Peace for the World

Peace for the World
First democratic leader of Justice the Godfather of the Sri Lankan Tamil Struggle: Honourable Samuel James Veluppillai Chelvanayakam

Saturday, January 19, 2019

Sri Lanka: Are we ready for Gota?


by  Rajan Philips-
“Man by nature is a social animal …” ~ Aristotle
“Human beings are social animals. They are not individuals.” ~ Gotabhaya Rajapaksa at Water’s Edge
Gotabhaya Rajapaksa (GR) has announced that he is ready to be a presidential candidate if the people are also ready for it. Not to be outdone, his oldest brother Chamal Rajapaksa has also declared his readiness: ‘If Gota is ready, so am I!’ It is immaterial whether these are conditional declarations, trial balloons, or, plain bravado to enthuse their respective sponsor groups. Gotabhaya’s sponsors are the upstart professionals of Viyath Maga who see their Messiah in Gota. For Chamal, the instigators are the degenerate progressives like Vasu, Dinesh, et al who are alarmed by the prospect of a Gotabhaya candidacy and are clinging on to Chamal to protect their placements at the Rajapaksa political table. It is immaterial as well even if their declarations are co-ordinated mixed signals from the Rajapaksa house to keep Sirisena worrying and Ranil Wickremesinghe guessing. And who cares if the signals are only aimed at the decision-making Rajapaksas-Mahinda-Basil-Namal and no one else.
What matters is the political universe that GR seems to be sketching for the benefit of his followers and the attention of all others. At their most recent gathering, after being sidelined for nearly three months by the tumults of the Sirisena-Rajapaksa power-grab antics and aftermaths, Rajapaksa addressed his faithful in esoteric terms – lauding the virtues of nationalism as opposed to globalism, pitching for a Sri Lankan identity rising above the island’s ethno plurality, and asserting (falsely) the collective rights of society over the individual rights of its members. He got into some terminological twists (‘Jathikathwaya’ vs ‘Jathiwadaya’) in differentiating between racism or communalism (even casteism) and nationalism in the national language (a terminological pitfall in articulating the theory and experience of nationalism, that is common to almost all South Asian languages), but rescued himself by claiming that diaspora Sri Lankans, given their life on the global platform, appreciate the attributes of Sri Lankan nationalism better than resident Sri Lankans.
The simple difference is that to every diaspora group, long-distance nationalism of the old country is the convenient antidote to the social and political alienation that a good number of diaspora members experience in their immigrant countries at least in the earlier years after their relocation. GR himself is a perfect illustration of this duality. A dual citizen of Sri Lanka and the United States, he successfully fought a war for the Sri Lankan government and now wants to be its President. But he must first renounce the US citizenship. Ay, there’s the rub, and more on it later.
The crux of his message is that Sri Lankans must celebrate nationalism as opposed to globalism, must privilege collective rights over individual rights, and as “social animals” work together to liberate Sri Lanka and the poor among Sri Lankans out of their poverty. There could not have been a more glittering gathering in Sri Lanka, or elsewhere, for a political homily on poverty, than the Viyath Maga audience, who assembled in their Saturday best to hear and cheer their political neophyte. And no one goes to Water’s Edge to talk poverty. No, poverty eradication is not on the agenda of the Colombo busybodies who are flocking behind Gotabhaya Rajapaksa.
They want to get back to the levers of power and influence at the commanding heights of politics and the economy from which they were suddenly wrenched off in January 2015. They want to restart from where they left and to them GR is the man who can take them back to the seats of power. They are fed up with the self-gratifying politics of Ranil Wickremesinghe and frustrated after the Maithri-Mahinda power grab cockup in October-December last year. The Gota-for-President campaign they launched last May with the Shangri La bash has since been sidelined and ambushed by developments within the Rajapaksa tent and outside it. Now, they want their man front and centre both inside tent and in the country at large.
Yet, the Gotabhaya candidacy is not a certainty. It is certainly more potent than the mendicant candidacy of Maithripala Sirisena. GL Peiris could not and did not brush aside Gotabhaya’s declaration of presidential readiness the way he (GLP) dismissed Sirisena’s vicarious overture through Nimal Siripala de Silva. Only Mahinda Rajapaksa can decide who the presidential candidate will be – that was Peiris’ putdown to Sirisena and Siripala. But commenting on Gotabhay’s candidacy is clearly above GL Peiris’ pay-grade in the Rajapaksa universe. Leaving Peiris aside, Mahinda Rajapaksa’s apparent reluctance to forthrightly endorse his brother’s presidential candidacy might be due to his caution about GR’s ability to successfully transition from his military background to a winning presidential candidate. Many other reasons have also been suggested for the former President’s reluctance about his younger brother’s candidacy.

Individual rights in a social animal farm

A few days after the Water’s Edge scripted remarks on social animals and individual rights, GR seemingly tripped himself up talking about his US citizenship. Given the speculation that he may not be able to give up his citizenship in time to be eligible to be a presidential candidate, he spoke like an American. He told reporters after appearing before the Special Corruption High Court in Colombo, that his US citizenship was an entirely personal choice and he could withdraw it at any moment. “It is a personal choice and I can make any decision on that. I can either seek to withdraw it or continue with it …. The US is the father of Liberal Democracy. The country cannot make a person a US citizen by force.”
Personal choices are individual rights by another name, and by GR’s Water’s Edge logic what is sauce for him as an American citizen may not be sauce for other Sri Lankans as Sri Lankan citizens. Sri Lanka is not in any enviable position like the US in having to deal with one of its (dual) citizens renouncing his American citizenship to be President in another country. But many Sri Lankans may consider themselves to be in unenviable positions if GR were to become Sri Lanka’s President in the next presidential election. And they are the experiential victims of the illiberal effects, putting it mildly, of the Mahinda Rajapaksa presidency especially after 2009. GR, as Defence Secretary, overseeing everything from national security to urban development to legal drafting, was a huge part of it.
Every illiberal effect of those years and the direct or indirect experience of it involved individual rights. What was involved was the violation by the state and its official and unofficial agents of basic individual rights – the right of personal security, the right to personal liberty, and the rights involving private and public property. People were arrested without cause; people were kidnapped and tortured or killed; and people were just killed in broad daylight. Private and public properties were sequestered and abused for the corrupt benefits of those in power. None of them have been proven in a court of law, but there is no doubt that every one of them happened and there are direct and indirect victims and survivors, the living but helpless proofs, carrying the physical and mental scars of the violations of individual rights. The litany of victims is long and old and needs no recounting here.
No one is accusing GR or any of the prospective presidential candidates of anything. But is it unreasonable to ask every one of them, including GR what their position is in regard to unresolved crimes and unexposed corruption, and what they will do differently, if elected as President, to address them? Will GR give the country the benefit of his understanding and the assurance that as President he will get cracking on them until every crime is investigated and resolved? He could, of course, ignore this plea and it would mean by implication that these individual loses are not worth the bother in the context of the larger schemes that he has in mind for the country.
GR’s Viyath Maga professionals will, of course, wholeheartedly agree. And that will take the country back to the slippery slope to the social animal farm, where it was heading until Maithripala Sirisena came out of nowhere and interrupted the slide. Given the special role he played as Defence Secretary under Mahinda Rajapaksa, the younger Rajapaksa’s Water’s Edge lecture on social animals and individual rights take on an ominous meaning for the future. It is too fanciful, and dangerously so, to dismiss individual rights to life and against arbitrary actions by the state as western constructs that are not relevant in Asian societies. These rights may have been formalized and codified in legal texts starting in the West, but they embody the basic human urge and aspiration to enjoy them anywhere and anytime. They are also internalized as constitutional rights in Sri Lanka, India and every Asian country that is a constitutional democracy. The alternatives are social animal farms.
Are GR and his professional faithful telling us that we put aside constitutional democracy in order to uplift Sri Lanka from its lower middle income status to the higher middle income status? Just how many more people need to be kidnapped, forced to disappear, or killed, before our average annual income goes up by a few hundred dollars? There is no political or economic project that is worth the deliberate sacrifice of even a single human life. When human lives are expended and individual rights are infringed by the state, the real reason is not any larger economic or political goal for the greater good; the real reasons are corruption, cronyism and family bandyism, and the narrow political agenda to sustain them at all cost. And, nationalism, without constitutional democracy and individual rights, has a different name: fascism. Be a Hitler, so to speak.

SRI LANKA PRESIDENT APPOINTS ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION TARGETING RULING PARTY, THE UNP.


Commission will cover period between Jan. 2015 to Dec. 2018.
Retired SC judge will head five member Commission.

Probe will cover acts of corruption, fraud, criminal breach of trust, criminal misappropriation of property, cheating and abuse or misuse of power or authority, state resources and privileges.
Interim report required within three month & final report within six months.

Sri Lanka Brief18/01/2019

President Maithripala Sirisena yesterday appointed a new anti-corruption Commission covering the period 15 January 2015 to 31 December 2018, a move that is likely to widen the existing rift between him and the UNP-led Government. The appointment of the five-member Commission was announced yesterday, while the President is away on an official visit to the Philippines.

The Gazette notification announcing the appointment of the Commission said that a large number of serious complaints and allegations had been made against persons who had held or continue to hold political office, and those who have been or continue to be public servants and officers of statutory bodies, regarding acts of corruption, fraud, criminal breach of trust, criminal misappropriation of property, cheating and abuse or misuse of power or authority, State resources, and privileges, during the period 15 January 2015 to 31 December 2018.

Hence, the President is of the opinion that it is in the interest of public security and welfare to investigate and inquire into such complaints, allegations, and information, in order to determine what measures should be taken to ensure that the law is appropriately enforced and wrongdoers dealt with in terms of the law, and that there will be no recurrence of such alleged acts, amounting to offences and abuse or misuse of power or authority.

It is authorised and empowered to conduct, or cause the conduct of, necessary criminal and forensic investigations and inquiries, and hold public and/ or confidential inquires as may be necessary.

The members of the Commission are: Retired Judge of the Supreme Court Upali Abeyrathne (Chairman), Retired Judge of the High Court Sarojini Kusala Weerawardane, Retired Auditor General P. A. Pemathilaka, Retired Ministry Secretary Lalith R. de Silva and Retired Deputy Inspector General M. K. D. Wijaya Amarasinghe.

The Commission is required to present an interim report within three months, subsequent Interim Reports once a month, and the Final Report within six months.

The terms of reference of the Commission are:

To call for and receive public complaints, information and other material relating to serious allegations against persons who have held or continue to hold political office, those who have been or continue to be public servants and officers of statutory bodies, regarding acts of corruption, fraud, criminal breach of trust, criminal misappropriation of property, cheating, and abuse or misuse of power, State resources, and privileges, which allegedly occurred during the period of 15 January 2015 to 31 December 2018 and have resulted in serious loss or damages to State assets and State revenue.

To conduct prompt, impartial, comprehensive investigations and inquiries into complaints, information and such allegations.

To identify persons who have been or are responsible in terms of the law for committing such offences, acts of wrongdoing, and abuse or misuse of power or authority, State resources, and privileges.

To identify and collect evidence available with regard to such offences and acts of wrongdoings and against persons responsible for having committed offences connected with such incidents and wrongdoing.

To identify which of the acts coming within the ambit of matters referred should be forwarded to the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption or to the Police or to any other law enforcement authority or statutory body for the conduct of necessary investigations an inquiries with the view to instituting criminal proceedings against persons alleged to have committed the said offences.

To transmit to the Attorney General investigational and inquiry material, enabling the Attorney General to consider the institution of criminal proceedings against persons alleged to have committed the said offences and prosecute the accused.

To present recommendations of the Commission regarding what action if any, should be taken against those held responsible for having committed offences and acts of wrongdoing and recommendations aimed at preventing the occurrence of such offences and acts of wrongdoing in the future.
FT

Original caption : New anti-corruption Commission likely to widen President-UNP rift.

UNP’s current ‘brand’ is losing: Is recovery possible?



People’s perception matters and it’s not only critical, it’s indispensable


“If you’re not branding yourself, you can be sure others do it for you.” 
~Unknown 
2019-01-19

The United National Party (UNP) had a problem with its branding since its earliest days. Being directly and closely identified with the Colombo-based elite usually clad in western suits, foreign-educated, uncomfortable with the vernacular and being confirmed as a political party always backing capitalist economic theories and practices, had been significant and essential elements of the then UNP. These facts are beyond refutation. Furthermore, its leadership from D.S. Senanayake up to J.R. Jayewardene belonged to this exclusive ‘club.’ I have written extensively on this subject, especially on the UNP’s perennial problem of being a ‘slave’ of the Western powers. However, this is more a perception than a fact. 

This is where ‘branding’ comes into play. The brand of any product is not what the owner of the product wants it to be; it is what the customer/consumer perceives it to be. This fundamental marketing principle seems to have evaded all the UNP leaders right up to J.R. Jayewardene’s time. Although JR himself had been a woeful victim of this perception problem as far as his own brand was concerned, he managed to put it to rest when he took over the reins of the party. Of all the UNP’s leaders in the fifties, sixties and seventies, JR was portrayed and defined by his political enemies as well as friends as one who was a lackey of the West, who had no empathy for the average man, whose policies and principles were diametrically opposed to those pursued by politicians whose reading of the pulse of the common man was much sharper and more accurate. Nevertheless, before embarking on the making and unmaking of JR’s brand, I hasten to delve into the unmaking of the UNP’s brand in general. 

S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike began his political career with the Sinhala Maha Sabha. The Sinhala Maha Sabha was a political party in Ceylon founded by Bandaranaike in 1934-35, substantially in order to promote Sinhalese culture and community interests. Nationalistic in its fundamental outlook and approach to resolving issues of the day, the Sinhala Maha Sabha attracted many a member of the locally-educated elites of the time. Having realised that he could not achieve his personal ambition of becoming the Prime Minister through the UNP, SWRD left it in 1951 and formed Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). 

If there were one politician who understood the underpinnings of political branding at that time, it was Bandaranaike. He not only knew the UNP’s branding deficiencies, he also understood what the need of the majority was at the time. He also knew that the majority Sinhalese Buddhists in Ceylonin the immediate aftermath of Independence was a largely neglected segment of the population and any emotional appeal to that vast majority, if marketed aggressively well, would be a winning formula. In other words, he created an exclusive brand for his party. From the leader downwards -- that is Bandaranaike himself -- to the ordinary electorate organiser, every activist and those Buddhist monks who supported the Bandaranaike cause took that brand new ‘brand’ across the country. Sanga, Veda, Guru, Govi, Kamkaru became that brand. And that was indeed quite a powerful and unreservedly-emotional appeal. 

In order to ‘right the untold wrongs visited upon the overwhelming majority,’ Bandaranaike most lucidly articulated, ‘the country’s political dynamic needs a right about turn.’ By ousting the UNP from power, the majority of the Ceylonese population that consisted of Sinhalese Buddhists who lived in the rural villages could assume a supreme status that they so richly deserved; English-educated and English-speaking Colombo based ‘pukka sahibs’ need to go; commanding heights of the economy must be with the people and in order to achieve that noble goal, all profit-making private business ventures must be nationalised. Caught on the crossroads of the ‘cold war’ between the Western powers led by the United States of America and the Soviet Union-led Eastern European bloc, an appeal to nationalisation of the country’s commanding heights of the economy had increasing charm. Whether Ceylon at the time possessed the administrative and financial wherewithal to run these nationalised institutions was a different matter altogether. Yet the brand that Bandaranaike created endured and it is still relevant today. 

This was the genesis of the ‘common man’s party.’ Bandaranaike and his SLFP’s not only went to great lengths to spread this new narrative as a party and the sole representative of the Sinhalese Buddhists; they also took care of the adverse narrative in respect of their main political rival UNP’s brand. Backed by the leftwing political parties at the time, Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) led by Dr. N.M. Perera, Communist Party (CP) led by Dr. S.A. Wickramasinghe and Viplavakari Sama Samaja Party (VLSSP), later Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP) led by Phillip Gunawardana, the campaign to malign the image of the UNP, the Bandaranaike stalwarts went to work. They were successful up until 1977. 
1977 was a different year. A watershed in Sri  Lanka’s politics, the unprecedented victory in 1977 for the UNP was no accident. The subjective appeal that the Bandaranaike-led coalition of the centre-left failed to change the objective conditions in the country; the common man’s misery continued and worsened by the year; the sugar-coated slogans lost their meaning and the common man’s party became an uncommon political entity governed by one single family deeply entrenched in the vested interests of a bygone era of feudalism. SWRD’s widow, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, by sheer strength of her personality, transformed that common man’s party into a party of intense corruption whose sole purpose was to enrich her family both politically and otherwise. Aided and abetted by another Bandaranaike, namely Felix Dias, Sirimavo and her SLFP presided over the affairs of the common man’s party. They crushed the foundations laid down by its founders. 

J.R. Jayewardene was one politician who understood these contradictions within the SLFP and its phoney brand of the common man’s party. After taking over the helm of the UNP 1973, JR transformed his party not overnight, but over a period of 3 to 4 years; he changed the objective conditions that surrounded his party; he transformed the party of the rich into a party of the educated rural youth who appealed to the Sinhalese Buddhist majority in the country. And he facilitated the rise of Ranasinghe Premadasa, a déclassé representative, a real common man to the helm of the party. It is not an exaggeration to surmise that Ranasinghe Premadasa would never have become the leader of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, the phoney ‘common man’s party’. 

In addition to Premadasa, leaders of the stature of Gamini Dissanayake, Lalith Athulathmudali, Nissanka Wijeratne, all educated and well-informed men of the day, rendered their time, energy and know-how to the party’s transformation from that of an uncommon man’s party into one that deeply cared about the common man. It is this UNP that Ranil Wickremesinghe, the current supremo, took over the leadership of. The UNP has not recovered from the serious setback it has suffered ever since the departure of Premadasa, Gamini and Lalith. Once again the top leadership of the UNP has become an exclusive club. It consists of some Colombo-based pseudo-intellectuals whose socio-political goals are far too divorced from those of the majority in the country. Yet the second tier of the UNP looks promising, Karu Jayasuriya, Sajith Premadasa and Navin Dissanayake. But unfortunately, the country does not see the UNP as the party of theirs; it is still portrayed as the party of Ranil Wickremesinghe and his ‘exclusive club.’ What needs to happen in order to change this adverse brand-effect of the UNP? One doesn’t have to look elsewhere. The talent, energy and motivation are all richly present within the UNP itself. When the presidential elections were called by Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2015, there was one person in the UNP who could have delivered the same or even better result that Maithripala Sirisena was successful in delivering and that was Karu Jayasuriya. Why on earth Ranil refrained from consenting to Karu Jayasuriya’s nomination is a mystery. 

A strong sense of security is a quality of a consummate leader. Ranasinghe Premadasa did not have that sense. That was why he resorted to the ugly means of preventing Gamini Dissanayake and Lalith Athulathmudali from gaining popularity among the masses. It was J.R. Jayewardene who was quintessentially secure in his position. When men and women of puny stature are invariably drawn inwards in order to secure themselves, strong ones look outwards to draw better talent to enrich the party and enhance its image. That is precisely the fundamental difference between a leader like JR and Premadasa. Ranil Wickremesinghe has fallen into the Premadasa category. 

If the United National Party is intent on being victorious at the forthcoming presidential elections, it has to change its brand. The people’s perception matters and it’s not only critical, it’s indispensable. Ranil Wickremesinghe has only one choice, he has no second option. And the one way in which he can change the brand of the party he says he loves so much is by nominating a new face for the forthcoming presidential elections. And he has to announce it now. Each day he waits without doing it is costing his party dearly. 
The writer can be contacted at vishwamithra1984@gmail.com 

When Education For Everyone Excluded Everyone Else


Uditha Devapriya
The second in a series of essays delving into the problems of our education system
logoIt has been pointed out that vernacular education in Sri Lanka predates the Kannangara reforms, an argument that is usually made by those who have an axe to grind with Kannangara and those reforms. It is, of course, a flawed argument, given that while the Morgan Committee was ostensibly concerned with the establishment of vernacular schools this was not done with the aim of providing a decent education for everyone and anyone. Indeed the cost of schooling became so prohibitive that it deterred everyone but the more affluent sections of the rural petty bourgeoisie from attending them. Besides, with the implementation of distance clauses, such schools were shut down if a missionary institution was nearby. They did not teach in English, moreover, which in colonial society was essential in getting to the top.
Antipathy to free education stems from two schools of thought. The first discounts what Kannangara did on the basis that he fuelled an entire generation of chauvinists through an education system differentiated on the basis of language and ethnicity. Kannangara, however, has been vilified like Bandaranaike for the wrong reasons here, because in the original proposals for free education he called for a bilingual education. In a context where less than 5% or 6% of the country spoke English, it was essential not only that Sinhala and Tamil be taught but also that education in swabasha be accompanied by education in the colonial tongue.
It’s ironic that the beneficiaries of free education themselves write against it, but they are preferable to that other school of thought which criticises Kannangara: those who believe that the colonial distinctions between “elite” and “mass” education promoted a nationalism that brought together all the ethnicities of the country. The proponents of this rather strange theory are, to be sure, a dying breed, and their argument rests on the assumption that the educationists who opposed the Kannangara proposals were moved by benign motives and that those proposals, when implemented, fermented rebellion against the elite (which, for these people, is strangely a bad thing).
In that sense, what Canon R. S. De Saram, Warden of S. Thomas’ College and a member of the National Education Committee, once said in a speech in front of Kannangara must be quoted verbatim:
… [i]t would be a pity if criticism should be allowed to degenerate into mere acrimony between those who differ on fundamental problems. Ill temper or partisanship will not solve our difficulties; nor the imposition by decree or otherwise of any one rigid system for all schools. On the contrary, toleration within limits of many varieties of educational practice is indicated by our varying conditions as the right and wise policy.
Note the hostility to any attempt made by the State to impose a uniform standard for all schools. If this argument can be considered valid, it can also be discounted by the simple fact that the State, i.e. the colonial government, had already implemented such a standard, for the vernacular and so-called Central Schools. There were hardly any differences between them, and they were distinguished by the lack of funds and the lack of proper maintenance they had to suffer on account of the government concentrating on the prestigious state and assisted schools.
This is not to say that the colonial government neglected other schools altogether: expenditure on education rose from Rs. 3,465,703 in 1920 to Rs. 12,053,379 in 1930, an increase of almost 250%. But the question to be raised at this point is whether the government was spending enough on schools that needed to be spent on. Even if State schools received a lion’s share of this rise in spending, it received that at a time when education had in effect been made compulsory through Ordinance No. 1 of 1920, which set up a Board of Education and empowered a Director of Education. Sydney Wanasinghe referred to this as “the first comprehensive education Ordinance” in Sri Lanka: it was followed 11 years later by the more democratic Executive Committee on Education that the Donoughmore Constitution created. Kannangara, of course, became the first Chairman of this Committee.

Ballistic missile proliferation

Afghan Security Forces personnel at the site of a car bomb attack in Kabul. Afghan Security Forces personnel at the site of a car bomb attack in Kabul.

Natasha Fernando and Sanoj Jayakody-Saturday, January 19, 2019

The Institute of National Security Studies Sri Lanka will jointly conduct South Asia Regional Seminar “Dealing with the missile threat in South Asia” with Foundation for Strategic Research, France and European Union External Action Service on January 15, 2019. This explainer on ballistic missile proliferation explains a few key aspects of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) in relation to small states with special reference to Sri Lanka.

Ballistic missiles are rocket-propelled weapons systems capable of carrying high explosives and also chemical, biological and nuclear munitions. Ballistic missiles fall into several categories such as strategic missiles (capable of being launched by land or sea), submarine-based fleet ballistic missiles, and intercontinental ballistic missiles etc. Currently, there are several states that have developed nuclear weapons: United States, Russia, United Kingdom, China, France, India, North Korea, Israel, and Pakistan.

The ballistic arms race could be traced back to the Cold War period between the former Soviet Union and the USA. Most other countries have not developed missile capability to the extent of these two States. However, the technology of manufacturing these weapons have transferred to less developed countries.

Ballistic missiles with chemical warheads are now a danger to third world countries. Hence the Hague Code of Conduct becomes an important instrument to create transparency on issues pertaining to ballistic missile proliferation.

The Hague Code of Conduct

The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) was established in 2002 to create politically binding commitments on the conduct of trade in missiles. The commitments encompass pre-launch notification of missiles and test flights, annual declarations of country’s policies on ballistic missiles launched during the preceding year, number and generic class of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles etc. As of today, there are 139 signatories to the HCOC.

The development of ballistic missiles began during the Second World War but the first agreement (even at interim level) occurred in the 1960s with the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) on limiting the development of inter-continental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and modern ballistic missile submarines. This was amidst the backdrop of the Cold War. Independent of multilateral agreements, bilateral agreements occurred between Russia and USA [referring to Anti-ballistic Missile treaty 1972]. However, the proliferation was serious with countries outside Soviet and US allies gaining access to missile development technology and increasing military capabilities due to threat perceptions of adversary states.

This was the case with India and Pakistan; neither country is reluctant to enter legal commitments on nuclear weapons including ballistics.

The code is also manifestly different from a legal agreement since violation of this could only result in political repercussions. The code is practical in the sense it includes a wide range of commitments such as compliance to international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation norms in broad language. The Code is voluntary and open to all states since countries are reluctant to enter legally binding agreements. It seeks to promote security through political and diplomatic measures. If this agreement was legal in character such as the Arms Trade Treaty, countries would be less reluctant to sign it; this was the case with both India and Sri Lanka rejecting the treaty as containing intrusive provisions. The code expects states to implement voluntary basis access of ballistic test launch sites to international observers. Countries are not forced to comply with these requirements but to rather “consider” the implementation. This is both clever but the effectiveness of the Code on actual non-proliferation of ballistic missiles is yet to be seen.

Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

Small states should ideally support international efforts to bolster ballistic missile proliferation in line with the Hague Code of Conduct. This is because the unregulated spread of ballistic missiles and the lack of coordination between ballistic missile states have the potential of causing regional instability. The Hague Code of Conduct addresses both. It is therefore vital for small states to encourage non-proliferation as a means of realizing a regional environment based on transparency and dialogue.

Sri Lanka, as a small state, has traditionally maintained an anti-proliferation stance. One main reason as to why this policy is prudent is because continued proliferation between nuclear-armed regional heavyweights India and Pakistan have increased regional tensions. There has been a long-standing conventional military imbalance favouring India. Consequently, a study by Kapur found that nuclear proliferation encouraged increased Pakistani aggression over Kashmir due to the stability-instability paradox. The stability-instability paradox is where mutual deterrence and the threat of nuclear war create a window for states to pursue their actions through coercion.

Being a founding member of the Non-Alignment movement, Sri Lanka has historically looked to stay away from and minimize rivalries between larger countries. Thus, it makes sense for a small regional country like Sri Lanka, whose interest lies in maintaining stability and dialogue in the region, to be one of the original sponsors of the Hague Code of Conduct in 2004. Moreover, in addition to promoting an atmosphere of regional cooperation, Sri Lanka has interests in maintaining good relations with both nations.

Finally, small states like Sri Lanka are against ballistic proliferation due to the devastating possibility that such delivery systems together with nuclear material will fall into the hands of non-state actors and terrorist groups.

There are numerous Jihadist groups operating across the porous borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan who have carried out a number of major attacks, including the Mumbai terror attacks of 2010. Sri Lanka itself has no active terrorist groups operating, but has experienced a civil war of over thirty years and therefore understands the threats these groups can pose. This leads to increased resolve against non-proliferation. Small countries lack the economic and military prowess of larger countries, which gives them less bargaining power. This makes them more reliant and supportive of multilateral institutions in order to achieve objectives like non-proliferation.

[Natasha Fernando is a Research Assistant at the Institute of National Security Studies Sri Lanka (Think Tank of the Ministry of Defence) She is a graduate of the University of Kelaniya and University of London, specializing in international studies and law. Sanoj Jayakody is a summer intern at INSSSL, an undergraduate of the Australian National University specializing in International Relations and Security.]

Gaza hospitals about to run out of fuel

Gaza’s health ministry warned this week that some health services would be interrupted due to the ministry’s inability to deliver fuel stocks to hospitals.Mahmoud AjjourAPA images

Services in Gaza’s hospitals may soon be disrupted as supplies of emergency fuel run out, 
a human rights group and health authorities in the territory are warning.
Some 35,000 liters of Qatari-funded fuel were delivered to Gaza in October, increasing the availability of electricity to up to 11 hours per day.
But the Qatari fuel stock is only enough to keep three turbines at Gaza’s aging power plant running for six months at most, and there is increased demand during winter.
Gaza’s hospitals rely on backup generators during regular blackouts, and fuel stocks used for this purpose are running out, the health ministry in the territory stated this week.
Disruption of medical care will have “dangerous repercussions” for patients, particularly for 800 kidney patients treated with dialysis machines, the human rights group Al Mezan stated. It would also interrupt the use of diagnostic devices and the scheduling of surgical operations, putting lives at risk.
While stressing that “the Israeli siege is the root cause of all the humanitarian crises in the Gaza Strip,” Al Mezan said that Palestinian authorities must go beyond managing the fuel crisis and increase health sector capacity.
During the current cold snap children with bronchitis are being turned away from some hospitals, while others are doubling up two ill children on one bed, the right group noted.

Israel conditions delivery of Qatari funds

Meanwhile the Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported this week that Israel is conditioning the delivery of Qatari funds to Gaza on the nature of protests along the eastern boundary of the territory on Friday.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has calculated that delivery of cash to Gaza would be too politically costly ahead of elections scheduled for 9 April.
The paper paraphrases an unnamed senior Hamas official stating that “withholding the money would prompt Hamas to launch airborne firebombs and send forces to damage the border fence.”
Hamas figures have publicly stated that the protests, launched under the banner of the Great March of Return on 30 March, will go on so long as Israel’s air, land and sea blockade, imposed in 2007, remains in place.
As Palestinians reel from half a billion dollars in aid cuts by the Trump administration in Washington, the World Food Program suspended or reduced aid to 27,000 people in the West Bank and Gaza this month.
A further 165,000 Palestinians, including 110,000 people in Gaza, are receiving 80 percent of their usual amount.
“The cuts were decided upon after a gradual reduction in donations over the past nearly four years, with US cuts having the biggest effect,” Al Jazeera reported.
The State Department-funded USAID is set to terminate its operations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip at the end of this month, leaving major infrastructure projects incomplete.
NPR reported on Thursday: “In the West Bank, a nearly complete multimillion-dollar sewage network in Jericho will have to be buried under asphalt and abandoned, and a $1.4 million school facility under construction in the Bethlehem area will be left behind, according to a recent document from the US Agency for International Development.”
A bill signed into law by Trump last fall effectively bars bilateral aid to the Palestinian Authority, whose security forces are trained by the US and cooperate with Israel.
The Anti-Terrorism Clarification Act of 2018, which goes into effect on 31 January, would disqualify the PA from receiving US aid “unless it agrees to pay court judgments of sometimes up to hundreds of millions of dollars on behalf of American victims of Palestinian attacks,” according to the Associated Press.
The Trump administration was “scrambling” to preserve this aid – which amounted to $61 million in 2017 alone – after realizing it would be threatened by the new law but it is unlikely to succeed as a government shutdown stretches into its 28th day.

Aid groups “delegitimized”

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs stated this week that aid operations have been undermined by campaigns of delegitimization by Israeli civil society groups “with the apparent support of the Israeli government.”
Delegitimization efforts “allege violations of counter-terrorism legislation and international law, or political action against Israel.”
The UN body said that the delivery of humanitarian assistance is negatively affected as aid groups allocate time and resources to address baseless allegations, while donors defund “certain activities to avoid risks.”
Israeli banks impede fund transfers and close accounts while venues in the country blacklist certain organizations.
All of the 41 organizations which participated in a survey by the Association of International Development Agencies reported that they had been affected by delegitimization efforts.
Nearly a quarter of the groups said that they were forced to alter, suspend or terminate programs, while roughly the same number “said they had faced threats of, or actual, legal or administrative actions against them.”
Almost half of the groups “indicated that the campaign had undermined their funding for certain types of activities.”
Coping strategies have included appointing staff to “comply with additional donor requirements or risk management,” diverting resources “that would have been otherwise channeled to the provision of assistance.”
The delegitimization campaigns have exacerbated already difficult operating conditions, particularly Israeli restrictions on the movement of Palestinian staff.
Additionally, humanitarian personnel entering and leaving Gaza are subjected to searches and interviews by both Palestinian and Israeli authorities.
Israel also maintains a list of “dual use” items which it restricts from being imported into Gaza, “particularly those required for water and sanitation projects.”
Structures donated by international bodies have been seized by Israeli occupation forces in Area C of the West Bank – some 60 percent of the territory under full Israeli military control.
Palestinian human rights defenders are subjected to harassment, threats and detention by Israeli occupation forces and raids on their offices.
“Israeli, Palestinian and international human rights organizations operating in the [West Bank and Gaza Strip] have faced several Israeli laws and administrative decisions targeting their right to freedom of expression, the right to access funding, and public funding eligibility,” OCHA added.

Israel doubles down on deportation order

Israeli law allows the interior ministry to deny any non-citizen entry to Israel or the West Bank “on political grounds.”
Israel is attempting to deport Omar Shakir, the director of Human Rights Watch’s Jerusalem office, claiming that he promotes a boycott of the country. The state defended its decision to deport the American national in response to his appeal of the order.
“Shakir disguises himself as a human rights activist but most of his activity is dedicated to promoting boycotts against Israel and its residents. Those who act against the state should not enter its gates,” Gilad Erdan, Israel’s strategic affairs minister tasked with combating the global boycott, divestment and sanctions movement in support of Palestinian rights, stated this week.
Human Rights Watch responded by saying that the organization does not take any position for or against the boycott movement.
“We defend the right of individuals to act nonviolently to promote their views, including participation in boycotts,” the group stated.
“It is worrisome that a government ministry of a democratic state monitors the activities of a foreign citizen who lawfully resides in the country but criticizes its policy.”

Private jet reportedly takes UAE and Israel officials from Abu Dhabi to Tel Aviv


Meetings held to prepare for Emirati foreign minister and Israeli PM to make surprise visits to each other's countries, Al-Khaleej Online reports

Screenshot of Flightradar24 website shows Jet 9H-VCL flying directly from Abu Dhabi to Tel Aviv on 17 January (Screengrab)

Friday 18 January 2019
Emirati and Israeli officials travelled together on a direct flight from Abu Dhabi to Tel Aviv late on Thursday, Al-Khaleej Online reported.
The private jet marked 9H-VCL flew from Abu Dhabi airport through Saudi airspace, without stopping in Jordan as is customary, and landed in Ben Gurion airport.
Israeli security figures were returning from a secret trip to Abu Dhabi to prepare for “a surprise visit” of the United Arab Emirates' foreign minister Abdullah bin Zayed to Tel Aviv, high-level sources told Al-Khaleej Online.
This was to be followed, the sources said, by a visit to Abu Dhabi by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
The sources added that a Saudi “green light” was given to the UAE for these visits, as Riyadh is keen to normalise ties with Israel officially and is preparing a meeting in Washington that would gather Netanyahu with US President Donald Trump and the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
Middle East Eye could not verify the information.
Kamal Khatib, deputy head of the Islamic Movement in Israel, told the Arabi 21 news site that two Emirati officials were allegedly on the plane: the foreign minister and head of UAE intelligence Tahnoun bin Zayed.

‘Hugs’ and visits

Earlier this week, Netanyahu revealed during a retirement celebration for Gadi Eisenkot, who has served as the 21st chief of Israel army's general staff since 2015, that the outgoing head of the army met the commanders-in-chief of several Arab armies during his four-year term.
The prime minister credited the outgoing chief of staff for being part of the change in Muslim and Arab states' attitude towards Israel.
"Gadi, you were part of it and you witnessed it, in your meetings with commanders-in-chief of armies of Arab states. You saw the hugs, and there are pictures of these hugs," Netanyahu said.
Netanyahu's revelation about the "hugs" with Arab military leaders comes as Middle East Eye reported last week that Mossad director Yossi Cohen attended a meeting in a Gulf capital in early December with senior intelligence officials from the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, with whom he discussed measures to curtail the regional influence of Turkey and Iran.
Last week it was also reported that the leader of Israel’s Labor Party, Avi Gabbay, secretly visited Abu Dhabi in early December and met with senior officials there.
The UAE, like most Arab countries, does not have official diplomatic ties with Israel and does not officially recognise it.
However, Israeli Minister of Sport and Culture Miri Regev travelled to the UAE in October to attend a judo tournament in which an Israeli competitor was allowed to compete under Israel's flag and sing its anthem for the first time in the country.
It was the first time an Israeli minister made an official visit to the Emirates.
Netanyahu also visited Oman, which does not recognise Israel, in November, and was hosted in Muscat by Sultan Qaboos.
Among the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Bahrain are becoming more open about their relations with Israel at an official level.
Despite the warm official ties that Israel has developed with some Gulf Arab states, the 2017-2018 Arab Opinion Index poll conducted by the Doha Institute indicated that 90 percent of Arabs believe that Israel "poses a threat to the security and stability of the region".