Peace for the World

Peace for the World
First democratic leader of Justice the Godfather of the Sri Lankan Tamil Struggle: Honourable Samuel James Veluppillai Chelvanayakam

Saturday, April 8, 2017

In Search of National Identity - Leonard Pinto

In Search of National Identity - Leonard Pinto

Apr 08, 2017

“In Search of a National Identity” a speech delivered by Dr Leonard Pinto to the Academic Circle of the Social Science Department of the Open University of Sri Lanka, Nawala on 13th Feb 2017, forwarded by the Asian Human Rights Commission

I had the privilege of addressing the Academic Circle of the Social Science Department of the Open University of Sri Lanka, Nawala on 13 Feb 2017 on the above subject. As the topic is current, some suggested that I share the ideas discussed at this academic session with the wider Sri Lankan community. This essay contains some of the ideas discussed at that meeting and their implications and applications.
In the recent history of Sri Lanka, a national identity based on religion and race resulted in the death of about 100,000 in an ethnic war that lasted 26 years. An identity based on class-struggle resulted in the death of about 60,000 in the two JVP insurrections. Therefore, it is necessary to search and apply a new a national identity that is sustainable, productive, inclusive and transcends differences.
As early as the 3rd century a Buddhist-Sinhalese Nationalism was developed in Sri Lanka in response to the invasion of Chola king Elara in the Anuradhapura period (377 BC-1017 AD). Same nationalism prevailed in the Pollonaruwa period (11 -13th century AD), when Magha, the Indian Kalinga king destroyed Buddhist shrines. However, When Parakramabahu the Great sent his troops to South India and Mayanmar in the 12th century, it was a Sri Lankan Nationalism of pride and prestige. It was not to protect Buddhist religion or Sinhalese race, but to provide military assistance, as a regional super power. The great king married a Hindu Indian queen, as he overlooked race and religion in this regard. His reign saw advances in agriculture, engineering, military and naval warfare, foreign policy, art and so on in Sri Lanka, but received less attention initially in Mahawansa, till Chulavansa updated it. When the Sinhalese kings lost their material power in Pollonaruwa, they moved to Dambadeniya (13th-14th century). Here they substituted the loss of material things with a spiritual Buddhist-Sinhalese identity, enriched with the stories of Mahawansa and other Buddhist literature.
Mahawansa synchronized the Vijaya landing with Buddha’s parinibbana in 543 BC in an attempt to seal the Buddhist-Sinhalese ownership of Sri Lanka. But there are issues with Mahawansa dates according to Contemporaries, Generation and Age theories, relating to the times of Alexander the Great, Mutasiva and Bhaddakachchana. According to Age theory, Bhaddakachchana, Buddha’s niece would have been at least 90 years at the time she married Panduvasudeva, and they had 11 children! Modern scholars consider Buddha’s parinibbana to be in 400±20 BC. But, the author of Mahawansa seems to have adjusted the years to show Buddha’s close association with the inhabitants of Sri Lanka in Vijaya landing, and also in narrating three visits of Buddha to Sri Lanka, which do not carry any historical evidence.
During the colonial period the Buddhist-Sinhalese nationalism was anti-colonial. Initially, Sinhalese kings invited the Portuguese, Dutch and British to solve their local problems or to replace one colonizer by another. In the independence struggle a Sri Lankan National identity emerged, as Sinhalese, Tamil, Christian, Buddhist and Muslim leaders worked together to obtain independence from the British.
Monks of the Vidyalankara Pirivena Kelaniya developed a Monk’s Buddhist-Sinhalese identity that led the moderate political monks to the parliament as MPs, and extreme monks to riots on streets through the initiative of Budu Bala Sena, Ravana Balaya and Sinhala Ravaya. During the ethnic war, when feelings were running high, the Buddhist-Sinhalese nationalism in general, and Elara-Dutugamunu war in particular were recalled to derive inspiration from this archetype to win the war against the Tamils. Now the war is over and all Sri Lankans are reconciling with one another, it is worth evaluating the past national identities, and move forward. According to Prof. Gananath Obeysekera, King Dutugamunu built Ruwanwelisaya, not to celebrate his victory over Elara, but to atone for the dead, including killing of Elera, a father figure. His son Saliya, stood for his rights, broke all social barriers and married Asokamala, a low caste woman.
In the course of time the ethno-religious composition of Sri Lankans had undergone change. In the 21st century, according to religion Sri Lanka has 70% Buddhists, 13% Hindus, 10% Muslims and 7% Christians. According to race, Sri has 75% Sinhalese, 15% Tamils, 9% Moors and 1% Malays, Burghers and others. Most of these ethno-religious differences are reflected in the Sri Lankan flag. In contrast, Indian leaders had transcended ethno-religious barriers in the symbolism of their flag, as green reflects greenery and not Muslims, saffron reflects earth and not Hindu-Tamils and white, peace and purity. When Sinhalese have placed a mythical Sinhalese lion from Mahawansa in the centre of their flag, Indians have placed King Asoka’s Buddhist Chakra in their flag, instead of the trident of Shiva to represent Hindu symbolism. We don’t need to change the flag, but can give a new meaning to symbols in the flag, as secular States that historically carry religious symbols, such as Scandinavians and Swiss have done with the cross, and Turks and Singaporeans have done with star/s and crescent.
Prof. Peter Schalk’s hypotheses (1986) on the ethnic war that its roots were really in economics (i.e. education and employment) and not in ethnicity, and the belief of Buddhist-Sinhalese that Sri Lanka was bequeathed to them by Buddha in ancient times, were critically assessed. Dr Gunadasa Amarasekera’s hypotheses (2003) that identified the rights of the majority Buddhist-Sinhalese that should not be given to the minorities, including the right to call their country their motherland, right to the territory of that motherland, the right to have their language as the national language and so on, were also critically assessed.
Various models of national identity that could be adopted into the Sri Lankan Constitution, where the rights of every citizen is given the right place in a constitution vis-a-vis Buddhism should be given the first and foremost place were considered. They include, (1) only Buddhist-Sinhalese identity, (2) first place to the Buddhist ‘values & culture,’ (3) Buddhist Sinhalese identity subject to equal rights of citizens, (4) secular Sri Lankan identity, (5) Sri Lankan identity focusing on economy, jobs production and export and (6) multi-cultural (i.e. ethnic & religious) identity. As of now, Sri Lanka is not prepared to accept a completely secular state. Retaining the good aspects of Buddhism and rights of all citizens and developing a Sri Lankan identity seems to be feasible.
How do we ensure that the tenets of Magna Carta that nobody is above the law, is enshrined in the constitution and implemented? It means that every citizen, including Buddhist monks should stand when the magistrate walks into the courthouse. Police must arrest violent monks on the streets as they would handle violet laypersons, and there should not be any special treatment of Buddhist monks, prominent leaders and politicians on bribery, assault and murder. The constitution must not give an opportunity to monks and lay leaders to say, “Buddhism is given the first and foremost place in the constitution, and therefore we Buddhists can do whatever we think is right in the interest of Buddhism, even in attacking minorities”. The constitution also must protect the rights of all citizens in trivial things, such as no loudspeakers for prayers, when people are sleeping.
As in any religion, three tiers of functioning can be recognized in the operation of Buddhism in Sri Lanka. (A) Buddhist values, philosophy and historical culture – that can be retained in the constitution. (B) Ritualistic Buddhism – personal aspects are good (i.e. for inner peace), but social aspects (i.e. outward manifestations) can be bad, as when Buddhist statues are placed in Hindu/Christian Tamil areas or a Muslim prays at the Mahamaluwa of Adam’s Peak as I have witnessed. (C) Political Buddhism – which often violates the rights of minorities should never be encouraged in the constitution. Therefore, the ‘value & culture’ option and the ‘subject to rights’ option, satisfies the importance given to Buddhism as well as the rights of all citizens in the constitution. Perhaps, (2) or (3) with a blend of (5) would be the most feasible, in line with the 21st century thinking, and suitable for a modern Sri Lankan Constitution.
In moving forwards, good ethics (i.e. universal truth, right, justice), integrity, responsibility, reconciliation, transparency, zero tolerance of corruption, total ban on commissions, love of work, punctuality, respect for law and law enforcement, respect for the rights of other citizens and development of industries, natural resources and export, creating jobs for citizens should be considered as the principles on which, Sri Lanka should build its future, as other successful nations have done. If Singapore could make the change in 25 years, why not Sri Lanka? Developing countries have remained poor, not because they do not have resources, brains or a rich history, but because of their narrow minded attitude in thinking within the box, and taking refuge in religion or/and ethnicity.
Singapore’s architect Lee Kuan Yew saw Ceylon as a prosperous country when it gained independence in 1948. It was the classic model of gradual evolution to independence. Ceylon was Britain’s Commonwealth model country. Lee wrote, “Alas it did not work out. During my visits over the years, I watched a promising country go to waste. The start of the unraveling of Sri Lanka was in 1956 with Sinhala being made the national language, and other moves to make Ceylon a more nativist society”. Placing religion and ethnicity as a priority in the constitution was another error of Sri Lankan lawmakers. Indeed, religion had become the opium of masses in Sri Lanka and some politicians have used the drug effectively to gain votes of the simple people. Development that is based on commissions for political leaders and their stooges is bound to fail Sri Lank, as it makes a few rich but increases the national debt, resulting in an increase in cost of living for the ordinary citizens. Perhaps, it is time to get out of this nativist ideology and think of Sri Lanka as part of the global community.

 PC: Image obtained from iknowpolitics.org
logoFriday, 7 April 2017

The two major parties in Government have apparently agreed on constitutional reforms that do not require a referendum. With presidential powers already reduced to some extent and independent commissions now functioning more or less, electoral reforms, if carried out with the larger constitutional objectives in mind, present a reform tool with significant impact.

Unfortunately, electoral reforms are planned and implemented piecemeal largely with nothing more than cut and dried solutions presented on political manifestos as the basis. Yes, as intended in those manifestoes (1) representatives have to be brought closer to people (2) intra-party competition has to be reduced if not eliminated and (3) excessive campaign spending should be discouraged removing incentives for corruption before or after elections, but, the reforms need to be better rationalized and more coherently implemented.

01Unfortunately, what we see is a fixation on a mixed-member method system with piecemeal application of the same across different levels of government. The result is an aborted 20th Amendment to reform Parliamentary elections in 2015, and now a strange beast of a local government electoral method made up of several amendments to existing legislation. The latest amendment to local government elections act would give 25% of seats in a council to women through a list dedicated to women. Sounds well and good at first sight, but I would caution all concerned to be careful. Will a women’s only list relegate women to a pink pedestal with little power? Have we thought through the implications of doubling the size of local councils as a result?

It is only too easy to increase the size of local authorities to make us women feel good, but as Robert McNamara, a former Defence Secretary of US would have advised, let us first ask what we get for 8800+ representatives in a local government system which we could not get with the present 4853. To begin let us look at the projected increase in size in more detail and then discuss alternatives that will keep the size of local councils at saner levels.

CMC size will increase from 53 to 113

Two key amendments that define the new methods for local elections are the Act No. 22 of 2012 and the Act no. 1 of 2016. The former was legislated to change the PR system to a mixed system (with most members elected first-past-the post from mostly single-member constituencies and another 30% of that number returned from party lists). Act No. 1 of 2016 was an add-on to increase women’s representation.

Taking the Colombo Municipal Council (CMC) as an example, it presently has 53 members. The Gazette on ‘Demarcation of Wards of Local Authorities” published on August 15, 2015, assigns a new total of 66 members to be returned first-past-post of FPP. This large increase is due to the fact that some constituencies are to be multi-member constituencies. The PR component as per legislation would be 19 seats (or thirty percent of 66) for an interim total of 85 seats.

The women’s quota as per legislation would then be 28 (or one third of 85). The final total of Members for the CMC is then 66+19+28 or 113. The net result is more than a doubling of the 53 Members in the present Council. In addition it should be noted that this increase is largely due to ‘19+28=47’ unelected members from Party Lists. 

Smallest Pradeshiya Sabha numbers too would nearly double 

According to the same Gazette of 2015, Neluwa Pradeshiya Sabha (PS), a small local authority with an ethnically homogeneous population, is entitled to ten members representing ten single-member constituencies. In a mixed member system, the Neluwa PS will be entitled to an additional 3 PR members. If we apply the Women’s quota legislation to this interim total of 13, a further addition of 4 women members should be apportioned to this PS, for a final total of 10+3+4=17 members. This new total is an increase of 90% from the current number of 9 Members in the Neluwa PS. 

Women could become token representatives on pink pedestals 

Currently women have a hard time getting nominations for elections. The situation is unlikely to change even if we divide the CMC area to 66 smaller wards, for example. The solution offered by the government is to create women’s only lists, where women are returned on the basis of votes received by each Party like in the National List in Parliament. This is a practical solution but has the danger of women not being given chances to contest in elections in constituencies because they have their own list, creating what I would call a pink pedestal from which it would be hard to transition to real world of politics.

Alternative mixed-Member scenario

for a smaller increase

in size? 

On close inspection, I think we stand to gain more by repealing the women’s representation amendment act and incorporating those ideals in the original amendment by,

1. Zipping the PR list (or mandating that every other candidates on the PR list should be a woman) and

2. Changing the ‘may’ to a ‘shall’ in the existing legislation where it mandates that “25% of candidates may be women”.

If we make these simple changes, there will be no need for a separate women’s list and hence no need to increase the size of the local authority by an additional 25% to accommodate women. If small Parties feel they need a higher percent of PR members that would be separate matter.

Other modes of increasing women’s representation

There are other ways to optimise women’s representation. The gamut of electoral reforms extends from FPP systems to PR systems and mixed member systems in between. The applicability of each to different levels of government would be different. In South Africa for example, a PR system is used at the National and Provincial levels, but a mixed member proportional system is used at the local level. Women’s representation activists should engage themselves with larger issue of representation to avoid the danger of myopically accepting legislation simply because they increase women’s representation.

Muslim women in Sri Lanka still second-class citizens – by law


Munza Mushtaq APRIL 5, 2017 5:24

No automatic alt text available.Despite its broadly progressive approach to female empowerment, Sri Lanka holds a dark secret: women in its minority Muslim community are second-class citizens – by law. Now, outdated legislation that dates back more than 65 years is being challenged by Muslim women from across the country.

Sri Lanka gave the world its first female prime minister, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, and South Asia its first female president, Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga. Sri Lankan women are known for their progressive nature and high literacy rates compared with other countries in South Asia. But the country still has the patriarchal Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act (MMDA), which allows girls as young as 14 years to be married off, without their consent.

Efforts to reform the MMDA are being met with stern resistance from hardcore religious groups, who have been attempting to disrupt a process of reform that is in the hands of a committee appointing under a previous government.

According to one political analyst, the MMDA is a very sensitive matter because of its religious aspect, leading successive governments to ignore it despite the fact that Sri Lanka’s constitution guarantees equality to all citizens. Behind Hindus, Muslims are the second largest minority in the largely Buddhist country, accounting for some 9% of the population.

The 16-member Muslim Personal Law Reform Committee was appointed in July 2009 to reform the MMDA. Headed by former Supreme Court judge Saleem Marsoof, its recommendations to the parliament of Sri Lanka are long overdue: owing to consistent hurdles and opposition, its final report has been delayed and delayed.
‘The Quazi court system is funded by the state, so it is the government’s responsibility to ensure women in Sri Lanka are not discriminated [against] by law’
Hyshyama Hamin,
Muslim Personal Law Reforms Action Group
The reform process received its latest setback when committee member Rizwe Mufthi, who is also president of the All Ceylon Jamiyyathul Ulama (ACJU), the apex religious body of Islamic theologians, made a statement that the MMDA was “perfect in the present state.” This was met with severe opposition from activists, as well as from Marsoof himself, who said Muslim clerics were attempting to hamper the process. He added that some members committee members even felt intimidated by the ACJU.

Apart from allowing child marriages, the MMDA, enacted in 1951, also allows a male guardian (father or uncle) to force his daughter or niece into marriage, even if she objects. A Quazi court system, which ostensibly upholds Sharia law, permits only men to sit as judges, even while other Muslim countries, including Malaysia, permit women to be Quazi judges.

Hyshyama Hamin, an activist with the Muslim Personal Law Reforms Action Group emphasized that it was the state’s responsibility to ensure there is no discrimination of women by law, regardless of which religious group they belonged to. “As per the MMDA, Muslim women are treated inherently as minors, and they do not have the full autonomy in the matter of marriage,” she pointed out. “The Quazi court system is funded by the state, so it is the government’s responsibility to ensure women in Sri Lanka are not discriminated [against] by law.”

Hamin also described how, during divorce proceedings, a Muslim man is never questioned as to his reasons for requesting a divorce, yet when a Muslim woman files for divorce, her request must be accompanied with witness statements and evidence detailing why she requires a divorce.

She added: “We have been lobbying the government to take the lead. We have been meeting with parliamentarians requesting them to take the lead, because it is the state’s responsibility to ensure all citizens are treated equally. The reforms are also important because it will put an end to child marriages.”
Activists want the minimum marriage age be raised to 18 for Muslims, in line with the law for other citizens.

Harrowing report

Hamin, along with Hasanah Cegu Isadeen, a lawyer, released an independent report late last year that documented some appalling consequences of the MMDA. “Unequal Citizens: Muslim Women’s Struggle for Justice and Equality in Sri Lanka” exposed how a 15-year-old girl was forced into marriage by a mosque committee citing “bad reputation” after a man who had been harassing her entered her home forcibly and tried to molest her while she was changing her clothes.

In another incident, a husband was accused of beating his 16-year-old bride with a helmet, causing her serious injuries, because she refused to ask her mother and brother to sell their remaining property and give him the money.

The report also detailed the harrowing experiences women have to undergo at the hands of the Quazi court system. In one instance, a girl who was married at the age of 14 applied for divorce, claiming she had been severely sexually abused by her husband. A judge interrogated her for more than two hours, demanding to know specific details about the sexual violence, which resulted in the girl suffering from further psychological trauma and even attempting to commit suicide.

Anti-reform movement

Early this year, the Colombo District Masjid Federation initiated a petition against the reforms. There were reports that those collecting signatures outside mosques after Friday prayers were asking men to also write down the names of their wives, sisters and mothers.

Meanwhile, the Sri Lanka Thawheed Jama’ath led a demonstration in Colombo demanding that child marriages continue to be allowed. Children as young as 10 were seen holding placards.

However, the government has continued to come under pressure from groups demanding action to ensure equality for Muslim women. The Women’s Action Network (WAN), a collective of eight women’s organizations working in the north and east of Sri Lanka has called on the government set a minimum age of marriage for all citizens and ensure state-salaried positions are open to women, among other demands.

“WAN is of the firm belief that it is both the MMDA and its implementation that allow for unequal and unjust treatment of Muslim women and girls, such as allowing child marriage, treating adult women as minors to strip their autonomy, restricting women from state-salaried positions, such as becoming Quazi judges, setting forth unequal divorce provisions for men and women, [and] allowing unconditional polygamy, among other concerns,” WAN said in a statement.
‘It is both the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act and its implementation that allow for unequal and
unjust treatment of Muslim women and girls’
This week, more than 300 organizations, action groups and individuals demanded accountability for the MMDA reform process. In an open statement, they expressed their disappointment over the lackadaisical attitude of Muslim and non-Muslim leaders toward its and lack of progress in addressing the injustices faced by Muslim women and girls. In an appeal to the government, they reminded it that the MMDA and Quazi court system were established and administered by the state, and, in the case of the latter, funded by it.

“The MMDA is enacted as a statute and judgments made through the Quazi court system are legally binding and enforceable only by the authority of the state. Therefore, the Sri Lankan state has the foremost responsibility to ensure that state laws protect rights of citizens and are not in-turn [sic] causing gender-based violence, discrimination and injustice. We urge the Sri Lankan government and all relevant state authorities to question the delay in addressing these problems and to recognize that the marginalized voices of women and girls of the Muslim community also constitute a valid community position,” the statement read.

SRI LANKA: OVER ALL APPROVAL RATE OF GOVT REMAINS AT 42%; 30 -35% AMONG SINHALESE



Sri Lanka Brief08/04/2017

According to a opinion poll conducted by Colombo based think tank, the Centre for Policy Alternatives approval rate of the Sri Lanka government remains at 43%  at the national level but much lawer among the majority sinhalese community: 30-35%.

Around 75% in the Northern and Eastern Provinces believe the government’s performance has been good since January 2015 while those in the Southern, North Central, Uva and Sabaragamuwa are the ones most dissatisfied with the government’s performance so far. Almost 30% in the Southern and North Central has said that the performance has been very bad since January 2015 and that the government should be voted out as soon as possible.

Approval ratings too remain low regarding the government’s performance in communicating information regarding the constitutional reform process.

Opinion Poll on Constitutional Reform – Executive summary.

The Centre for Policy Alternatives’ latest opinion poll on constitutional reforms reveals that only 1.1% of Sri Lankans believe that the government’s performance since January 2015 has been excellent and does not need any improvements. 42.3% said that the performance has been good but the government needs to show better results. 23% believe that the government’s performance has been bad but that it should be given more time to deliver results. 16.5% think that the performance has been very bad and that the government should be voted out as soon as possible.

When asked how successful the government has been in informing people about the constitutional reform process, 55.1% of Sri Lankans said that the government has been unsuccessful, with almost 30% saying that the government has been very unsuccessful. 55% (with 30.8% saying very unsuccessful) say that the government has been unsuccessful in publicising the content of discussions within the Constitutional Assembly and it’s sub-committees about constitutional reforms. 56.4% of Sri Lankans also said that the government has been unsuccessful in obtaining citizens perspectives about what should be included/ what should change in the new constitution.

Overall, awareness about the constitutional reform process has somewhat increased when compared to CPA’s October 2016 survey. In March 2017, 29% of Sri Lankans said that they are somewhat aware compared to the 22% in October 2016. Those who say that they did not know that a constitutional reform process is taking place has reduced to 12% from 24%.

When asked if the current constitution should be wholly replaced with a new constitution or whether the current constitution should continue but with some needed changes, 23.5% of Sri Lankans said that we need a new constitution while 38.9% said that the current constitution should continue but with some needed changes.

The three key areas that Sri Lankans believe the Government should prioritise at present are (1) Economy and development (2) Law and order (3) Corruption. This selection was made out of a list of five key areas, the other two being constitutional reform and reconciliation. When asked what specific aspect of their first choice (economy and development) the Government should prioritise, people said it should be to reduce the cost of living.

66.2% of Sri Lankans believe that there are more important issues than constitutional reform and transitional justice for the government to address. This view is held across all Provinces except in the North and East. When asked to specify what these more important issues are, the answers given were all related to the economy and development – cost of living, infrastructure development, economy of the country and unemployment.

Conducted in the 25 districts of the country, this survey captured the opinion of 1992 Sri Lankans from the four main ethnic communities. The selection of respondents was random across the country. Fieldwork was conducted from March 14 – 19, 2017.

Download the full report in English

Yahapalanaya - Lunacy,Idiocy or Plain Hubris? 


article_image
by Anura Gunasekera-April 8, 2017, 6:12 pm

 

When absolute virtue is your launching pad, there is no way but down thereafter and that has been the sad story of the Yahapalanaya regime from its laboured birth.

Yahapalanaya is a collage of intrinsically incompatible points of view and an uneasy cohabitation between groups and individuals who would not, normally, bed with each other. Given its current state of incompetence and paucity of achievement, the union between a mare and a donkey, which produces the sterile mule seems an apt comparison. Briefly, and fortuitously for the nation, these disparate groups and individuals found a common objective; the ouster of a man who, in one narrow sense, may be described as the liberator of the Nation State of Sri Lanka, and from another point of view, will be seen as the man who decided that having freed it, that it belonged to him to do as he pleased with.

Yahapalanaya owes its existence, not to previous performance but to promises, some partly addressed and most others yet unfulfilled and simply languishing in the wish lists of those who voted for it. It must perform, and quickly, as it has no laurels to rest on to reinforce its bid for continued existence, or for that matter, for its legitimacy. At the maximum it has another year for productive action, before it is compelled to abandon even a pretence of service to the nation and the main protagonists start preparing for the next election; when all the actors and principals currently in action, as well as others presently side-lined but hopeful of a piece of future action, initiate the deals, alliances, the horse-trading, when yesterday’s sworn enemy becomes today’s friend and vice-versa; when it becomes politic to cast aside sanctimoniously enunciated principles, assurances and ethics in favour of the expediency of the moment.

In the Yahapalanaya regime there is this incomprehensible variance, a bewildering disparity between rhetoric and action. To start with, the promised, lean, mean, purpose driven cabinet has become a bloated vulgarity. The assurances of austerity in state administration has been replaced by an obscene consumerism, totally at variance with the needs of the moment, even in the context of the need for material blandishments to maintain happiness amongst the troops; a successful Rajapaksa strategy, embraced wholeheartedly by the MS-RW administration.

According to official assessments, close to 800,000 citizens of the country - at the bottom end of the income level - have been affected by the recent drought and are in need of assistance. Many are farmers exposed now to income loss, the spectre of unpaid debts, malnutrition of children, interruption to schooling in affected areas, denial of medical aid for the sick and elderly and other similar deprivations, contributing to overall rural poverty and destitution. In this background the State has, in absolute insensitivity to priorities, allocated Rs 500 Mn, for the purchase of luxury vehicles for a dozen parliamentarians, along with an additional Rs 100,000 per month to all parliamentarians - Rs 140 Mn per annum - to enable them to maintain offices in their electorates.

The Joint Opposition, which violently contests all decisions made by the ruling coalition, has maintained a studious silence in regard to the above obscenities. The legitimacy of an Opposition, in a democratic system, is grounded in the service it provides a nation in helping to confine an over-ambitious incumbent administration within reasonable boundaries. Unfortunately, irrespective of the agitation that it has mounted on various other issues, clearly, the main aim of the JO is the reinstatement of the Rajapaksa regime and the possible revival of individual political fortunes that may follow. Inequities visited on the populace are not part of that agenda. In that context, the 51-strong JO has as little legitimacy as the 16- member official Opposition.

Recently, the Cabinet approved Minister DM Swaminathan’s proposal to pay an indemnity of Rs 2 mn to the next of kin of 16 prisoners, killed in the Welikada prison riots and the 20 inmates injured to be paid Rs 500,000 each. Eleven others, deemed as killed whilst trying to escape, will not attract any compensation.

Normally, compensation is paid by the State in instances where the State acknowledges responsibility, or culpability and by that very action, the State has decided that some killings were unlawful whilst others were reasonable. The decisions have been based, obviously, on the report of the independent panel which investigated the riot and, if one concedes that a killing is unlawful, then it amounts to murder, or at the very least, manslaughter.

The investigation must have been thorough and specific in respect of each casualty and the relevant circumstances also clearly identified. There are also, apparently, eye witnesses to incidents of search, identify and destroy actions implemented by members of the security forces, against some of the inmates. In this overall context, what action is the State taking, or contemplate to implement, in regard to 16 cases of custodial murder?

Speaking of murder, there is much speculation that the probes on the Lasantha Wickrematunge assassination, Wasim Thajudeen’s murder, the Ekneligoda disappearance, all have been stymied just as the investigations reached stages when there is clear indication of culpability of high profile individuals, in both the previous and present administration. Will the perpetrators ever be identified and suitably dealt with according to the law, as most suspects are, or have been , members of the Tri-Forces and , thereby, automatically become "Rana Viru", sacrosanct and immune from punishment, irrespective of the nature of the crime?

Another interesting issue is the appointment of Ramanathan Kannan to the High Court, made in breach of protocols customary in such cases, commencing with the unilateral recommendation of the then BASL President, overlooking District Judge Manaf, who was considered far more suitable on all aspects. The situation has been partly rectified by the subsequent appointment of DJ Manaf to the High Court, on account of severe agitation by interested parties but Kannan continues to occupy his present position, although the appointment itself is in a grey area.

The UN Resolution now being discussed in Geneva is yet another example of the regime’s incoherence. To now refuse to implement an accord to which one is a co-signatory, is ridiculous; equally ridiculous is the Prime Minister’s current position that such mechanisms are untenable and politically unfeasible , and that a suitable alternative must be found, as if that accord had been entirely at the whim and fancy of the Foreign Minister. The only ray of hope for this beleaguered administration is that the international community is more likely to be conciliatory and sympathetic to its pleas for time, simply because Mahinda Rajapaksa is no longer the President.

Another intriguing issue is the timing of the delayed PC Elections. In a situation of fast eroding credibility, how much longer can the incumbent regime postpone PC elections, without damaging its chances irrevocably at the next General Elections? There is an inherent danger in holding PC elections close to a General Election as the results, particularly if unfavourable to the incumbent power, can give the voting population, especially those not totally committed to a party, the direction in which they should go. And the longer a government stays in power, the less popular it becomes.

The Yahaplanaya regime, with its lack of co-ordination, its indecisiveness and absence of direction and cohesion, needs replacement at some point in the future, or its direction immediately clarified and strategy of governance reconstructed. Otherwise, wittingly or unwittingly, it is clearing the path for a Rajapaksa resurgence, now clearly identified as " Project Gota", fiercely championed and articulated by Dayan Jayatilleke, who sees no alternative to the country’s woes, but the reinstatement of MR and BR, with GR at the helm. The Troika will rule, whilst NR the crown prince, the heir to the throne, waits in the wings for his cue, for his moment.

Gota is being promoted by DJ as the only man who can lead the country towards a "… fair and just society in which ethnic and religious factors can be transcended in a new fusion….". Surely, an unfamiliar objective, however distant, for a man , whose iron-fisted militarism contributed heavily to the loss of the North and the East for the Rajapaksa regime, in two successive elections; who gave patronage to the murderous " Bodu Bala Sena", which totally alienated the Muslim community from the same regime. In the Sinhala South, apart from the Welikada prison massacre, need one mention the Rathupaswela, Weliveriya, Chilaw and Katunayake episodes, when legitimate citizens’ protests were muted through military force, culminating in the murder of several innocents; a fair and just society , indeed!!!!

There is more; "…a decorated warrior, who knows how to defend his country at the risk of his life …." , though Gota possibly owes his life to the fact that he abandoned both the country and the war, when the latter was at its most intense , and sought refuge in another country. Many of his contemporaries did die for the country, in battle, some of them destined to lie in unmarked graves, their fate unknown with the bereaved yet unable to find closure.

And yet more ;"….A man with a modernizing vision and capacity…….fighter and builder……any country needs and should be proud to have "….; are we, indeed, looking at the best of Mao, Ho Chi Minh and Fidel Castro, with contributions from Nehru, Gorbachev and perhaps Sadat, just to randomly name a few?

In regard to this modernizing vision, all will agree that in improving infrastructure in greater Colombo, a very effective strategy was spearheaded by GR. It is not too difficult to achieve objectives, when funds are approved on request and disbursement permitted outside normal protocols; when the Tri-Forces are at your beck and call, under your thumb as it were and marginalized residents of coveted areas can be evicted , literally at gun-point; when dissent and criticism of any sort can be stifled through unlawful abduction, physical intimidation, torture, disappearance and not infrequently, by plain and simple murder. None of these resources and strategies has been available to any other public servant of this country, in any previous regime.

The current regime surely understands that its failure to deliver on promises will usher in, due to total absence of an alternative, another Rajapaksa era, with the potential for the re-enactment of the grim realities of the past. It is said that those who fail to heed the lessons of history, will permit history to repeat itself. A cliche’, perhaps, but absolute fact.

Ranil’s security advisor contracts ‘Royal’ and ‘P.M’ supremacy fever – courting disaster for the forces..! Letter to president


LEN logo(Lanka-e-News -08.April.2017, 2.00PM)   Retired major general Sumith Balasuriya the security advisor to  prime minister (P.M.) Ranil Wickremesinghe has contracted an odious   ‘Prime minister fever’ cum ‘Royal fever’ , consequent upon which henchmen and the corrupt are being appointed to the posts in the army ‘s nerve center whereby the defeated deflated pro Gotabaya groups are being administered saline and revived , according to a true war hero of the army who has made these allegations  with evidence.

This war hero has addressed a letter to president Maithripala Sirisena the commander in chief of the forces with a copy to Editor , Lanka e news. Since these base actions of retired General Sumith Balasuriya should be stopped forthwith , we are publishing that letter for the benefit of the public.
His Excellency the president
 Commander in chief of the forces.
Mr. Maithripala Sirisena
His Excellency ,
It was the fervent  hope of all of us , following your victory on 2015-01-08 , the pro Gotabaya Rajapakse group which was on the rampage within  the Sri Lanka army until your victory ,  would end  and justice would prevail through  good governance .
However , even after one year elapsed since the advent of good governance , the fruits were collected by the same pro Rajapakse group within the army. Even when Good governance completed two years in 2017-01-08 , there weren’t any changes, and the same Rajapakse groups remained entrenched. 
The main reason for this unwelcome situation is , Sumith Balasuriya who is the security advisor of the P.M. ,by flaunting his powers as P.M.’s security advisor  before the army commander is awarding foreign scholarships to follow courses  , giving appointments  to army officers who were Royal College students   and  to those  who were true to him  when he was in the artillery regiment of the army ,violating laws and procedures. 

Examples :

Major General S.T.D. Liyanage the Military Liaison officer (MLO)  was replaced by Brigadier D. R. Ranawake of the artillery division. When Ranawake was serving as the head of  the 56 th regiment , in order to execute  a plan of Gotabaya Rajapakse , along with actress Anoja Weerasinghe under the pretext of rehabilitating the LTTE terrorists he canvassed votes for Rajapakse  .
Brigadier Roshan Seneviratne (artillery) who was the assistant security co ordinating officer was appointed as the director , army’s media .
While major general Kariyakarawana , an officer of the Wijayaba regiment was  confirmed as an utterly  incompetent officer during the period of the war , and there is also a   letter recommending that he should not be given  any commanding posts , yet because he was an old Royalist  , on the recommendation of Sumith Balasuriya and the army commander he is appointed now as Kilinochchi  commander.
Brigadier P.L.T.B. Jayawardena (Sinha) and officer W.A.S. Werawardena (artillery) belonging to  course No. 4 were recommended to  be  sent on retirement by the army headquarters based on inefficiency. Yet Weerawardena  was appointed as the chief of the 65 th regiment , and subsequently Brigadier Jayawardena was sent on retirement because there was no backing for him.
Recently , there was a circular under the signature of Major General Walgamage stipulating that officers who were absent during the period of the war without applying for  leave for more than two days shall be sent on retirement sans promotion beyond the final rank . Some days later because the circular was militating against several favorites  and minions , it was amended  so as to increase  the number of days of  leave to 4 days so as to rescue them from the penalty. . This is clear inference directives are changed from time to time to suit each individual.
Even after  the amendment to  the directive to permit four days leave without applying ,   Brigadier Thilak Weerakoon of the Artillery regiment who during the period of the war took  more than 4  days leave without applying  in fear of the war was , instead of being brought down in his seniority rung  and punishing him was sent  to serve in the SL embassy in China because he was a stooge  of Balasuriya.
Wives of Balasuriya and army officer Anura Sudusinghe are together engaged in export of flowers . In order for Sudusinghe to supervise this business better , Balasuriya has got down Sudusinghe to Colombo as Director sports. Mind you this was effected ignoring the officers who are serving in difficult areas North and East for over two years .
board was appointed recently in regard to promotions to the major general post. Brigadier Jagath Gunawardena who was removed because he could not endure the war hardships , and became insane during the war period , is being groomed by the army commander to be made a major general after his NDC course , it is learnt . The reason for this is , Jagath and the army commander have been in the same regiment .
Yet Brigadier Wimal Dias who was reinstated  by the president to the military police after  the former was sent on retirement owing to  political victimization , despite having all the qualifications was deprived of the opportunity . Wimal Dias’ wife committed suicide because Dias was sent on compulsory retirement by Gotabaya .Dias who is a father of two children will be reaching  the age of 55 on 28 th  February 2017, meaning that he will have to retire promotion. It can be imagined what injustice he has suffered. 
In the same way , Sumith Balasuriya of his own accord has appointed retired major general W.B. Jaysundara (artillery) his crony as army secretary .
Therefore , Sumith Balasuriya has been appointing his stooges to prominent positions in the army unjustifiably.  This is akin to oxygenating  Gotabaya’s force of the previous government . Mahinda Rajapakse had to pack up and go home because of Gotabaya’s unjust and corrupt activities .Hence, it is a pertinent question whether the good governance government too despite being fully aware of  what happened to Mahinda is also heading in the same direction owing to Balasuriya ?
Your Excellency , the examples furnished above illustrate how  good governance is being undermined within the army. Slowly  but surely , the officers who faced sufferings during the war are to be sent on retirement through criteria created via the army commander. We wish to draw the attention of your Excellency to the necessity to send the officers who left the forces in fear of the terrorists during the war be sent on pension after preparing the necessary criteria towards that as this is the opportune  moment, and keep back the competent officers only. In that event the 563 rd commander in chief of the Jaya Sikuru operation will get the opportunity to retire. Thereby all will stand to gain .
Moreover , might we pinpoint  , officers in the army who are stooges of Gotabaya and currently paving the ‘way for disaster’  are earnestly anticipating the return of Rajapakses  to power .
In the circumstances , we are requesting your excellency , the commander in chief of the forces to establish  a just and good governance which would hold sway  within the forces

Yours

A true war hero

Copies to :
Hon. Prime Minister
Defense secretary
Editor, Lanka e news. 
---------------------------
by     (2017-04-08 08:53:46)

MMDA – The Bat In The Belfry: Popular Fallacy Or Collective Delusion


Colombo Telegraph
By Ruwan Laknath Jayakody and Faizer Shaheid –April 8, 2017
The Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act (MMDA), No. 13 of 1951, has rightfully come under fire lately for being patriarchal, and in relation to certain issues such as child marriage, even reprehensible. The patriarchy is so deeply rooted that no female is entitled to become a Quazi or a Registrar of Marriages. It gets even worse with further issues pertaining to underage marriage and the lack of written consent of/from the bride in a marriage.
Although the pressure for change has mounted only recently, the issue itself is nothing new. Many have claimed that Sri Lanka is caving into pressure applied by the United Nations. However, the issues have been taken up from nearly 50 years ago. It is well documented that one Dr. H.M.Z. Farouque led a committee for reforms in the 1970s, and a committee led by one Dr. Shahabdeen was set up in the 1990s to look into the shortfalls. More recently, the committee led by retired Supreme Court Judge, Justice President’s Counsel (PC) Saleem Marsoof, is on the verge of finalizing and presenting its report on reforms to the MMDA, supposedly on May 21 this year.
This article seeks to deal with Sections 1 to 26 of the MMDA and address some of the issues from a legal standpoint.
The Applicability of the Law
Section 2 of the Act (Section 16 too is linked to this) holds that the provisions of the MMDA apply solely to Muslims living in the country. This provision coupled with the fact that the Marriage Registration Ordinance in its preamble provides an exemption in the case of Muslim marriages, means that all Muslims wishing to enter into marriage are not afforded any choice with regard to the applicability of the law. The application of an Act of such a nature and of such intended purpose cannot be of an involuntary nature in terms of its application.
That said, it is a generally held opinion among certain lawyers who also happen to be Muslims (the authors spoke to Attorney-at-Law Noordeen Mohamed Shaheid) that Muslims marrying fellow Muslims (a marriage between two Muslims) can only do so under the MMDA and must compulsorily be registered under the MMDA. They hold that Muslims marrying non-Muslims however have one alternate albeit unattractive option afforded to them. This is that they can marry under the Marriage Registration Ordinance subject to one condition, the condition being that one has to declare oneself in the eyes of the mosque and the Muslim clergy as an apostate. They claim that marrying under any other law is not permitted unless such a person openly declares himself/herself to be apostate. According to them, in the event a fellow citizen objects to an attempt by a Muslim to marry a non-Muslim under the said Ordinance, the Muslim in question has no other option other than to marry under the MMDA. However, a certain other section of the legal community who also happen to be Muslims (the authors spoke to M.U.M. Ali Sabry PC) opine that a Muslim has a choice with regard to the applicability of the law in that s/he can choose to marry a Muslim or a non-Muslim under the MMDA or the Ordinance and therefore that the marrying under the Muslim personal law is only optional. Can two Muslims marry under the Ordinance?
How it applies voluntarily the authors cannot comprehend, as the language used in both enactments is fairly clear in that the marriages of and contracted among Muslims are regulated by the MMDA. Perhaps it is possible that the courtrooms have interpreted the law differently.

International warrant issued to arrest Lanka's ex-diplomat to Russia

Colombo Fort Magistrate Lanka Jayaratne had earlier issued a warrant through Interpol for the arrest of Weeratunga. (Photo: Representational Image/Twitter)
Colombo Fort Magistrate Lanka Jayaratne had earlier issued a warrant through Interpol for the arrest of Weeratunga. (Photo: Representational Image/Twitter)
Colombo Fort Magistrate Lanka Jayaratne had earlier issued a warrant through Interpol for the arrest of Weeratunga. (Photo: Representational Image/Twitter)

ANI-PublishedApr 8, 2017
Weeratunga is alleged to have committed financial misappropriation of USD 14 million while purchasing 4 Ukraine-built MIG-27 aircraft.

Colombo: An international warrant has been issued for the arrest Sri Lanka's former ambassador to Russia, Udayanga Weeratunga, the Financial Crimes Investigation Division (FCID) of Sri Lanka police has informed the court.

The FCID informed the Colombo Fort Magistrate Friday that they were yet to ascertain the ex-diplomat's exact address in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and steps have been taken to execute the warrant against him, reports Colombo Page.
 
Colombo Fort Magistrate Lanka Jayaratne had earlier issued a warrant through Interpol for the arrest of Weeratunga.

Weeratunga, a relative of former president Mahinda Rajapaksa, is alleged to have committed financial misappropriation to the tune of USD 14 million while purchasing four Ukraine-built MIG-27 aircraft for the Sri Lanka Air Force in 2005.

The FCID told the court that it was investigating whether the former Ambassador had invested money earned through the Mig-27 transaction in a company called Sri Lankan Limited Liability Company in Moscow.

SRI LANKA: NAVY CHIEF FAILS TO PRODUCE KEY SUSPECT


Image: Recently President Maithripala Sirisena gave a six month service extension to Navy Commander Vice Admiral Ravindra Wijegunaratne.

Sri Lanka BriefBy Nirmala Kannangara. - 07/04/2017 

Navy Commander Vice Admiral Ravindra Wijegunaratne has been accused of protecting a Navy officer who is alleged to have been involved in the abduction of two Tamil civilians in Kotahena during the height of the war.

The Criminal Investigation Department (CID) had unearthed details of an abduction carried out by Navy officials which had been swept under the carpet by former Senior DIG Anura Senanayake who is now in remand custody for concealing evidence in the Wasim Thajudeen murder case.

Loganathan and Rathnaswamy had been abducted by the Navy on January 11, 2009 on their way to Wattala and the vehicle in which they were travelling had been found in a building that housed the Navy intelligence officer’s quarters at the Navy Gemunu Base in Welisara.

According to defence sources, the OIC of the Gang Robbery Bureau of the CID, Nishantha Silva, who was conducting investigations against the abduction of the 11 students, had received information that parts of a vehicle had been hidden in a secret safe house at the Navy Camp Welisara.

“Based on that information, the investigation officer with a court order had found out the hidden parts of a vehicle which later confirmed to be the vehicle in which the two Tamil civilians were travelling at the time of the abduction. It is said that these Tamil persons had been in possession of more than 15 gold sovereigns,” sources said.

During the investigation, it had revealed as to how the inquiring officer SI Wijesinghe of the Colombo Crime Division (CCD) was not allowed to record the statement from the wife of Loganathan by Anura Senanayake.

“Wijesinghe was stopped from recording the statement and this allowed SI Hettiarachchi who was on probation to record the statement. If Anura Senanayake did not interfere with the inquiry and later with the investigation, the CCD officers would have carried out a full investigation at that time itself. After the CID took over the case from the CCD last year, the investigators have found out how the Navy officers were using the two telephones that belonged to Loganathan and Rathnaswamy,” sources claimed.

Meanwhile, it had come to light as to how the then Director Intelligence, Sri Lanka Navy, Ananda Guruge, who is accused in the eleven students abduction in 2008, is also involved in this and that a few navy officers had given their statements to the CID in this regard, according to the ‘B’ report filed in Colombo Magistrate Court by the CID.

Lt. Commander Mapa, who was the Director Intelligence Welisara Navy Camp at the time Loganathan’s vehicle was brought and dismantled into 72 pieces and hidden in a safe house, had been taken into custody and the Navy officer Dayananda, against whom credible evidence had been gathered for his involvement in the abduction and also using the two mobile phones that belonged to the victims, is being protected by the present Navy Commander.

“The CID had written to Navy Commander Ravindra Wijegunaratne to produce him in courts but over the past three months, the Navy Commander has failed to do so,” sources alleged.


01Friday, 7 April 2017

logoThere is much debate about the proposed Public-Private Partnership (PPP) for the Hambantota Port. The plan is to offer the Hambantota Port through a 99-year PPP structure to a port operator; the PPP operation is valued at $ 1.4 billion and China Merchant Port Holdings Company Ltd. (CMPH) will invest $ 1.12 billion as their share in the venture, and the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) agrees to offer 80% of the share capital of the joint venture company (PPP Operator), established for the purpose of undertaking the development of the Hambantota Port and allied infrastructure to CMPH. The Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA) will subscribe to a minority share of 20% of the venture.

The SLPA had obtained borrowings of $ 1.271 billion for the construction of phase I and II of the Hambantota Port. With its limited scope and operations, the revenue of the port was Rs. 2.4 billion ($ 16.5 million) in 2015. It is obvious that the Hambantota Port has been constructed without consideration of a commercially feasible business model. The majority of the loans are still within their grace periods, when the above loans become due for payments, the servicing of these debt commitments will be a challenge for the SLPA as the income of the SLPA will not be sufficient enough to meet these requirements. These circumstances have led the GoSL to explore an alternative mechanism to operate Hambantota Port in a commercially viable structure.

Critics argue that the Hambantota Port should be operated by the GoSL without giving such a national asset to outsiders. To see the merits of such arguments, one should analyse the dynamics of the global container shipping industry and see whether SLPA is capable of building a transhipment hub in Hambantota Port competing with other ports for regional cargo.

SLPA operates one main container terminal; Jaya Container Terminal (JCT) within the port of Colombo (POC) while two other terminals of the port are being operated by private operators; South Asia gateway Terminal (SAGT) and Colombo International Container Terminals Ltd (CICT) with the SLPA holding a minority stake in each terminal. The Port of Colombo is a regional transhipment hub with vast majority of container boxes (nearly 75% of the total) being diverted from regional ports.

The Port of Colombo had recorded a 10.6% growth in container handling in 2016.The key driver of the growth in the recent past is from the CICT terminal which is modern and capable of handling mega container vessels with depth of approximately 20 meters.  In terms of terminal efficiency, JCT, being the oldest terminal has outdated equipment being able to move approximately 25 containers (TEUs) per hour. The other two private terminals can move at a faster pace of 30-35 containers (TEUs) per hour resulting in lower vessel turnaround time. Over the years, the JCT has been gradually losing its market share to more efficient private terminals.

Global container

shipping industry

02The global container shipping industry is highly competitive and the shipping lines are in foray to build economies of scale through mega vessels to carry maximum cargo load. The container shipping industry operates in a hub and spoke system. The mega vessels call only at key transhipment hubs while feeder vessels feed the regional cargo to those hub points (this cargo is identified as transhipments). Main transshipment hubs in the region are Hong Kong, Singapore, Salalah port (Oman), Port Klang and Tanjung Pelapas (Malaysia) and Dubai. Such transhipment hubs have built reputations as efficient port operators with the best infrastructure, continuous improvement and innovation to stay ahead of the competition.

Port operations are a specialised job and a credible port operator should have the capability to attract and pull regional cargo into one location. There are mega scale port operators who have built credibility in the industry which helps attract regional cargo.  To revive a port of the nature of the Hambantota Port with virtually no commercial activity surrounding the port, a highly credible port operator should operate the port and attract transhipments from the region. The proposed Kra Canal is blessing to Hambantota Port. Kra Canal doesn’t mean that the sea ports in the belt can receive business automatically. Development of Hambantota Port as a transhipment hub will remain a dream unless we build the core competencies with a reputed port operator when the proposed Kra Canal comes into operation.

Debt to GDP

The critics of proposed PPP operation for the Hambantota Port argue that the country’s debt burden in terms of Debt to GDP ratio is not worrisome when compared internationally.   However, the official debt to GDP ratio excludes the very same debt obtained for Hambantota Port which is held in the books of SLPA. If those SOE debts are included, the actual Debt to GDP ratio is exorbitantly high. Current Debt to GDP ratio of the country is 76% and it is 56% for median of B rated countries while the same is 51% for median of BB rated countries. In comparison, the debt to GDP was 103% in Greece prior to the financial crisis. (More discussion on public debt, please refer my pervious article on debt burden and fiscal challenges in 2017: http://www.ft.lk/article/587692/ft)

Annual lease income

According to the proposed agreement with CMPH, the PPP operator for 99 years are valued at $ 1.4 billion. In reference to above valuation, the critics argue the value of average annual lease income is only $ 11 million.  The above argument had completely ignored the time value of money. Estimated long term borrowing cost (15-20 year) for Sri Lanka would be approximately 7.5%, by comparing the secondary market yield rate of existing Eurodollar bond issued by the GoSL. Assigning a risk premium of 2.5%, a discount rate of 10% is used for calculation of time value of money.

The annual lease payment corresponding to an upfront valuation $ 1.4 billion is estimated to be $ 140 million if accounted for time value of money. It amounts to Rs. 21,002 million at current exchange rate of Rs. 151 per USD.  If historical annual depreciation of LKR is applied, the value will reach Rs. 28,623 million in 10 years’ time while the same could reach Rs. 40,376 in 20 year later. This should be compared with Rs. 11 billion of stated profits earned by SLPA in 2016.

Use of lands and FDI

With future expansion, the phase III of the Hambantota Port includes landmass of 1,255 hectares. This land is currently idle and generates no meaningful economic benefits. The PPP operator is compelled to attract productive investments which could generate export oriented cargo to be routed through the port in addition to transhipments.

If the GoSL couldn’t make available lands for such industrial activities, the PPP operator has no way to generate the required local cargo for the port terminals. If the PPP operator could attract relocation of industrial activities to Hambantota, the Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) will create employment for locals; thereby create economic benefits and valuable foreign exchange earnings for the country.

Debt servicing

Another argument on the debt servicing, that the annual debt service payments which is approximately $ 96 million could be saved from imports of fuel, motor vehicle and wheat. In contrary to claims by those critics, imports of motor vehicles during 2016 was $ 794.7 million while the country has spent $ 249.1 million to import wheat and maize. One needs to carefully analyse whether there is space for curtailing down such imports, giving due consideration to needs of citizens of the country for maintenance of day today life.

The operations of CICT terminal, at the PoC, which handled approximately 1.6 million TEUs in 2015, is profitable. On a similar comparable basis, Hambantota Port should handle a minimum of 4.0 million TEUs to run a profitable operation and service its debts. It is unlikely that SLPA can generate these volumes easily attracting large regional transhipments business to Hambantota Port. Large private sector investments are required for developing an industrial zone around Hambantota (i.e. Tanjung Pelepas, Malaysia). Even then, revenues for such projects will only be generated in the longer term.

Conclusion

In order to take advantage of our strategic location amidst changing landscape of the global container shipping industry, the development of Hambantota Port as a regional transhipment hub is important. The proposed PPP operation is a necessary step in reaching towards such a long term objective. It is worth to note that the port operation is a specialised job and only a credible port operator can build a large transhipment hub in the Hambantota Port.

(The writer is a CFA charterholder with local and international capital market experience.)