A Muslim man reads the Quran in a mosque in Kelantan. Source: Shutterstock/Ruzely AbdullahByEmma Richards|
WHEN it comes to tackling religious fundamentalism, the Malaysian government struggles to reconcile the commitments it makes on the international stage with the realities of life for the Malaysian people, according to UN Special Rapporteur Karima Bennoune.
Under Prime Minister Najib Razak, the Malaysian government has long touted the merits of a cohesive and inclusive multi-religious society in the Muslim-majority nation, and continues to declare its commitment to a “moderate and progressive” form of Islam.
In comments made in response to Bennoune’s thematic report on fundamentalism, extremism and the cultural rights, Najib placed the success of the nation at the feet of its ethnic and religious diversity.
“In Malaysia’s experience ensuring a multi-racial, multi-religious and multi-ethnic population have freedoms to practice their cultures, traditions and religious belief has been essential and integral to our nation building and progress,” he said in March 2017.
The message of “moderate and progressive” is one that comes up repeatedly in the government’s message to the international community. Indeed, Malaysia continues to be seen by some as a beacon of religious pluralism and tolerance in the world.
But the experience for many Malaysians around the country does not reflect these strongly stated commitments, Bennoune said at a press conference on Thursday.
UN Special Rapporteur Karima Bennoune speaks at a press conference in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. September 21, 2017. Source: Asian Correspondent
As UN Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights, Bennoune has just completed a 10-day fact-finding mission in the country. She expressed concern that there was a disparity between the lived reality of the people and the rhetoric of the government when it comes to religious freedoms and fundamentalism.
According to initial findings, many sectors of society “expressed concern at what they saw … as the growing Islamisation of the Malaysian society and polity, based on an increasingly rigid and fundamentalist interpretation of Islam.”
As a result of this uptick of rigidity in religious affairs and this particular form of Islamisation, Bennoune found there had been far-reaching negative consequences affecting a vast array of subsets of society.
Highlighting women, human rights defenders, LGBT persons, artists and cultural experts as particularly vulnerable to this trend, Bennoune also pointed out the detrimental effects it was having on the Muslim community themselves, stating, “the freedom of religion or belief of Muslims themselves is now at stake in the struggle against fundamentalism in Malaysia.”
There are a number of examples of such contradictions happening in Malaysian politics today according to Bennoune.
While saluting the authorities’ efforts in combatting terrorism, she pointed to their partiality for “acquiescing to the underlying ideology of terror groups, such as, ‘there is only one way to be Muslim’ or … ‘religion should be used as a tool of state policy’.”
She also highlighted the risk this messaging can bring.
“Doing these things can only create conditions that are more conducive rather than less conducive to the risk of radicalisation,” she said.
Other examples included the increased involvement of religious authorities in policy decisions throughout the government, and the consideration to strengthen the Syariah Court’s powers in the country.
A participant at the Himpunan RUU355 rally at Padang Merbok, Kuala Lumpur, in support for the amendments to the Syariah Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 1965. Source: @zurairi.
If proposed amendments to RUU355 (Act 355) had been approved, it would have increased the Syariah punishment caps in Malaysia to a maximum 30 years imprisonment, RM100,000 (US$22,400) fine and 100 lashes of the cane; far harsher sentences than those currently implemented under the civil system.
Just the consideration alone is “difficult to rationalise with stated commitments to moderation and progressiveness,” Bennoune said.
As Malaysia witnesses the blurring of lines between religion and politics, Bennoune warns of the dangers of the “movement of religion into the political arena and as a political tool.”
“[It] can have a lot of unintended consequences. It may be expedient sometimes in the short-term…but it can have very negative consequences in the medium and in the long-term that maybe aren’t predicted ahead of time,” she told Asian Correspondent.
Quick to point out that this happens across the globe, and certainly not only in Muslim-majority countries, Bennoune also praised Malaysia as a wonderfully diverse country in which many people do enjoy their cultural rights. But she warned, as with everywhere in the world, the creep of hardline religion into politics could place this tolerance at risk.
“You … really need to make a determination that the long-term human rights in the country matter more than the short-term strategic gain,” she said.
“You can’t take for granted that the diversity and tolerance that there has been, is resilient enough to survive that unscathed”
Researchers found that countries’ reporting practices made it nearly impossible to understand exactly how much money had reached the appropriate recipient and that there were massive gaps between the amount of money pledged and the amount of money host countries received.
“The more we researched, the more we realized that it’s almost impossible to figure out basic information — how much money from a given donor actually reaches recipients in a given host country,” said Bill van Esveld, a researcher at Human Rights Watch (HRW) based in Erbil, Iraq.
For instance, the six donor countries pledged to provide $250 million for education in Jordan before the start of the 2016 school year. However, by September 2016, only $79 million had been received. Similar discrepancies existed in funding for Lebanese and Turkish education programs: Lebanon had a $181 million shortfall, while Turkey was shy $137 million.
Specifically, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) reported that it had provided $248 million for educational development programs in Jordan for fiscal year 2016, but its own aid tracking database only accountedfor $82 million in “basic education” funding during the same time period. In turn, HRW reported that a Jordanian government database only noted $13 million in U.S. aid during the 2016 calendar year. (That data has since been removed from the Jordanian website.)
USAID told Foreign Policy that it had met all its London commitments for aid in the Syrian crisis, including doling out $290 million for education assistance to Jordan and Lebanon. The agency stressed that it “reports detailed financial information on all of its development and humanitarian programs worldwide.”
The other countries and multilateral organizations surveyed in the report had equally mixed reporting records. The U.K. and Norway provided a relatively complete picture of their funding, while Japan provided what HRW termed “so little public information … that it is impossible to determine when this aid was delivered or what it supported.”
The Japanese Embassy in Washington, D.C., was unavailable for comment at the time of publication.
The report was careful not to ascribe the apparently contradictory numbers to corruption or malfeasance — indeed, “corruption” only shows up once in the entire report — while discussing a Transparency International reportnoting that many donors were unwilling to deal directly with the Lebanese government because of corruption concerns.
But lax reporting and accounting practices pose serious problems for both donors and recipients, not to mention the schoolchildren the money is meant to help educate.
As a school administrator, “how can you run an education program and plan it if you’re told you’ll be getting one amount, and the recipient says they’re getting another?” Esveld said. “How can you plan a multi-year education response if you don’t know how much money you’re going to be getting?”
This situation has direct consequences for children on the ground in the countries bearing the brunt of the refugee crisis.
In a separate release on Sunday, Save the Children reported that roughly 730,000 children — 43 percent of school-aged refugees — in Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon were not currently getting any schooling at all. That’s up from 34 percent last year.
SITTWE, Myanmar (Reuters) - Buddhist protesters in Myanmar threw petrol bombs to try to block an aid shipment to Muslims in Rakhine State, where the United Nations has accused the country’s military of ethnic cleansing
The incident late on Wednesday, ended when police fired in the air to disperse the protesters, reflected rising communal animosity and came during an official visit by U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Patrick Murphy.
Murphy said later, after talks with government leaders, that Washington was alarmed by reports of rights abuses and called on authorities to stop the violence, which raised concern about Myanmar’s transition from military rule to democracy.
Myanmar’s army chief on Thursday called for internally displaced non-Muslims to go home.
In a speech on his plans for Rakhine State while on his first visit there since strife erupted, he made no mention of the estimated 422,000 Rohingya Muslims who have crossed the border into Bangladesh.
They have fled Myanmar to escape a sweeping counter-insurgency operation by his army in response to attacks by Rohingya insurgents on Aug. 25.
Hundreds of protesters were involved in the attempt to stop Red Cross workers loading a boat with relief supplies bound for the north of Rakhine State, where the insurgent attacks last month triggered the military backlash.
The boat being was loaded with aid at a dock in the state capital of Sittwe, a government information office said.
“People thought the aid was only for the Bengalis,” the secretary of the state government, Tin Maung Swe, told Reuters, using a term that Rohingya find offensive.
Protesters threw petrol bombs and about 200 police eventually dispersed them by shooting into the air, a witness and the government information office said.
The witness said he saw some injured people. Eight people were detained, the office said. No aid workers were hurt, a spokeswoman for the International Committee of the Red Cross said.
PLIGHT
Tension between majority Buddhists and Rohingya, most of whom are denied citizenship, has simmered for decades in Rakhine, but it has exploded at times over the past few years, as old enmities surfaced with the end of decades of harsh military rule.
The latest bout of bloodshed began with August’s insurgent attacks on about 30 police posts and an army camp, in which about a dozen people were killed.
The government says more than 400 people, most of them insurgents, have been killed since then.
A woman reacts as Rohingya refugees wait to receive aid in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, September 21, 2017. REUTERS/Cathal McNaughton TPX IMAGES OF THE DAY
Rights monitors and fleeing Rohingya say the army and Buddhist vigilantes have mounted a campaign to drive out the Muslim population and torch their villages.
Myanmar rejects that, saying its forces are tackling insurgents of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army who it has accused of setting the fires and attacking civilians.
The crisis has drawn international condemnation and U.S. President Donald Trump called on Wednesday for a quick end to the violence.
The plight of the Rohingya has raised questions about the commitment of government leader Aung San Suu Kyi to human rights.
Nobel peace prize laureate Suu Kyi addressed the nation on Tuesday and condemned abuses and said all violators would be punished.
However, she did not address the U.N. accusations of ethnic cleansing by the military, which is in charge of security.
“The Conservative government allowed Jobcentre Plus to tell people that food banks existed, and the former Labour government would not tell them. And that was a policy decision to stop people knowing that there was help available … The real reason for the rise in numbers [of food bank usage] is that people know that they’re there – and Labour deliberately wouldn’t tell them.” – Jacob Rees-Mogg, 14 September 2017
The analysis
The UK’s largest food bank network, the Trussell Trust, requires users to show up with a voucher from a recognised agency. These can include doctors, social workers, Citizens Advice or statutory organisations.
A voucher enables people to get a minimum of three days’ emergency food.
When the Conservatives came into office in 2010, they announced an official referral scheme with Jobcentre Plus, meaning staff could formally refer jobseekers to their local food bank.
However, by 2013, this had stopped as a national scheme. The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) told FactCheck that formal referrals were replaced by simply “signposting” the local food bank.
In 2013, a minister confirmed that the DWP “is only a signposting body that does not get involved in any decision to award a food parcel. The act of signposting to any local organisation including food banks is not a formal referral or endorsement on the part of the DWP.”
It’s true that the national policy is still that Jobcentre Plus still makes people aware of food banks – and can refer them to a third party (such as Citizens Advice) – who can then issue a voucher. But it does not issue vouchers itself.
All this is at the discretion of district managers at the Jobcentre Plus, not the government.
According to the Trussell Trust, the reality on the ground is mixed. Some job centres don’t engage with their local food bank at all; some tell people to go to Citizens Advice or another third party who will then issue a voucher; while others apparently continue to issue direct referrals.
A Trussell Trust report in 2015 said that 60 per cent of its food banks reported having a good relationship with a local JobCentre Plus.
But it added: “In England, positive relationships between food banks and JCPs appears to have largely occurred due to actions of individual food banks or job centres, rather than as a result of ministerial efforts to ensure DWP agencies better address the needs of food bank clients.”
As for what happened before the Conservatives came into office in 2010, the DWP told FactCheck that it didn’t have any information about the policy of signposting under previous governments. The department said it was perfectly possible that, on a local level, individual job centres may have worked with food banks, but there is no national record of this.
Impact on food bank usage
Even if we forget about government policy, what impact does awareness raising by Jobcentre Plus have on food bank usage?
Despite pressure from campaigners, the government does not hold any information about the numbers of people who have been referred to food banks by Jobcentre Plus over the years.
However, the Trussell Trust commissioned an analysis of its data between 2014 and 2017, to see how many direct referrals came from Jobcentre Plus. The results suggests that these only account for a very small proportion of the three-day food supplies it hands out. In fact, the proportion has decreased.
In 2014-15, only 5.5 per cent were directly referred by Jobcentre Plus. This went down to 4.9 per cent the following year, and then to 5 per cent in 2016-17.
Of course, these figures need to be viewed very cautiously as they only account for direct referrals. It is possible that a significant number of people were referred via third parties, and who would not have otherwise used a food bank.
However, experts do not believe the role of Jobcentre Plus to be very significant in explaining the spike in food bank usage. Indeed, in 2014 a parliamentary committee looked at this exact question.
Giving evidence, the director of Oxfam’s UK Poverty Programme, Chris Johnes, said this was “unlikely to be a major factor”.
Increasing number of food banks
Government welfare policy has been widely acknowledged to be a key factor in explaining why food banks are used so much.
The latest Trussell Trust statistics show that in more than a quarter of all cases, the primary reason people are referred to a food bank is that there has been a delay in their benefit payments. A further 17 per cent are referred because of changes to their benefits.
Indeed, the Trust says: “Our research shows that nationally, food banks in areas of full Universal Credit rollout to single people, couples and families, have seen a 16.85 per cent average increase in referrals for emergency food, more than double the national average of 6.64 per cent.”
But, of course, these referrals could not be made at all if food banks didn’t exist. So why are there so many? Is government policy to blame for this as well?
Clearly, a significant part of the reason must be demand – after all, there is no point setting up food banks in a places where everyone is rich and doesn’t need help providing basics for their families. So government policy is undoubtedly an underlying cause.
But the idea of building a large network of food banks across the country, to act as a welfare safety net, has been a longstanding aim of the Trussell Trust. The initiative was established back in 2004, when Labour were in government.
The Trussell Trust’s 2007 annual report states: “The aim is to socially franchise the food bank project to other community groups throughout UK … The trustees set a target of establishing fifty food banks by the end of 2010.”
This makes Jacob Rees-Mogg’s comparisons to food bank usage under the Labour government not very meaningful. After all, it could be argued that developing a national policy for a small network which only exists in a few locations may not make a lot of sense – but when that network expands nationwide, it does.
The verdict
We can’t find any evidence to support Jacob Rees-Mogg’s claim that the increase in food bank usage is due – in any significant way – to the government allowing Jobcentre Plus to make people aware of them.
The comparison to Labour’s policy is not useful, given that food banks were not as widespread. But even if we make this comparison, there is no evidence to suggest that, under Labour, some job centres did not develop relationships with food banks on a local level.
The change in policy that Rees-Mogg seems to refer to has been watered down since it was first introduced. It is not national policy for Jobcentres to directly refer people to food banks.
The referrals that do take place only account for a very small proportion of all referalls. And this proportion has fallen. Charities do not consider it a major factor.
Considerable evidence suggests that the government’s welfare policy is a key reason why many people need to use food banks. Indeed, research suggests that areas with full Universal Credit see far higher increases in food bank usage.
If Jacob Rees-Mogg offers any evidence to support his claim which we are not aware of, we will update this blog.
a training course that teaches how to use the brain to improve the body's level of health
it is run over three half-days in group sessions and costs about £650
it focuses on using simple exercises, movements and gestures to help stimulate recovery
it combines elements of osteopathy, life coaching and neurolinguistic programming
the scientific community is sceptical of it
no previous research had been done to investigate how effective it is
it is not available on the NHS
21 September 2017
For the Bristol study, published in Journal of Archives of Disease in Childhood, 51 children aged 12-18 years received standard medical care plus three days of the LP training programme, while another 49 received standard care alone.
Six months later, the group that received the additional training said they were experiencing less fatigue and anxiety and better physical function than the control group.
After a year, the training group also reported they felt less depressed and had spent more days at school, compared with the other group - who also said their symptoms had improved.
Image copyrightGETTY IMAGESProf Crawley said there were limitations to the study - they did not know why LP had worked and could not say whether it would help adults or younger children.
And she said more research was needed to find out if the same results could be achieved again and to understand more about the process, before it could be incorporated into NHS care.
About 250 youngsters with CFS/ME have therapy each year. Current treatments include:
medication
cognitive behavioural therapy
graded exercise therapy
activity management
Charities and campaign groups say CFS is not a mental health condition and psychological-based therapies such as the Lightning Process are not going to help.
They say people have reported spending huge amounts of money on the training with no obvious benefit, and some have even experienced worsening symptoms.
They are calling for more science-based research into the physical causes of chronic fatigue syndrome.
'Over-simplistic'
Dr Charles Shepherd, medical adviser for the ME Association, said: "The Lightning Process is not a treatment that we endorse or recommend for people with ME/CFS.
"It may well be that there are some people with a general fatigue state resulting from stress, emotional or psychological problems who could benefit from a 'mind over matter' retraining approach such as this."
But he said this was not to be confused with ME/CFS.
He said: "There has been a very significant growth in biomedical research globally into ME/CFS in the past decade which has demonstrated clear abnormalities in brain, muscle and immune system function.
"The over-simplistic and largely psychological model of ME/CFS causation that is being put forward to patients by Lightning Process practitioners is totally out of step with emerging scientific evidence as to its cause."
'Vulnerable children'
The ME Association said using children and young people with ME/CFS in trials of this nature was "unethical and potentially damaging to their lives and health".
Jane Colby, executive director of the Young ME Sufferers Trust, said: "As a former head teacher, I know that children are vulnerable, especially when they are ill.
"They desperately want to believe the adults around them, but if their body is telling them something different from what the adults are saying, the child must be in conflict about what to believe."
Action for ME said it did not recommend any single form of intervention or treatment for ME and advised people to "examine with scepticism any treatment, therapy or other approach which claims to offer a cure".
(ACPR). Adayaalam Centre for Policy Research, Jaffna, has released, “Civil Security Department: The Deep Militarisation of the Vanni”,
a report examining the Civil Security Department’s establishment in the
Vanni and its impact. Eight years after the war ended, and despite
multiple promises to the international community to end military
involvement in civilian activities, the Civil Security Department (CSD)
is the epitome of the Sri Lankan government’s failure to undertake
meaningful security sector reform and uphold its pledges.
The CSD is a department of the military established in 2006 out of the
controversial National Home Guard Service by then Secretary of Defence,
Gotabhaya Rajapaksa. Originally envisaged as a volunteer security force,
the CSD was largely operational in border villages and the Eastern
province as part of a counter-insurgency strategy. However, as the
report documents, post-2009, the CSD remade itself out to be a provider
of economic development. Since 2012, the CSD has aggressively targeted
former LTTE cadres and war-affected women in the Vanni to join its
ranks. As of last year, the CSD employed over 3000 individual in
Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi alone, making it one of the largest providers
of employment in the region.
The report notes the increasingly militaristic character of the CSD
through its implementation of mandatory one-month military training for
all CSD farm employees, and the increasing presence of the military in
pre-schools with CSD-paid pre-school teachers, among other things. The
report also raises questions about the need to investigate gender-based
violence by supervisors and soldiers on CSD farms and the suppression of
political and civic activism by the CSD.
The Conclusion and Recommendations of the report fellows. ( PDF version of the full report is attached at the end)
Discussions on militarisation in Sri Lanka often revolve around the
numerically large presence of the military in the North-East and their
occupation of lands. But what this report on the CSD demonstrates is
that the process of militarisation in war-affected Tamil areas,
particularly the Vanni, goes far deeper and is far more complex than
simply the amount of visible military structures and troops.
The CSD is an example of the way the State continues to militarise
economic and civic spaces in the war-affected Vanni region. The CSD also
symbolizes Sri Lanka’s failure to uphold its commitments to the
international community to put an end to the military’s involvement in
civilian activities, and work on meaningful security sector reform.
The growth of the CSD in the Vanni points to the larger issue of the Sri
Lankan military’s failure to transition into a reduced post-war role.
Instead, the military’s approach to its post-war role has been to embed
and normalize the process of militarisation, thereby extending its
control and subjugation of Tamil populations in the post-war Vanni. The
CSD is very clearly a part of the military, and so its provision of
livelihood opportunities though much needed, must be read as
the creation of economic dependence on the military, rather than
economic development.
Through this dependence and because of its military character, the CSD
also suppresses civic and political activism of its employees, and
further marginalizes women employed as this report explains.
Alarmingly, a consequence of the CSD has also been the beginning of a
destruction of community identity and cohesiveness. Consequently, the
use of the CSD to militarise the economy and civic spaces in the Vanni
must be challenged at the domestic and international levels. Tamil
politicians and communities must also be more cognisant of the pressures
and context in which individuals have been compelled to join the
CSD. Rather than denigrate and ‘traitorise’ CSD employees, it would be
far more effective to work towards creating alternative forms of
employment and push for the removal of the CSD from operating livelihood
projects in the Vanni and a transfer of control over those projects
back to communities.
Ultimately, permitting the military’s control over war-affected Tamil
populations in the North will only further the cycle of conflict and
will destroy any hopes of building a truly participatory democracy and
sustainable peace.
Recommendations to Government of Sri Lanka:
1. In consultation with CSD employees in the Vanni, develop a process to
transfer ownership of CSD agricultural and animal husbandry projects to
civilian CSD employees and convert the farms into
co-operatives. Co-operative farms have a long history in the Northern
province and are a model for agriculture that continues to exist in the
Northern province.
2. Reimburse profits made from CSD agricultural and animal husbandry
projects to the communities in which they are located, preferably in the
form of assistance to the setting up of co-operatives mentioned in the
first recommendation.
3. Put an immediate end to the mandatory military training being
instituted for CSD employees, and the requirement that they wear
military uniforms at events in public.
4. Put an end to the CSD paying the salaries of pre-school teachers. The
budget for the CSD allocated for such payments should be re-allocated
to the Ministry of Education. Issue a clear directive that the CSD and
the military should have no role in educational activities in any
form whatsoever.
5. Issue a clear directive to the military to cease and refrain from
engaging in any civilian activities, in particular in the Vanni.
6. Permit open access into CSD farms and other places of employment for the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka.
7. Return any private lands being used by the CSD to its rightful owners.
8. End the practice of CSD-organized protests and civic action.
Recommendations to the Northern Provincial Council and Tamil political parties
1. In consultation with the relevant pre-school teachers and after
setting in motion transitionary arrangements, the Northern Province
Ministry of Education to issue directives to pre-school administrators
to stop receiving payments from the CSD for teacher salaries and ban
any involvement of the military in educational activities.
2. Formally apply to the Central Government to transfer all state land
used by the CSD to run farms and other economic activities to the
Department of Cooperatives of the Northern Province. Through the
Department of Cooperatives establish new cooperative societies which
will run the CSD farms or reallocate farms to existing cooperative
societies in consultation with the CSD employees and the people of the
Vanni.
3. Appoint a representative Task Force (including ex LTTE cadres,
current CSD employees; both men and women) to study and report back on a
framework for economic development and livelihood opportunities for
ex-LTTE cadres and the wider community in the Vanni. Identify
pilot projects based on the above policy framework and implement with
financial support from the Central Government / multilateral, bilateral
donors/ private sector / Diaspora.
4. Hold regular consultations with CSD employees in relation to the
above recommendations so that they feel heard and included in the
community. Importantly, such consultations should not be an opportunity
to denigrate CSD employees for their choice to work for the CSD,
but rather to give them a space to voice their concerns.
Recommendations to the International Community
1. Make the cessation of the military’s involvement in civilian
activities a pre-condition of any military-to-military relationship
building (in addition to other pre-conditions that should already be in
place such as accountability).
2. Call on the Government of Sri Lanka to fulfil the above
recommendations listed as part of their commitments under HRC Res 30/1
and 34/1.
3. Ensure that any aid or development assistance going into the Vanni is
not inadvertently endorsing or supporting the militarised economy.
A new report by the United Nations names Sri Lanka as a state that
continues to intimidate and harass activists who co-operate with the
global body on human rights issues.
The report stated that the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights was
“disturbed” to hear that civil society members had faced intimidation
from Sri Lanka in the United Nations Palais des Nations in Geneva
earlier this year.
“He referred the case to the Assistant Secretary-General and stated that
he trusted that the President of the Council will give these cases
close attention,” it continued.
The UN Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights who authored the
report noted, in particular, the case of human rights activist S.
Ganeshnantham from Amparai and other members of the civil society
organization Pupil Salvation Forum.
Mr Ganeshnantham had addressed the Human Rights Council on the 7th and 9th of March 2017, stated the report.
Just two days later, “officers
from the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) attached to the
Kalmunai Police station, in Sri Lanka, arrived at Mr. Ganeshnantham’s
house in Kalmunai, and threatened his relatives”.
Special procedures mandate holders who examined the case “expressed
serious concerns at the alleged threats and intimidation which appear
to be linked to Mr. Ganeshnantham’s participation in the 34th session of
the Human Rights Council”.
To date, “no response had been received from the Government,” the report noted.
Presenting the report at the Human Rights Council, UN Assistant
Secretary-General for Human Rights Andrew Gilmour said “there is
something grotesque and entirely contrary to the Charter and spirit of
the United Nations, and particularly this Council, that people get
punished, through intimidation and reprisals, for cooperating with the
UN on human rights”.
“Some States have been mentioned in several of the Secretary-General’s annual reports since 2010,” he stated.
Sri Lanka has been mentioned in five such reports, alongside Bahrain and
Iran. Only China and Saudi Arabia have been featured more.
“It is frankly nothing short of abhorrent that, year after year, we are
compelled to present cases to you, the UN membership, of intimidation
and reprisals carried out against people whose crime – in the eyes of
their respective Governments – was to cooperate with the UN institutions
and mechanisms whose mandate of course derives from you, the UN
membership,” Mr Gilmour continued.
“Our slogan and task is to “stand up for someone’s rights today.” I do
not think there is any group of people for whom we have more of an
obligation to stand up than those brave souls who have been harshly
punished for cooperating with your institutions”.
It is not the policy of this newspaper to comment on articles published
by other newspapers or websites. However given the importance of the
‘Bill to introduce into local law the provisions of the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
isappearance’, and the campaign of misinformation surrounding this
proposed piece of legislation, an exception will be made in this
instance. In an article posted on D.B.S.Jeyaraj’s blog titled
"Extradition Clause in Enforced Disappearances Bill is Identical to
Section 7(2) of Torture Act Passed in 1994", its author one Gehan
Gunatilleke has argued that Clause 8 of the International Convention for
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance Bill is
identical to Section 7(2) of the Convention Against Torture and other
Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Act, No. 22 of 1994.
The two passages have been quoted as follows by the author of the said
article.
Clause 8 of the Disappearances Bill: "Where a request is made to the
Government of Sri Lanka, by or on behalf of the Government of a
Convention State for the extradition of any person accused or convicted
of an offence under sections 3 or 4, the Minister shall, on behalf of
the Government of Sri Lanka, forthwith notify the Government of the
requesting State of the measures which the Government of Sri Lanka has
taken, or proposes to take, for the prosecution or extradition of that
person for that offence".
Section 7(2) of the Convention Against Torture Act of 1994: "Where a
request is made to the Government of Sri Lanka, by or on behalf of the
Government of any State for the extradition of any person accused or
convicted of the offence of torture, the Minister in charge of the
subject of Foreign Affairs shall, on behalf of the Government of Sri
Lanka, forthwith inform the Government of the requesting State, of the
measures which the Government of Sri Lanka has taken, or proposes to
take, for the prosecution or extradition of that person, for that
offence".
On this basis, the author of this article who is not known to this
writer, but is said to be advising the yahapalana government, has stated
as follows: "The President should be informed that there is absolutely
nothing to worry about in this clause. It is a standard clause, and we
have had the identical clause in a very similar statute for over 20
years!" We view this as an attempt to mislead the President of the
country by conveying the wrong information to him.
Clause 8 of the Bill to introduce into Sri Lankan law, the provisions of
the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance refers to Sri Lankans whose extradition has been
requested by foreign countries on the grounds that they were responsible
for causing enforced disappearances in Sri Lanka. No such thing is
possible under Act No: 22 of 1994 which was passed to introduce into
local law the provisions of the International Convention Against
Torture. Under the 1994 Act, any Sri Lankan who is alleged to have
committed torture can be tried only in Sri Lanka and there is certainly
no provision to extradite Sri Lankans suspected of committing torture in
Sri Lanka to stand trial in other countries for crimes allegedly
committed in Sri Lanka.
Section 7(2) of the Convention Against Torture Act of 1994 refers to
foreign nationals wanted in their own countries over allegations of
torture, who may happen to be in Sri Lanka. In such cases, when a
request is made for the extradition of that foreign individual, Sri
Lanka will be obliged to comply. However Clause 8 of the proposed Bill
to introduce into Sri Lankan law, the provisions of the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance
is designed to extradite Sri Lankans who are deemed by foreign nations
to be responsible for causing enforced disappearances in Sri Lanka to
stand trial overseas.
There is a vast difference between the two and the President should be
made aware of this attempt to convey wrong information to him.
Saturday, 16 September 2017
The war crimes cases registered against former army commander General
Jagath Jayasuriya in five South American countries even while he was Sri
Lanka’s ambassador to Brazil would alert the government that it needs
to take remedial action without further delay. Although the former army
commander had diplomatic immunity, international law also states that
those accused of war crimes are subject to universal jurisdiction. Last
week at the current session of the UN Human Rights Council meeting in
Geneva, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid
Ra’ad Al Hussein, expressed his concern over the slow pace of reforms in
Sri Lanka and said the absence of action on accountability meant
exercising universal jurisdiction would become even more necessary.
The possibility exists that the cases registered against General
Jayasuriya and the international publicity they have generated, will
encourage similar international legal actions not only military
personnel, but also political leaders and public service officials who
had significant roles to play in the war. International law comes into
operation when the national (or domestic) law is not properly
implemented. The resolution of the UN Human Rights Council that was
co-sponsored by the government in October 2015 states that the
government will set up four special domestic mechanisms to deal with the
aftermath of the war. These are a truth commission, office of missing
persons, office of reparations and special court for accountability
purposes.
In March 2017, at the last session of the UN Human Rights Council
session in Geneva, the government obtained two more years to implement
its commitments. Instead of procrastinating on setting up the four
mechanisms promised to the world, the government should start
operationalising them. So far only the legislation for the office of
missing persons has been passed by parliament and gazetted by the
president which will become operational from today. If the government is
able to show that it has a credible domestic legal process underway in
the transitional justice mechanisms it sets up, and that justice is done
within the country, the requirement of international legal processes
will diminish correspondingly. The National Peace Council calls on the
government to implement the four mechanisms it has promised without
further delay.
Governing Council
The National Peace Council is an independent and non partisan
organization that works towards a negotiated political solution to the
ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. It has a vision of a peaceful and
prosperous Sri Lanka in which the freedom, human rights and democratic
rights of all the communities are respected. The policy of the National
Peace Council is determined by its Governing Council of 20 members who
are drawn from diverse walks of life and belong to all the main ethnic
and religious communities in the country.
“In view of this proposed amendment in respect pf certain provincial
Council the terms will be extended beyond 5 years and in respect of some
Provincial Council the term will be curtailed. in both ways it was
submitted that franchise will be affected. ” says the Supreme court
determination on the proposed 20th amendment to the constitution of Sri
Lanka.
Read the full text of the SC determination here :SC Determination on 20th Amendment Bill (19Sep’17)
Sri Lanka’s two major political parties are likely to work together at
least until 2020 or even until they achieve the goals of Vision 2025
though they will contest separately at the upcoming provincial and local
council elections.
The two major
parties working together for the first time since independence is itself
a major achievement though there are regular public disputes and
divisions between the two parties. Yet to consolidate the alliance and
consensus Government, there is a need for a new political culture.
As President
Maithripala Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe have
repeatedly stressed, if any person wants to do business, he or she
should not come into politics. This should be the case at national,
provincial and local council levels. To come into politics means a
sincere desire to serve the people, especially the millions of oppressed
people caught in a poverty trap imposed on them by a wicked and selfish
society. Aspiring politicians need to be servant leaders of these and
other people. They also need to practise the principle proclaimed by the
Statesman Lakshman Kadirgamar. Taking ministerial office in 1994, he
said, “My country has given so much to me - free health services and
education and so many other blessings of a tropical paradise. I am
accepting this post to give something back to the people and not to grab
from them.”
Aspiring
politicians should keep this enlightened principle in mind. If they wish
to do business they could do it elsewhere but not in politics where one
of their primary tasks is to bring about poverty alleviation by
reducing the gap between the rich and impoverished people and bringing
about a more equitable distribution of wealth and resources. This needs
to happen mainly in the rural areas and therefore is more important for
provincial and local government politicians who need to be guided by the
principle of giving and self-giving, not grabbing the resources of the
people and the country. The UNP and SLFP leadership therefore must
ensure that for the upcoming provincial and local council elections,
their nominees need to give a firm commitment, even a written commitment
that they will not do business in politics or rob from the people’s
funds though they may do it in subtle ways. Our
politicians also need to remember a hallowed principle of Buddhism --
hatred does not cease by hatred, violence does not cease by violence but
by love, provided the person or persons concerned seek forgiveness,
turn from their evil ways and return what they had plundered from the
people.
This principle
is vital because taking revenge or vengeance is also a wicked deed and
wickedness added to wickedness may often lead to self-destruction.
The new Local
Government Amendment Law brings in landmark changes such as the
restoration of the ward system for 60% of the local council area with
40% being elected on the proportional representation system. The widely
criticised and more widely abused preferential voting system has been
scrapped hopefully helping to curb business in politics, corruption or
fraud. Giving women 25% of the nominations may also help in the gradual
process of reducing business or corruption in politics. We also hope
there will be amendments to give the youth a bigger representation
because it is mainly their responsibility to build a peaceful, just and
all-inclusive society where there is gradual poverty alleviation, a
full-scale battle against climate change and conflict resolution through
peaceful dialogue instead of resorting to war or violence. As we said
earlier, violence does not cease by violence, but by love, which means
dialogue, goodwill, and accommodation on the middle path.
( September 21, 2017, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) The
existence of so-called ‘baby farms’ was the most important reason for
the Sri Lankan government to suspend intercountry adoption in 1987. At
these baby farms, women were impregnated to meet the demand for adoptive
children. This is confirmed by Sri Lanka’s Minister of Health, Dr.
Rajitha Senaratne, in response to the investigation by ZEMBLA. “There
were a lot of baby farms back then,” says the minister. “They collected
the babies there and sold them to foreigners for adoption.” This is the
first time the Sri Lankan government admits the existence of ‘baby
farms’. Stories of ‘baby farms’ had previously been dismissed as
rumours.
In response to the ZEMBLA findings, Sri Lanka will launch an
investigation into the adoption fraud involving thousands of children
who were brought from Sri Lanka to the Netherlands during the 1980s.
Minister Senaratne also takes the initiative to establish a DNA
databank, which children as well as parents can use to search for
relatives.
The news that the judiciary had determined a referendum was necessary if
the 20th Amendment was to be passed into law was out in the public
domain by Friday last week. The purpose of the 20th Amendment was
firstly to extend the terms of the existing PCs until around October
2019 when the election to the last PC becomes due and secondly to
postpone all the elections to PCs until that date. This was the
provincial council equivalent of what the present government has already
done to the local government elections. The LG elections which were due
after March 2015 are yet to be held. It was possible to postpone the LG
elections by simply delaying the delimitation process. In the case of
the PCs however, there was no such readymade excuse available.
Furthermore, in the case of the provincial councils, under Article 154E
of the Constitution, they stand automatically dissolved on the day they
complete five years from their first meeting. If the PC elections are to
be postponed, the first thing that needs to be done was to extend the
terms of the existing PCs until an election is held. But, when the
government gazetted the 20th Amendment for this purpose, there was an
immediate rebellion within the SLFP, depriving the government of the two
thirds majority needed to pass a constitutional amendment. Then the
government decided to utilise the provisions of Article 154 G(2) of the
Constitution, which allows an amendment to the chapter on provincial
councils in the Constitution to be made with a simple majority in
Parliament if all the provincial councils give their assent to the said
Bill. On this basis, the President sent the 20A Bill to the provincial
councils.
The North Central provincial council, which is among the first PCs to
stand automatically dissolved, approved it. But then things went wrong
when the Uva PC, which will be the last to be dissolved, voted against
the 20A. Even though the whole purpose of the 20A was to buy time till
the Uva PC also stands dissolved, the wording on the amendment said ‘not
later than’, which means that it could be either the day on which the
Uva PC stands dissolved or earlier. Due to the slight possibility that
they could lose some time from their normal tenure, the Uva PC defeated
the 20A with a two-thirds majority with even a group of UNP members and
the chief minister himself voting against it. The Uva chief minister
gave up a seat in parliament to become chief minister and he seems to be
determined not to lose even a day of his chief ministerial tenure if he
could help it.
The Northern PC also unanimously rejected the 20A on the principle that
the power to dissolve PCs should not be given to Parliament. Under
Article 154 G (2) if even one PC rejects a Bill to amend the provincial
councils chapter in the Constitution, it cannot be passed without a
two-thirds majority. So, the government came back to square one. In the
meantime, the 20A was being scrutinised by the Supreme Court for its
constitutionality. Since the Bill had already been certified as a Bill
to Amend the Constitution the SC’s role was to determine whether it
could be passed with just a two-thirds majority in Parliament or whether
it needed a referendum in addition to that. Given the fact that a
postponement of an election or the extension of the tenure of an elected
body by legislative fiat naturally impinges on the franchise, which is
guaranteed by Article 3, one of the entrenched provisions of the
Constitution, it is only natural that a referendum is necessary to pass
the 20A into law.
Now, the government has fallen back on the last desperate attempt to
head off the PC elections – this is to give up the idea of extending
terms of the existing PCs but to amend the Provincial Councils Elections
Act No: 2 of 1988 so as to be able to postpone the PC elections. The
advantage the government has here is that the PC elections law can be
amended with just a simple majority. Due to their inability to amend
Article 154E of the Constitution, the PCs will stand dissolved one by
one as they complete their terms until there are no more PCs left in the
country. But, the election to those PCs will be indefinitely put off by
amending the PC elections law. The amendment they intend bringing to
the PC elections law is to introduce the hybrid first-past-the-post and
proportional representation system that has been introduced at the local
government level, to the PC level as well.
Once this amendment goes through, the PC elections can be postponed
indefinitely on the excuse that the delimitation of the constituencies
is taking time. This was the same excuse that was used to postpone the
LG elections. The way the government intends changing the PC elections
law is also not through the front door by gazetting a new Bill and
giving the Supreme Court time to scrutinise its constitutionality.
Instead, they intend bringing in these changes through the back door in
the form of committee stage amendments to a Bill that was gazetted some
time ago, to increase female representation on provincial council
election lists. This trick of introducing sweeping changes to Bills at
the committee stage so as to be able to circumvent Supreme Court
scrutiny is a new feature introduced by the good governance government.
This was the means by which they recently amended the local government
electoral system as well; they brought in committee stage amendments to a
Bill drafted for a different purpose.
The bottom line is that the government can in fact make changes to the
PC elections law with just a simple majority in Parliament. This will
have the effect of indefinitely postponing the PC elections. But, due to
the inability of the government to amend article 154E of the
Constitution, the PCs will cease to exist one by one until there is not
one left by the last quarter of 2019. This will be good news for all
enemies of the 13th Amendment and the provincial councils system. The
precedent thus created will be of immense use to them. The Eastern
province PC will be among the first to cease to exist. The Northern PC
will stand dissolved in 2018. The very system of devolution forced on
Sri Lanka by India on 1987, will have been dismantled by a government
that was installed in power by RAW! Of course the government will try to
sweet talk the Northern and Eastern PCs by telling its councillors that
this is only a temporary suspension and that with the promulgation of
the new constitution, the PCs will be given even more powers and
autonomy.
But, the new constitution is just a pie in the sky. If the government
does not have a two-thirds majority for the 20 A, how will they muster a
two thirds majority in Parliament for a new constitution? If the 20A is
giving the SLFP group in the government cold feet, the presentation of a
totally new constitution will send them into a blind panic because the
new constitution will be such that it will restructure the whole Sri
Lankan state in such a manner completely repugnant to the traditional
SLFP voter. Every SLFP MP is acutely aware that he or she will have to
get into Parliament the next time on SLFP votes. So, what is the
likelihood of him voting for a new constitution that is being prepared
by the UNP in collaboration with some foreign-funded NGOs? There is a
strong possibility that if the existing PCs are allowed to stand
dissolved and no elections are held immediately, that the PCs will
permanently cease to exist.
The Mahinda Rajapaksa camp will have no incentive to revive the PCs
because their people at the PC level can be taken into Parliament. SLFP
provincial council members are largely with President Sirisena for
reasons of power politics. The Rajapaksas can simply ignore the PCs
altogether – and it won’t be them who will be responsible for having
allowed the PC system to lapse – the good governance government will be
responsible for that! Hence, every enemy of the 13th Amendment and the
provincial councils system will be supporting the latest ploy of the
government to avoid holding PC elections by allowing the PCs to stand
dissolved but not having elections. Those who are for the provincial
councils system will however raise a howl of protest saying that the
government has decided that the electoral system for the PCs needs to be
changed only at the eleventh hour when every other attempt at
postponing the PC elections failed.
They will say that the government had nearly three years to change the
system of elections for the PCs but they did not do so and now with just
days to go for the first PCs to stand dissolved they are trying to
bring amendments to the PC elections law through the back door so as to
be able to put off elections to the PCs that will stand dissolved. Given
this situation there is the possibility that the Northern and Eastern
PCs will object to their PCs being allowed to lapse without elections
being called immediately - so we have to see how things will work out in
the end. In the meantime, the automatic dissolutions will begin next
week with the Sabaragamuwa PC standing dissolved on 26 September
followed by the North Central and Eastern PCs on the 30th and the 1st
October. So the government will have to do some quick footwork if they
are to head off the PC elections. In terms of the present PC elections
law, the Elections Commission is obliged to call for nominations within a
week of the dissolution of the PC.
A Muslim man reads the Quran in a mosque in Kelantan. Source: Shutterstock/Ruzely Abdullah
