The Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn had a stormy shadow cabinet this morning.
It follows last night’s announcement that the party would now back a second referendum as an alternative to Theresa May’s Brexit deal.
Some Labour MPs have expressed anger about the change in stance, particularly those representing Leave constituencies.
One man understood to have played an important role in persuading Mr Corbyn to change course was the party’s deputy leader Tom Watson. He’s been trying to stem the flow of Remain-supporting MPs to the new Independent Group.
Tonight he’s chairing a meeting of a new grouping of Labour MPs from the party’s social democratic wing.
But is Mr Watson in step with his own voters?
We have been to his constituency of West Bromwich East, which voted Leave by a resounding margin in the 2016 referendum.
Vietnamese soldiers stand guard near the Dong Dang railway station, in Lang Son on February 25, 2019. (Photo by NHAC NGUYEN/AFP/Getty Images)
BYBILL HAYTON|
As the orange man meets the rocket man this week, the venue is also drawing attention. Vietnam, the host for U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s second meeting, is being held out as a model for North Korea to follow. The message will be: Embrace the free market, make friends with the United States, and investment and economic growth will flow in your direction. But Vietnam is currently giving the world a reminder that, fundamentally, it remains a communist state.
In what appears to be another backward step for intellectual freedom in the country, a leading academic foundation has been obliged to close down. It’s the latest episode in a dispute that began with a campaign against the translation of books by Western political theorists. The ruling Vietnam Communist Party seems to have doubled down in its campaign against ideas “contrary to the views and policies of the Party and State.”
On Feb. 20, the president of the country’s leading independent-minded organization, the Phan Chau Trinh Culture Foundation issued a public letter saying the association was closing “due to objective circumstances.” The nature of those circumstances has not yet been made clear, but the trail of evidence points toward pressure from the top. Several key figures linked to the foundation have recently been embroiled in a public dispute with the Communist Party leadership.
The closure appears to be the latest stage in a campaign by the Communist Party general secretary, Nguyen Phu Trong, to reimpose political orthodoxy after a decade of loosening control. In October 2018, Trong also became the country’s president, a dual role that has not been seen in Vietnam for half a century. In a parallel initiative to that seen in China, Trong and his supporters have been using a so-called anti-corruption campaign to eliminate their political opponents and reassert the power of the party bureaucracy.
The Phan Chau Trinh Culture Foundation was established in 2007 to encourage the exchange of ideas between Vietnam and the rest of the world. It is named after an early 20th century nationalist intellectual who established a free school to bring new ideas into the country and shake off French colonialism. The foundation’s president is Phan Chau Trinh’s granddaughter, Nguyen Thi Binh, a war hero and former vice president of Vietnam. She is now in her early 90s and looking to step down.
According to Tran Vi, the editor in chief of the dissident online magazine the Vietnamese, the foundation was unable to agree on a replacement with the Communist authorities. By law, all Vietnamese organizations—from local sports clubs to national churches—have to be registered with either a government or Communist Party supervisory organization. The Phan Chau Trinh Culture Foundation was under the supervision of the Vietnam Union of Science and Technology Associations which is, in turn, supervised by the Ministry of Science and Technology. The science union has a record of allowing more outspoken organizations to shelter under its umbrella. However, in this case its umbrella does not seem to have been strong enough to resist the storm from above.
The energy behind the Phan Chau Trinh Culture Foundation comes from a well-known writer, Nguyen Ngoc. In October 2018, in a rare and surprising move, Ngoc announced that he had resigned from the Communist Party because of its treatment of another leading intellectual, Chu Hao. Chu Hao had also resigned from the party after being disciplined for allowing his Knowledge Publishing House to issue books the party said were “politically and ideologically wrong.” Among the titles the Central Inspection Commission objected to were several standard European works of political philosophy including books by John Stuart Mill, John Locke, Alexis de Tocqueville, and Friedrich Hayek.
According to the Vietnamese’s Tran Vi, Nguyen Ngoc and Chu Hao were the two leading candidates to replace Binh as the Phan Chau Trinh Culture Foundation’s president. However, “given what happened last year, regarding them leaving the party, it is almost impossible for the government to approve either one to be the new leader, leading to the closure.” Although Ngoc and Hao were members of the Communist Party, they were also critics of many of its policies. In December 2012 they, along with hundreds of others, signed“A Call for Human Rights,” asking the National Assembly to abolish Article 88 of the Penal Code that punishes “crimes of propaganda against the State” and strike down a government decree invoked to prevent demonstrations. The two men have been prominent critics of China’s behavior toward Vietnam, particularly in the South China Sea.
In 2008, the foundation established annual prizes to honor academics who had made outstanding contributions to Vietnamese education. It is possible that the foundation’s choices of whom to honor contributed to its closure. Among them was one of the leading figures in Vietnamese studies in the United States, Cornell University’s Keith Taylor, whose 2013 book A History of the Vietnamese radically revised many of the more nationalist accounts of the country’s history.
Most critically, Taylor has also organized events examining the history of the Vietnam War from the perspective of South Vietnam. According to Hue-Tam Ho Tai, a professor emerita of Vietnamese studies at Harvard University, that “bothered a lot of leaders in Hanoi.” The foundation tried to give the award to Taylor in 2014 but was blocked from doing so by the party. They tried again in 2015 and overcame the objections. However, the Communist Party’s daily newspaper Nhan Dan (“The People”) carried denunciations of Taylor’s work for four straight days afterward.
There has been no comment from Vietnam’s government or the Communist Party about why the foundation has closed. Democracy campaigners will say that the party has deliberately silenced an influential advocate of political reform. Some will suspect that the closure was directly requested by Beijing in order to silence the domestic anti-China constituency.
All this may offer Kim Jong Un some reassurance. As Vietnam demonstrates, it is entirely possible to have 6 percent economic growth, booming foreign investment, one-party rule, and a silenced opposition. Perhaps Hanoi does have something to teach Pyongyang after all.
Bill Hayton is an associate fellow at Chatham House.
Anti-Taiwan independence movement protesters in Washington DC
Wednesday, 27 February 2019
The year 2019 marks the 70th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China, and also the heartbreaking 70 years of the split between Taiwan and mainland China. As the Chinese Ambassador to Sri Lanka, I would like to talk about the cross-Taiwan Strait relations and explain the Taiwan issue to Sri Lankan friends for a better understanding on this core interest of China.
To begin our story, please allow me to quote Yu Guangzhong, a famous poet from Taiwan and his well-known poem ‘Nostalgia’: “When I was a child, nostalgia was a tiny stamp, connecting me here on this shore, with my mother far away on that shore. After I grew up, nostalgia was a ferry ticket, linking me here on this coast, and my bride far away on that coast. Now, nostalgia is a shallow strait, separating me here at this end, from my mainland at the other end.”
For many years, this poem has deeply touched and influenced generations of compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, connecting all Chinese in hearts and minds, making the dream of national unity as a beacon that lights up our way forward.
What is the Taiwan issue?
Basically, the Taiwan issue is a question for China to end the status of cross-strait secession and to realise complete national unification. The Taiwan issue is a fundamental issue concerning China’s core interests and the common will of all the Chinese people in the world.
Its significance can be explained as follows: Firstly, it is left over from the China’s civil war and is purely China’s internal affairs. Secondly, it is concerning China’s sovereignty and territory integrity, and how China is maintaining her national dignity and fighting against external interventions. Thirdly the basic conflict is between the secession and anti-secession, ‘Taiwan independence’ and unification, ‘One China’ policy and the ‘Two States’ illusion.
The Taiwan Island has been China’s territory since ancient times
The Chinese Government in ancient ages has already set up administrations and jurisdiction on this island. From 1624 to 1662, the Dutch and Spanish colonialists invaded the Taiwan Island, but only after a few years they were expelled by the Chinese military and civilians.
In 1895 Japan forced the dying Qing Empire to sign the unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki and occupied the Taiwan Island until the end of WWII. In 1943 the Cairo Declaration signed by China, United States and British Governments declared that Japan must unconditionally return the Chinese territories including the Taiwan Island to China.
In 1945 the Potsdam Declaration issued by China, United States and British Governments ruled that the contents of the Cairo Declaration must be carried out. In August 1945 Japan surrendered and committed to faithfully fulfil the rules and its obligations in the Potsdam Declaration. On 25 December 1945, the incumbent Kuomintang Government resumed the sovereignty of the Taiwan Island, etc.
The split status of the cross-strait will not change the fact that there is only one China in the world, and the legal truth that Taiwan Island is an inalienable part of China. After being defeated by the Communist Party in 1949, part of the Kuomintang administration personnel retreated to Taiwan Island. With support from the United States, they continued to use the designations ‘Republic of China’ and ‘Government of the Republic of China’. But this will not change the fact and the legal status that the Taiwan Island is an inalienable part of China.
In the political aspect, since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese Government upholds and insist that there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, the Government of the P.R.C. is the sole Government representing the whole of China.
During the last 40 years, the Kuomintang authority also insists that the Taiwan Island is an unalienable part of China and there is only one China in the world and they firmly opposed the ‘Two States’ and ‘Taiwan independence’ though they refused to admit the legal status of the Government of P.R.C.
On 1992, both sides of the cross-strait reached a consensus on the fact that both the Mainland and the Taiwan Island are part of China, both sides should make efforts for the national unification. The consensus is well-known as ‘1992 consensus,’ the community of Taiwan always followed the principles of this consensus except for only very small number of ‘Taiwan independence’ forces.
In the legal aspect, since the founding of the P.R.C. on 1 October 1949, the Republic of China has lost its dominance in Chinese history and the Central People’s Government of P.R.C. became the sole legal Government of China and the sole Government representing the whole of China. According to the well-established rules and regulations of international laws, the turnover of the regime will not change China’s subject of international law, the Government of P.R.C. certainly has the right to have and exercised the sovereignty of whole China including Taiwan Island.
In the reaction of the international community aspects, the One China Policy has gained the understanding and support of the international community. According to UN Resolution No. 2758, the People’s Republic of China has restored its lawful seat and legitimate right in the United Nations. According to the joint communique on establishing China-US diplomatic relations signed in 1978, the US Government acknowledged that the Government of P.R.C. is the sole Government representing the whole of China and also acknowledged China’s position that there in only one China in the world and the Taiwan Island is part of China.”
Now, China has established diplomatic relations with 178 countries all over the world including Sri Lanka, all of them acknowledge the principle of One China and commit to handle relations with the Taiwan regime within the framework of the One China policy. During the official visit of Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe on 2016, the Sri Lankan Government reiterated in the Joint Statement that it would continue to stick to the One China policy and would support the efforts of the Chinese Government in safeguarding national unity.
Cross-strait unification is an irreversible historic trend
In recent decades, China’s development has scored remarkable achievements, people’s living conditions have upgraded dramatically, one-fifth of the world’s population had been lifted from poverty. In 2010, the Chinese economy became the second in the world. In 2018, China’s GDP had exceed 90 trillion RMB (about $ 13.7 trillion), the per capita of GDP is around $ 10,000. In recent years, China contributed 30% of global economic growth and has become an economic powerhouse and anchor of stability.
On 2 January, President Xi Jinping’s speech at the 40th anniversary of issuing ‘Message to Compatriots in Taiwan’ has mentioned clearly that the future of Taiwan lies in national unity, the well-being of the compatriots of Taiwan lies in national rejuvenation. China must be and will be reunified. Anyone or any force cannot change the de facto and de jure that Taiwan is part of China, the Mainland and Taiwan Island are all members of the whole China. The historic trend of the rise of China, the national rejuvenation and the national reunification are unstoppable.
Peaceful unification and ‘one country, two systems’ are the best way to realise national unification
‘One country, two systems’ is to ensure the wellbeing of the compatriots of Taiwan, on the basis of considering the reality of the Taiwan’s community and its social system. The concrete accomplishment of the ‘one country, two systems’ will fully consider the reality of Taiwan’s community and its social system, will fully absorb the opinions and suggestions of the people from both sides of the strait and will also fully consider the wellbeing of the compatriots of Taiwan.
On the basis of safeguarding national sovereignty, security and development interests, after the peaceful unification, the social system and the lifestyle of the compatriots of Taiwan will be fully respected, the property, religions and legal interests will be fully protected.
‘Taiwan independence’ goes against the trend of history and will lead to a dead end
For 70 years since the foundation of the P.R.C., the Chinese Government has always firmly safeguarded its sovereignty and territory integrity. The compatriots across the Taiwan straits will unite their efforts to defeat any form of ‘two states,’ ‘One China, One Taiwan’ or ‘Taiwan independence’ and win the anti ‘Taiwan independence’ and anti-secession fight.
Chinese people should not fight fellow Chinese people. Mainland China will show its utmost sincerity and best efforts to fight for peaceful reunification, because peaceful reunification will benefit the compatriots from both sides of the strait and the whole nation. But we will not create any opportunity for any kind of ‘Taiwan independence’ activities.
We make no promise to renounce the use of force and reserve the option of taking all necessary means, but these means are just aimed at the external intervention and a very small number of ‘Taiwan independence’ separatists. The compatriots from both sides of the strait should join together to realise peace, to protect peace and to enjoy peace.
No interference from outside The adherence to the ‘One China’ policy is a well-accepted norms of international relations and common understanding of the international community. The Chinese people’s efforts of anti ‘Taiwan independence’ activities and justice to realise national unification are widely supported by the international community, including Sri Lanka. We highly value and appreciate this stand. Chinese domestic affairs should be decided by the Chinese people. We object to any external interference.
China’s reunification does not harm any country’s legitimate interests, including their economic interests in Taiwan. It will only bring more development opportunities to other countries, inject positive energy into prosperity and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, and make greater contribution to foster a community with a shared future for mankind, to the peace and development of the world and also to the cause of human progress.
I suppose that the Sri Lankan people can understand the meaning of unification, sovereignty and territorial integrity best, as well as the feelings of the Chinese people. It’s our common dream that the nostalgia will be dispersed and national unification will be realised not far ahead.
(The writer is the Ambassador of the People’s Republic of China.)
To ensure that only authorised users have access to the information, blockchains use cryptography-based digital signatures that verify identities. A user signs transactions with a “private key,” which is generated when an an account is created. A private key typically is a long and random alphanumeric code, known only to the person who controls the account.
Using complicated algorithms, blockchains also create “public keys” from private keys. Public keys are known to the public and make it possible to share information. For instance, a bitcoin wallet address is a public key. Any bitcoin user can send payments to that address. However, only the person with the private key can spend the bitcoin.
From researchingblockchain and China’s internet control measures, I can see that blockchain systems’ features are in conflict with the goals of the Chinese Communist Party. Truly decentralised blockchains will challenge the ability of authoritarian nations to maintain a tight grip over their populations.
Since Ethereum transactions are permanent and public, anyone can read the letter. The posts cannot be tampered with. Since they are distributed among many computers in decentralised networks, it is not possible for Chinese internet censors to pressure any company to remove them.
The Chinese government has been alarmed about blockchain censorship resistance. Starting in February, a new regulation of the Cyberspace Administration of China requires users to provide real names as well as national ID card numbers or mobile phones to use blockchains. Law enforcement must be able to access data posted on the blockchain when necessary. Blockchain service providers are required to keep relevant records about transactions and other relevant information and report illegal use to authorities. They also need to prevent the production, duplication, publication and dissemination of contents that are banned by Chinese laws.
According to the new regulation, blockchain services are also required to remove “illegal information” quickly to stop it from spreading. This requirement is puzzling because, in commonly understood blockchains, information stored is immutable and thus cannot be removed.
The first blockchain served as the public transaction ledger of the cryptocurrency bitcoin. Source: igorstevanovic/shutterstock
Blockchains with Chinese characteristics
The Chinese strategy toward modern technology is to balance economic modernisation and political control.
The former head of the People’s Bank of China’s digital currency research institute, Yao Qian, argued against the need for community consensus in which all users engage in transactions and governance related decisions. He favored a multi-center system, in which consensus is managed by several main nodes. Intervention can be applied in case of emergency. If needed, data can be rolled back, and transactions can be reversed. The system can even be shut down.
China has been the first nation to rank blockchains. Most blockchains that rank high are developed in China or have strong Chinese connections. It is easier for the government to access and control such blockchains. It is impossible for a Chinese blockchain company to operate and succeed in China without helping the government to achieve its censorship goals.
The blockchain most favored by the Chinese government, EOS, uses a model where users vote for representatives. Only the representatives verify transactions and make decisions regarding system updates. All transactions and governance decisions in EOS are processed and approved by only 21 main nodes, known as supernodes. Twelve of the EOS supernodes are in China. This makes it easier for the government to control blockchains, since the penalty of noncompliance with Chinese regulations is high for China-based supernodes.
The third-ranked blockchain, Ontology, and the seventh, Neo, have smaller numbers of main nodes: seven each. Censorship can be easily enforced in these blockchain thanks to small numbers of main nodes, mainly in China, involved in transactions and governance decisions.
Struggle for control
China’s approach to blockchain regulation reflects the tension it faces between using modern technologies to maintain control and using them to stimulate economic growth. The Chinese government wouldn’t allow blockchain implementation without significant modification. Blockchain applications modified to satisfy China’s have lost fundamental elements of the original technology.
These examples illustrate that blockchains are being developed that help suppress contents that are objectionable to the Chinese government. Activists who are vocal against the Chinese government may also be barred from using some blockchains, such as Neo. In this way, China could also emerge as a role model for other authoritarian regimes in developing censorship-enabled blockchain solutions.
BARCELONA (Reuters) - The security of next-generation 5G networks has dominated this year’s Mobile World Congress in Barcelona, with conflicting views on the risks of moving to the new technology being debated on stage and in backroom meetings.
5G promises super-fast connections which evangelists say will transform the way we live our lives, enabling everything from self-driving cars to augmented-reality glasses and downloading a feature-length film to your phone in seconds.
But there are also security concerns, some of which have fueled a drive by the United States and others to remove Chinese-made equipment from Western networks.
The concerns can be broken down into three main areas:
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
As 5G becomes embedded in everything from hospitals to transport systems and power plants it will rapidly become a part of each country’s critical national infrastructure.
This makes the consequences of the networks failing or being deliberately sabotaged in a cyber attack significantly more serious.
“What makes people concerned is that you are not going to use 5G only for smartphones and consumers, you will connect, over time, infrastructure that is at the very core of our societies,” said
Thomas Noren, head of 5G commercialization business area networks at equipment maker Ericsson.
Ericsson, Huawei and Nokia are the world’s leading suppliers of telecoms equipment.
MORE CONNECTIONS
As 5G makes high-speed internet increasingly available, the number of devices in the network will increase dramatically.
These will include traditional mobile and broadband connections, but also internet-enabled devices from dishwashers through to advanced medical equipment. Industry association GSMA forecasts the number of internet-enabled devices will triple to 25 billion by 2025.
The larger the network, the more opportunities there are for hackers to attack, meaning there is an increasingly complex system with more parts that need protecting.
“Once you have complexity across a broader system, regardless of what it is, the complexity itself is a vulnerability,” said Gee Rittenhouse, senior vice president for security at networking gear maker Cisco.
“You don’t have a coherent view through the system, and once you don’t have that coherent view there are gaps, and the adversaries... take advantage of those gaps, which open up security holes.”
DISTRIBUTED SYSTEM
One of 5G’s biggest changes is the ability to take the advanced computing power usually kept in the protected “core” of a network and distribute it to other parts of the system.
This will provide more reliable high-speed connections, and also means that future technologies such as augmented-reality glasses will not need inbuilt computing power because they can pull it from the network instead.
But it also means engineers will no longer be able to clearly segregate the sensitive and less-restricted parts of the system.
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“It is going to fundamentally change the architecture of the network,” Nokia CEO Rajeev Suri told Reuters.
The United States and others have warned that this means equipment made by Chinese companies such as Huawei Technologies, which Washington has accused of spying for Beijing, will have access to protected information.
Huawei has denied the allegations.
Additional reporting by Douglas Busvine; Editing by Georgina Prodhan and Jane Merriman
President Trump’s former personal lawyer Michael Cohen described his work over the past decade as Trump’s “fixer” at a hearing on Feb. 27.(Video: JM Rieger/Photo: Matt McClain/The Washington Post)
For more than seven hours Wednesday, Michael Cohen unspooled a withering portrait of President Trump, painting his longtime patron as a liar and a fraud in starkly personal terms.
He described how Trump ordered him to lie to the first lady about his relationship with an adult-film star and personally directed a hush-money scheme. He said Trump inflated his net worth to try to secure loans and to boost his status. He recounted how Trump made racist remarks, claiming he said at one point that African Americans were “too stupid” to vote for him.
It was a stunning turn for a man who served asTrump’s lawyer and all-purpose fixer for more than a decade, a role he onceembraced with unapologetic ferocity — pledging to take a bullet on the mogul’s behalf as evidence of his loyalty.
On Wednesday, he was equally zealous about the president’s failings. During occasionally emotional testimony before the House Oversight Committee, Cohen used his backstage view of Trump to level a broad attack against the president’s character.
“Since taking office, he has become the worst version of himself,” Cohen said. “He is capable of behaving kindly, but he is not kind. He is capable of committing acts of generosity, but he is not generous. He is capable of being loyal, but he is fundamentally disloyal.”
President Trump’s former personal lawyer Michael Cohen called Trump a “racist,” a “conman” and a “cheat” on Feb. 27.(Reuters)
Cohen’s depiction of himself as a credible witness was complicated by his own admitted criminal conduct and past lies — including false statementshe made previously to Congress.
Altogether, he has pleaded guilty to nine felonies, including tax evasion and campaign finance violations. In May, he is scheduled to begin serving a three-year prison sentence, the culmination of his dramatic fall from Trump intimate to outcast and felon.
Throughout the day, Republicans members of the Oversight panel repeatedly used Cohen’s lies to disparage him and challenge his veracity.
“Certainly it’s the first time a convicted perjurer has been brought back to be a star witness in a hearing,” Rep. Jim Jordan (R-Ohio) told Cohen, deriding him as a “cheat” and a “fraudster” who is about to go to prison. Referring to the Democrats, Jordan said, “They just want to use you, Mr. Cohen. You’re their patsy today, Mr. Cohen.”
Cohen largely absorbed the assault without dissent, casting himself as a cautionary tale for other Trump allies. Michael Cohen, longtime fixer and attorney for President Trump, is expected to testify publicly Feb. 27 before the House Oversight Committee.(Monica Akhtar/The Washington Post)
Asked during his testimony if White House staffers may end up in legal jeopardy because of their allegiance to the president, he replied, “Sadly, if they follow blindly like I have, the answer is yes.”
Cohen described a widespread culture of lying around Trump, as he sought toexplain why he stayed by the president’s side for so long.
He described how their schemes evolved from “trivial” to “significant and dangerous” as Trump graduated from private businessman and television celebrity to the Republican presidential nominee.
He portrayed himself as an unquestioning member of acultlike following, saying he carried out the president’s orders “and concealed his illicit acts” without hesitation because “I was so mesmerized by Donald Trump that I was willing to do things for him that I knew were absolutely wrong.”
“Being around Mr. Trump was intoxicating,” Cohen said. “When you were in his presence, you felt like you were involved in something greater than yourself — that you were somehow changing the world.”
Throughout the day, he offered an insider’s unvarnished view of Trump, a perspective rarely seen by the public.
“He doesn’t give you orders; he speaks in code,” Cohen testified, seated alone at the witness table, his New York roots audible in his husky voice. “And I understand the code because I’ve been around him for a decade.”
He claimed Trump “frequently told me that his son Don Jr. had the worst judgment of anyone in the world.”
Branding the president a “racist,” Cohen recalled that Trump told him that “only black people would live that way” as they drove through a poor Chicago neighborhood.
After slashing his own employees’ salaries “in half — including mine” in 2008, Cohen said that Trump boasted about the $10 million tax refund he received from the Internal Revenue Service “and said that he could not believe how stupid the government was for giving ‘someone like him’ that much money back.”
At another point, as reporters were asking about Trump obtaining a medical deferment to avoid military service in Vietnam, Cohen said Trump told him, “You think I’m stupid? I wasn’t going to Vietnam.’ ”
As for Trump’s view of his chances as the 2016 presidential campaign unfolded, Cohen said, “He never expected to win the primary. He never expected to win the general election. The campaign — for him — was a marketing opportunity.”
“Donald Trump is a man who ran for office to make his brand great, not to make our country great,” Cohen testified. “Mr. Trump would often say this campaign was going to be the ‘greatest infomercial in political history.’”
Cohen spent more than a decade championing his boss’s brand and threatening potential foes that he would “come at you, grab you by the neck, and I’m not going to let you go.”
Like Trump, who is from Queens, Cohen grew up on the edge of New York City, on Long Island, thirsting to conquer Manhattan, the epicenter of wealth, power and glamour. Before meeting Trump, Cohen became rich as a personal injury lawyer and various investments, including the taxi business.
Cohen also invested in New York City real estate, paying millions for apartments in Trump properties, including Trump World Tower, where the developer, at the suggestion of Donald Trump Jr., drafted Cohen to beat back a 2006 revolt by the building’s co-op board.
The following year, Trump hired Cohen as his counsel.
While helping to coordinate Trump’sflirtation with a 2014 New York gubernatorial campaign, Cohen told Republican strategists he wanted to run for mayor. At one point, Cohen openly floated the idea of running on a statewide ticket as Trump’s pick for lieutenant governor.
The specter of Cohen talking up his own political aspirations while supposedly working on behalf of Trump rankled the billionaire’s political advisers, some of whom said they began to question whether the attorney was as selfless as he proclaimed.
Yet in his public statements, Cohen’s fealty to his boss never wavered — that is, until July, several monthsafter the FBI raided his residence and his office, when he declared that his “first loyalty” was to his family and country.
“Over the past year or so, I have done some real soul-searching,” Cohen told the committee Wednesday in his opening remarks. “For those who question my motives for being here today, I understand. I have lied, but I am not a liar. I have done bad things, but I am not a bad man. I have fixed things, but I am no longer your ‘fixer,’ Mr. Trump.”
More than seven hours later, his eyes tired and face drawn, Cohen issued a last warning “to those who support the president and his rhetoric as I once did.”
“I pray the country doesn’t make the same mistakes that I have made,” he said, “or pay the heavy price that my family and I are paying.”
A combination of photos of U.S. President Donald Trump meeting with North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un at the Capella Hotel on Sentosa island in Singapore June 12, 2018. REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst
27 Feb 2019
SINGAPORE: North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and US President Donald Trump were at pains to show they were getting along in the well-choreographed first moments of their meeting in Hanoi, body language experts said.
The first images of their meeting in the Vietnamese capital showed them both walking towards each other against a backdrop of intertwined flags hands outstretched, before they clasped and turned in sync to face the flashes of the assembled media.
"They are both making an effort to show their relationship has improved since the last time," said Allan Pease, an Australian body language expert and author of several books on the topic. "The mirroring between them is quite strong."
Pease said "mirroring" was how people who want to show that they have a rapport imitate each other’s body language to put the other at ease.
Both of the leaders sought to project a sense of command with "alpha male"
Trump has since declared he and Kim "fell in love" after exchanging letters, a far cry from the threats and insults traded in late 2017 when Trump called Kim "Little Rocket Man" and a "sick puppy", while Kim said Trump was a "dotard" - an archaic word meaning senile old person. Trump, 72, is more than twice the age of Kim, 35.
Kim looked far more confident compared to their last meeting in Singapore, while Trump welcomed Kim with his palm facing up - a sign, said body language expert Karen Leong, that was almost supplicatory.
"Kim was walking towards Trump far more briskly with his hand extended. Previously in Singapore, Kim was far more hesitant. There is much more sense of familiarity," said Leong, managing director of Singapore-headquartered Influence Solutions and author of the book Win People Over.
"Trump wants the rapport. He is not here to become the bully, he is here to win Kim."
There were signs of tension, however, when the two men sat down after the initial handshake.
Pease noted Trump – sitting in his traditional, dominant position with hands forward making a steeple shape – furrowed his brow. Kim’s fingers were clenched in his lap, a position that shows frustration and self-control.
“They both smiled only when they were expected to, and how they practised it. They were performing,” he added.
The summit in Singapore marked the first time a sitting American president met with a North Korean leader, but the vague agreement struck to work towards complete denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula has produced few concrete results.
Venezuela’s political crisis is in a tenuous stalemate. Opposition leader Juan Guaidó sought to bring a quick end to President Nicolás Maduro’s rule several weeks ago by declaring himself Venezuela’s legitimate president and trying to persuade the military to topple him. Maduro dug in. So far, it appears, the military remains so deeply entrenched in the economy and profits so handsomely from support of Maduro that it has cast its lot with him.
Now both the Venezuelan government and the popular opposition are engaged in a dangerous game of brinkmanship. Guaidó is trying to back the military into deciding whether to topple Maduro or take uncomfortable and unsavory positions—like blocking international aid and even firing on peaceful protesters—as it has in recent days, tarnishing its reputation with civilians. And Maduro is trying to tar the opposition as ineffective stooges of a foreign plot to dislodge him, in an effort to endure despite the economy dropping into free fall.
The actions on both sides carry deep risks. If the opposition wins, it will inherit an economy in shambles and a divided society, complicating its ability to build a stable democracy. If Maduro wins, he will further tighten his grip on power and strangle the possibility of a transition for the foreseeable future.
Amid the chaos, the window for the most effective solution to Venezuela’s crisis—a negotiated political transition—is closing. But recent reports have surfaced that elements of the opposition are trying to craft just such a deal by reaching out to ruling Socialist Party (PSUV) officials and military generals. In a recent interview, Edgar Zambrano, the vice president of the National Assembly, argued that the opposition was not seeking political revenge and that, “This transition requires a big national agreement between the country’s political forces.”
Lessons from other transitions to democracy around the world can shed light on how such an agreement could be forged in Venezuela. The best shot for democracy is for the mainstream opposition to bring along the moderate elements of the Chavismo movement while leaving out Maduro in a way that will be stable while also delivering enough justice to satisfy the population as a whole.
First, Venezuela’s notoriously divided opposition must stay united while also sidelining its most extreme elements, who advocate regime change by any means necessary followed by the severe prosecution of the PSUV. Many citizens have suffered from hunger, persecution, and declining living standards under Maduro and have every reason to want to destroy Chavismo and prosecute its leading figures and allies.
If the opposition takes power, it will have to quickly deliver on popular demands like greater political freedom and an improved economy while carefully tempering the most extreme demands for justice. When the opposition legislator Stalin González recently made the casethat “Chavismo is not just Maduro,” the popular pushback on social media was strong and swift. Many people feel that the regime has to be punished for its misdeeds, if not in revenge at least in the service of justice.
But the threat of punishment itself might prevent a transition from taking place. Only when mainstream elements of the regime believe that they can survive beyond Maduro will they be willing to strike a deal.
Although the Venezuelan opposition has no Nelson Mandela, its current leadership should heed Mandela’s example. When Mandela went from being a political prisoner to the president of post-apartheid South Africa over the course of four years, he taught that democracy requires patience: “Just as we told the people what we would do, I felt we must also tell them what we could not do,” Mandela said. “Many people felt life would change overnight after a free and democratic election, but that would be far from the case. … You must have patience.”
Second, the military has to be persuaded to support the transition and either topple Maduro or force him to capitulate. To do so, amnesty protections are not enough. Since former President Hugo Chávez took power, the Venezuelan military has become deeply involved in a wide range of profitable economic activities. Chávez effectively gave the military control of Venezuela’s crown jewel: the state-run oil company, PDVSA. While falling oil prices and a lack of investment have sapped PDVSA of its vitality, it remains the country’s biggest source of revenue. The military also presides over imports and exports, holds contracts for public housing projects, and has mining and oil services concessions. It also reportedly controls lucrative drug trafficking routes and money laundering operations.
To encourage the military to support a transition, the opposition needs to guarantee it legal and direct sources of revenue. The most obvious option is to deliver it a share of PDVSA revenue. This should be coupled with autonomy over their chain of command, at least for five to 10 years, and an important position in defending Venezuela’s borders and port-based economic activity.
While this appears unsavory, it is commonplace in negotiated democratic transitions. Consider Chile’s transition to democracy in 1989. As part of the deal, the top military brass were given constitutionally protected amnesties, direct positions in the Chilean Senate, a majority position on the National Security Council, constitutional oversight, and 10 percent of the country’s copper revenues delivered directly to the military’s budget—an enormous sum given Chile’s mineral-reliant economy.
Third, key elements of the ruling PSUV have to be convinced that the status quo is unsustainable and that they could compete and even win political office in a democratic system. The PSUV still has a strong organizational base around the country. Together with its predecessor, the Fifth Republic Movement, it has long organized civilian groups and won offices at the mayoral, gubernatorial, and national levels in elections that were largely free and fair through the 2000s, and competitive but biased ever since. And many of its core principles—national ownership of major resources, social and economic equality, and popular participation in governance—remain widely popular. This puts it in a comparatively strong position relative to a party like the ruling National Party that handed over power to end apartheid in South Africa.
But the party has also presided over an unparalleled decline in the Venezuelan economy and is riddled with corruption and patronage. Furthermore, key officials have been linked to serious drug trafficking charges and other illicit activities.
The tricky task will be to bring along officials who are important enough to maintain the PSUV intact while cleaving off the most unsavory elements, Maduro included. Ideally, figures like Diosdado Cabello who operate the political rather than the repressive or illicit arms of the PSUV could make a deal with the opposition while sidelining the Maduro faction.
Fourth, the opposition and moderate PSUV elements have to agree upon a transitional government with power-sharing elements following national elections. Given the PSUV’s recent record under Maduro, it will expect to be steamrolled if national elections are held. It may therefore fear being permanently politically buried. To alleviate these fears, it needs a chance to help rehabilitate its reputation by taking a part in the governance of recovery.
South Africa is a useful model here. The first five years of democracy in South Africa after the end of apartheid were governed by a transitional power-sharing agreement in which the newly empowered African National Congress agreed that the outgoing apartheid National Party would be part of the government despite a lack of popular support—the party only won 20 percent of the vote in the 1994 elections. Cabinets were to make consensus decisions over major policies. This helped to stabilize South Africa’s fragile new democracy by incorporating its most likely potential spoilers.
Finally, the opposition needs to appeal to citizens as a whole to play a bigger role in the country’s future. While the opposition needs to be cautious and inclusive in the short term, democracy can only succeed in the long run if it comes to truly represent the will of the Venezuelan people. This means revisiting core elements of the transition deal years in the future.
Swiftly revising the terms of a negotiated deal threaten the possibility of a backlash by the PSUV and military. But if everyone expects that the rules of the game will be different in 10 or 15 years, they can begin to change their behavior accordingly.
A negotiated transition in Venezuela with all of these elements can still be achieved. Rather than rattle its saber by implicitly threatening the use of force, the United States should work behind the scenes along with other governments from the region and multilateral organizations such as the Lima Group to help craft a negotiated transition.
But as the crisis over international aid delivery over the weekend demonstrates, the threats to such a deal are numerous. For one, Maduro knows that if such a deal is made, he may be cut out of it. He therefore has incentives to force the military to crack down on civilians so that the military would be more likely to be punished if there is a democratic transition, encouraging it to stiffly oppose such a transition in the first place.
His calculus could shift if he were given the option of a golden parachute, whereby he could leave the country without facing major punishment. There is at least one political patron of Venezuela who would likely be glad to have him if the alternative to a negotiated transition is an eventual outright opposition victory: Russia.
Vietnamese soldiers stand guard near the Dong Dang railway station, in Lang Son on February 25, 2019. (Photo by NHAC NGUYEN/AFP/Getty Images)
Supporters of Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó gather in Caracas Feb. 12. (Edilzon Gamez/Getty Images)