Israel-Hamas relations: a predictable but fatal dance

The longtime enemies have developed a fiery pattern of trading rockets for airstrikes
 A ball of fire is seen above Gaza City after an Israeli airstrike on a building believed to house the offices of the Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh. Photograph: APAImages/Rex/Shutterstock

Oliver Holmes in Jerusalem-Tue 26 Mar 2019

It has become a near-monthly event with a predictable pattern – rockets from Gaza are traded for Israeli airstrikes. Palestinians cower in basements while Israelis hide in bomb shelters. Each flare-up signals the threat of full-blown war, but the next day it is usually over.

Israel and Hamas – the Palestinian faction that rules Gaza Strip on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean between Israel and Egypt – have fallen into a bloody and fiery dance over the past year.

In multiple rounds of fighting, neither side has used its full arsenal against the other. Yet both remain in a constant state of on-off conflict, always appearing on the verge of another major conflagration.

The Israeli military said over the past 12 months it carried out about 900 strikes on Gaza and that Hamas fired more than 1,200 rockets and mortars. During the same period, however, there has not been an Israeli ground incursion into the territory that it occupied from 1967 until 2005.

The latest fighting began on Monday when a post-dawn rocket fired from Gaza obliterated a family home in a neighbourhood north of Tel Aviv. Israel’s formulaic response was to retaliate by decimating buildings across Gaza. In return, militants launched more rockets, which drew yet more Israeli strikes. And then by mid-morning on Tuesday, local media reported, for what felt to many like the umpteenth time, that a “tense calm” had ensued.

For now, however, nobody is breathing a sigh of relief. The most recent battle erupted at the same time as a series of potentially explosive developments converged.

Hamas has faced some of the most public displays of internal dissent since it came to power in 2007. Last week, its security forces violently suppressed rallies by Palestinian residents of Gaza against tax hikes, arresting and beating dozens of people. The group’s critics say its leaders have provoked Israel in the past to distract from its own failings.

Meanwhile, Israel is due to hold elections in two weeks. Several of Benjamin Netanyahu’s more bellicose opponents have used the ongoing Gaza violence to paint the prime minister as being indecisive and weak on security issues.

To refute them, the leader of 13 years has gone to considerable lengths to show he is willing to use violence. “Hamas needs to know that we shall not hesitate to go in [to Gaza] and take all necessary steps,” he warned. The military mobilised brigades to the frontier and drafted reserve forces. And in an apparent show of exceptional force, Israel struck the office of the Hamas leader, Ismail Haniyeh.
Israel’s hawks are not convinced. The far-right politician Naftali Bennett has accused Netanyahu of failing against Hamas and said he would instead “open the gates of hell”.

Even Netanyahu’s main political foe, Benny Gantz, who is considered a centrist in Israel, has played up how in 2014 he flattened whole neighbourhoods in Gaza while serving as army chief during the latest of three wars Israel has fought with Hamas.

The prime minister, however, may view those conflicts as politically costly and militarily ineffective. The last one ended with more than 2,200 Palestinian deaths, more than half of them being civilians, and 73 killed on the Israeli side. Polls show Israelis do not want another war with Hamas.

Nahum Barnea, a columnist for the country’s leading daily, Yedioth Ahronoth, said: “[E]very incursion into Gaza involves a cost in human life and in daily life – a price that is liable to cost him at the polling stations. Netanyahu is in no rush to pull the trigger.”

However, Barnea writes, if Netanyahu does not show a willingness to fight, his “image as the strong man, as Mr Security, which he has been cultivating for years, is liable to collapse”.

Potentially the most incendiary development is that this weekend marks the anniversary of a year-long Palestinian protest along Israel’s frontier with Gaza. Those rallies had hoped to draw attention to a dire humanitarian crisis in Gaza, where the economy has collapsed under a severe Egyptian-Israeli blockade.

Israeli troops, however, have responded with lethality, killing more than 180 people and shooting 6,100 others in acts the UN says may amount to war crimes.

Hamas, which backs the rallies, is expected to call for thousands to attend on Saturday, while Israel has given no indication it will end its live-fire policy against what it calls “violent riots”.

It was Israel’s use of deadly force against these protests that set the backdrop for the gradual descent into regular battles, several of which kicked off following particularly bloody episodes at the fence.

As the death toll grew, Palestinians began to tie Molotov cocktails and incendiary explosives to kites and balloons that floatef into and burned fields across the fence. A few months ago, Israel started responding to these in the same way it does to rocket attacks: with bombs. In several respects, there is already a low-intensity war.

Many in Israel are calling for restraint. But there are growing cries for harsher, more decisive action.
“Israel cannot afford to remain quiet,” read an editorial in the rightwing Jerusalem Post newspaper on Tuesday. “Deterrence doesn’t come just from strong words, but also from strong action.”

Pitzer College president casts veto to protect Israeli apartheid

The Pitzer College president has vetoed a governing council vote to support the suspension of a discriminatory study abroad in Israel program. (Campus Grotto)

Nora Barrows-Friedman -26 March 2019

In a historic move, the College Council at Pitzer College voted to suspend a study abroad in Israel program on 14 March.

However, college president Melvin Oliver vetoed the measure just hours later, a decision a faculty member said was “a betrayal of [Pitzer’s] core values” and one that displayed “contempt for the college’s democratic process.”

The council, a legislative body that includes staff, faculty and students, passed the measure conditionally suspending the partnership with Haifa University by 67-28 votes, with eight abstentions.

The move followed a faculty vote to suspend the program last fall, citing Israel’s discriminatory entry restrictions based on ancestry and political speech.

In that vote, faculty called on the university to curtail the program until Israel “adopts policies granting visas for exchanges to Palestinian universities on a fully equal basis” as it does with Israeli institutions. They also rejected the administration’s move to nullify a 2017 resolution passed by the Pitzer student senate in support of the boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS) campaign for Palestinian rights.

Oliver’s veto of the 14 March council vote “shows that his deeply personal commitment to protect Israeli apartheid is more important to him than the best interests of the college,” Dan Segal, a Pitzer professor and a sponsor of the resolution, told The Electronic Intifada.

The Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI) said Oliver’s move was “a shameful precedent” and “a desperate attempt to shield Israel’s far-right regime of apartheid and occupation from accountability and a show of extraordinary disdain for the Pitzer community.”

View image on Twitter

PACBI

✔@PACBI

We warmly salute Pitzer College Council's 67-28 vote to suspend study abroad with Haifa University over Israel’s racist anti-Palestinian policies.

We strongly condemn Pitzer president's shameful veto, aiming to shield Israel’s occupation & apartheid regime. #SuspendPitzerHaifa

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10:48 AM - Mar 15, 2019

“In the history of the college, there’s never been a veto of the student senate, and there was over BDS,” Segal said. “There’s never been any veto of the college council, and there was over [the study abroad in Israel program].”

“The only two vetoes in the history of the college have come over Palestinian rights issues,” he added.

Pitzer is one of several campuses in the Claremont Colleges consortium in southern California.

Members of Claremont Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) condemned Oliver’s veto, saying they will continue to organize to suspend the program with Haifa University while demanding that the president reverse his decision.

Student groups expressed their support of the campaign to suspend the discriminatory Haifa University study abroad program. (Claremont SJP)

A petition to support the council’s vote to suspend the Israel program has gathered 900 signatures, including dozens of prominent anti-racist professors and scholars such as Judith Butler, Richard Falk, Steven Salaita and Robin D.G. Kelley, more than a dozen US campus organizations and hundreds of students and alumni.

Protesting the college president’s veto, student groups created messages in support of the Haifa study abroad suspension around campus in chalk.

Threats and propaganda

In the weeks leading up to the College Council’s vote, Segal said he was smeared by anonymous anti-Palestinian groups which accused him of anti-Semitism, while posters appeared on campus equating the support by Students for Justice in Palestine and their allies for the suspension of the Haifa program with support for terrorism.

Such tactics “expose our students and their allies to the possibility of violence, and the trope of identifying students as such is Islamophobic,” Segal told The Electronic Intifada.

He said he called on the administration and the faculty executive committee to denounce the posters as hate speech and incitement to violence, but the administration has so far stayed silent.

Leading up to the vote, the Israel on Campus Coalition, a right-wing Israel lobby group, produced a videopromoting Haifa University as a “diverse” and inclusive institution that should be protected against a boycott at all costs.

Students for Justice in Palestine said that the ICC’s video, which features Pitzer students answering vague questions about the Haifa University suspension campaign, was “unethical propaganda” and a “disingenuous distortion of student opinion.”

In a statement from Students for Justice in Palestine, one of the students featured in the video said she was “approached by people who appeared to be students” and asked what she would do if she was told she could not study abroad in her preferred country of Spain.

“At no point during this time did these people mention Israel or Haifa to me,” the student said.

“They took my answers and used them out of context for their own propaganda.”

In Al Jazeera’s leaked undercover documentary The Lobby–USA, the director of the Israel on Campus Coalition claimed that the group had a multi-million dollar budget for “research” for smear campaigns against activists.

Jacob Baime also admitted that the ICC coordinated with Israel’s strategic affairs ministry. He called these campaigns “psychological warfare.”

The Israel study abroad program remains “only available to some,” noted SJP, adding that during the Nakba, tens of thousands of Palestinians were expelled from Haifa alone and those refugees still cannot return home.

“Descendants of these refugees who study at the Claremont Colleges would likely be barred from this study abroad program,” SJP added.

Israel suppression playbook

In addition, a mobile phone app, Act.IL, which was created and funded by the Israeli government and prominent Israel lobby groups, had been directing its users in the weeks prior to the Pitzer vote to spread propaganda materials intending to disrupt and smear Palestinian rights campaigners at the college:

Behind Israel's Troll Army@AntiBDSApp

Ahead of last week's vote by Pitzer College faculty to end their 'study abroad' partnership with Haifa University, Israel's anti-BDS digital infrastructure was distributing petitions and videos to oppose the vote. #Pitzer #BDS

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10:22 AM - Mar 18, 2019

Today, Israel's anti-BDS app is awarding its international users 30 points if they send this automatic e-mail to the president of #Pitzer College to thank him for vetoing the democratic vote of Pitzer faculty. pic.twitter.com/qAoPnmMLEz

— Behind Israel's Troll Army (@AntiBDSApp) 18 March 2019

A petition and video promoted by the app were created by a new Facebook group called “Students for Academic Freedom,” a page that has fewer than a dozen “likes” and has focused its handful of posts solely on the Pitzer vote.

Following the president’s veto, the app has incentivized its users to send multiple emails to the college president, thanking him for vetoing the college council’s democratic vote.

International users of Israel's anti-BDS app can score an additional 30 points if they send an automatic e-mail to the #Pitzter College Student Senate to ask them to support the President's veto of a democratic faculty vote. @pzsenate pic.twitter.com/dUxuUgtdZz

— Behind Israel's Troll Army (@AntiBDSApp) 18 March 2019

The attempts by Pitzer’s president and others to thwart the council’s vote “come straight out of the Israel suppression playbook,” according to Liz Jackson, senior staff attorney at Palestine Legal.

Along with the nullification of the 2017 student vote in support of BDS, the president’s veto is “only the latest in a long string of incidents where Pitzer has applied discriminatory treatment to restrict support for Palestine,” Jackson added.

In 2015, under pressure from Israel supporters, university administrators threatened to sanction studentsover their plan to construct a mock wall on campus in order to bring attention to Israel’s violations of Palestinian rights.

The 60-foot-long wall was a replica of Israel’s wall in the occupied West Bank.

How to tackle Indonesia’s persistent gender inequality

(File) Indonesian domestic helpers raise their hands during a police check on the eligibility of the workers' status to travel and work abroad at a shelter in Bekasi on June 22, 2011. Source: AFP

25 March 2019 

INDONESIAN President Joko Widodo’s track record of considering gender representation in ministerial appointments is lauded in global circles. With nine women appointed to his cabinet, there are more female cabinet ministers in Indonesia than in countries such as Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Strong female ministers lead influential portfolios in finance, state-owned enterprises, maritime and fisheries, forestry and environment, foreign affairs and health.

Women’s empowerment activists praise these appointments, seeing them as a means of signalling to the wider populace that barriers to women taking up leadership positions are slowly being reduced. But they also note that such efforts need to be more widely applied and more pervasive to reduce gender inequality in Indonesia.

SEE ALSO: How do conservative Muslims see Indonesia’s presidential hopefuls?

Indonesia ranked 104 out of 160 countries on the United Nations Development Programme’s 2017 gender inequality index, which measures gender disparities in education, reproductive health and economic and political participation. That ranking has changed little in recent years and is below that of most of its Asian neighbours.

While gender gaps in childhood are closing, gender gaps in adulthood are persisting. Tackling maternal mortality continues to be a major challenge, particularly given the difficulty of providing accessible birthing facilities with appropriately skilled medical staff in the many small islands throughout the archipelago.

All too often national policies and international development programmes concerned with women’s empowerment mainly focus on improving the number of beneficiaries: the number of girls who go to school, the number of women who can give birth safely or who can access credit for livelihood initiatives.

Indonesia’s Minister of Finance Sri Mulyani Indrawati (L) speaks with International Monetary Fund (IMF) managing director Christine Lagarde (R) during a meeting at the IMF and World Bank annual meetings in Nusa Dua on Indonesia’s resort island of Bali on October 13, 2018. Source: Sonny Tumbelaka/AFP

These are certainly indicators of progress, but long-term reductions in gender inequality involve breaking down or transforming the economic, political and social power structures that prevent women from achieving their full potential and a higher quality of life.

This will be no mean feat given Indonesia’s large population and geographic size, the number of districts with significant policymaking autonomy and the presence of diverse social norms that in some places limit the role of women in public life and decision-making.

Indonesian civil society organisations (CSOs) play a key role in chipping away at social norms and structural barriers to gender equality. They provide the crucial link between ‘high-level’ policy and concrete changes on the ground by supporting large networks of subnational women’s organisations and groups.

SEE ALSO: Under Jokowi, Indonesia’s middle-class the winner of economic growth

These bottom-up initiatives seek to improve participatory development so that women — particularly those locked out of public life or unaccustomed to participating in village-level decision-making forums — slowly grow in skill and number to collectively influence how priorities are set and how money is spent. This is increasingly important now that around 10 percent of Indonesia’s national budget is transferred directly into village coffers, following the ratification of the 2014 Villages Law.

One organisation with a network throughout Indonesia, the Female-Headed Household Empowerment Programme (PEKKA), focusses its support on households where the head is a woman. It helps to form small women’s groups that share their experiences and know-how and undertake collective economic and social activities.

PEKKA supports these groups to influence village decision-making. In one village in South Kalimantan, PEKKA women’s groups collectively pressed for village funds to be used to support the formation of a village-owned enterprise (BUMDes).

A Muslim woman reads the Koran as she waits for iftar during the holy fasting month of Ramadan at Istiqlal Mosque in Jakarta, Indonesia May 19, 2018. Source: Reuters/Willy Kurniawan

While the national government also advocates for forming BUMDes, it is women’s collectives through the PEKKA network that, in several instances, have ensured that such enterprises meet women’s needs and are run by women.

Another example is the Institut KAPAL Perempuan network, which seeks to improve women’s skills and confidence in participating in village development. Participants of its Schools for Outstanding Women programme take part in village decision-making forums and review and evaluate working groups and district-level planning forums. In one district in East Java, the schools have been so successful that the district government is now investing in the programme so that it can reach more villages.

‘Aisyiyah — the women’s organisation affiliated with the powerful Islamic organisation Muhammadiyah — facilitates small women’s groups through its Balai Sakinah ‘Aisyiyah programme. Their efforts have seen village funds used for free pap smears, mammograms and other vital health services that are otherwise inaccessible to villagers for geographic, economic or cultural reasons.

SEE ALSO: Indonesia: Why Jokowi and Prabowo won’t be getting the indigenous vote

In other cases, women’s groups — supported by CSOs focussed on social protection, reducing violence against women and support for migrant workers — have successfully called for village funds to be used for safe houses for victims of domestic violence, protection for migrant workers and care for the elderly.

Indonesia’s women’s organisations and their networks are also bolstered by international support. The Australia–Indonesia Partnership for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment provides funding assistance to core CSOs, including those mentioned above. Through this collaboration the grassroots work of CSOs has been able to continue apace, reaching some 900 villages across 27 provinces as of mid-2018, in which some 1300 women’s groups with 32,000 members have directly or indirectly benefitted.

Even so, reducing the structural barriers to gender equality is a long-term project involving slow, hard-fought gains that are not easy to count in development indicators that are often bound by programme timeframes. The impact of such support may only be apparent well into the future.

While there are many examples of change, these remain few and far between, given the scale of investment in village development. Elected village officials must interpret ministerial directives, district policies and regulations and administrative frameworks that are at times overwhelming.

What lies inside or outside the rules and what village funds can be used for is not always clearly understood. Villagers worry that they may break the rules if they prioritise specific types of projects, even though the Village Law is intended to create space for villagers to decide their own priorities. Clearly articulating gender-inclusive targets for village priorities at the national level may go some way towards reducing the barriers to women’s empowerment.

Rachael Diprose is a Lecturer in Development Studies in the School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Melbourne.

This article is republished from East Asia Forum under a Creative Commons licence. 

China Sets Agenda For Year Ahead

The backdrop to the plenary sessions, popularly called “Lianghui”, or “Big Two”, is the spreading dissatisfaction in China with Xi Jinping and his policies. 

by Jayadeva Ranade-25 March 2019 

Does Doklam still rankle?

China has just concluded plenary meetings of the Party’s top two bodies, which set the agenda for the year ahead. 2,158 delegates of China’s political advisory body, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and 2,948 Deputies of China’s version of a parliament, the National People’s Congress (NPC), gathered in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing from 9-11 March, and 5-15 March 2019, respectively. The plenary sessions are intended to formalise approval of the 89 million-strong Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to the policies, programmes and budget of China’s leadership for the coming year.

Highlights of this NPC session included the lowered GDP growth rate of 6%-6.5% for 2019; commitment to provide 11 million new jobs and reduce rural poverty by 10 million; increase the national defence budget by 7.5% to approximately US$177.6 billion and approving a 5% increase in national security expenditure. Unprecedentedly, the Premier’s report admitted that “China faced a complicated and challenging domestic and international environment of a kind rarely seen in many years, and its economy came under new downward pressure”. In an obvious attempt to ease US pressure, his report omitted all reference to the hi-technology “Made in China 2025”. Similarly, mention of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was buried in a single line in a sub-paragraph on domestic connectivity.

The backdrop to the plenary sessions, popularly called “Lianghui”, or “Big Two”, is the spreading dissatisfaction in China with Xi Jinping and his policies. Since the latter half of last year senior Party cadres and reputed Chinese academics have publicly articulated their discontent including against the abolition of age and term-limits for the posts of Chinese President, Vice President and the CCP Politburo. They specifically warned against any return after 30 years to the “one-man” rule of Mao Zedong. Worker discontent rose with strikes in every province of China except the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Protests by veteran and demobilised soldiers added to the CCP leadership’s anxieties. Economists and owners of private enterprises too criticised government policies and failure to reform the State owned Enterprises (SoEs) who, they said, had entered every area of economic activity.

To prevent disruptive incidents and avoid embarrassment to China’s leadership, elevated levels of security were enforced. Beijing, Tianjin and other cities initiated “stability-maintenance” measures and Chinese State Councillor and Minister of Public Security, Zhao Kezhi was in Tianjin from 22 to 23 February to check safety measures. Li Chunsheng, head of the Guangdong Provincial Public Security Department, told public security officials in Guangzhou that there were sensitive anniversaries this year and warned that “hostile forces inside China have long marked this year as an important time to implement their plan—which is a vain attempt—to overthrow our system.”

Enhanced security measures were evident in Tibet because of the 60th anniversary this year of the abortive 1959 uprising against Chinese rule in Tibet and the XIVth Dalai Lama’s flight to India. Tibet was declared off-limits to journalists and foreigners for an extended period till 30 April and TAR leaders inspected Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and convened a series of conferences of security cadres to “uncover” and “eliminate” the “double-faced cadres” owing loyalty to the Dalai Lama. Chinese armed police personnel and armoured police cars staged a show of force through Lhasa on 7 March.

Despite these signs of discontent, the reports presented to the plenary sessions by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and CPPCC Chairman Wang Yang bore the firm imprimatur of Chinese President Xi Jinping and affirmed his authority. Li Keqiang and Wang Yang opened their reports with acknowledgments to Xi Jinping’s position as the “core of the Party”. Li Keqiang’s report contained 15 references to Xi Jinping and not one to Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping or his predecessors. Only Xi Jinping’s political ideology found mention in the reports. Of the 15 and 19 tasks mentioned in the reports to the NPC and CPPCC plenary sessions respectively, the first two listed following “the strong leadership of the Party Central Committee with Xi Jinping at the core” and “Xi Jinping Thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics in the New Era”.

There were some interesting, though mainly tangential, references to the India-China relationship. On the side-lines of the NPC on 8 March, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi claimed Beijing had played a “constructive role” in defusing tensions between India and Pakistan over Pulwama and, referring to the “historic” Wuhan meeting asserted that “the strategic understandings of our leaders trickle down to our people and become a common view”.

Nevertheless, the stand-off at Doklam seems to still rankle the Chinese. Discussing China’s military modernisation with two Chinese military experts on the state-owned CGTN, well known Chinese TV anchor Yang Rui referred to Doklam during his programme on 16 March. Earlier on 15 February, the state-owned PLA Daily reported that 37 NPC Deputies had proposed amendments to China’s Criminal Law to curb military-related rumours online to protect the image of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Jiang Yong, one of the Deputies and Political Commissar of the PLA Beijing Garrison Command, specifically cited “China offering soft loans of 20 billion yuan ($2.95 billion) to India in exchange for their retreat” as a “major false rumour”. This rumour, which spread rapidly across China had caused serious concern to China’s leadership. It was, very unusually, denied then by China’s Ministry of National Defence, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the CCP’s official mouthpiece, People’s Daily.

Jayadeva Ranade is a former Additional Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India and is presently President of the Centre for China Analysis and Strategy.

How China is getting Nepal into its orbit

• The highest Chinese FDI pledge went to energy-based industries
• China is using soft power in a big way in Nepal

26 March 2019 

Nepal has been slowly but surely getting into China’s orbit, enticed by some of Beijing’s policies. Among China’s policies which the Nepalese find congenial are: non-interference in internal affairs; disbursement of large amounts of money for desperately needed infrastructural development; funding of studies in Chinese universities; aid for the preservation of ancient Buddhist sites; and teaching of the Chinese language, which the Nepalese see as an avenue of mobility in the emerging world order.   

While non-interference in internal affairs of Nepal provides a solid foundation for Nepal-China relationship, massive economic and technical aid, coupled with efficiency and perfection in the execution of projects gives life to the relationship.  

A Global Times report dated August 1, 2018, quoting Nepal’s Department of Industry (DOI), said that Nepal had received a total of US$ 505 million in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) between 2017 and mid-July 2018, with Chinese investment accounting for 84% of the total, or US$ 427 million.India came second with a pledge of US$ 46 million, followed by the US with US$ Nine million.According to the DOI, China had topped the chart in committing FDI in 2016-17 and 2015-16 also.   

• Chinese Confucianism and the Chinese language are being taught in Nepal in a big way
• Nepal received an FDI pledge of US$ 57 mn in 2015-16; US$ 76 mn in fiscal 2016-17; and US$ 427 mn in fiscal 2017-18

The highest Chinese FDI pledge went to energy-based industries, with mineral, manufacturing and forest-based industries coming second, third and fourth respectively.Chinese investment in Nepal has grown in the areas of hydro-power, agriculture and tourism also.  

China will be the largest represented country in the Nepal Investment Summit to be held in Kathmandu on March 29-30, 2019. According to the Investment Board Nepal (IBN), a total of 620 investors from 38 countries have confirmed their participation in the event. Of them, 250 are Chinese participants. After China, comes India (110), Nepal (49), Myanmar (28) and Japan (20).   

During the last investment summit in March 2017, Nepal had received the largest investment pledges that had come from Chinese companies. Of the total pledged investment of US$ 13.52 billion, US$ 8.2 billion came from Chinese investors, representing 61 percent of total investment pledges made there. The President of the Beijing-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) announced at the summit that Nepal would receive loans from the AIIB starting in 2018. 

Nepal had received the largest investment pledges that had come from Chinese companies. Of the total pledged investment of US$ 13.52 billion, US$ 8.2 billion came from Chinese investors

Currently, 108 Chinese companies have invested in sectors like energy, services, tourism, agriculture, manufacturing, and mining. Two larger hydro-power schemes, one international airport, two special economic zones, and a cross-border transmission line are among major areas of Chinese investment. It is estimated that these projects have collectively generated 32,932 jobs.

Chinese investment in Nepal has been growing. Nepal received an FDI pledge of US$ 57 million in 2015-16; US$ 76 million in fiscal 2016-17; and US$ 427 million in fiscal 2017-18, according to Nepal’s Department of Industries.  

Since the visit of PM K.P. Oli’s to Beijing in March 2016,China and Nepal have accelerated cooperation under the framework of Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and have strengthened interconnection through trade, transportation, and telecommunications.   

Significant progress has been achieved in the construction of key projects like the highway bridge over Karnali River at Hilsa; the Kathmandu Ring Road reconstruction project; and construction of three economic corridors, namely the Koshi Economic Corridor, Gandaki Economic Corridor, and Karnali Economic Corridor among others.   

China and Nepal have also signed a transit agreement under which both sides have agreed to increase the number of bilateral international road freight transport lines from the existing three to 12. It is reported that the new road and rail transportation services connecting Guangdong, Tibet, and Nepal have been officially opened and goods are being transported to and from China along this route.   

The Northern rail line connecting Nepal and China is expected to cost U$2.6 billion, and the East-West line is to cost around US$7 billion. The Northern Lhasa-Kathmandu railway and the East-West railway will contribute a lot to Nepal’s tourism industry. As of date, the Chinese are the second largest group of tourists in Nepal. They could flood the area if these rail lines come up.   

Nepal-China trade has also been growing fast since 2015-2016. Of the U$10 billion of the present trade volume, Nepal’s trade with China is currently 14%,with imports from China galloping at the rate of 39% per year.   

Sino-Nepalese military ties

In December 2008,China gave military aid to Nepal worth US$ 2.6 million. During Chinese Army Chief Gen.Chen Bingde’s visit to Nepal in 2011, China announced military aid to the tune of US$ 7.7 million. In March 2017, the Chinese Defense Minister and State Councilor, Gen. Chang Wanquan, visited Kathmandu to offer a grantof US$ 32.3 million to the Nepalese Army to strengthen its capacity to deal with natural calamities and providing it equipment for the UN peacekeeping missions.   

Use of soft power

China is using soft power in a big way in Nepal in line with President Hu Jintao’ 2006 statement that China’s international status and influence needs to be “demonstrated in hard power such as the economy, science and technology, and defense, as well as in soft power such as culture.”  

Chinese Confucianism and the Chinese language are being taught in Nepal in a big way. Beijing has set up Confucius Institutes and China Study Centers. The Confucius Institute at Kathmandu University has established four Confucius Classrooms and 14 teaching sites, cultivating more than 20,000 students in all. Over a 100 Nepalese schools offer free Chinese language courses.   

Scholarships are given to Nepalese students to pursue courses in Chinese universities, where apparently they are treated well. Xinhua Net states that as of 2016, 5,160 Nepali students had studied in Chinese universities through scholarships “supported” by the Chinese government.

At the fourth gathering of Nepalese alumni in Kathmandu in November 2017, Chinese Ambassador Yu Hong noted that after finishing their studies in China, the Nepalese students were promoting the China-Nepal relations.  

Many Nepalese men marrying Chinese   

In 2011, China entered into an agreement to modernize  Lumbini, a place on the Nepal-India border, where the Buddha was born. The US$ 3 billion Lumbini project was a substantial part of Nepal’s GDP which was $35bn. The organization behind the project was the Asia Pacific Exchange and Cooperation Foundation (APECF), a quasi-governmental organization in China. China’s aim is to make Lumbini attract tourists from all parts of Asia and bring together various schools of Buddhism  

China is cultivating the Sherpa community in Nepal which is Buddhist. Many Nepalese are given permits to go to Tibet and purchase modern goods which are cheap and available in plenty there thanks to Chinese rule.   

China has not ignored the Hindus either, as the Hindus are the majority in Nepal. Beijing facilitates pilgrimages to the Hindu holy places of Mt. Kailash and the Manasarovar Lake in Tibet. 

Nepal-China trade has been growing fast since 2015-2016. Of the U$10 billion of the present trade volume, Nepal’s trade with China is currently 14%, with imports from China galloping at the rate of 39% per year