Peace for the World

Peace for the World
First democratic leader of Justice the Godfather of the Sri Lankan Tamil Struggle: Honourable Samuel James Veluppillai Chelvanayakam

Tuesday, May 30, 2017

Tataouine: Tunisia's jobless search for answers after deadly protest


Demonstrations may have subsided after the death of protester, but frustrations endure among unemployed
One in four youths are unemployed in Tataouine (AFP)


Tuesday 30 May 2017 
TATAOUINE, Tunisia – Pupils throw firecrackers and play in front of the city's high school, locals pack the shops for Ramadan, and men throng the cafes for a spot of early morning socialising.
But beyond this picture of everyday life lay the scars of protest in Tataouine. Only days before, on 23 May, burned tyres littered the streets, whose scorch marks are still visible, and the protest camps surrounding the local oil refinery remain, only their residents have now since departed.

Russians parade in blackface ahead of Cameroon-Germany match

Other marchers at Carnaval Sochi Fest parade were seen carrying bananas as city prepares to host Confederations Cup, once more raising racism concerns

 Some participants in the Carnaval Sochi Fest 2017 parade wore blackface, while others carried bananas. Photograph: Artur Lebedev/Tass
Participants dressed in ‘bright costumes’. Mexico will play New Zealand at Fisht stadium in Sochi Photograph: Artur Lebedev/TASS

 in Moscow-Tuesday 30 May 2017
People in blackface and carrying bananas marched in an official parade in Sochi less than a month before the city hosts Cameroon for a Confederations Cupmatch, once again raising concerns about racism at football matches in Russia.
A photograph from state news agency Tass showed a man in a Cameroon jersey with his face and arms painted black beating a drum at the Carnaval Sochi Fest parade on Saturday. A second man in blackface is visible behind him, wearing an Afro wig and carrying a drum and bananas on a string.
Another man can be seen draped in a Mexican flag, wearing a sombrero and what appears to be a stick-on black mustache. Two young men in a different photograph were wearing what appeared to be Native American headdresses and fringed costumes.
Cameroon will play Germany at Fisht stadium in Sochi, which was built for the 2014 Winter Olympics, on 25 June. Mexico will play New Zealand at the stadium on 21 June.
Sochi’s mayor led more than 3,000 marchers in “bright costumes” down a main street to officially open the southern city’s beach season. The marchers in blackface were part of a section dedicated to the Confederations Cup, which will serve as a dry run for the World Cup that Russia will host next year.
Late on Tuesday, the Sochi city government said in a statement that the parade was a “celebration of the different continents and a testimony of Russia’s open attitude toward traditions from around the globe.”
“By no means did the carnival parade intend to insult anyone,” it said. “On the contrary, it was organized with the friendliest of goals in mind: to create a positive atmosphere. We look forward to warmly welcoming the Cameroon national team and its fans, as well as the representatives of all other countries, during the FIFA Confederations Cup.”
But Russia’s track record of football-related racism has raised questions about whether non-white fans and players will be comfortable at the two huge international football tournaments.
A 2015 report by the Fare network and the Moscow-based Sova Centre for information and analysis documented 99 racist and far-right displays and 21 racially motivated attacks by Russian football fans during the 2012-13 and 2013-14 seasons. In one case, hooligans beat up fans of Anzhi Makhachkala, a club from Russia’s mostly Muslim Caucasus region, outside matches in Moscow and St Petersburg in August 2012.
International players have also been targeted. A banana was thrown at Brazilian left back Roberto Carlos at a match in St Petersburg in 2011, and fans in Moscow held up a banana banner directed at Nigerian striker Peter Odemwingie in 2010.
Zenit St Petersburg’s Brazilian striker Hulk said in 2015 he encounters racism in “almost every game” in Russia, and Ghanaian player Emmanuel Frimpong said he was “racially abused” by the crowd while playing for FC Ufa.
Russia has promised racism will not be an issue at the tournaments it will host, and the Russian Football Union appointed former Chelsea midfielder Alexei Smertin anti-racism and discrimination inspector in February. But even this news didn’t come without controversy, as Smertin had said in 2015 that “there’s no racism in Russia”.
The head of the official Russians supporter group at Euro 2016, Alexander Shprygin, has far-right affiliations and has been photographed performing a Nazi salute. He was among fans detained after violent clashes at the Russia-England match and was later deported.
Lolade Adewuyi, a Nigerian journalist who was present at the Sochi parade, told Associated Press that he didn’t believe the marchers were trying to offend but were simply unaware of the impact of their actions.

The Macron Method




Featured image courtesy Loic Venance/AFP via Getty Images
MARK LEONARD on 05/29/2017
LONDON – Emmanuel Macron’s election to the French presidency provides the European Union with an opportunity to move past the internal conflicts that have hastened its disintegration. Rather than standing exclusively with the old elites or the new populists, Macron has promised to rally broad political support under the banner of European reform. But can he really breathe new life into an ailing project?
When Macron met with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, he offered a plan for ending the cold war between northern and southern Europe – which is to say the tension between advocates of austerity and those in favor of growth policies. And when he meets with Russian President Vladimir Putin this week, he could find a way to bridge the divide between the EU’s eastern and western flanks, which want, respectively, to contain and engage Russia.
Likewise, Macron has tried to reconcile the idea of a welcoming Europe with advocacy of a fortress Europe. He wants to take in more refugees, while urging the EU to create a border force of 5,000 soldiers, and to accelerate repatriation of illegal migrants.
But while many EU leaders were relieved to see Macron elected, it is often because they hope he will give a new lease on life to the old project, rather than a radical break with the past. To bring true change, Macron will have to transcend the two contradictory but mutually reinforcing political models that have defined the last decade of EU governance: technocracy and populism.
Technocracy has been a central feature of European integration from the beginning. Jean Monnet, the French economist who is considered one of the modern EU’s founders, was renowned for his ability to turn big political conflicts into smaller technical issues. This method was highly successful during the post-war period of European reconstruction, because it allowed diplomats and officials from different countries to bypass national disagreements or lingering resentments and address the continent’s most pressing problems.
But, over the years, EU policy discussions have departed from Monnet’s model. They now tend to be disconnected from national politics altogether, driven as much by the logic of EU institutions as by member states’ needs. Moreover, EU-level decisions have been pickled into rigid codes to which member states must adhere, even if their governments or electorates do not support them. Together, these trends have fed the widespread perception that there are no alternative forms of EU governance, and that Europe is being run by elites who have little concern for the interests of the people they are supposed to be serving.
The populist explosion in recent years is a natural reaction to this disconnected form of technocracy. It is no accident that leaders such as Marine Le Pen in France, Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, Viktor Orbán in Hungary, and Nigel Farage in the United Kingdom have all posed as tribunes of the “people.” Through referenda – their favorite political tool – they have been able to inflict damage to the EU constitutional treaty, the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, refugee-repatriation deals, and, with the UK’s Brexit vote, the composition of the EU itself.
As European technocrats have pushed for covert integration to resolve the euro and refugee crises, the populists have struck back even harder. And every time populist-driven referenda against EU treaties force governments to retreat into technocracy, the populist narrative is reinforced.
The UK’s Brexit negotiations have already become a battleground between technocrats and populists, with each side vying for an outcome that will support its narrative. When British Prime Minister Theresa May says that she wants to “make a success of Brexit,” she sets off alarm bells in Brussels and other European capitals, because such an outcome could inspire populist anti-EU movements elsewhere.
To forestall that scenario, some members of the German government, fearing that they will be unable to accommodate Macron’s other demands (particularly concerning eurozone reforms), are hoping to work with him to make Brexit unattractive. This also seems to be what EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker was getting at recently. “Brexit will show how much more attractive it is to be a member of our Union,” he said. “Thanks to Europe, people enjoy the freedom to live, buy, love, and trade across borders.”
It is understandable that European leaders would latch onto Brexit as the one thing EU member states can agree on. But, unfortunately, the Brexit debate tends to bring out EU elites’ worst instincts, not least because it encourages them to fight for the status quo, rather than for reform and innovation.
If the EU continues to look inward, consumed by the questions posed by Brexit, the next five years will be as sterile and unproductive as the last. The big question now is whether Europe can accept the lifeline that Macron is offering, and look forward to a new project, rather than backward to old struggles.
To be sure, many observers have poked fun at Macron for refusing to commit himself to one side in any debate. And satirists have pointed out that he starts almost every sentence with “en meme temps” (at the same time). But for a long-gridlocked EU, Macron’s proposed grand bargains could offer a valuable way forward – one that relies not on institutional changes, but on political trade-offs.
Macron’s security policies try to square tough anti-terrorism measures with a more humanitarian approach to refugees. On economic policy, he has offered reform in exchange for investment. And, given his tough stance on Russia and support for action in Africa and the Mediterranean, he might even be able to rally the EU’s southern and eastern members around a common foreign-policy cause.
If Macron lives up to his promise, he will not stand for technocracy or populism, but for a genuine third way. That is an admittedly shopworn term. But Macron could imbue it with new meaning if he can combine, rather than accept, today’s false choices. He will have to bridge the EU’s geographic divides, and position himself as pro-European and patriotic, establishment and anti-establishment, open and protectionist, pro-growth and fiscally restrained.
Can Macron’s method allow EU leaders to break the vicious circle of technocracy and populism, and end the paralysis of the last decade? For the time being, the only certainty is that – to invoke another hackneyed phrase – there is no alternative.
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Mark Leonard is Director of the European Council on Foreign Relations.

Politics should not undermine justice

Robert Mueller has a wide remit and ample authority to fulfil his duties.

by A G Noorani-
( May 29, 2017, Mumbai, Sri Lanka Guardian) A dishonest judge perverts the course of justice — a dishonest prosecutor ensures that the course of justice doesn’t even begin. Recent events in the US, concerning the appointment of Robert Mueller as special counsel for the Russia investigation, holds lessons for every country governed by the rule of law.
The situation could not be murkier. Respected by both Republicans and Democrats, the former FBI director was recently appointed by deputy attorney general Rod Rosenstein after President Donald Trump’s dismissal of James Comey as FBI director had created a deep, nation-wide crisis of confidence. Attorney general Jefferson Sessions had to hand the investigation over to his deputy after it was revealed that he had kept suspiciously silent about his meetings Russian ambassador Sergey Kislyak.
Mr Kislyak was also responsible for Michael Flynn’s short stint as national security adviser being terminated by Mr Trump after disclosures of secret conversations with the ambassador — which he lied about — were published by the press. In conversations with then director Comey, Mr Trump sought pledges of loyalty and assurances that he himself was not under investigation, and capped it with a word of “advice” on the investigation into Mr Flynn’s alleged misconduct. Mr Comey’s refusal brought about his dismissal.
There is a long and instructive tradition of the special counsel in the US. After Watergate came the Iran-Contra and Whitewater probes. President James Carter, secured the enactment of the Ethics of Government Act, 1978. It envisaged the appointment of a special counsel by the court to which he reported. The act lapsed in 1999, but the Department of Justice issued internal regulations enabling the attorney general to appoint a special counsel.
Robert Mueller has a wide remit and ample authority to fulfil his duties. He is specially authorised to investigate “any links and/or coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the campaign of President Donald Trump”. He can press criminal charges.
In the UK, the first Labour government fell in 1924 because it withdrew a prosecution for political reasons. The minutes from a Cabinet meeting on Aug 6, 1924, recorded: “No public prosecution of a political character should be undertaken without the prior sanction of the Cabinet being obtained”. It was rescinded in 1931. The independent Crown Prosecution Service came into being in 1986.
Institutions and procedures may vary, but the fundamental principle remains unchanged — political considerations must not be allowed to interfere with the course of justice. India adopted a legal system based on British law. Rulings of its Supreme Court affirm the independence of the prosecuting agency from governmental and political influence or consideration. But the reality is its direct opposite.
Prof D.H. Bayley, author of the definitive work The Police and Political Development in India, observed that “a dual system of criminal justice” emerged. “The one of law, the other of politics … the rule of law in modern India, the frame upon which justice hangs, has been undermined by the rule of politics. Supervision in the name of democracy has eroded in the foundations upon which impartiality depends in a criminal justice system.”
The pogrom of Muslims in Gujarat in 2002 saw a near total collapse of the criminal justice system. Many a prosecutor turned defence counsel. There were, however, a good few notable exceptions and some important figures were brought to book.
However, nearly a quarter century after the demolition of the Babri mosque in December 1992, the prime accused in the conspiracy case are yet to be brought to book. One of them, L.K. Advani, became Union home minister, in charge of the Central Bureau of Investigation that was pursuing the case. Recently, there has been a spate of cases in which Muslims were falsely charged with terrorism and spent years in prison, only to be acquitted.
After 2014, the National Investigation Agency under the Narendra Modi government has treated Hindus accused of terrorism with kid gloves. There is no danger of India having a Robert Mueller any time soon. In no case can one rely on executive restraint. Restraint must be imposed by law, and the law must be inscribed within the Constitution. If the Constitution can establish a comptroller and auditor-general, why can it not establish the office of an independent director of public prosecutions?
The writer is an author and lawyer based in Mumbai. He is a columnist for Dawn, a daily newspaper in Pakistan where this piece first appeared

Germany Is Quietly Building a European Army Under Its Command

Berlin is using a bland name to obscure a dramatic shift in its approach to defense: integrating brigades from smaller countries into the Bundeswehr.
Germany Is Quietly Building a European Army Under Its Command

No automatic alt text available.BY ELISABETH BRAW-MAY 22, 2017

Every few years, the idea of an EU army finds its way back into the news, causing a kerfuffle. The concept is both fantasy and bogeyman: For every federalist in Brussels who thinks a common defense force is what Europe needs to boost its standing in the world, there are those in London and elsewhere who recoil at the notion of a potential NATO rival.

But this year, far from the headlines, Germany and two of its European allies, the Czech Republic and Romania, quietly took a radical step down a path toward something that looks like an EU army while avoiding the messy politics associated with it: They announced the integration of their armed forces.

Romania’s entire military won’t join the Bundeswehr, nor will the Czech armed forces become a mere German subdivision. But in the next several months each country will integrate one brigade into the German armed forces: Romania’s 81st Mechanized Brigade will join the Bundeswehr’s Rapid Response Forces Division, while the Czech 4th Rapid Deployment Brigade, which has served in Afghanistan and Kosovo and is considered the Czech Army’s spearhead force, will become part of the Germans’ 10th Armored Division. In doing so, they’ll follow in the footsteps of two Dutch brigades, one of which has already joined the Bundeswehr’s Rapid Response Forces Division and another that has been integrated into the Bundeswehr’s 1st Armored Division. According to Carlo Masala, a professor of international politics at the University of the Bundeswehr in Munich, “The German government is showing that it’s willing to proceed with European military integration” — even if others on the continent aren’t yet.

European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker has repeatedly floated the idea of an EU army, only to be met with either ridicule or awkward silence. That remains the case even as the U.K., a perennial foe of the idea, is on its way out of the union. There’s little agreement among remaining member states over what exactly such a force would look like and which capabilities national armed forces would give up as a result. And so progress has been slow going. This March, the European Union created a joint military headquarters — but it’s only in charge of training missions in Somalia, Mali, and the Central African Republic and has a meager staff of 30. Other multinational concepts have been designed, such as the Nordic Battle Group, a small 2,400-troop rapid reaction force formed by the Baltic states and several Nordic countries and the Netherlands, and Britain’s Joint Expeditionary Force, a “mini-NATO” whose members include the Baltic states, Sweden, and Finland. But in the absence of suitable deployment opportunities, such operations-based teams may as well not exist.

But under the bland label of the Framework Nations Concept, Germany has been at work on something far more ambitious — the creation of what is essentially a Bundeswehr-led network of European miniarmies. “The initiative came out of the weakness of the Bundeswehr,” said Justyna Gotkowska, a Northern Europe security analyst at Poland’s Centre for Eastern Studies think tank. “The Germans realized that the Bundeswehr needed to fill gaps in its land forces … in order to gain political and military influence within NATO.” An assist from junior partners may be Germany’s best shot at bulking out its military quickly — and German-led miniarmies may be Europe’s most realistic option if it’s to get serious about joint security. “It’s an attempt to prevent joint European security from completely failing,” Masala said.

“Gaps” in the Bundeswehr is an understatement. In 1989, the West German government spent 2.7 percent of GDP on defense, but by 2000 spending had dropped to 1.4 percent, where it remained for years. Indeed, between 2013 and 2016 defense spending was stuck at 1.2 percent — far from NATO’s 2 percent benchmark. In a 2014 report to the Bundestag, the German parliament, the Bundeswehr’s inspectors-general presented a woeful picture: Most of the Navy’s helicopters were not working, and of the Army’s 64 helicopters, only 18 were usable. And while the Cold War Bundeswehr had consisted of 370,000 troops, by last summer it was only 176,015 men and women strong.

Since then the Bundeswehr has grown to more than 178,000 active-duty troops; last year the government increased funding by 4.2 percent, and this year defense spending will grow by 8 percent. But Germany still lags far behind France and the U.K. as a military power. And boosting defense spending is not uncontroversial in Germany, which is wary of its history as a military power. Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel recently said it was “completely unrealistic” to think that Germany would reach NATO’s defense spending benchmark of 2 percent of GDP — even though nearly all of Germany’s allies, from smaller European countries to the United States, are urging it to play a larger military role in the world.

Germany may not yet have the political will to expand its military forces on the scale that many are hoping for — but what it has had since 2013 is the Framework Nations Concept. For Germany, the idea is to share its resources with smaller countries in exchange for the use of their troops.
For these smaller countries, the initiative is a way of getting Germany more involved in European security while sidestepping the tricky politics of Germany military expansion.
For these smaller countries, the initiative is a way of getting Germany more involved in European security while sidestepping the tricky politics of Germany military expansion. “It’s a move towards more European military independence,” Masala said. “The U.K. and France are not available to take a lead in European security” — the U.K. is on a collision course with its EU allies, while France, a military heavyweight, has often been a reluctant participant in multinational efforts within NATO. “That leaves Germany,” he said. Operationally, the resulting binational units are more deployable because they’re permanent (most multinational units have so far been ad hoc). Crucially for the junior partners, it also amplifies their military muscle. And should Germany decide to deploy an integrated unit, it could only do so with the junior partner’s consent.

Of course, since 1945 Germany has been extraordinarily reluctant to deploy its military abroad, until 1990 even barring the Bundeswehr from foreign deployments. Indeed, junior partners — and potential junior partners — hope that the Framework Nations arrangement will make Germany take on more responsibility for European security. So far, Germany and its multinational miniarmies remain only that: small-scale initiatives, far removed from a full-fledged European army. But the initiative is likely to grow. Germany’s partners have been touting the practical benefits of integration: For Romania and the Czech Republic, it means bringing their troops to the same level of training as the German military; for the Netherlands, it has meant regaining tank capabilities. (The Dutch had sold the last of their tanks in 2011, but the 43rd Mechanized Brigade’s troops, who are partially based with the 1st Armored Division in the western German city of Oldenburg, now drive the Germans’ tanks and could use them if deployed with the rest of the Dutch army.) Col. Anthony Leuvering, the 43rd Mechanized’s Oldenburg-based commander, told me that the integration has had remarkably few hiccups. “The Bundeswehr has some 180,000 personnel, but they don’t treat us like an underdog,” he said. He expects more countries to jump on the bandwagon: “Many, many countries want to cooperate with the Bundeswehr.” The Bundeswehr, in turn, has a list of junior partners in mind, said Robin Allers, a German associate professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies who has seen the German military’s list. According to Masala, the Scandinavian countries — which already use a large amount of German-made equipment — would be the best candidates for the Bundeswehr’s next round of integration.

So far, the low-profile and ad hoc approach of the Framework Nations Concept has worked to its advantage; few people in Europe have objected to the integration of Dutch or Romanian units into German divisions, partly because they may not have noticed. Whether there will be political repercussions should more nations sign up to the initiative is less clear.

Outside of politics, the real test of the Framework Nations’ value will be the integrated units’ success in combat. But the trickiest part of integration, on the battlefield and off, may turn out to be finding a lingua franca. Should troops learn each other’s languages? Or should the junior partner speak German? The German-speaking Dutch Col. Leuvering reports that the binational Oldenburg division is moving toward using English.

Photo credit: Sean Gallup/Getty Images

German Chancellor Angela Merkel talks with President Trump. (Evan Vucci/Associated Press)

 

On Tuesday morning, President Trump wrote a tweet saying that the United States had a “MASSIVE trade deficit with Germany.” He further said that this was bad for the United States and (in what seemed to be a vague threat against Germany) said that this would change. This follows on Trump’s reported statement in a closed-door session with European officials a week ago that German trade policy was “bad, very bad.” What lies behind Trump’s complaints about Germany’s trade deficit? Here’s what you need to know.
We have a MASSIVE trade deficit with Germany, plus they pay FAR LESS than they should on NATO & military. Very bad for U.S. This will change
Trump doesn’t understand Germany’s trade relationships

The Trump administration seems to have some basic misunderstandings of Germany’s economic policy.
 Trump’s trade adviser, Peter Navarro, seems to think that Germany wants a weak euro. In fact, German officials have spoken out consistently against the European Central Bank’s quantitative easing policy that is helping hold down the euro’s value.

More broadly, the president seems to think of trade in terms of bilateral relationships between pairs of countries that bargain with one another to strike a deal. However, trade relations are much more complex and harder to trace — policy changes in one country can lead to indirect ripple effects that are difficult to trace, but very important.

Even if Trump’s criticism rests on dubious assumptions, the United States is not the only country worried about Germany’s economic policy, and some of the U.S. concerns are both reasonable and long-standing. Germany’s large current account surplus is now in its 15th year and exceeds 8 percent of German gross domestic product. However, neither the Trump nor the Obama administrations, nor, for that matter, other European officials, have convinced the Germans that this is a problem, let alone that they need to solve it.

After recent summits, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said May 28 that Europe must take its fate into its own hands. (Reuters)

Germany, too, misunderstands the sources of its own success

As I discuss in a recent paper for the Transatlantic Academy, Germany has responded to such concerns with two complementary rhetorical arguments. First, it says that its large surplus and other countries’ deficits are a simple product of differences in competitiveness. Second, German officials “normalize and apologize.” To do this, they start by stressing that Germany is just like any other advanced economy and that any state willing to do the right policy reforms could enjoy its competitive advantages. When they get pushback, they become apologists, articulating and defending Germany’s uniqueness and purported inability to change.

A better explanation, however, would move the focus away from competitiveness to capital flows — large financial flows between countries that reflect policy-driven changes in incomes, consumption, savings and investment. In Germany’s case, a host of labor market, pension, public investment and fiscal policy changes have helped lower the share of national income that goes to labor. This put far more money in the hands of those who save rather than spend. As a result, German domestic consumption has necessarily grown much more slowly than has national income, and lower consumption, by definition, has meant greater savings.

Practically, this means firm profits have soared ever higher, and, more recently, government debt has shrunk — both manifestations of these higher savings. Overall, German national savings grew from about 21 percent of German GDP to 28 percent during the period in which its current account went sharply into surplus (2003-2017). Meanwhile, German private investment stagnated, and public investment fell to among the lowest levels in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. This means that of the three usual sources of economic growth — consumption, investment and trade — Germany has become disruptively reliant on trade since about 2003.

Thus, where German apologists claim that the trade surplus is simply the aggregate result of free consumer choices, it is, in fact, mostly the result of Germany’s capital outflows, which are a result of policy choices, especially those that shift national income from consumers to firms (as profits or capital subsidies) or to government (as budget surpluses). Global capital flows have their own logic and have now grown to dwarf trade flows.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel told world leaders at NATO headquarters, May 25, that preserving "open societies" leads to success, not "the building of walls." (The Washington Post)

This has policy implications

Why should it matter to other countries how much Germany saves? The answer is that national savings don’t just sit in banks. They often have large unanticipated knock-on effects elsewhere. It is an economic truism to say that global savings and investment must equal each other by definition. This means that savings increases in one place logically must be matched either with investment growth (there or somewhere else) or by savings declinessomewhere else.

Broadly speaking, Germany is one of a number of countries, including China, Japan and South Korea, that are now saving far more than they are either consuming or investing (a country’s GDP is the sum of its consumption and investment. Because all GDP is income for the nation’s residents, another way to put this is that GDP is the sum of consumption and savings — the two things people can do with their income). This alone is complicated enough to make most elected officials’ heads hurt.

But it gets worse. What happens to those “extra” savings (e.g., in excess of the nation’s total investment)?
 According to macroeconomic theory and data, these savings are going to any country with a trade deficit. Indeed, another way to understand a country’s trade surplus is that it is (and must be) exactly equal in size to its investment deficit.

The academic literature on capital flows emphasizes the importance of this relationship and spells out its counterintuitive and often unwelcome results. For example, it is difficult for countries to deal with unwanted capital inflows when their current investment needs are largely covered, as is true in the United States today. Because savings must, again by definition, match investment, those inflows that aren’t invested must generate lower savings in the receiving country. Put differently, countries don’t simply get to choose their own savings rates because these are profoundly affected by the presence of foreign capital.

Thus, countries that persistently save more than they invest — even if for sensible reasons such as the aging of their society — can nevertheless cause trouble for other states. However, free capital flows in the euro zone and in the liberal international order more broadly mean that there are few ways of stopping inflows of capital.

The two main ways that a country like the United States reacts to inflows from Germany, China and elsewhere are through a consumption boom or an increase in unemployment. Both ultimately bring down U.S. savings rates to compensate for inflows. For example, consumption decreases savings by increasing debt, and the boom runs out when no more credit is extended; meanwhile, unemployment also causes savings to shrink because people have to live off past earnings. Unfortunately, however, this can persist for a very long time, especially when fresh supplies of foreign capital arrive every day.

Of course, German capital flows are not the only problem for the United States or countries in Southern Europe — but German commentators rarely acknowledge that they are a problem.
There are responses Germany could make

If the German government actually wanted to tackle this problem, there are steps it could take, such as reducing taxes on labor and consumption (Germany, like other E.U. member states, has a value-added tax that hits consumer spending), increase public spending, and either reduce national savings or improve the domestic investment climate for firms. Equally, there are steps that the United States could take, too. But vituperative disagreements about trade miss the point — trade relations are dwarfed in importance by capital flows.

At some point, the world will be unable to absorb the capital surpluses of Germany, China and others, leading to another painful correction that might undermine the liberal order. As a surplus country, Germany depends on that order, even if it is difficult for German and U.S. politicians to understand that.

Wade Jacoby is a professor of political science at Brigham Young University.

Merkel wants to foster India ties, softens message on U.S. as Trump scolds

German Chancellor Angela Merkel shakes hands with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi following a news conference at the Chancellery in Berlin, Germany, May 30, 2017. REUTERS/Hannibal Hanschke--German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi walk before a signing ceremony at the 4th round of German-Indian government consultation at the Chancellery in Berlin, Germany, May 30, 2017. REUTERS/Hannibal Hanschke
German Chancellor Angela Merkel talks to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during the 4th round of German-Indian government consultation at the Chancellery in Berlin, Germany, May 30, 2017. REUTERS/Fabrizio Bensch--German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi pose with members of their delegations for a family photo ahead of the 4th round of German-Indian government consultation at the Chancellery in Berlin, Germany, May 30, 2017. REUTERS/Hannibal Hanschke

By Michelle Martin and Thomas Escritt | BERLIN- Tue May 30, 2017

Germany wants to develop its ties with India but this should not be at the cost of its trans-Atlantic relationship, Chancellor Angela Merkel said on Tuesday after meeting Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Merkel, trying to repair damage after shocking Washington on Sunday by declaring the era in which Europe could rely on its partners was somewhat over, repeatedly stressed the importance of trans-Atlantic ties. But she also highlighted Germany's history of cooperating with India and China in a global world.

On Monday, Merkel had underlined her doubts about the reliability of the United States as an ally. She
Merkel talked to Modi in Berlin about developing cooperation with India.

"That's of huge importance and in no way directed against any other relationships and certainly not against the trans-Atlantic ties, which have historically been very important for us and will remain so in future," she said.

Merkel said she and Modi had discussed open markets and free and fair trade during their meeting in Berlin.

In a thinly veiled dig at the Trump administration, Merkel said "protectionist tendencies" were increasing worldwide and this made it necessary to remain open and ensure conditions for negotiations are fair.

"For that reason it's important to us that we make progress on the German-Indian, or rather EU-Indian free trade agreement," she said at a Berlin business forum where she shared a platform with Modi.

Modi said economic collaboration between Germany and India was still "below full potential".

Speaking at a joint news conference with Modi, Merkel reiterated her view that "we need to take our fate in Europe into our own hands".

Europe needs to step up its presence on the international stage, for example by bringing about solutions to issues such as the Libya conflict, migration and economic problems including unemployment, she said.

Merkel praised India for implementing that climate pact very "intensively and in a very committed way" and Modi said people had no right to ruin the environment for future generations.

The German and Indian governments signed numerous agreements, including on cyber cooperation, development cooperation, education and railway safety.

In a sign of Berlin's shifting focus towards Asia, Merkel is also due to meet Chinese Premier Li Keqiang on Wednesday.

(Additional reporting by Paul Carrel and Andreas Rinke; Writing by Michelle Martin; Editing by Louise Ireland)
Sri Lanka’s flood survivors at risk of dengue, disease – aid workers
(File) A relative of a victim reacts at a landslide site during a rescue mission in Athwelthota village, in Kalutara, Sri Lanka May 28, 2017. Source: Reuters/Dinuka Liyanawatte--A man looks at the landslide site during a rescue mission in Athwelthota village, in Kalutara, Sri Lanka May 28, 2017. Source: Reuters/Dinuka Liyanawatte
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A part of a flooded highway exit is seen in a village in Matara, Sri Lanka May 29, 2017. Source: Sri Lanka Air Force/Handout via Reuters

30th May 2017

THOUSANDS of survivors of devastating floods and landslides in Sri Lanka are at risk of potentially fatal diseases such as dengue fever, charities warned on Monday as the death toll from the disaster continued to rise.

Torrential rains over the last four days have sparked widespread flooding and triggered landslides in southwestern parts of the Indian Ocean island. At least 177 people have died and almost half a million others have had their lives disrupted.

As search and rescue teams look for more than 100 people who remain missing, and Sri Lanka’s military in boats and helicopters struggle to reach marooned villagers with food and clean water, charities are warning of a looming health threat.

“The threat of water-borne diseases is a big concern with over 100,000 people displaced from their homes, many of whom are staying in damp, crowded conditions,” Chris McIvor, head of Save the Children Sri Lanka, told the Thomson Reuters Foundation.

 “I’m particularly worried we could start seeing even more dengue cases because of the floods, as stagnant water provides the perfect breeding ground for mosquitoes. It’s the last thing needed by communities that have already lost so much.”



Outbreaks of diseases such as dengue fever and cholera, and illnesses like diarrhea and dysentery, are often a threat in the aftermath of floods due to water-logging, say experts.

Dengue is common in South Asia, especially during the monsoon season which runs from June to September, and if untreated, it can kill.

Sri Lanka’s ministry of disaster management says almost 558,000 people from 15 of the country’s 25 districts have been hit by the disaster. Villages and towns have been inundated, thousands of homes damaged and agriculture land swamped.

Around 75,000 people in the worst-affected districts have been relocated to temporary shelters.

The Sri Lanka authorities have called for international assistance to help with search and rescue efforts, and have also appealed for aid ranging from boats, generators and mobile toilets to mosquito nets, clothes and clean drinking water.

But aid workers say reaching survivors remains a challenge. Entire communities remain marooned, living out in the open as their homes have been destroyed, with roads submerged under water or blocked by landslides.

“Getting in to these communities is of the highest priority right now so we can find out exactly what the needs are and respond,” said McIvor.

“At the same time more rains are predicted since we are only at the start of the south west monsoon season, so the situation could worsen even more over the coming days and weeks.” – Thomson Reuters Foundation