Yameen’s economic offensive to counter political adversity ahead of presidential poll

 Saturday, 24 February 2018

The embattled Maldivian President Abdulla Yameen, who is facing intense political opposition both in and out of the country, hopes to win the September, 2018 presidential election using a combination of political belligerence and a strong economic program which is at once development and welfare oriented.

Yameen is holding on to the view that the State of Emergency is a national security necessity on the grounds that there had been an organised attempt to bribe the judiciary into engineering his overthrow “through constitutional means” (to use Opposition Leader Mohamed Nasheed’s words).

Yameen is also of the view that the western powers and their allies are doing all they can to bring about a regime change.

To prevent anti-government street agitations, he has taken to the expedient of jailing two Supreme Court judges including the Chief Justice and has continued to detain top opposition leaders even against Supreme Court orders.

Softening evident

However, as the September election approaches, a softening of Yameen is evident. After rejecting foreign mediation, he has now called for UN mediation but he blames the Opposition for the process not starting. According to him, the UN wants the Maldivian parties to start talking prior to UN mediation, but the Opposition has been refusing to come for talks. While Yameen wants unconditional talks, the Opposition wants all prisoners released as per the Supreme Court order of 1 February, a condition not acceptable to Yameen.

However, Yameen hopes to win the election basically on the strength of his growth and welfare-oriented economic performance and plans.

$ 3.4 billion in FDI over five years

In his landmark speech in parliament earlier this week, Yameen said that the Maldives will be receiving $ 3.4 billion in foreign investment in the tourist and non-tourist sectors in the next five years. Giving the break down he said that $ 1.6 billion will be invested in the tourist sector by 40 foreign companies and another $ 1.8 billion will come to other sector from 50 investments from overseas.

He drew attention to the fact that the economic growth rate had increased from 6.2% in 2016 to 6.9% in 2017. At the end of 2017, the per capita GDP stood at $ 9,671. National reserves stood at $ 586.2 million at the end of 2017. This is expected to increase to $ 600 million this year, Yameen said.

In 2017, tourist arrivals had increased by 8% over the previous year, to total 1.3 million arrivals. More than 76,000 new jobs had already been created for youth as a result of economic expansion.

2018 will see the inauguration of 24 new island resorts. Together with two new Male city-hotels, the number of beds in the country will increase to more than 5,300, the President said.

Fishing and farming

A substantial sum of the $ 160 million loan, given by the governments of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, will be utilised to develop the fisheries industry. Mariculture business projects, such as the bait production project worth $ 11 million launched last year, have been initiated by the government to expand and diversify the fisheries industry.

Work is underway to create a loan scheme, where up to MVR 6 million will be made available to farmers. “Hopefully, we will decrease the import of such goods by 25% by increasing production to 1,866 tons of produce which will make its way to our markets,” Yameen said.

Roads, harbours, and airports

Forty-five kilometres of roads are being constructed in the nine most populated islands in the Maldives. Road construction work will continue in 12 more islands until the end of this year.

The harbours of forty-eight islands have now been completed and the construction of harbours in 30 more islands will be concluded by the end of this year.

Harbour development projects, including dredging projects, are also underway in 31 islands and these have been equipped with harbour entrance lights.

“Thus, over the past five years we have solved the problem of sea transport for 109 out of 187 inhabited islands,” Yameen said.

Work is on to establish airports at H.Dh Kulhudhuffushi, Sh. Funadhoo, N. Maafaru and G.Dh Maavaarulu to be completed within this year.

Social welfare projects

The biggest ever housing project launched by the government this year, to be completed next year, is expected to provide housing to more than 160,000 people.

Digital education

Yameen said that digital technology will be introduced to support teaching and learning. “By the beginning of the second term for this academic year, all schools will have Wi-Fi and all students from grades one to 12 will receive computer tablets. The Maldives will be the first country to educate all its students in this way. Students who graduate from our schools will be technologically literate. As such their odds of succeeding in the work place in the 21st Century would be higher,” he said.

Tertiary education

The percentage of students in tertiary education has increased from the 19%, four years ago, to 32%, the President said, and added: “The government aims to increase enrolment in tertiary education to 60% by 2022.”

Better health facilities

In the past four years, up-to-date water systems have been established in twenty-two islands, the President said. This year, work is expected to start on establishing such systems in twenty-four more islands.

The price of providing water in the atolls has been reduced and from 1 January, 2018 we have equalised the price of water in the atolls with that of Malé. In the past four years, water storage facilities have been established in 29 islands, while 2018 will see the establishment of these systems in an additional 86 islands.

Medicare

The 25-storey ‘Dharumavantha Hospital’ will open this year. Previously unavailable healthcare services in the Maldives have been introduced over the past three years. The National Cardiac Centre established in 2016 has now enabled 5,300 heart disease patients to receive treatment.

Since November 2013, the government’s Renal Disease Treatment Guarantee Policy has seen the introduction of dialysis services in six atolls. Forty-four individuals have also had government-funded kidney transplant operations abroad over the past four years.

First medical college

The first-ever medical college in the Maldives will be established this year, the President said. Students will have the opportunity to do their medical internships at IGMH, allowing them to reside in their motherland with their families.

Sewerage

Over the past four years, sewerage systems have been established in 21 islands, while this infrastructure will be further developed in 42 more islands over the course of this year, the President said.

“Thus, by the end of 2018, 75% of the Maldivian population will have sewerage systems,” he promised.

Drastic reduction in crime

The first-ever technical assessment of crime in the country, based on crime statistics for the past nine years, was undertaken in 2017. The findings of this study show that the crime rate has reduced by 35% over the past four years, President Yameen said. 

Southeast Asia is in the grip of a biodiversity crisis

Deforestation in Kelantan State, West Malaysia. Source: Wakx/Flickr

 23rd February 2018

RICH in wildlife, Southeast Asia includes at least six of the world’s 25 “biodiversity hotspots” – the areas of the world that contain an exceptional concentration of species, and are exceptionally endangered. The region contains 20 percent of the planet’s vertebrate and plant species and the world’s third-largest tropical forest.

Southeast Asia is in the grip of a biodiversity crisis.docx by Thavam on Scribd

'Mini-tumours' created to battle cancer

The mini-tumours can be used to predict if a patient will respond to therapy

By James GallagherHealth -22 February 2018

Scientists have been able to predict how cancer patients will respond to therapy by growing miniature versions of their tumours in the laboratory.

They say the groundbreaking work could lead to "smarter, kinder and more effective treatments".

The study, in the journal Science, was 100% accurate at telling which drugs would fail and this could spare patients from unnecessary side-effects.

Mini-tumours could also be a powerful way of testing new drugs.

Tiny brains

Biopsies of 71 patients with advanced colorectal cancer were taken and then grown into miniature 3D cancerous organs in the laboratory.

Growing "organoids" is a relatively new scientific technique and even tiny brains have been made in the lab.

Researchers treated each organoid with the same drug doctors gave to the patient in the clinic.

The results showed:

• If the drug worked in the organoids, it worked 88% of the time in the patient
• If the drug failed in the organoids, it failed 100% of the time in the patient

Just sparing patients the brutal side-effects of a drug that will not work would make a huge difference, the researchers said.

Dr Nicola Valeri, from the Institute of Cancer Research in London, said: "For the first time we proved these organoids not only resembled the biology of metastatic cancer, but also mirror what we see in the clinic."

In one patient, conventional genetic testing had suggested their tumour would respond to a drug.

But the treatment failed in both the clinic and the organoid. The researchers think organoids might be combined with current tests.

Mouse models

Prof David Cunningham, from the Royal Marsden NHS Foundation Trust, where some of the patients were treated, said: "This promising research moves us forward in the field of personalised medicine, and should ultimately lead to smarter, kinder and more effective treatments for patients."

DR. GIANMARIA LICCARDIImage caption-A organoid of intestinal tissue

Previous attempts to predict how patients would respond to treatment included making "cancer avatars" - essentially mice with the patient's cancer growing in them.

But getting the answers quickly enough to inform treatment has always been the challenge.

Dr Valeri said: "This has been a huge issue in the past, when people were using mouse models it was taking six to eight months to get to the results.

"With this tool we can get results in a couple of months and I think we can get even faster."

You might also be interested in:

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But if mini-tumours accurately reflect their "parent" cancer then they could be a powerful new tool for testing drugs and for understanding the biology of why cancers can resist treatment.

They could also be used to decide if patients should take part in clinical trials of new drugs.

Prof Charles Swanton, the chief clinician at Cancer Research UK, said: "Predicting how effective treatments such as chemotherapy will be for an individual patient can be difficult, with very few accurate tests available for doctors.

"This new approach could help us test future targeted therapies before trialling them in the clinic."

Follow James on Twitter.

Mannar fishing village protests Sri Lanka Navy's ongoing harassment and intrusion

21Feb 2018

Residents of a Mannar fishing village have protested against the Sri Lankan Navy’s ongoing harassment and intrusion into their livelihoods.

The fishing community of Talaimannar expressed their anger at the constant intrusions and hindrances by the Sri Lankan Navy into carrying out their livelihood, particularly with regards to blocking access to an islet (Theedai) and its surrounding waters.

The Talaimannar residents said that they first struggled to regain permission to fish in their traditional areas when the wildlife department attempted to block them off for ‘conservation reasons’.

Having regained permission from the government, they are still being constantly hindered by the Navy, with the situation escalating last week when navy personnel made threats of violence to turn away the fishermen.

The community engaged in a roadblock protest outside Talaimannar police station on Monday, demanding that the Navy be withdrawn from their areas and stop intruding into their livelihoods.

Related Articles: 

18 February 2018 : Fishermen massacred by Sri Lanka Navy remembered in Vadamarachchi

11 February 2018 : Ongoing navy occupation of most of Myliddy preventing fishing and resettlement

10 February 2018 : Navy officer arrested over girl's death in Pungudutivu granted bail

29 January 2018 : Another navy officer arrested of disappearance of Tamil youths

25 January 2018 : Navy intelligence officers threaten Tamils protesting against land grabs in Kayts

24 January 2018 : Girl killed by Sri Lankan navy vehicle in Pungudutivu

Promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka

Excerpts from the annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General

( February 23, 2018, Geneva, Sri Lanka Guardian) Pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 34/1, the present document is an update on progress made in the implementation of resolution 30/1 on promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka during the period from March 2017 to January 2018, in particular with regard to the Government’s commitment to put in place transitional justice measures. In the present update, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights also looks at the general human rights situation in the country, including with respect to accountability.

Conclusions and recommendations

48. The High Commissioner reiterates his appreciation for the constructive engagement of the Government of Sri Lanka with OHCHR and United Nations human rights mechanisms since January 2015. However, as he noted in March 2017, this constructive collaboration must be accompanied by the implementation of key commitments. The fulfilment of the transitional justice commitments made under Human Rights Council resolution 30/1 has been virtually stalled for more than a year. Progress with some confidence-building measures has often been insufficient and inconclusive, and the structures set up to coordinate implementation have not consolidated enough or did not receive sufficient political support to move things
forward.

49. In statements and reports issued since 2015, the High Commissioner, while expressing concern over the lack of progress on accountability and reforms, was encouraged by the positive improvement of the general human rights situation. However, 2017 was marked by intermittent inter-ethnic tensions and attacks on minorities which are unlikely to dissipate completely.

50. While the Government has managed to steer many of these worrying events in a positive direction, this type of violence in a country that has experienced cycles of extreme violence roughly every 10 years is deeply troubling, particularly when accompanied by hate speech, misinformation and agitation through social media and political manipulation.

51. The continuing allegations of torture and surveillance and the lack of sufficient progress in implementing critical confidence-building measures, such as the release of land, the repeal of the Prevention of Terrorism Act and the solution to the pending cases under the Act, have antagonized key constituencies that could be instrumental to the Government’s reform efforts.

52. The High Commissioner urges the Human Rights Council to continue to play a critical role in encouraging progress in accountability and reconciliation in Sri Lanka. It also calls on Member States to explore other avenues, including the application of universal jurisdiction, that could foster accountability.

Read the full report here;

UN-High-Commissioner-report-Sri-Lanka-Feb-2018.pdf by Thavam on Scribd

SLB BRIEFING NOTE: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN SRI LANKA: CURRENT CHALLENGES AND ISSUES

Image: Children of a war affected family in Vanni, Sri Lanka, July 2017; Addressing the issues related to poverty is necessary for a successful TJ process. (c) s.deshapriya.

Transitional justice in Sri Lanka: current challenges and issues.

(Advanced copy of the section on Transitional Justice in SLB No. 13 titled Transitional Justice and Constitutional Reform:  Sri Lanka at the Cross Roads.)

 23/02/2018


After coming into power in 2015, Sri Lanka’s Unity Government made numerous commitments to implement transitional justice (TJ) and devised a TJ process that consists of an Office of Missing Persons (OMP), a mechanism for reparation, a Truth Commission and a judicial mechanism. In the consensus Resolution A/HRC/30/L.29 adopted at the 30^th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) Sri Lanka made a commitment to implement a comprehensive TJ process.

The progress of the TJ process has been limited to the OMP. All other mechanisms have not been implemented and the results of the recently concluded Local Government elections indicate some sort of rejection of the TJ process and of the ongoing constitutional reform process. The party led by former President Mahinda Rajapaksa dominated the polls in the vast majority of Sinhala Buddhist constituencies in the South by reviving majoritarian Sinhala Buddhist nationalism, opposing the devolution of power and promoting impunity for war-related human rights violations. This has the potential to reverse the democratic gains Sri Lanka has achieved and derail the TJ process. Therefore, Sri Lanka is at the crossroads between democracy and authoritarianism.

CURRENT CHALLENGES TO THE TJ PROCESS

Return of majoritarian politics

The local government election[1] results show a lack of understanding among the Sinhala Buddhist community of the TJ process and the need for reconciliation and accountability.

In the South, the apparent standstill of the constitutional reform process, the rising cost of living and large-scale corruption are causes of grave dissatisfaction. The leaders of the former regime and de-facto winners of the local government elections have been accused of financial crimes, violations of human rights, as well as criminal offences, and yet, they have never been charged for all these offences. This has resulted in the perception among the public that these allegations are false which now challenges and threatens the TJ and reconciliation process in Sri Lanka.

In the North and East, the prolonged absence of justice for the families of disappeared, the inaction against perpetrators of war-related atrocities, the absence of reparations and the continued discrimination against minorities has caused great disappointment. This resulted in some Tamil political groups to campaign for moving the TJ issues from the UNHRC to the agenda of the UN Security Council and the International Criminal Court. Such demands are very unlikely to happen and will only further polarize political opinions in Sri Lanka.

Continued militarization

Resolution A/HRC/30/L.29 envisaged substantial security sector reforms as part of the TJ process, withdrawing security forces in civilian affairs, releasing land held by the military and reducing the military presence in the North and East.

Security forces currently still run hotels, restaurants, kiosks and large farms selling agricultural products at low prices, undermining local farmers and traders. The civilian arm of the military, the Civil Security Department, runs preschools and the military itself is also involved in the Northern educational sector. In addition, security forces still engage in building Buddhist statutes and temples in the Tamil dominated North and despite releasing some land, they still hold large areas of land belonging to the Tamil people. This means that the military presence in the North remains high. For example, in the district of Mullativu the ratio of people to military is 2:1[2] and the GOSL has not contested this data.

Finally, heightened surveillance and increased intimidation of human rights activists have been reported in the North. This situation hinders the TJ process and obstructs trust-building among the Tamil population.

Poor living standards

According to Sri Lanka’s Poverty Head Count Index only 4.1% of the population lives below the poverty line of USD 30/month[3] which as such is an unrealistic figure. Actual poverty, however, is much higher: poor income levels are prevalent across the country but are felt harshly in the North and East where infrastructure is poor and the overall economic development is low. Micro-finance companies exploit poor families in the North and target especially women as lenders, collecting daily and weekly repayments with excessive interest rates up to 300%[4].

Ex-LTTE combatants still face high unemployment rates, social stigma, disabilities due to battle field injuries, poor educational qualifications and poor mental stability. Hence, they still live in poverty with limited means of income generation. For example, many are unable to obtain loans promised by the Government due to the absence and unwillingness of government officers to stand surety and due to other restrictions[5].

Even in the Sinhalese dominated North Central Province, poor income levels and food shortages[6] remain, among others, due to the two-year-long drought. Overall, the Government has failed to implement long-term programs aimed at uplifting the economic conditions, causing major distress among the population. This may have contributed to the local election set-back of the governing coalition and pushed the TJ and reconciliation process out of the public attention.

Complaints over rising living costs and grievances over poverty and poor living conditions surpass the demands for transitional justice and reconciliation.

Resistance by State officials

State officers politically appointed during the previous regime still function within the state machinery and operate along the political party divide, contributing to the continuous politicization of the public service. Bribery and favoritism by state officials remain common at the local level.

Language discrimination against Tamil speaking people remains, manifesting itself, among others, in empty language help desks and Sinhala only sign boards. State officials lack awareness about the TJ process and therefore, resistance to this process flows from state institutions and state officials themselves.

Role of media

Media institutions are politically affiliated and TV News are still the main avenue of information dissemination. In the absence of fair and balanced media and an objective analysis of current affairs, the TJ process is mainly portrayed as an effort to “punish war heroes”. Politically controlled state media has lost credibility and cannot influence public opinion decisively anymore.

Dominant media institutions of all language streams provide one-sided reporting and misinformation, thereby widening the ethnic divide in the country.  A multilingual media institution that can speak and transfer the same message to all language communities alike is missing.

Transitional justice issues are not communicated and explained well to the public. Jargon and unfamiliar terminology prevail across the different language media and render the implementation of TJ process more difficult.

Growing anti-Muslim sentiments

Anti-Muslim sentiments has heightened and multiple violent attacks on mosques and Muslim-owned businesses[7] has continued throughout the year: For example, in May 2017, a mob led by Buddhist monks attacked the Muslim village Selva Nagar, claiming 49 acres of land as a Buddhist archeological site[8]. Another example is a minor road accident in Ginthota (Galle district) in November 2017 which led to a series of anti-Muslim communal attacks[9] at a time when the victims of the anti-Muslim communal violence in Aluthgama (2014) are still waiting for justice and compensation.

Generally, anti-Muslim messaging is rampant on Facebook and Islamophobic myths, particularly referring to attempts of the Muslim community to cause infertility in Sinhalese by using ‘infertility causing additives’ in food[10] and smearing ‘infertility causing substances’ in underwear, are commonly treated as truth. This has led to increasing anti-Muslim sentiments and sparked occasionally further violence.

The Government has failed so far to address this growing anti-Muslim hatred which hampers the TJ and reconciliation process.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Although the government needs to respond to the local government election set-back through focusing on regaining the peoples’ mandate for the originally promised democratic agenda, it should not sideline the TJ process.

•  Civil society and the international community should find ways and means to safeguard the democratic achievements and ensure a gradual but steady progress towards implementing the TJ process.

• The Government should operationalise the Office of the Missing Persons without any delay and address ongoing demands of the families of the disappeared.

• Once operationalized, the OMP should establish reginal offices in the war affected areas, as well as in the Southern districts affected by the 1988 -1990 civil war.

• The Government should immediately establish the TJ mechanism for reparations in an independent and transparent manner.

• The international community should commit substantial financial support for reparation disbursements.

• Security forces should set timeline and thereafter, gradually handover civilian and educational activities in the North and East to the elected local authorities.

• The Government should launch a comprehensive economic upliftment plan for the poverty stricken, war affected, rural population, regardless of their ethnicity.

• The Government and the civil society groups should urgently address the growing anti-Muslim sentiments, in collaboration with community leaders of all ethnicities.

• The Government should devise effective communication strategies to popularize and create a positive awareness of the TJ and reconciliation process.

• President Sirisena and Prime Minister Wickremesinghe should set timelines and benchmarks to establish all TJ mechanisms.

Abbreviations
OMP            Office of Missing Persons
TJ                 Transitional Justice
UN                United Nations
UNHRC       United Nations Human Rights Council
GOSL           Government of Sri Lanka

 Acknowledgements

Sri Lanka Brief thanks Sri Lanka Advocacy Group, Germany for their continuous support.
Research and writing: Uda Deshapriya

Editors: Sunanda Deshapriya and Michaela Told.

srilankabrief@gmail.com; http://srilankabrief.org/

[1] One section of SLB No. 13 will focus on the local government election results in relation to the TJ process.

[2] http://adayaalam.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Normalising-the-Abnormal-The-Militarisation-of-Mullaitivu.pdf

[3] The poverty line is calculated at an amount of LKR 4’584/ month (approx. USD 30/month); see Department of Census and Statistics Household Income and Expenditure Survey
(2016). http://www.statistics.gov.lk/poverty/Poverty%20Indicators_2016.pdf

[4] http://www.sundaytimes.lk/171015/business-times/micro-finance-blamed-for-rising-indebtedness-in-north-263653.html

[5]http://www.ceylontoday.lk/print20170401CT20170630.php?id=35460

[6] https://www.yamu.lk/blog/2017s-drought-and-what-it-means-to-sri-lanka

[7]https://asiancorrespondent.com/2017/05/sri-lanka-anti-muslim-attacks-rise-buddhist-leader-stokes-tension/#7hKAjVKMVG5UP9tM.97

[8]http://groundviews.org/2017/05/22/escalating-violence-renewed-assaults-on-the-muslim-community/

[9]https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/anti-muslim-assaults-in-gintota/

[10]http://groundviews.org/2017/07/04/disinformation-in-sri-lanka-an-overview/

SRI LANKA 2017/2018

Sri Lanka continued to pursue its 2015 commitments to deliver justice, truth, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence for alleged crimes under international law, but progress slowed and there was evidence of backsliding. Parliament passed an amended Office on Missing Persons Act, intended to assist families of the disappeared seeking missing relatives. The Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) was not repealed; it was still used to arrest and detain suspects. Torture and other ill-treatment in police custody continued. Threats against religious and ethnic minorities and human rights defenders were reported.

Background

Enforced disappearances, extrajudicial executions, torture and other serious human rights violations and abuses were committed with impunity before, during and in the aftermath of the armed conflict between government forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) that ended in 2009. Commitments made by Sri Lanka in 2015 – through its co-sponsorship of UN Human Rights Council resolution 30/1 – to establish truth, justice and reparation mechanisms and reforms aimed at non-recurrence of these crimes, had not been implemented by the end of the year. Sri Lanka’s constitutional reform process, initiated in 2016, also faltered as lawmakers differed over issues such as the fate of the executive presidency, the place of Buddhism in the new Constitution, and whether economic, social and cultural rights would be included in the Bill of Rights.

Arbitrary arrests and detentions

The authorities continued to detain Tamils suspected of links to the LTTE under the PTA, which permitted extended administrative detention and shifted the burden of proof to a detainee alleging torture or other ill-treatment. During his visit to Sri Lanka in July, the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism stated that over 100 unconvicted prisoners (pre- and post-indictment) remained in detention under the PTA, some of whom had been held for over a decade. Sri Lanka failed to follow through on its 2015 commitment to repeal the PTA and replace it with legislation that complied with international standards.

Torture and other ill-treatment

Reports of torture and other ill-treatment in detention continued. In March, Sri Lanka’s human rights record was examined under the UPR process; the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka said that it had continued to document widespread incidents of violence against detainees, including torture and other ill-treatment, which it described as “routine” and practised throughout the country, mainly by police. The Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism found that 80% of those arrested under the PTA in late 2016 had complained of torture and other ill-treatment.

Excessive use of force

Impunity persisted for excessive use of force against protesters. Killings by the army of unarmed demonstrators demanding clean water in August 2013 had yet to be prosecuted. In August, a Criminal Investigation Department investigator told the Gampaha Chief Magistrate that all evidence related to the shootings had been “destroyed” by previous investigators.

Enforced disappearances

By the end of the year Sri Lanka had not passed legislation criminalizing enforced disappearance in domestic law, despite ratifying the International Convention against Enforced Disappearance in 2016. A parliamentary debate on a bill criminalizing enforced disappearance scheduled for July was postponed without explanation.
The amended Office on Missing Persons Act was passed by Parliament in June; the amendments limited the Office’s power to seek outside assistance. It was signed by the President on 20 July but had not come into operation by the end of the year. The Office was proposed to help many thousands of families of the disappeared trace missing relatives.
In June, President Sirisena promised families of the disappeared that he would order the release of lists of those who surrendered to, or were detained by, the armed forces during and after the armed conflict that ended in 2009. The lists were not made public by the end of the year.

Impunity

Impunity persisted for alleged crimes under international law committed during the armed conflict. Impunity also remained for many other human rights violations. These included the January 2006 extrajudicial executions of five students in Trincomalee by security personnel and the killing of 17 aid workers with NGO Action Against Hunger in Muttur in August 2006; the December 2011 disappearances of political activists Lalith Weeraraj and Kugan Muruganandan; the 2010 disappearance of dissident cartoonist Prageeth Eknaligoda; and the 2009 killing of newspaper editor Lasantha Wickrematunge.

Human rights defenders

In June, the then Minister of Justice threatened to have human rights lawyer Lakshan Dias disbarred if he did not apologize for speaking publicly about reported attacks against Christians.
Tamil human rights defenders and activist community members, including relatives of the disappeared, continued to report surveillance and harassment by law enforcement officials. Women human rights defenders in the north and east reported that interactions with police were often degrading and sexualized.

Freedoms of expression, assembly and association

Attempts by families to arrange stones as memorials for lost relatives were stopped by security forces. Catholic priest Elil Rajendram was detained and other residents of Mullaitivu were subjected to police harassment following their efforts to hold memorials for family members who died during the armed conflict.

Legal, constitutional or institutional developments

An expected parliamentary debate on the proposed draft Constitution aimed at ensuring checks on executive power and more equitable ethnic power sharing had not taken place by the end of the year.
Despite repeated promises, Sri Lanka failed to repeal the PTA and to pass legislation criminalizing enforced disappearances.
In December, Sri Lanka ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture (OPCAT).

Discrimination

Law enforcement officials continued to subject members of the Tamil minority, particularly former members of the LTTE, to ethnic profiling, surveillance and harassment.
Police failed to take action in response to continued threats and physical violence against Christians and Muslims by members of the public and supporters of a hardline Sinhala Buddhist political group.
In March, the UN CEDAW Committee asked Sri Lanka to amend all personal laws to remove discriminatory provisions. The Committee expressed particular concern about the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act of 1951, which failed to specify a minimum age for marriages and permited girls aged under 12 to marry with the permission of a religious adjudicator (Qazi). The Act also restricted women from serving on Qazi Boards, and did not recognize marital rape unless the couple was legally separated; this included statutory rape of a girl under 16 by an adult spouse.

Violence against women and girls

Impunity persisted for various forms of violence against women and girls, including child marriage, domestic violence, human trafficking, rapes by military or law enforcement officers or assaults by private actors. In a rare exception, the trial began on 28 June in Jaffna’s High Court of nine men accused of involvement in the May 2015 gang rape and murder of Sivaloganathan Vidya, an 18-year-old school student, in Punkuduthivu. The trial was still ongoing at the end of the year. The nature of the crime and police mishandling of the case sparked widespread protests in 2015. In July 2017 a serving Senior Deputy Inspector General of Police was arrested for allegedly assisting one of the suspects to evade arrest.

Death penalty

Death sentences were imposed for murder, rape and drug trafficking. No executions have been carried out since 1976. On 4 February, Sri Lankan Independence Day, President Sirisena commuted the sentences of 60 death row prisoners to life imprisonment.

One Year in Kilinochchi

GROUNDVIEWS-02/22/2018

On February 20th, the protest by families of the disappeared in Kilinochchi passed the one year mark. Mothers, wives and fathers have sat by the side of the A9 road, inside the premises of the Kandasamy kovil, asking for answers about their loved ones. This is one of many protests by relatives of the disappeared; others are taking place in Vavuniya, Mullaitivu, Maruthankerny and Trincomalee.

Over the course of this year, these families have had three meetings with the President, two United Nations Special Rapporteurs have visited Sri Lanka to assess its transitional justice process and there has been some incremental progress around the Office on Missing Persons and the Enforced Disappearances Bill. However, this progress has been marred by setbacks, particularly around the OMP. Overall, these steps have failed to answer these families’ calls for truth and for the fulfilment of the promises made to them by the Government.

This piece lays out a timeline of events around the issue of disappearances that have taken place in the one year – February 19th 2017 to February 20th 2018 -since the protest in Kilinochchi began.

View the full story, compiled using Adobe Spark, here, or scroll below.

The centre, the periphery and the corpse

2018-02-23

The Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP), now in its third or fourth month, is no longer a third force. The numbers, the percentages and the seats won should convince anyone with a modicum of political sense that it has gone beyond being just an alternative party, a feat considering that the JVP has strived hard to transcend the limits of being such an alternative for more than two decades with no notable success. It’s a populist wave we’re seeing here, and like all populist waves the momentum, while intermittent when accounting for the long term, can be spoiled, improved on, or sustained depending on whether the primary tenets of the party are adhered to. Those who voted for the Pohottuwa were, by default and for the most, voting for a Rajapaksa Restoration. Naturally, they were by no means dim enough to think that the LG elections would be enough for such a restoration to occur anytime soon.  

The SLPP won a mandate at the grassroots level, but that mandate does not and will not transcend the larger mandate given by the people on January 8, 2015. These two mandates are now interlocked, and will for a long time be pitted against one another owing to the fact that those elected from the Pohottuwa to the LG bodies will have to depend on, and fight with, those elected from the UNP and the anti-Rajapaksa UPFA in the Central Government for the mobilisation of funds. Those who voted for the SLPP, even those who may not have been aware of this, hence voted not because they wanted Rajapaksa to seize power, but because they wanted to create a mess.  

Whether or not the mess created was enough for them to claim bragging rights (after all, even with that momentum, they still were not able to clinch a majority in the local government bodies) is grist for another debate. What’s important to note here is that the SLPP did not come to power at the grassroots level with the intention of claiming power from the centre. Logically this means that any attempt at claiming power from that centre has to be seen as being antithetical to the larger motives of the Pohottuwa Brigade, since the fact that they don’t have the necessary numbers in parliament implies that for such an attempt to work out, they have to cohabit with a mainstream party; a pro-Rajapaksa SLFP. That will be seen, by the SLPP voter, as a betrayal of his vote. And why? Because cohabitation at this juncture means a betrayal of the principles on which the Pohottuwa Brigade was founded and mobilised.  

The SLPP won a mandate at the grassroots level, but that mandate does not and will not transcend the larger mandate given by the people on January 8, 2015

At the time of writing this article I could conceive three contingencies in the political sphere; the continuation of the Unity Government; an absolute UNP government, with the SLFP and UPFA relegated to the Opposition and a broader alliance between the SLFP-UPFA and the SLPP. It’s interesting to note that none of these contingencies and possibilities bodes well for the President; the continuation of the Unity Government will be seen by his supporters, from the party he leads, as a further excuse to try and oust him from the Chairmanship of that party. A UNP government will only bolster that excuse further and any marriage between the SLFP-UPFA and SLPP would mean, as one website memorably puts it, the “path to self-destruction”, since it enables a Rajapaksa Restoration. Ostensibly the UNP has opted for the first of these, but marriages of expedience don’t last long; we may hence see the second contingency materialising eventually. This is what the Pohottuwa wants.  

So why is the SLPP engaged in power politics to the extent that they are sending us the message that they are ready to cohabit with the UPFA if that’s what it will take to topple the UNP? Has there been enough evidence that the sole cause for this country’s problems and ills, in the past three years, is the UNP? By itself, it is still a party to reckon with, not because it’s a party of angels but because it has shown itself to be a party of rationality (never mind the occasional unfortunate outbursts from its MPs). The Bond Scam was the cause of its shrinkage at the local polls, yes, but even accounting for this one can coherently make the case that the shrinkage of the government (SLFP + UPFA + UNP) had more to do with the SLFP’s wildly erratic behaviour than anything else. Those who were baying for Ranil Wickremesinghe’s blood would have been shocked, not surprisingly, when on Friday he gave probably the coolest, most self-assured news conference one could have expected from him under the circumstances. Nothing has been seriously ruptured, in other words: the President can’t remove the UNP and the UNP can’t remove Ranil.  The SLPP mandate was not, repeat NOT, to topple the present government. Regardless of what veterans of the calibre of Vasudeva Nanayakkara and Dinesh Gunawardena can and will say, the mandate given by the people on January 8, 2015 has not expired by any stretch of the imagination. Two more years exist, two years which the government can continue to play ball with or which the government can efficiently use to deliver on the promises that got them that mandate in the first place. The SLPP’s first move was to establish itself as a veritable alternative, a watchdog if you will, over the abuse and misuse of power at the centre, if at all because no such watchdog existed; not the official opposition under the TNA, or the forever-ranting-against-you-and-me opposition under the JVP. Neither of these parties had what it took to go beyond communalism (TNA) and class-conscious thrust (JVP) that they stand for. A more multifarious, across the board movement was needed at this juncture. This was the Pohottuwa.  

Does that mean that the Rajapaksa Cabal has no real power? Perhaps. Local governments have to depend, as I pointed out, on the central government. But in terms of grassroots mobilisation, in terms of the number of seats won and the mayors and chairmen to be appointed, I think we can safely say that the SLPP is here to stay, for quite some time. The first step towards sustaining the momentum that drove it, is to stick to the manifesto it rode on. That momentum does not enable its members to topple the government, nor does it enable them to cohabit with a section thereof in the hopes of toppling it in the future. What it does enable them to do, though, is to stand apart on its own and watch the mess that the present regime has created, because of its own internal failings and contradictions, continue and if at the 11th hour a saviour is needed, present a Rajapaksa sibling or progeny to come and save the day. Personally speaking, I don’t entertain such illusions with respect to this whole Rajapaksa Restoration campaign, but it’s the most feasible option that the SLPP has as of now.  

To enable that option, to ride into the sunset triumphantly with that option, however, the Podujana Peramuna must abide by the licence that the people gave them. Of the aforementioned three political contingencies, then, the most beneficial to them will have to be Contingency Number One: The continuation of the Unity Government. If their aversion to the UNP (their traditional enemy) transcends their desire to stick to their mandate this way, it can only mean one thing: Mahinda Rajapaksa is so power-hungry, so grasping, that his cabal is ready to commit everything and anything under the sun for the sake of temporary power, be it in the form of a coalition or a caretaker government.  

Reliable sources tell us that Mahinda has refused to be a part of the government. If this is true, it can bode well not just for the SLPP, but also for their enemy. So the UNP has the centre, the Pohottuwa has the periphery, while the SLFP-UPFA has become what Gunadasa Amarasekara said it would eventually become, back in 2015: a “kavandaya”, or a headless corpse.