On this day 25 July 1983 - Tamil prisoners massacred at Welikada

On the 25th July 1983 Sellarasa “Kuttimani” Yogachandiran, leader of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) and Ganeshanathan Jeganathan, a political writer, had their eyes gouged out in mockery before being killed by Sinhalese inmates at the high security Welikada prison in Colombo. A total of 37 Tamil prisoners were murdered the same day, and 18 more were killed two days later. 

Tamil political prisoners: Dr S Rajasunderam, Selvarajah Yogandram and Nadarajah Thangathurai

5th August 1983 – The Guardian, UK 

'It is the massacres in the Welikade gaol which are attracting the most attention. There is a particular interest in circumstances in which two alleged guerrilla leaders were killed.

The two men, Sellarasa “Kuttimani” Yogachandiran, leader of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) and a political writer, and Ganeshanathan Jeganathan had been sentenced to death last year for the murder of a policeman.

In speeches from the dock, the two men had announced that they would donate their eyes in the hope that they would be grafted on to Tamils who would see the birth of Eelam, the independent state they were fighting for.

Second hand reports from Batticaloa gaol, where the survivors of the Welikada massacre are now being kept, say that the two men were forced to kneel and their eyes gouged out with iron bars before they were killed.



One version has it that Kuttimani’s tongue was cut out by an attacker who drank the blood and cried: “I have drunk the blood of a Tiger.”

The two men were among the 35 Tamils killed in the Welikada gaol on July 25. Another 17 were killed in the gaol two days later and the Guardian has obtained a first hand account of part of the fighting in this incident, including the circumstances in which Sri Lanka’s Gandhian leader, Dr. Rajasunderam, died.

Dr. Rajasunderam was one of nine men, including two Catholic priests and a Methodist minister, who were moved out of their cells immediately after the July 25 killings—to make way for survivors moved into their cells on security grounds—into a padlocked hall, upstairs in the same block.

The nine, convinced that further attacks were coming, made repeated representations to the prison authorities on July 26 for better security measures. Assurances were given that they would be protected, but nothing was done.

At 2:30 pm in July 27, hearing screaming and whistling outside, one of the priests looked out of a high window and saw prisoners breaking in from a neighboring compound, wielding axes, iron bars, pieces of firewood, and sticks. There was no sign of the prison guards.

The mob, which was later found to have killed 16 prisoners in the downstairs cells, ran up to the hall and began breaking the padlock. Dr. Rajasunderam then went to the door and cried out: “Why are you trying to kill us? What have we done to you?” At that moment, the door burst open and Dr. Rajasunderam was hit on the side of the neck by a length of iron. Blood was seen to spurt several feet.

“At that juncture, we thought we should defend ourselves,” one of the prisoners related. “We broke the two tables in the hall and took the legs to defend ourselves.” “We kept them at bay. They threw bricks at us. We threw them back. Pieces of firewood and an iron bar were thrown at us. We used them to defend ourselves. It went on for about half an hour. They shouted: ‘You are the priests, we must kill you.’”

The killing was eventually ended by the army, who moved in with teargas.An inquest has been opened into the Welikada massacres, but the above details did not emerge. Prison warders claim that keys to the cells were stolen from them.

Lawyers for the prisoners who have accused the warders of having participated, claim that they were not given the opportunity to bring evidence despite representation to the Government.'

The International Commission of Jurists commented:

"It is not clear how it was possible for the killings to take place without the connivance of prison officials, and how the assassinations could have been repeated after an interval of two days, since Welikade prison is a high security prison and the Tamil prisoners were kept in separate cells..."

(Ethnic Violence in Sri Lanka, 1981-83: Staff Report of the International Commission of Jurists, ICJ Review)

More information on Sangam.org

Black July – Setting The Record Straight

By Usha S Sri-Skanda-Rajah –July 25, 2016 | 

Usha S Sri-Skanda-Rajah

Black July – Was It a Spontaneous Reaction to the Ambush killing of Thirteen Soldiers by the LTTE or A Sri Lankan Government Sponsored, Pre-meditated and Targeted Campaign of State Terror Unleashed on the Tamil People amounting to Genocide?

– Where Was I on Black July? What Caused the Hardening of Resolve for a Free Tamil Eelam?

As we mark the 33rd anniversary of Black July – the 1983 pogrom against the Tamil people orchestrated, as evidence will show, by the Sri Lankan government of J R Jayewardene, as part of a continuing Genocide, lasting 10 days, leaving more than 3000 Tamils killed, 18,000 Tamil homes and numerous businesses burned down and personal possessions lost/looted with 150,000 Tamils made homeless, resulting in an unknown number of internally displaced Tamil people and in a mass exodus of Tamil refugees fleeing the island, now part of a formidable Tamil Diaspora, my thoughts go back to where I was on Black July, what hardened my resolve for a free Tamil Eelam and more importantly the need for setting the record straight on who was responsible for Black July, whether it was a spontaneous response to the ambush killing of thirteen Sri Lankan soldiers allegedly by the LTTE or was pre-meditated?

Hence the need to write…

Additionally, it would be remiss not to forget at this time what Tamil people at the time of Black July could not foresee or ever imagine would happen in their life time – that the worst was yet to come, that there was on the horizon a much worse, far more brutal, hitherto unspeakable, horrendous mass atrocity against the same people – the Tamil people in the island of Sri Lanka, once known as Ceylon – this time at Mullivaikkal. One that happened in 2009 intended actually to finish off, on a mass scale, the Tamil race in the island.

Where Was I on Black July? What Caused the Hardening of Resolve for a Free Eelam?

Before examining whether the Sri Lankan government’s claim was true that Black July was a reaction to ambush killing of the soldiers, I want to look back and recall those fateful days and weeks in July 1983, remembering where I was and ponder on certain defining moments in my life, those that hardened my resolve for a free Tamil Eelam, which I can’t seem to shake, when nothing substantive is being offered in the form of reconciliation and a political solution. We were living in Manila in the Philippines in the late 70s and 80s until the late 90s. In the month of July 1983 we decided to go back home and also visit London. The first leg of our journey was Colombo. Once we arrived, rumours were circulating amongst the Tamil community of an impending pogrom against Tamils. We were asked not to travel around too much and hence our plans to go to Jaffna, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Kathirkamam were put off indefinitely, very much to our disappointment and dismay. With much concern for the safety of the Tamil people very much in the forefront of our minds, we proceeded on the second leg of our journey to London to visit with my sister-in-law and her husband who was then the High Commissioner for Sri Lanka in the UK – with plans afoot to return home to Colombo and Tamil Eelam on our way back to Manila. We were so sure of returning that we even left half our luggage with relatives in Colombo.

But it was not to be.

On the 23rd of July our worst fears came true. Another pogrom – a Sri Lankan government sponsored, premeditated and targeted campaign of violence was unleashed on the Tamil people – on their person and on their properties – yet again.

A dire warning was received by the Sri Lankan High Commissioner in London as a fire bomb was thrown at the front door of his office, although swiftly extinguished, it was troubling to my sister-in-law!

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National Reconciliation – A Pipe Dream unless Inclusivity Achieved

Featured image courtesy Rotary Peace Centre

 LUKMAN HAREES on 07/25/2016

“Democracy is two wolves and a lamb voting on what to have for lunch. Liberty is a well-armed lamb contesting the vote.” -Benjamin Franklin

 It is ironic that Sri Lanka, which had such a favourable point of departure and was one of the most affluent countries in Asia in 1947; a model which even Singapore was yearning to emulate,  gradually lost its sense of direction and purpose in an environment of increasing fragmentation and factionalism. The unity and mutual trust which emerged among the communities when gaining Independence quickly dissipated, with the hopes and aspirations of the people becoming evaporating fantasies in the process, as Dr Tambiah once put it. “The introduction of the majoritarian model of democracy rule in Sri Lanka chosen already during the late-colonial period, paved the way for political forms that were undemocratic in the moral sense of the term. Far-reaching decisions regarding the political process were based on political expediency rather than on fundamental discussions of democratic rule” as Peter Kloosin ‘Democracy, Civil War and the Demise of the Trias Politica in Sri Lanka’ pointed out.

It was unfortunate that following independence from Britain in 1948, cracks began to appear in inter-community cohesion and mutual mistrust led to decades of ethnic conflict between Sinhalese and the Tamils. Despite all the assurances of the leaders such as D S Senanayakeand SWRD Bandaranaike to make Sri Lanka an inclusive nation for all communities, the historic reality in  Post-Independence era has been that starting in the mid-1950s ,  both SLFP and UNP leaders have been seeking to outbid each other on who could most espouse the cause of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism, creating a majoritarian model of democracy rule in Sri Lanka. Muslims meanwhile got caught in the crossfire , suffered and sacrificed heavily, but became the forgotten party in the Sri Lankan conflict, and were never been properly consulted on how to end the conflict. What transpired after the War against Tigers ended was regrettable; the majoritarian lobby emboldened by the tacit support received from the Mahinda Rajapakse Regime, began not only to further alienate the Tamils, but also Muslims as well, who also suffered heavily  under Tiger atrocities.

Prof. S.J.Tambiah argues in ‘Buddhism Betrayed’ that ‘this (Sinhala Buddhist nationalist) ideology is so hegemonic that it led to the inferiorisation of a minority in Sri Lanka  and to the generalization of a resistant attitude among many Buddhist nationalists towards any suggestion of devolutionary authority ,let alone the division and dismemberment of the Island’

It is however inaccurate to place all blame for the ills on Sinhala Buddhist Nationalism, as the  Tamil leaders too did not take serious any conscious efforts to integrate with the  Sinhalese. The ethical failure of Tamil nationalism, as writer Qadri Ismail (2000 223-24; 2005) has argued, is that it demands majoritarian status in response to its marginalisation rather than ethically re-configuring the discourse to re-imagine the nation as a more inclusive site based on principles of justice and equality for all communities. However, many analysts note that the dismal failure to creative an all-inclusive Sri Lanka was clearly due to the critical failure of the Post-Independence governments  to act as a government for all and to bring about mechanisms to promote national reconciliation and their short sighted policies to surrender to the hegemony of Sinhala Buddhist majoritarian lobby led by Maha Sangha, driven by political expediency. The reason why many have argued that the rise and institutionalisation of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism in post-independent Sri Lanka bear much responsibility for today’s ethnic conflicts between the majority Sinhalese state and the minorities!

Prominent Writer J.L. Devananada puts the impact of Mahavansa in creating this  ‘Sinhala- Buddhist’ supremacist mind-set, in perspective. He says ‘the Mahavihara monks of Anuradapura, due to their strong devotion to Buddhism and desire to consolidate and protect this religion in Sri Lanka wrote the Pali chronicles Deepavamsa/Mahavamsa just to glorify Buddhism and the Buddhist kings of Sri Lanka and not to record objectively what happened. The ‘Lion Ancestry’ and the myths about the origin of the Sinhala race as pre-destined, true custodians of the island of Sri Lanka and guardians of Buddhism is a myth of the creative authors to protect Buddhism and is not the common true history. An analysis of the Pali chronicles (Deepavamsa/Mahavamsa) makes it very clear that the Mahavihara monks who authored them in the 5th century AD have created the ethnic identity Sinhala, yoked it with Buddhism and created a new ethno-religious identity in Sri Lanka known as Sinhala-Buddhist to sustain the religion in the country for 5000 years’. Thus, ‘ultimately, the Mahavamsa has transformed the Buddha into a special patron of Sinhala-Buddhism, an ethnic religion created in Sri Lanka.

He further says, ‘Ven. Mahanama’s Mahavansa created an imaginary link between the three elements, Country-Race-Religion and made it into one unit similar to the Holy Trinity, whereby Sri Lanka (Dhamma Deepa), Buddha’s chosen people (Sinhalese), and Buddhism (Buddha Sasana) should be protected for 5000 years. This is known as the Jathika chintanaya or the Mahavamsa mindset and its outcome is the ‘Sinhala-Budda Deepa’ and ‘unitary state’. Therefore, for the next 2500 years, a Sinhala Buddhist will never allow a federal state or any autonomy for others (non-Sinhala-Buddhists) in Sri Lanka’.

‘What we witness today therefore is a kind of political Buddhism trying to promote the interests of the Sinhala-Buddhist people, rather than religion (Buddhism) as a path for personal salvation, and it is the main impediment to peace in the Island of Sri Lanka because it is based on the doctrine of primacy and superiority of the Sinhala race and the Buddhist religion.

Scholars and analysts have identified that the ‘Sinhala (Mahavamsa) Buddhist mindset,’ (about the Sinhala Buddhist claim to the whole island of Lanka), as the reason why most of the Sinhalese cannot be rational and liberal’ opines Devananda.

Contrary to the dominant belief that Buddhism is the ‘sole’ preserve of the Sinhala Buddhists’ akin to Sinhala- Buddhism, historians have shown that in Sri Lanka, there were also Tamil Buddhists who followed Theravada Buddhism. In the 3rd century AD, Buddhism had spread widely in Tamil Nadu and won the patronage of the rulers.. Three of the greatest Pali scholars of this period were Buddhaghosa, Buddhadatta, and Dhammapala and all three of them were associated with Buddhist establishments in the Tamil kingdoms.

It is pertinent to quote another eminent Sri Lankan historian, K.M. de Silva who points out that the Sinhala Buddhist revivalists had no time for such norms such as Multi-culturalism or multi- ethnicity : “In the Sinhala language, the words for nation, race and people are practically synonymous, and a multi-ethnic or multi-communal nation or state is incomprehensible to the popular mind. The emphasis on Sri Lanka as the land of the Sinhala Buddhists carried an emotional popular appeal, compared with which the concept of a multi-ethnic polity was a meaningless abstraction.”. This mind-set prevailed in post-Independence era as well as Nira Wickramasinghe, another author in history (2006)  says  that ‘the three Constitutions of post- independence Sri Lanka, helped demarcate and define a majority from within the citizens pitting them against non- Buddhists and non- Sinhala speaking minority communities…(.placing) minorities in a somewhat dependent and subaltern situation’.

Many subsequent historic opportunities were also missed to promote national reconciliation, and the reality in the midst of the above  ‘Mahavansa’ mentality has been Sinhalese Buddhist Nationalism ultimately triumphed, having found a safe place in the psyche of the Sinhala community. The latest being the defeat of the Tigers in 2009, as a result of vested political interests blinding the people with a web of deception, thus corroding the tolerance that characterizes our society. In 2009, when the SL Army defeated the Tigers, Mahinda Rajapakse became a Dutugemunu who appealed to the strong Sinhala Buddhist nationalist sentiments that prevailed, which made the Tamils already affected by the War feel more alienated. There was a sense of triumphalism and collective or group-level narcissism (excessive interest in or admiration of oneself and self-centredness). Post-war the nationalists needing a supposed enemy or threat to stay relevant, and with the LTTE militarily eradicated, the island’s Muslims and also Sinhala Christians have turned out to be convenient scapegoats to ensure the dominance of the Sinhala Buddhist supremacy and majoritarian lobby.

The Answer therefore lies in developing a two-pronged approach through constitutional, political, educational and social mechanisms. Firstly, the current reality in Sri Lanka is that whatever degree of “secularism” may have existed, still the Sinhalese Buddhist majoritarian lobby is relatively strong in statecraft, despite cosmetic changes and also some visible action  being taken against the violent sections of this nationalist lobby by the present Maithripala-Ranil government.  In this context, forcing the present regime to operate in a manner antithetical to majority Sinhalese Buddhist wishes could very well topple the government, catapult the ‘racist’ Rajapakse,to the helm, and propel the island once more towards sectarianism and authoritarianism. Therefore there is a need to look for solutions within this majoritarian framework, as Dr Tambiah suggests in his book ‘(to explore) whether framework of current Buddhist nationalism can in the future stretch and incorporate a greater amount of pluralist tolerance in the name of Buddhist concepts of righteous rule’ and sees ‘no reason to foreclose on this possibility, for there are precedents that can be positively employed to urge a new view’.

However, for this to happen, there needs to be a well-organised effort to allay the fears of mainstream Sinhala Buddhists who feel threatened by the minority communities namely the Tamils and the Muslims,whom they perceive have racial/religious links beyond the shores of Sri Lanka. There is a constant fear among them that their race and religion is under continuous threat from Christianisation and Islamisation, which Nera Wickramasinghe refers to as their ‘minority’ complex and is a cry in desperation for self-preservation than intended to hurt the minorities or deprive them of their equality of status as citizens. Unless these underlying fears and concerns of the Sinhala Buddhist people are addressed and sorted out,, in the same manner the concerns of the ‘other’ are addressed,  it will be an utopian dream to achieve sustainable peace and development in Sri Lanka. Any meaningful provisions in the proposed constitution, to promote national reconciliation will only work if these majority community’s concerns are duly addressed.

Secondly, developing an intellectually mature looking civil society which will act as catalysts to re-engineer the society in the middle run and to target the university graduates and school children in the long run, to create a more inclusive and tolerant society.  The government  have  already sought civil society expertise when writing the draft constitution, and the government should be encouraged to liaise with civil society and its’ intellectuals  to promote national reconciliation and religious tolerance as well. Many Sinhalese Buddhists loathe theBodu Bala Sena and its ilk but are especially averse to speak out against Buddhist monks. A government and civil society that is proactive against religious intolerance may empower them to oppose the extremists who tarnish Buddhism. The challenge for Sri Lanka will therefore be , how to promote ethno-religious tolerance and national reconciliation amidst majoritarian pressures and by allaying the reasonable concerns of the majority community.

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN SRI LANKA: IMDAR TO UN CERD

( Anti Muslim hate speech still exists in Sri Lanka)

Introduction.

26/07/2016

1. Notes that Sri Lanka acceded to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in 1982, and it submitted the last periodic reports to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in 2000. Regrets with concern the delay in submissions of the latest periodic reports.

3. Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society comprising one large ethnic group (Sinhala) and several much smaller ethno-religious groups: North-Eastern Tamils (11.1% in the total population); Muslims (9.3%); and Up-Country Tamils (4.1%) , and Tamil is their first language.

4. The three decade of the ethnic conflict which resulted in a full blown war in 2009 has impacted the majority-minority relations in the island, leaving behind challenges within the constitutional, legal and policy framework of the minority rights discourse including the stark reality of a narrative of bipolarization of the political imagination of a multi-ethnic society; marginalization through displacement and within minorities. No doubt that the new government will be confronted with the every reality of the war as it grapples with the establishment of mechanisms for reconciliation, truth
seeking, non-recurrence and accountability.

5. One estimate suggests that 75,000 people were killed as a result of the war since 1983. 290,000 persons were displaced often on multiple occasions. In March 2009, estimated 150,000 to 190,000 people, most of those were North-Eastern Tamils, were believed to be trapped in a small corner of the Vanni, subjected to the forced LTTE conscription and denial of the freedom of movement, under constant shelling and with insufficient water, food and medical care.

6. Since the decolonization in 1948, there has been legal, political and economic discrimination of minorities including racist violence against them. For examples: the disenfranchisement and deprivation of the citizenship of Up-Country Tamils; the ‘Sinhala Only’ language policy; anti-Tamil riots such a in 1958, 1977 and 1983; discrimination in access to State lands and development funds;and poor quality of housing, health and education in estates.

7. The Northern Muslim populations were forcibly evicted from their homes and lands by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 19906.

8. Tamils of Indian origin, also known as plantation Tamils or Up-Country Tamils, comprise about 4.1% of the Sri Lankan population . They were originally brought to work as bonded laborers in the tea,coffee and rubber plantations in Sri Lanka by the British around 1820 during the colonial period.Some Tamils of Indian origin came to Sri Lanka as traders and settled in Colombo and other urban areas. A large part of the Indian Tamil population remains in the central, plantation areas of Sri Lanka,while approximately 6% of them have moved to other parts of the country in search of various employments.

SRI LANKA: 1983: Betrayal of the Absolute Right to Justice

By Basil Fernando-July 25, 2016

It has been 33 years since Black July, 1983. These 33 years have been part of our lifetime. We have witnessed not only the horrendously criminal acts of July 1983, but also what happened by way of justice after those serious crimes.

I would like to illustrate my point in terms of one single event: the Welikada prison massacre. This was without a doubt an act that falls within the definition of crimes against humanity. What concerns me here are the procedures of the so-called inquiries which were held into this crime. Various inquiries were announced and undertaken, and some reports were published. What becomes quite prominently clear is that, during all these inquiries, some of the senior members of the Attorney General’s Department played a blatant role in sabotaging justice. The state, rather than using the occasion to get the message across that it did not condone such acts and that it stood for the defense of the absolute right to justice, in fact proved the very opposite.

What matters is not only the criminality of those who committed the crimes, but also that of those who orchestrated the crimes. Their motives could be understood when we recall that these prisoners were those who were standing in various inquiries and trials in the Colombo courts in relation to charges of terrorism. I was myself a witness to some of these trials, including the famous trial of Kuttimani. These trials were, naturally, attracting the attention of the public inside Sri Lanka and outside. One of the very purposes of an open trial is to open a whole matter to public scrutiny. The public have a right to observe criminal trials and the right to reach their own judgments, not only regarding the crimes but also the purposes and motives of all parties involved. Through such trials, the public learns about every aspect of public issues, represented by both the accused and the state. These particular trials also had a certain theatrical impact. For every hearing, the prisoners were brought with many security guards and in a convoy of vehicles. This was expensive. It also attracted the attention of society to the events taking place in the courts.

It appears that one of the main purposes of those who orchestrated the crimes at the prison in 1983 was to stop these trials becoming a public spectacle, and also to stop the public debate on these matters, which were taking place in and outside the country. Thus, in the attack on the prisoners there was also an attack on the very principle of open trials.

In the period that has followed the 1983 events, we have not seen any highly public trials like those relating to Kuttimani. Kuttimani’s trial also showed the manner in which judges looked into these cases, extricating themselves from the political aspects and purely concentrating on the legal examination of crimes, as they would do in any other criminal case. An exemplar is the manner in which Kuttimani’s trial was brought to an end by the great judge Tudor De Alwis. Before pronouncing his verdict, he rose from his bench – which was hardly ever done – and told the prisoner that when he, the judge, sat down he would have to carry out his obligations as a judge; however, he went on, he did not consider Kuttimani to be an ordinary prisoner. If, someday, the president was to use his prerogative to pardon Kuttimani, the judge would be one of the people who would be happy with that decision. Having said that, the judge sat at his bench and pronounced the accused guilty, and thereafter, the sentence that was to follow was the death sentence.

The killing of the prisoners was to stop all such demonstrations, not only of the accused and the prosecutors, but also of the judiciary, in showing their own views in the face of these problems. Through this attack on open trials, the people were denied of one of their basic rights, which was to be observers of such open trials and to make up their own minds about things of importance taking place in their societies.

The worst aspect was regarding the inquiries and their outcomes. The direct participation of senior state counsels was used to sabotage the inquiries. The manner in which the inquiries were carried out showed that the Sri Lankan state was not intent on delivering justice to these prisoners, treating them merely as ‘others’ without the right to justice. They were treated as a special category – terrorists –and even in the sphere of justice they were treated in that manner.

What was lost was the respect for justice as an absolute right. The Sri Lankan state did not demonstrate a will and capacity to uphold justice irrespective of whatever they thought of the accused. The result was that everyone, citizens as well as those involved in justice institutions - including the judges -, saw that the Sri Lankan state would not treat the issue of justice in the way that it should be treated. They would not uphold justice irrespective of the consequences.

The result not only affected the prisoner-victims in these cases, but also everyone who would come before the courts in Sri Lanka. No one could have absolute faith that the Sri Lankan state would do everything it has to do in order to ensure that the outcome of his or her case would be in terms of justice and justice alone.

It was this shaking of the faith in justice that should have been in the mind of the people who were dealing with the problem of reconciliation in the past few decades. The reconciliation is not only important to the victims of crimes, but also to the very structure of the state. When justice does not have the central place it should have within the structure of a state, there is a fundamental deficiency in that state. What the reconciliation process does is, among other things, restores the state structure back into what it should be, with a re-establishment of a firm capacity to uphold justice.

The Sri Lankan state today does not represent itself as capable and committed to upholding justice. That means that it cannot be a state as envisioned in a democratic state structure, one that is capable of upholding the rule of law. That endangers everyone, including the rulers themselves.

Under these circumstances it is not a surprise when the former president, Mahinda Rajapaksha, condemns attempts to inquire into enforced disappearances, claiming that that would be an attack, according to him, on the armed forces. Again, what we see is the idea that justice should be sacrificed whenever the state decides to do so. It is this danger that the government, the opposition and the civil society has not yet come to terms with. The fundamental consideration in dealing with reconciliation is to end this dangerous situation. In making a constitution, a primary concern should also be to undo every form of relativism regarding the administration of justice.

The crimes committed in 1983 and the denial of justice thereafter goes beyond the limits of common sense. However, Sri Lankan society as a whole has failed to realize this enormous imbalance, and thereby it keeps itself exposed to every kind of societal danger.

Remembering Sri Lanka’s Black July

Taylor Dibbert- 07/23/2016

Sri Lanka’s civil war pitted the almost exclusively Sinhalese military against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The LTTE fought for a separate Tamil state in the northern and eastern parts of the country. In May 2009, Sri Lankan military forces militarily defeated the LTTE. However, the island nation’s ethnic conflict remains unresolved.

In this interview, Elil Rajendram examines war-related issues, the current state of affairs in the country’s Tamil-dominated Northern and Eastern Provinces and the ongoing search for justice.

Mr. Rajendram is co-spokesperson of the Tamil Civil Society Forum.

What is Black July? What happened on July 23, 1983?

Black July was a pogrom that was unleashed on Tamils who were living in Colombo and some other places. This happened after 13 Sri Lankan soldiers were ambushed and killed by the LTTE in Thirunelvely, Jaffna.

After the incident in Jaffna, Sri Lankan soldiers killed 51 civilians in Jaffna. The violence in the country lasted for several days and nearly 3,000 Tamils were killed. The death of the 13 soldiers was used to justify violence against Tamils. Shops that Tamils owned were looted. Tamils were even burnt alive and the police witnessed these incidents without taking any preventative measures. Thousands of Tamils fled to Jaffna, believing that staying in a predominantly Sinhalese area was not safe for them.

The incident started a civil war between the Sri Lankan military and the LTTE.

What are the root causes of Sri Lanka’s longstanding ethnic conflict?

The institutionalized discrimination and injustice against Tamils in Sri Lanka. This injustice is embedded in Sri Lanka’s constitution.

Mahinda Rajapaksa, the country’s longtime president, lost a presidential election in January 2015. Since the new government came to power, how much has changed in Sri Lanka’s Tamil-majority Northern and Eastern Provinces?

Tamils speak about the “non-transition transition” while the Sinhalese people residing in the Sinhala-majority South claim it is a real transition. Why I state that it is a non-transition transition is because militarization is at its peak. Abductions, arbitrary arrests and sexual violence perpetrated by the military have not decreased. Military involvement in the North and East is still strong. Most military camps have become permanent and Sinhala colonization is actually on the rise. Buddhist statues continue to be built in these locations. However, as most human rights activists have noted, more space for public dissent is available now.

The coalition government has set out an ambitious transitional justice plan, including a truth commission and a judicial mechanism to deal with alleged wartime abuses. How much of that plan has been implemented? What would you like to see happen in the next six to twelve months?

Since the end of armed conflict in 2009, Tamils have made it clear that they would like to see an international inquiry to investigate the crimes perpetrated by the government of Sri Lanka, including during the last phase of the war. But a recent U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights inquiry has promoted a hybrid mechanism (which would include both Sri Lankan and international participation). The Sri Lankan government has now said that foreign judges will not be part of any such mechanism; one can see this in the country’s print and electronic media. For nearly 70 years, Tamils have not seen real justice via the county’s judiciary system. We feel that the system is very biased and favors the majority Sinhalese community.

How can the international community help Sri Lanka heal the wounds of war?

Only an international inquiry or international accountability mechanism can ensure that the Tamil community sees justice. The international community could help with that.

This interview has been edited for brevity and clarity.

Follow Taylor Dibbert on Twitter: www.twitter.com/taylordibbert

Military places Buddha statue inside Mannar Hindu temple

25 July 2016

The Sri Lankan military placed a statue of Buddha inside the Tamil Hindu temple in Murunkan, Mannar.

The statue is the latest in the growing number of the Buddha statues and Buddhist stupas that have been erected by the military in the Tamil North-East following the end of the armed conflict in 2009.

Battling The Gods: Atheism In The Ancient World

By Charles Ponnuthurai Sarvan –July 25, 2016

Prof. Charles Sarvan

The “Socratic dialogue was never aggressive; rather it was conducted with courtesy, gentleness and consideration. If a dialogue aroused malice or spite”, it had failed (Karen Armstrong, The Case For God).

At root, I think my opposition to militant atheism is based on a commitment to the very values which inspire atheism: “an open-minded commitment to the truth and rational inquiry”. Hostile opposition to the beliefs of others combined with a dogged conviction of the certainty of one’s own beliefs is antithetical to such values (Julian Baggini, Atheism).

Tim Whitmarsh, Battling The Gods: Atheism In The Ancient World, London, 2016.

It has been suggested that human beings created god(s) out of fear, ignorance and wishful-thinking: fear because we were confronting fierce animals, armed only with primitive weapons; ignorance because we couldn’t understand and explain most of natural phenomena; wishful because we couldn’t face the thought of our individual, final, extinction, plus other temptations such as justice in another world, and reunion with loved ones. As both our domination and understanding increased, so god decreased in size. However, as this book’s dustjacket states, “Long before the Enlightenment sowed the seeds of disbelief in a deeply Christian Europe, atheism was a matter of serious public debate in the Greek world. But history is written by those who prevail, and the Age of Faith mostly suppressed the lively free-thinking voices of antiquity.” History being written by the winners, the author aims to recover the suppressed voices of the minority (p. 8).

Generally, polytheism is more hospitable and accommodating than monotheism with its sacred scripture which is seen as a non-negotiable contract with the divine (p. 29) demanding orthodoxy – and with orthodoxy comes the politicization of religion. (The Greeks had no sacred texts.) But in ancient Greece, the work of priests was to carry out religious rituals: the idea of priests trying to “sway public debates” (p. 21) was unthinkable. “Legal judgement was never theologized in ancient Greece” (p. 22): Whitmarsh is Professor of Greek Culture at the University of Cambridge. Philosophy celebrates the critical spirit, the willingness to question received beliefs and values: when the Greeks pondered the nature of the world, they did so through philosophy and religion, and not through organized religion (pp. 54 & 52). Religion was not used by the Greeks to drive and justify historical events. “No war was ever fought for the sake of a god, no empire was expanded in the name of proselytization, no foe was crushed for believing in the wrong god” (p. 193).

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Buddhism deserves its due place in Constitution: Archbishop

The right status and respect deserved for Buddhism should remain intact in the constitution, Colombo's Archbishop Rt. Rev. Malcolm Cardinal Ranjith said today. 

He expressed this view while participating at a religious ceremony held under the patronage of Chief incumbent Ven. Daranagama Kusaladhamma Nayaka Thera at the Sri Sambodhi Viharaya in Colombo.

 The ceremony was held to confer the honour on the new Mahanayaka of the Asgiri Chapter Most Ven. Warakagoda Sri Gnanarathana Thera and the Anunayaka Theras and the Secretary Thera of the Asgiri Chapter and the Chief Incumbent Thera.

 Rev.Cardinal Ranjith expressing his pleasure for inviting him to the occasion also said the teaching of Buddhism bring us relief whenever we are confronted with mental pain and discomfort .

 The prominence of the country relies on Buddhism and there should not be any decision to change its due place secured by the constitution as we all live in a country nourished by Buddhism.

 Rev. Cardinal Rajith also expressed their willingness to cooperate with the Maha Sanga to enhance the spiritual improvement of the people. (Amaradasa Silva)

UN CERD ON SRI LANKA: LIST OF THEMES TO BE REVIEWED & GOVT RESPONSE

(Discrimination against ethnic and ethno-religious minorities is one of the major themes of CERD)

List of themes in relation to the combined tenth to seventeenth periodic reports of Sri Lanka.

26/07/2016

Consideration of reports, comments and information submitted by States parties under article 9 of the Convention List of themes in relation to the combined tenth to seventeenth periodic reports of Sri Lanka will take place on 15/16 August 2016)

Note by the Country Rapporteur.

1. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination decided at its seventysixth session (see A/65/18, para. 85) that the Country Rapporteur would send to the State party concerned a short list of themes with a view to guiding and focusing the dialogue between the State party’s delegation and the Committee during the consideration of the

State party’s report. The present document contains a list of such themes. It is not an exhaustive list; other issues may also be raised in the course of the dialogue. No written replies are required.

Legal and institutional framework for the implementation of the Convention (arts. 1-7)

2. Information on efforts to ensure that article 12 (2) of the Constitution is in line with the definition of racial discrimination provided in article 1 of the Convention (CERD/C/LKA/10-17, para. 13).

3. Updated information on progress towards administrative, judicial and Constitutional reform in order to bring domestic legislation into line with the Convention, as well as amendments to the Criminal Code to criminalize hate speech (CERD/C/LKA/10-17, paras. 14 and 36-40).

4. Information on measures taken to raise public awareness about the rights protected under the Convention (CERD/C/LKA/10-17, para. 145).

5. Further information on the application of customary laws, particularly where it may create inequalities, and measures adopted to ensure that customary laws are in conformity with the provisions of the Convention (CERD/C/LKA/10-17, para. 77).

6. Detailed information, including disaggregated statistical data, on reported cases of racial discrimination and prosecutions and convictions for acts of racial discrimination (CERD/C/LKA/10-17, paras. 134-144).

7. Information on specific training for law enforcement officers, armed forces personnel, prison officers and civil officers on the rights enshrined in the Convention, and on the impact the training has had on the treatment by these officials of members of ethnic and ethno-religious minorities (CERD/C/LKA/10-17, paras. 147-152).

Discrimination against ethnic and ethno-religious minorities (arts. 2-7)

8. Disaggregated statistical data and detailed information on the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights by various ethnic and ethno-religious groups, including numerically smaller groups such as the Burgher, Malay, Sri Lanka Chetty and Vedda peoples, and the representation of ethnic and ethno-religious minorities, including women from such groups, at all levels of public life (CERD/C/LKA/10-17, paras. 7 and 13).

9. Updated information on the work of the Special Presidential Task Force on Reconciliation and the Office for National Unity as it relates to the ongoing process of reconciliation and ensuring the non-recurrence of civil war, and on the establishment of the Commission for Truth, Justice, Reconciliation and Non-recurrence and its mandate
(CERD/C/LKA/10-17, para. 14).

10. Detailed information on the existence and impact of special measures to overcome discrimination faced by ethnic and ethno-religious groups, particularly in the fields of employment, education, housing and health care, and on measures taken to allow those groups to maintain their cultural, religious and linguistic identities (CERD/C/LKA/10-17, paras. 14, 82, 89, 100 and 131-133).

11. Information on the protection of members of ethno-religious minorities and their places of worship from discriminatory acts and attacks, on measures taken to prevent and investigate such acts and prosecute the perpetrators, and on efforts to promote and protect the right to freedom of religion (CERD/C/LKA/10-17, para. 79).

12. Information on the measures taken to protect human rights defenders, members of civil society and journalists, particularly those from ethno-religious and ethnic minority groups and those who advocate on ethnic and ethno-religious issues, from arbitrary arrest and detention, enforced disappearance, restrictions on their activities, attacks and stigmatization (CERD/C/LKA/10-17, para. 144).

13. Updated information on measures to exclude from domestic legislation provisions that discriminate against women, which may have a particularly detrimental effect on women from ethnic and ethno-religious groups, including on their succession rights (CERD/C/LKA/10-17, para. 78).

14. Further information on the State party’s counter-terrorism programme and on steps taken to ensure that it does not discriminate in purpose or effect on the grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin, and on measures taken to monitor the enforcement of counter-terrorism legislation to ensure that it does not have a disproportionate impact on specific ethnic or ethno-religious groups (CERD/C/LKA/10-17, paras. 51-55).

15. Information on measures taken to address caste-based discrimination, particularly within the Sinhala, Sri Lankan Tamil and Indian Tamil groups, including discrimination resulting in extreme poverty, limited hereditary caste-based occupations and limitations on access to education and basic services (CERD/C/LKA/10-17, para. 13).

16. Detailed information on measures taken to protect the Vedda people from discrimination and stigmatization, and on the impact and effectiveness of special measures taken to ensure that they have access to education, health care and livelihood support (CERD/C/LKA/10-17, para. 31); and information on measures taken to compensate the Vedda people for the conversion of their traditional land into a national park, and to ensure that this does not lead to further socioeconomic marginalization or impoverishment (A/56/18(SUPP), para. 335).

Situation of internally displaced persons and non-citizens, including refugees and asylum seekers (arts. 2-7)

17. Updated information on the resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees, particularly Tamil and Muslim ethnic minorities, and measures taken to address the challenges they face in terms of reintegration, including in employment, access to basic services and resolution of land claims, and information on the living conditions of internally displaced persons who remain in camps, including access to basic services, and measures taken to protect them from ill-treatment, torture and sexual and other forms of gender-based violence (CERD/C/LKA/10-17, paras. 25-28).

18. Information on measures taken to prevent and protect vulnerable communities, including children from ethnic and ethno-religious minority groups, from human trafficking, and on measures taken to punish perpetrators of human trafficking and provide victims with effective remedies and rehabilitation, including the impact of all those measures.

19. Information on the situation of asylum seekers and refugees in the State party,including the possibility of seeking asylum or refugee status, access to basic services, and measures being taken to prohibit discriminatory treatment against those groups, and on cases of refoulement or expulsion of refugees and asylum seekers from the State party.

Read Sri Lanka government report here:Sri Lanka Govt report to CERD Oct 2015

Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
Ninetieth session
2-26 August 2016
Item 4 of the provisional agenda

PM to resolve estate sector salary issues

Jul 25, 2016

Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe is to meet the heads of the Ministry of Plantation, the Treasury and the Employers Federation (EFC) at Temple Trees today (25), to resolve salary issues in the estate sector.

The Prime Minister has already directed authorities to take action to address salary issues in the estate sector, and its progress will be discussed at tomorrow's meeting.

The Treasury had earlier agreed to offer financial assistance to regional plantation companies, to increase the salaries of the estate sector workers.

The proper implementation of this programme and its way forward will also be discussed at the meeting.

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