim Palestinians celebrate the Islamic holiday of Isra and Miraj at the al-Aqsa mosque compound in Jerusalem’s Old City on 3 April. The holiday marks what Muslims believe is the Prophet Muhammad’s journey from Mecca to Jerusalem followed by his ascension to heaven.
Afif AmeraWAFA

Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, attends a meeting with leaders of Palestinian factions in Gaza City on 6 April.
Ashraf AmraAPA images

A Palestinian worker evacuates a cat at a zoo in Rafah, southern Gaza Strip, on 7 April. The international animal welfare charity Four Paws removed 40 animals, including five lions, from the squalid zoo in order to relocate them to sanctuaries in Jordan.
Ashraf AmraAPA images

Palestinians dressed in Israeli prison uniforms sit in a mock cell during a Gaza City protest held in solidarity with Palestinians held prisoner by Israel on 9 April.
Mahmoud NasserAPA images

A man carries a sign reading “The right to a life with dignity” as Palestinians with disabilities demand their rights in front of the headquarters of UNRWA, the UN agency for Palestine refugees, in Gaza City on 11 April.
Mahmoud AjjourAPA images

Israeli occupation forces detain a man during confrontations with Palestinian protesters in the West Bank city of Hebron on 12 April.
Wisam HashlamounAPA images

Palestinians in the West Bank city of Ramallah protest in solidarity with political prisoners held in Israeli jails on 13 April. Hundreds of Palestinian prisoners went on hunger strike the previous week after negotiations with the Israel Prison Service failed. The prisoners’ demands included improved medical care, more family visits and access to a public telephone.
Ayat ArqawyAPA images

Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas looks on as appointed Prime Minister Mohammed Ishtayeh speaks during the swearing-in of the new government at the PA’s headquarters in the West Bank city of Ramallah on 13 April.
Thaer GanaimAPA images

A Palestinian woman harvests wheat to prepare freekeh in Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip, on 13 April. The ancient cereal is made from green durum wheat that is roasted and rubbed to create its flavor.
Ashraf AmraAPA images

Omar Barghouti, the father of two Palestinian fighters recently arrested or killed by Israel, stands on the rubble of his home that was demolished by occupation forces in the village of Kobar near the West Bank city of Ramallah, 17 April. Assem Barghouti is being held by Israel for a shooting attack that fatally injured two Israeli soldiers in the West Bank in December. On 12 December, Assem’s brother Saleh was apprehended alive by Israeli forces, who announced his death hours later. Both brothers are accused by Israel of involvement in a West Bank shooting in December in which a pregnant Israeli woman was critically injured. Her baby, delivered prematurely, died a few days after his induced birth.
Ayat ArqawyAPA images

Fatah party supporters celebrate in the West Bank city of Ramallah after the student council elections at nearby Birzeit University on 17 April. The election is seen as a gauge of Palestinian politics writ large, and this year 78 percent of the student body participated in the campus vote. The Fatah-backed Martyr Yasser Arafat bloc received 4,056 votes and the Hamas-backed al-Wafa Islamic bloc got 3,997 votes. Both secured 23 seats in the 51-seat student council.
WAFA

Palestinians confront Israeli occupation forces during Great March of Return protests along the boundary with Israel in the southern Gaza Strip on 19 April.
Ashraf AmraAPA images

The home belonging to the family of Arafat Irfaiya in the West Bank city of Hebron after it was demolished on 19 April by the Israeli military in revenge for the rape and murder of a 19-year-old Israeli woman in a Jerusalem forest. Israeli forces destroyed two apartments belonging to Irfaiya’s family. Israel says that Irfaiya, who is awaiting trial, had nationalist motives but this was roundly rejected by Palestinian factions.
Mashhoor WahwahWAFA

A Palestinian jockey rides during an equestrian competition in Gaza City on 19 April.
Ali HamadAPA images

Israeli settlers celebrate Passover at an archaeological site in Sebastia, a Palestinian village in the northern West Bank, on 22 April. The Israeli military sealed off the village and prevented Palestinians from reaching the area for two days as hundreds of settlers held celebrations at the Roman ruins.
Shadi Jarar’ahAPA images

Palestinians write messages to the outside world on a banner during an event organized by the International Commission to Support Palestinian People’s Rights at the Gaza City seaport on 22 April.
Ashraf AmraAPA images

Palestinians protest against the Israeli blockade on Gaza in front of the Gaza City offices of UNSCO, the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, on 23 April.
Ashraf AmraAPA images

Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Mohammed Ishtayeh meets with US Senator Mitt Romney at Ishtayeh’s headquarters in the West Bank city of Ramallah on 24 April.
Prime Minister’s office

Members of the Samaritan sect mark the holiday of Passover atop Mount Gerizim near the West Bank city of Nablus on 25 April.
Ayman NobanyWAFA

Orthodox Christians attend the Holy Fire ceremony in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem’s Old City on 27 April. Worshippers believe that the Holy Fire, which emanates from within the Tomb of Christ, spontaneously lights and represents the power of resurrection.
Afif AmeraWAFA

Palestinian Christians attend Orthodox Easter service at the Church of Saint Porphyrius in Gaza City on 28 April.
Mahmoud AjjourAPA images

Palestinian wheelchair users take part in a dabke class at a club in Gaza City on 28 April. Dabke is a Levantine folk line dance widely performed at weddings and other joyous occasions.
Mahmoud AjjourAPA images

Palestinian farmers use a threshing machine as they harvest wheat near the boundary with Israel in Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip, on 29 April.
Ashraf AmraAPA images