Electricity Price Hike, Token Strike And Mass Protests

By Laksiri Fernando -May 23, 2013 

Dr. Laksiri Fernando

As the events unfolded in the month of May, culminating in mass protests and one day token strike on 21 May, the price hike in the electricity consumption charges undoubtedly has proved to be a rallying point of general masses against the Rajapaksa regime irrespective of the concessions announced at the May Day rally by President Mahinda Rajapaksa.

The concessions were meagre, only applicable to the vastly low electricity users while the general price hike remained around 60 per cent quite unprecedented in any country as a sudden single increase. Even the low electricity users might not be happy about the raise and then a small ‘concession’ as it would reveal a future threat of increase unless they join the protests against the overall price hike.

No Justification

No Minister could openly justify the sudden price increase except Dr Sarath Amunugama who seems to have completely gone ‘troppo’ according to the Australian idiom who even recently invented a ‘new class struggle theory’ saying that “there is an acute struggle by trade unionists and some others to grab most of the wealth amounting to billions of rupees earned through the hard labour of the ordinary people of the country” (Daily Mirror, 12 May 2013). What the good doctor/minister failed to answer was who actually embezzle the hard earned wealth of the ordinary people of the country: the family, the ministers or the politically rich?

All other Ministers, including the President, were passing the buck to various sources including the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) or the ‘engineers’ cartel’ in the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB). The current Energy Minister even blamed the former Minister in her own Cabinet completely disregarding the so-called collective responsibility. The price hike was something approved by the Cabinet, the President presiding.

Everyone knows that the CEB is a mismanaged enterprise for decades. It is not a recent story. But theMahinda Chinthana has failed to fix it; and for that the ordinary electricity consumers are not responsible. Amunugama also should know it. Sri Lanka is one of the countries with high electricity tariff especially compared to the earned income of a household or a person concerned. Although the average tariff is higher in a country like Australia, it is a reasonable fraction of the household income with many concessions given to low income earners.

What is abundantly clear behind the electricity price hike is a major failure of the government’s not only the pricing policy but also the energy policy. This government was not elected in recent times but first in 2005. It was in October 2006 that the Ministry of Power and Energy came up with a “National Energy Policy and Strategies” document but merely as a cosmetic exercise. Then it took one year to approve it by the Cabinet. A review was expected to conduct in three years’ time but never done so. What was the need of a review if a plan is not implemented or no intention to do so!

There are major holes emerging in the government’s development policy behind and leading to this energy crisis. To highlight only some: there is a major imbalance within the infrastructure policy paying much attention to roads and highways for some reason but completely neglecting a viable energy policy. The government is borrowing exorbitant amounts of funds from foreign sources while the government’s domestic revenue has dwindled to almost half during the last five years. While the government boasts about the GDP per capita income increase in monetary terms, the imbalance between the Western Province and the other provinces are scandalous. Ironically, the people in the Western Province are the most dissatisfied, perhaps due to the vast income differences in their midst.

Pricing Policy

On the question of electricity pricing policy in the so-called National Plan, in one section it assigns the sole responsibility to the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) and in another it states “Institutional responsibility to implement the electricity pricing policy lies with the Ministry of Power and Energy, PUCSL, electricity utilities and the General Treasury.” All responsibilities are utterly confused.

It is obvious that the tariff proposals naturally should come from the electricity distribution utilities and that means mainly the CEB and then it should go for the approval of the PUC which will seek concurrence of the Treasury on government subsidy. This is where the problem seems to have cropped up. It is common knowledge that the CEB’s annual loss is around or over 60 billion in recent times. This is something that the previous governments, right or wrong, have been subsidising through other incomes or sources, because the average selling price is lower than the cost of a kilowatt-hour of electricity. This time around, the ‘crooked economics’ of Sarath Amunugama and PB Jayasundera must have said no, the President as the Minister of Finance obviously nodding.

The ‘economics’ of Amunugama company, no need to say ‘crooked’ again,  is asking each and every government enterprise or even institution to be profitable these days. This appears to be the New Mahinda Chinthana without perhaps the knowledge of Mahinda Rajapaksa himself. This is a complete absurdity that goes against the aspirations of those who elected the present government believing that this is a ‘caring government,’ let alone rational economics. If they want profits, there are other sectors that they can earn them from within perhaps the same ministry. For example, oil refinery is one where if they utilize the full capacity of our refineries, the costs can be brought down and even foreign exchange might be earned by exporting refined oil. Instead, what we have seen in recent times is the complete standstill of the Sapugaskanda oil refinery due to poor planning in obtaining crude oil in time. Again, the blame goes to the international conspiracy.

There is another cardinal principle in their own ‘national energy policy’ that they have flouted in the case of the recent pricing policy and that is the following.

“Electricity generation prices at bulk purchase points will be as stated in the Power

Purchase Agreements, and the cost of transmission, distribution and supply will be

regulated ensuring fairness to both consumers and electricity utilities. Consumers

and all other stakeholders will be given opportunities to present their views at a

public hearing.”

Have they consulted the ‘consumers’ and other ‘stakeholders,’ particularly the trade unions on this matter of price hike? The answer is NOPE. On the other hand, if the “prices at bulk purchase will be as stated in the power purchase agreements” then how can they ensure “fairness to both consumers and electricity utilities”? It is well known that a particular mafia operates behind the ‘power purchase agreements’ that key government politicians either overlook or party to. If these agreements could be renegotiated and the supplies could be more competitive then there can be possibilities of bringing down the costs. If you ask the relevant trade unions and the concerned engineers they would definitely come up with the other cost cutting measures.

May Protests

It is in the above context that I have watched with considerable dismay the utterances of Earl Gunasekara, for example, and few others on behalf of the government claiming that the actions called by the Coordinating Committee of the Trade Union Alliance (CCTUA) on 21 May as an utter failure. Gunasekara obviously is a novice to the trade union field and it is amusing that the government had used a crossover MP from the opposition to do their dirty work. As an academic observer of trade union struggles in Sri Lanka and elsewhere for over 40 years, my judgement of the day was different.

Of course it was not an all-out general strike as in the case of 1960s or even 1970s. It didn’t mean to be such. Although it was called by a trade union alliance it was more of a mass protest led by trade unions since it was mainly a consumer issue. It should be the case even in the future in my opinion on the issue of electricity price hike. Even PB Abeykoon, Secretary to the Ministry of Public Administration, must be correct in saying that in some government institutions the attendance was higher than on a normal working day because the government had cancelled all leave and threatened to dismiss anybody participating in the work stoppage. The proverbial Sword of Damocles was hanging over their heads. Added to it were the memories of the July 1980 strike when the then UNP government took harsh measures in sacking over 80,000 government employees as a result of that strike. It is that kind of a situation that the trade unions should avoid by devising different strategies and tactics.

There were, however, brave ones in many places even in the public sector, and others participated in lunch time protests. Strike action by trade unions is a legitimate action according to the country’s constitution and legal set up. In the private sector it was a complete success, the young and the new working masses coming into swift action. Within the government sector, significant sections of the railways and printing corporation were on strike in addition to teachers in some districts and lecturers in selected universities. The selective action was part of the planned strategy of some unions and particularly of FUTA.

It was definitely for the first time after the present government came into power that the trade unions went into action in the present scale. The government failed to mobilize counter demonstrations or protests except in few remote localities as it did during the protest march of the opposition on 15 May in Colombo on the same issue. The government feared that the absence of their supporters from workplaces would be counted as strike action. It is natural that the government still has a stronghold on the public sector employees as they were mainly recruited through political patronage. But this power base is fast eroding.

Repressing trade union action has never been a major problem for a government of the UNP type in the past. But for a government of the SLFP type, with left wing alliances, similar action would definitely be suicidal.  Of course the Rajapaksa regime can rely on its newly acquired military might against the trade unions and its traditional popular base. Nevertheless it would be a dangerous game even for its own survival, and any repressive measures would erode it’s still remaining popular base even in the rural sector. Majority of the urban workers still have their social links in the rural Sri Lanka.

If the JVP or any other union does not engage in adventurist action and stick to the legitimate and democratic yet forceful mass action through joint opposition then it would not be difficult to win over demands or even oust the present regime at the next elections which is increasingly going against its electoral mandate. There are two things which are of paramount importance.

First is to conceptualize the pressing needs and demands of the people in the vocabulary of human rights which could attract wider sections of the populace. By doing so the people also can send the repressive government politicians quite insane. They are quite allergic to human rights. Electricity undoubtedly is a basic human need and the general masses have a right to obtain electricity at a reasonable price.

Second is to move away from pure shop floor trade union struggles to involve the unorganized sections of the populace and also as a tactic to avoid direct repressive measures of the government such as dismissals and/or other victimizations. The broad actions called by the CCTUA on 21 May in this respect were quite commendable. The government may rejoice that it was not a total work stoppage. But its power base is increasingly eroding underneath.

Video: Kelaniya PS chairman assaulted

MAY 23, 2013

Kelaniya Pradeshiya sabha Chairman Prasanna Ranaweera has been admitted to the Kiribathgoda Hospital following a clash at Dalugama this morning, sources said.

It is reported that a heated argument between the chairman and another UPFA member during an event had led to the clash.(Pix and Video by: Lal S Kumara)

Electricity bills rise despite promised relief

THURSDAY, 23 MAY 2013

Despite assurances by the Government that those who consumed less than 60 units of electricity would not see an increase in their electricity bills, a consumer from Moratuwa complained that the bill he received on Tuesday for this month, had doubled even though he had consumed less than 60 units.

Mr. V.S.K. De Mel who did not use any electric appliances but only used electricity for lighting said he had received the bill issued by the Lanka Electricity Co. (LECO) on Tuesday which read Rs. 741.18 for 59 units of electricity consumed as the amount payable for this month. However, if calculated according to the tariffs specified under the old system the bill should have read as Rs.365.50.

A family member said their household consumption was not more than 60 units per month and that prior to this they were charged a nominal sum varying between Rs. 200-300. “We were promised that if we consumed less than 60 units we would not be affected. But our electricity bill has now doubled,” he said.

The electricity tariff has three components - the number of units consumed, the percentage rate of the fuel adjustment charge and a fixed rate which vary depending on the number of units consumed.

According to the old electricity tariff system, users who consumed 0-30 units were charged Rs.3 per unit and for 31-60 units they were charged Rs.4.70 per unit. The number of units consumed were multiplied tier by tier and then added together, after which the percentage of the fuel adjustment charge and a further fixed rate was added.

For 31-60 units of electricity consumption the fuel adjustment charge was 35% and the fixed rate was Rs.60. This added to a total of Rs. 365.50.
“I went to LECO and made a complaint because I thought the meter reader had miscalculated my bill. But I was told that the bill had been calculated the way they had been advised to by the Public Utilities Commission. They told me there was nothing they could do,” he said. (Olindhi Jayasundere)

JANAKARALIYA MOBILE THEATRE- SRI LANKA
by: Dr. Ajay Joshi-May 15, 2013
Janakaraliya Mobile Theatre- Sri Lanka

Dr. Ajay Joshi speaks to Parakrama Niriella of Sri Lanka's first mobile theatre which works towards social integration and harmony in a country with a history of bitter ethnic conflict.

The lights dimmed on the open stage in the auditorium at the British School in Colombo, Sri Lanka, which was the venue for the second edition of the Colombo International festival, organised by the theatre organisation Interactart, from 26th March to 5th April 2013 and spearheaded by its artistic director M.Safeer. Since this was the last play of the festival and that too in Sinhalese, I fidgeted waiting for it to start and finish quickly. But what unfolded before me took me into its fold and I glided along, oblivious of the language barrier, to witness one of the best performances of the festival and probably the most spectacular I had seen in recent times.

The play in question was Disaster Market performed by the brilliant artistes of the Janakaraliya Mobile Theatre - the theatre of the people of Sri Lanka, under the direction of Parakrama Niriella, the founder of this theatre. It talks of the commodification of all forms of ‘disaster’ and how it is being used to promote self and the market. Seeing the raw energy unleashed on stage and the meticulousness and precision with which the actors unfolded the story onstage, I was compelled to meet the director and get to know of his theatre. The other more captivating reason was that this mobile theatre is the first ever such to make its mark in Sri Lanka. It has seen the tumultuous years of the ethnic war and has been an important tool in bridging the gaping divides between the warring factions - the Tamils, Sinhalese and Muslims.

Parakrama Niriella studied Drama and Theatre at the Art Centre Theatre Academy of the Lionel Wendt Centre in Colombo since 1974. His career in theatre began as a pioneer member of the first street drama group in Sri Lanka. Later he expanded his creative activities into the field of cinema and television, many of which brought him accolades locally and internationally.

Parakrama Niriella

When did you start the Janakaraliya Mobile theatre and how did the name come to mind? 

We registered Janakaraliya and started organising activities legally on the 25 February 2003. Actually I initiated this as a collaborative work with one of my colleagues, veteran actor and dramatist H. A. Perera, who passed away in 2010. In Sinhalese ‘Jana’ means 'people' without any ethnic, language or cast barrier. 'Karaliya' means 'performing space'. As Janakaraliya Mobile Theatre provides access to the people to watch dramas sitting around the performing space without any class, race or cast barriers I named it as ‘Janakaraliya’.

What was the objective of starting this theatre? 

There are several objectives. I started my career as a street drama artist. I was a pioneer member of the first ever street drama group joining my theatre arts teacher, Dr.Gamini Hattotuwegama, in his street drama group in 1974 after studying theatre arts. We produced three dramas and travelled across the country performing them at waysides, under trees, open grounds, threshing floors, out-door stages and sometimes interior proscenium stages. It was a marvellous as well as a valuable experience for me to watch the common folk watching and enjoying the same dramas performed in different ‘performing spaces’. What I saw made me realize that performing dramas shouldn’t be limited to urban proscenium theatres. The fundamental weakness of our street dramas was they lacked in artistry, aesthetics and finesse. The principal objective of our street drama group was not to take theatre arts to the underprivileged majority who cannot afford nor have access to watch dramas in urban proscenium theatres. In my opinion we must inculcate the creative excellence, professional values, aesthetic qualities, smoothness and flow in our creations too. In order to prove my position I created a drama titled Sekkuwa’(Oil Press) in 1976. It depicted the existing political situation using various symbols. It was an aesthetic drama consisted of dancing, music and singing that could be performed at any performing space just like our street dramas. After that, in 1978, I produced Albert Camus’ The Just Assassins in Sinhala and performed it in an open village space as an experiment. I realized that there should be a method to overcome obstacles from the environment when performing dramas of this nature in village spaces. The need of a full fledged mobile theatre as an alternate option for a proscenium theatre emerged at that time. That dream was realized after 25 years in 2003.

In 1977 an attack was launched against the Tamils living in this country. An organization was established to prevent this type of ethnic conflicts under the title Movement for Inter Racial Justice and Equality (MIRJE) with the participation of major leftist political parties and trade unions. I worked as a bureau member of that movement. This is the period 1979 / 1980. I created a street drama group under the title Open Arts Circle and tried to add a Tamil drama group to the team. Since there were different confrontational needs among the Tamil youth rather than acting in dramas my effort was unsuccessful. Another reason for the failure was that I was not known well among the Tamil community at that time. My endeavour was to create a multi ethnic drama group connected inseparably with my dream mobile theatre. I wanted to establish such a cultural group capable of taking drama and theatre in both Sinhala and Tamil languages for the entertainment, ecstasy, and wisdom of the Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim people living in far corners of this country. 

What was the political situation back then?

In 2002, while Chandrika Kumaranathunga was the executive President of Sri Lanka the opposition won the legislative power and Ranil Wickramasinghe became the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka. He signed an MOU with LTTE leader Prabhakaran and established a temporary peace in the country. Janakaraliya was launched during this temporary peace pact in 2003.

How was the mobile theatre concept accepted in the initial years?

It is a common practice in other countries for artists belonging to different ethnic groups to work together. But due to the friction, as the expectations of the Sri Lankan Tamils were not fulfilled by governments with a Sinhala majority and the resulting attacks against the Tamil population in 1956, 1977 and 1983 gradually these two communities started to drift away from each other. Therefore joint artistic creations by Sinhala and Tamil artists died away. In such a social context creation of a multi ethnic drama group after a number of years was subjected to scepticism and mistrust by extremists blinded by Sinhala and Tamil racism. Some racist newspapers attacked us saying we were white washing LTTE tigers while Tamil extremists thought it was a joke to use drama as a tool for bridging differences in an environment where their problems are stagnated. Some others accused us of taking advantage of the peace pact to earn dollars and dirty money. For some others it was a temporary effort. Most of the artists’ response towards Janakaraliya was perverse. The mammoth performances by Janakaraliya during 10 years have silenced unjust critics of it.

Did you have any role models in mind when you started? Your inspiration?

In 1978 the Asian Cultural Forum on Development conducted a workshop in Raipur, India. I had the opportunity to participate in that session. The workshop was conducted by prominent Indian dramatist Habib Tanvir. There I was able to watch the drama Charandas Chor performed by Naya Theatre in an open stage at a village on one night and on a bare floor of a ground at another village. After watching that aesthetic drama, with dancing, music and singing, my opinion on street drama and how a drama should be created for performing for the common people was consolidated. Two Japanese dramatists participated in that workshop. They were from the Black Tent travelling drama group in Japan performing their dramas in their tent. During the workshop they showed a video documentary on the Black Tent drama group. I saw how dramas are performed in their tent theatre with approximately 250 seating capacity. This was a good answer for my imaginary mobile theatre. But they performed in a stage constructed in the proscenium method. This reminded me of our rural dramas known as Teeter. Teeter dramas were shown in large thatched sheds with about three hundred to four hundred audience. Also there are circus groups in our country. In their circus tents they performed for the audiences who were seated on all four sides. Circuses and other sports are performed in the space in the middle. One day I took 20 actors and performed in one of these circus tents. I realized it was ideal to perform dramas in a space where the audience is seated on all four sides. Accordingly I made the audiences sit around the performing space of my Mobile Theatre.

You worked right through the war. How was your experience?

Yes, even during the terrifying period of the war we travelled with the Mobile Theatre and regularly conducted drama festivals. In all districts we travelled to we conducted theatre arts programmes in the schools too. Our mission for an inclusive society with social and cultural harmony was conducted unbrokenly. Not only in the North but also in the South of our country there were tight security cordons. We encountered regular road blocks and barriers. The Tamil boys and girls of our drama group were subjected to tough security inspections. But as the higher officials of the central government as well as the key officials of provincial governments accepted the need of a cultural movement to ease the conflict situation, our endeavours were supported at all districts. The civil status and country-wide recognition and trust enjoyed by me and my partner late H. A. Perera also helped in getting support from different sections of the society. Our biggest challenge was to protect the Tamil members from security forces and Sinhala extremists. The parents of the Tamil members were at ease since they thought their children were better protected at Janakaraliya than in their villages. Two of the most skilled members (a boy and a girl) had to flee to India with their parents due to threats. They are still living in refugee camps in Tamilnadu.

Did you face any resistance then?

In two locations in the South we confronted two minor incidents. One day in the Southern Province (Hambanthota) a group made a big clamour in front of our lodge. On another day while doing a street publicity campaign in another town in the same province, the public surrounded the team and handed them over to the police. When the task conducted by the group was explained they were released.

During the first two-three days at locations with Sinhala majority, the police emergency had been informed about a ‘suspicious group’. In these instances the police had surrounded the lodge and inspected the group. Once they realized the truth they left. This has happened several times. After we were known to the general public there were no such problems.

Were your movements or plays banned?

Other than the Forum dramas all our drama scripts are approved by the Public Performance Board. We neither produce agit-prop’ dramas openly talking politics nor dramas that the board is compelled to ban. If we continue to do drams subjected to regular bans we won’t be able to carry out our mission. We produce dramas in order to widen the knowledge of the people and their astuteness through ecstatic and aesthetic entertainment.

What kind of topics do you handle? You have an assortment of actors- Tamil, Sinhalese, and Muslim. How is it working with such multi-ethnicity?

Most of the times we choose topics close to our experiences, those that criticise political and social situations. Take Charandas, which was based on Habib Tanvir’s Charandas Chor. From the third scene the story was changed to suit Sri Lankan political and social realities. It strongly criticised the falsehood, corruption and anomalies existing in our society. We produced a drama titled Makaraksha based on the Russian dramatist Yevgini Swath's The Dragon. It depicts pervasiveness of a backward society that fails to rise against a cruel autocratic ruler. Andara Mal interprets the anomalies and unequal distribution of resources within the education system.Seethambara Pata shows how rulers fool people. Although these dramas discuss politics and social discrepancies they are not populist dramas or agit-prop that discuss raw politics.

Charandas

Our dramas do not discuss peace or sends messages on peace. Our process of making dramas and the way we perform them help communicate and propagate philosophies of peace and harmony. Sometimes dramas with light substance help in this matter. For example, while we conduct workshops for Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim youth or for school teachers we use light entertaining stories such as How Andare Ate Sugar or How the Village Chief Went to Heaven. Making use of such light stories sometimes helps to communicate solid messages. The important factor in these is how a group of youth or teachers belonging to three communities work together in a creative process as one team. Are there any better ways to promote or inculcate peace and harmony among people and teaching them to respect each other’s cultures, other than the process of working together? Students and teachers belonging to three communities are working towards a common goal of creativity! The process is stronger than any message given by a drama because the persons actively engaged in such processes understand better the values of inclusiveness and strength in unity.

There is an instance where this process was advanced. I used the Sanskrit dramaMrichchakateeka believed to have been produced in 400 BC by a king named Shudraka. At a glance it is a light entertaining drama based on a love story without deep substance. But there are more dramatic or theatrical features in this drama compared to other Sanskrit dramas. Initially we edited the script and produced a Sinhala drama under the title Meti Karattaya. It was a great production bagging several awards at the State Drama Festival. Then the Sinhala and Tamil actors of that drama went to Batticaloa in the Eastern Province and produced a Tamil version, of it namelyMruchchakateeham, as a joint venture with the Tamil students of Swami Vipulananthan Aesthetic Education Institute affiliated to the Eastern University. Sinhala and Tamil traditional drama styles and music were infused into that drama. It became an outstanding production and created a wonderful impact among the Eastern Tamil community and scholars. These are exemplary productions for our pluralistic society for promoting inclusiveness.

We can cite three similar examples. We established a drama group in the estate sector training a group of Tamil youth. I gave them a unique assignment during the training. It was to produce a drama based on a Sinhala, Buddhist Jathaka story Nalapana. They produced a wonderful drama using dancing, singing and music of traditional Kaman Kuttu style prevailing among the estate Tamil population. It’s being performed at Janakaraliya drama festivals to date after some improvements. It was recognized as a great infusion of two traditions. Enthayum Thayum by veteran Tamil dramatist Kulanthei Shanmugalingam was translated into Sinhala and produced by the Tamil members of the Janakaraliya drama group. Parallel to that a Tamil drama was produced by the Sinhala members of the group. These types of integrating productions have not being produced in Sri Lanka for decades. In a multi-ethnic society of Sri Lanka these productions have become outstanding creations. 

From where do these actors come? Their background?

We recruit members for the Janakaraliya drama group from far away localities of the country. Most of them are from rural families. Few of them are from urban middle class. Some Tamil members are sons and daughters of the labourers working in the upcountry tea estates. Majority have failed to secure university entrance, not trained in any profession. They were given continuous theoretical and practical in-house training. 

While lecturing at the university esp. in Batticoloa, I realised that many drama students were involved in community theatre and your mobile theatre. Is it a common feature for students from the university to be a part of the troupe?

Your understanding is correct. Lecturers teaching theatre arts in the University of Batticaloa in Tamil language mainly, probably only use Community Theatre as practices for the students. They also focus on sending raw messages to the Tamil people through Community Theatre on subjects such as women’s liberation, household aggression, child abuse, consumption of liquor, usage of insecticide and modern machinery in farming, etc. Other than that they concentrate mainly on teaching traditional and historical styles like Kuttu. Teaching universal theatre arts is limited to theory only. There are no teachers knowledgeable in teaching modern or contemporary theatre arts. They are caged firmly within their traditional styles and Applied Theatre. Both students and teachers are engaged in theatre arts without a universal attitude but with an anthropological attitude. It is a great obstacle for the development of Sri Lankan Tamil theatre arts. The reason for this situation is that the conflict situation prevailing for years has separated the Tamil people including the scholars from the external world limiting resources to acquire universal knowledge of theatre. 

Currently you have a big mobile theatre space. Was it always so big from the beginning?

Janakaraliya has two different mobile theatres. One is big and known to us as Mother Theatre. 600 adults or 800 school children could be seated in it. This can be arranged or assembled for watching from all four sides, as Thrust Theatre for watching from 3 sides or as Proscenium Theatre where the audiences are seated against the performing space at one side.

We have two more mobile theatres known as Mini Theatres. Most of the time these are assembled in schools grounds where there’s no space for performances. 300 children can watch dramas in these theatres seated on the ground. It is constructed similar to a wide spread shadow under a tree. 

a performance in the Mother Theatre

Who are your audiences for the plays? Do they pay for watching the plays?

Janakaraliya audiences include Provincial Governors, Ministers and Members of Parliament, senior officers of armed forces and people from states including people traditionally considered as lowest ranks. Our common seating arrangement cannot be separated class wise. Our audiences congregate without biases of race, class, creed, cast or status. We charge Rs. 100/- for adults and Rs. 50/- for a child to watch dramas at our festivals. We perform our dramas free of charges for rural peasants and marginalized communities in open spaces, with support of funding from local sponsors, funding agencies or NGO’s.

In addition Janakaraliya dramas are performed for the urban population at proscenium theatres in towns. These are organized by professional contractors engaged in organizing drama performances. Urban audiences pay for these performances ranging from Rs. 50/- to Rs. 3000/-. Janakaraliya and its members are able to earn additional income through these performances.

Considering that you have Tamil, Muslim and Sinhala actors, how do you handle the language issue? How do you decide which language to do the play in? Is it decided by the area in which you are performing? Have you done plays which are bilingual or trilingual?

Majority of Tamil and Muslim people in our country know Tamil language. Most of the Sinhala people do not know Tamil language. Therefore we perform dramas in Sinhala when the majority living in that particular location are Sinhala and if the majority of the audience is Tamil or Muslim the drama is performed in Tamil. When all three communities are congregated we perform in both languages. Our multi ethnic drama group is trained to perform all our dramas in both languages.

You said this is the only one of its kind in Sri Lanka. Any particular reason for that?

I always say this is the first ever mobile theatre in Sri Lanka and the first ever multi-ethnic theatre group in Sri Lanka. It is the truth. This wonderful theatre and the multi ethnic drama group inseparably connected to each other. We were able to establish the mobile theatre and the Multi Ethnic Drama Group because we opted to stay away from the traditional method of drama performance and focused on our mission of social integration and communal harmony. 

What the future plans for the mobile theatre?

My objective is to find ways and means of revenue for self subsistence for the continuity of the institution and its members. Janakaraliya now has the resources collected for that purpose. There is a massive fan support for us. Today Janakaraliya has arrived at an important juncture. Many of its artists have won highest awards at the State Drama Festivals and National Youth Drama Festivals. Dramas considered being Best Drams have been produced by Janakaraliya. Members’ have had opportunities to participate in international drama festivals and travel overseas. As a result Janakaraliya is recognized nationally and internationally. Janakaraliya has been selected as one of the 10 Best Cultural Groups in the Asia-Pacific region. In addition Janakaraliya has received numerous donations and resources. From 2011 International Organizations stopped assisting Sri Lankan NGOs. Under such a situation Janakaraliya will not receive international aid, but with above mentioned positive factors the need to forge ahead is our challenge today. 

Dr Ajay Joshi is a practicing dentist, with a PhD in theatre criticism and an MA in Journalism and Mass Communication. He has freelanced as a theatre journalist for publications like Times of India, Indian Express, Saakal, PtNotes, Himal etc. He is involved in theatre as a media person, organiser, coordinator, judge and teacher

Devolution, Sri Lanka’s Defence And Security

By Dayan Jayatilleka -May 23, 2013 

Dr Dayan Jayatilleka

Prof G.H. Peiris in his latest response (‘The Case against the Thirteenth Amendment’, The Island Midweek Review, May 22-23, 2013) to my article inThe Island of 15^th May 2013, argues that the distribution of ethnicity renders the district rather than the province the more suitable unit of devolution if empowering the minorities is the name of the game. My counterarguments are threefold: domestic geopolitics, politics, and regional geopolitics. Or, to reduce it a single factor, the realities of the balance of power and the island’s strategic vulnerability.

Firstly, it is not merely the Jaffna district or any single district in the North, but the Northern Province that has a Tamil majority. The Tamils of that province have evolved and crystallised a collective identity that the Sri Lankan state must accommodate, institutionally and structurally, if it is to remain as a single overarching entity over the very long duration. Military dominance alone cannot ensure this and in any case such dominance is both prohibitively expensive to sustain and easily neutralised by far stronger players over the horizon. I recall Prof Peiris’ distinguished colleague Prof KM de Silva writing that the matter ultimately boils down to the Northern Province and conceding that the case for devolution to that province is a rather strong one, unlike that for a merged North-East or even for the Eastern province.

Secondly, it takes two to tango; this is all about dialogue and negotiation, and no administration has been able to persuade a Tamil party of any significance to accept the district as the main unit of devolution.  It is a non-starter and GoSL would have no representative Tamil partner for a process of political dialogue and reconciliation.

Thirdly, the vital strategic and security realities: the sophisticated and increasingly influential Tamil secessionist network (of which the Tigers are only a component), are attempting to widen the contradictions between Sri Lanka and India, Sri Lanka and the US, and Sri Lanka and the Indo-US axis. Watching with pride the V-day march past on TV, I was seized by the crucial importance of protecting our superbly honed (and hopefully, not corrosively over-politicised) military machine from the trap that the Tamil secessionists are setting for it, namely to place it in the line of fire of Indian kinetic power, backstopped diplomatically and strategically by the US.

As a student of comparative politics I am keenly aware that the unravelling of Yugoslavia – whose fine army, steeped in guerrilla fighting traditions had long deterred Stalin’s Russia — commenced precisely with the abolition of the autonomous status of the province of Kosovo. That unravelling was the result of political lobbying and argumentation by Serbian ultranationalists, along exactly the lines that Prof Gerry Peiris and his co-thinkers (such as the Bodu Bala Sena, oxymoron though it be) that are engaging in today.

The usually well-informed political column of the Sunday Times (Colombo) reported that “…These sources said India’s External Affairs Minister Khurshid “politely told” Peiris that any such measures by the Government of Sri Lanka would be “at its own risk” and would force the New Delhi Government to react with “firm measures.” He has also cautioned that Sri Lanka would be isolating itself in the international community.” (‘Storm Clouds Still Over CHOGM’ May 19^th 2013) That report (which pertained to 13A, as distinct from the one about the acquisition of 6,000 acres) has not been contradicted so far, by GoSL. My collection of back issues of the Lanka Guardian is replete with such statements made in the years leading to the intervention of 1987 – accompanied by the accurate editorial reading of those (Indian) tea leaves.

It is not that intervention is already planned. However, the atmosphere, diplomatic (Geneva, New York), conceptual (retroactive R2P) and world opinion, is building up – or being created—which is not unpropitious for such intervention and in which any intervention would be readily endorsed. It certainly went uncontested in 1987. The last time, Sri Lanka was able to roll back that intervention because the LTTE took on the IPKF, generating collective cognitive dissonance in Tamil Nadu which in turn led to VP Singh making and fulfilling an electoral promise to withdraw Indian troops. In any future scenario of intervention, this factor will not operate. There will be no Tamil army fighting the Indians or anyone else who may come along. There will also be no foreign troops in the Sinhala areas, and therefore no possibility of a heroic, protracted, patriotic guerrilla war of national liberation against them. The Sri Lankan armed forces, being almost totally Sinhala, will find it impossible to wage guerrilla war in Tamil areas, with restive Tamil civilians in its rear, against a foreign interventionist force, which is in any case able to neutralise our most significant military assets not just in the North but all over the island, in a single strike wave. There will be an overwhelming force projection which cuts off the Tamil areas and imposes punitive strikes (as happened to Serbia) in case of massive Tamil civilian casualties due to reactive ‘ethnic cleansing’ ( real or perceived) in the South.

Any lucid strategic thinking does not proceed from intention but capacity, and plans for worst case scenarios, not best case ones. Sri Lanka must make note of its security environment and its strategic vulnerabilities. Changes in that environment are , in all probability, not aimed at Sri Lanka and have nothing to do with us, but can also be used against us in a worst-case scenario. It is the stance of an ostrich to assume that Indian and US planners do not have Hambantota on their maps and have planned for neutralisation of a possible asset of their Asian rival. The dispositions that result from such planning can be used for other contingencies.

I would draw attention not only to the speculation about US military arrangements with the Maldives, but far more importantly, the supplementing of the existing Indian naval air base in the South (which has the longest airstrip in the region) with the brand new airbase in Thanjavur, Tamil Nadu, to which India plans to transfer its top-of-the line Sukhoi SU30MKI warplanes. One notes that neither China nor Pakistan lie to the south of India. Sri Lanka does lie within the operational arc (and the intersecting Indo-US arcs) of such arrangements. Therefore, large security zones and military dispositions provide no real security beyond a limited point and may indeed prove excessively vulnerable (especially to stand-off weaponry).

The bottom line is that if Sri Lanka’s costly military victory which has given us back our natural borders, is to be made permanent; if Sri Lanka’s fine military is to be ‘ target hardened’; if Sri Lanka’s security is to be truly assured, it cannot be done purely or primarily by hard power alone, but by restoring our soft power. Provincial devolution in the form of the 13^th amendment (perhaps with mutually agreed upon swaps in the concurrent list), is a political solution which lies at the cusp of acceptance, however grudging, by both Sinhalese and Tamils communities. It will help us to strategically re-stabilise our relations with India which (as Geneva 2012 and 2013 have shown) have deteriorated since 2009 and seem to be on a slippery slope. Moderate, prudently centripetal provincial devolution is an indispensable part of our national defence shield.

It is rather sad that Prof GH Peiris sees fit to distort what I said in order to say what he must. He writes that “My response to Dr. DJ’s article (The Island of 15 May) was restricted almost entirely to his attempt to persuade the reader that the Thirteenth Amendment was essentially a product of indigenous political thought and strategy, and not a consequence of India’s coercive intervention in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka.”

I had said no such thing and even the most cursory re-reading would demonstrate that Prof Peiris is engaging in sleight of hand by substituting ‘the 13^th amendment’ for ‘province based devolution’. My point had been that the case for province–based devolution had long, non-Indian (and non-Tiger) antecedents; that the case had issued from intelligent reflections on the problem of political relations between Sinhalese and Tamils in 20^thcentury Ceylon/Sri Lanka. I argued that the specific form that provincial devolution eventually took– that of coercive Indian diplomacy and the 13^th amendment– was due precisely to the decades-long delay in implementing such devolution domestically. I proceed to caution that just as the blockage of a domestic process of devolution to the provinces resulted in or provided the opening for external intervention, an ethnically unilateral abolition or disembowelling of existing arrangements for devolution is likely to revive such external interference and intrusion, and do so in an external environment that is at least as unpropitious as that of the 1980s and arguably even more so. I observe that this may dovetail with the strategic designs of the global Tamil separatist network and result in jeopardising Sri Lanka’s military achievement and our strategic assets. I therefore conclude that though the implementation of provincial level devolution in the form of the existing 13^thamendment constitutes a risk, a significantly greater risk, on balance, would be posed to our sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity by the unilateral scrapping or permanent freezing of such devolution. I would withdraw my argument if a grand bargain could be struck with the predominant parliamentary party of the Tamils in which provincial devolution is replaced by devolution to the district in exchange for a more equal citizenship–which I have called the ‘Soulbury Plus’ scenario.

Prof Peiris refers to my contention ( and no, it wasn’t my “central contention”) that “… had the agreements announced at the PPC (Political Parties Conference) of mid-1986 or at the APC (All Parties Conference) of 1984, which were primarily domestic processes, been implemented, there would have been no opening for Indian intervention in mid-1987″. He proceeds to ask “Does such a “central contention” even deserve a response?” I’m afraid so. I repeat, had the domestic deliberations for devolution been successful and been implemented, starting with the B-C Pact of 1957 right up to the June 1986 PPC proposals, would India have felt the compulsion or had the politico-diplomatic opening it did, to intervene?  This is not idle speculation. It has very considerable current relevance. As Ambassador Tamara Kunanayakam and I have separately yet consistently cautioned, the case is being built up that Sri Lanka either has no will or capacity to undertake domestic reform including in the realm of political dialogue and reconciliation with the Tamils, and that this case is the foundation for escalation to greater levels of external interventionism, conceivably culminating in the most intrusive and dangerous.

Prof Peiris queries “Wasn’t the PPC of 1986 very largely a dialogue between a segment of the UNP leadership and representatives of the TULF?” Well, frankly, no, because the TULF did not attend the conference (though Mr Amirthalingam returned to Sri Lanka briefly and observed the deliberations at some remove).

He goes onto to assert that “From 1936, as the leader of the Sinhala Maha Sabha, until his electoral victory 20 years later, SWRD remained one of the most ardent exponents of the unitary nation-state of Sri Lanka. To Dr DJ, these are inconsequential.”

Of what conceivable relevance is this, when SWRD Bandaranaike negotiated the pact for provincial devolution (regional councils with amalgamation even across provincial boundaries) one year after his victory in 1956 and the passage of Sinhala Only? And what pray has SWRD’s or anyone’s support for the unitary nation state of Sri Lanka to do with devolution within precisely such a unitary state, which was the case with the B-C Pact and the autonomy arrangements in a great many unitary political systems throughout the world?

Prof Peiris queries whether “as evidence, do these tiny bits of thrash picked up as it were from the “dust bin of history” represent the early stages of a vibrant domestic process that culminated in province-based devolution in 1987?” Perhaps not, but then again, I never said that it was a ‘vibrant domestic process’, merely that the political idea had been around for quite some time, including in the serious manifestation of the B-C Pact, and that it was the failure to make the transition from an overly centralised unitary state to one with sufficient devolution of power so as to bring it line with domestic geopolitical realities that “culminated in province based devolution in 1987” through coercive external intervention.

Seeking to combat my contention about the B-C Pact and the tragedy that resulted from its non-implementation at the time, Prof Peiris says that “anything might have happened if it was actually implemented. To go by Indian experiences, it could have intensified Sinhalese ultra-nationalism which could have… intensified rather than defused Sinhalese-Tamil hostilities to a level which, especially in the period during which the “Uncrowned Empress” held sway over India, could have resulted in an Indian military intervention in Sri Lanka, and a “liberation” not only of the claimed ‘traditional homeland’ but an area embracing “Malainadu” as well where more than a million stateless Indian Tamils were present. Such a scenario, to my mind, is substantially more realistic that what the ‘realist’ Dayan has said about the possible outcome of pre-emptive provincial devolution in 1986 or early ‘87.”

Well, let the reader judge the lucid realism of that scenario, bearing in mind however, that “to go by Indian experience” as Prof Peiris says we should, nowhere has a region seceded because an agreement for autonomy was arrived at and implemented. On the contrary every serious scholar agrees that it is precisely the flexible accommodation of regional (sub) nationalisms that has permitted the vastly diverse India to stay together.   This is not to say that Sri Lanka should seek to imitate India’s arrangements, only to learn from them as from other places.

Prof Peiris then contests my argument that “had the Thirteenth Amendment preceded the ‘Operation Liberation’ of mid-1987, there would have been no Indian intervention.” His counterargument is to quote from my 1995 book on Sri Lanka with regard to the provocative conduct of the EPRLF led North Eastern Provincial Council. Prof Peiris is oblivious to the irony that he is proving my case. The EPRLF was both tempted and capable of engaging in that kind of militia based adventurism precisely because of the presence of the IPKF, which would not have been on Sri Lankan soil had we legislated devolution through a domestic process before the launch of Operation Liberation and as a preparation for it. The commitment of President Kumaratunga to a political solution (however imprudently over-generous those packages were) and the promise to implement 13A repeatedly made by President Rajapaksa and his troika of top representatives (who included two of his siblings) to New Delhi, constituted an important factor , apart from the murder of Rajiv Gandhi by the LTTE—in keeping India ‘on side’, when the army under CBK liberated Jaffna and when President Rajapaksa finally crushed the LTTE despite Western moves for a ceasefire and Indian elections including in Tamil Nadu. This last factor explains why President Rajapaksa saw fit to reiterate the commitment to implement fully the 13^thamendment, in two summit level communiqués, issued just days AFTER the conclusion of the war, on May 21 and 23^{rd .}This tends to prove my point that Indian intervention could have been avoided had devolution been in place at least on paper, in 1987.

Prof Peiris contrasts Sri Lanka with India in terms of size and concludes that federalism is an absurdity. Firstly, size has very little to do with it: both the young SWRD and the mature Leonard Woolf regarded Switzerland (hardly a vast landmass) as a possible model for Ceylon. Secondly, and more importantly, where does the issue of federalism come in? While the Tamil nationalists may have it on their wish list it, the debate today, and certainly between Prof Peiris and me, pertains to provincial level devolution within a unitary state.

Navy Commander to be sent home after boat topples on Victory Day

Thursday, 23 May 2013

Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa has called for an explanation from Navy Commander Admiral Jayanath Colombage over the death of a sailor after a Navy fast attack craft toppled during Victory Day celebrations.

It is learnt that the Defence Secretary had called for explanation from the Navy Commander due to instigation by Rear Admiral Jayantha Perera. The Defence Secretary has stated that the death of the sailor during the celebrations had prevented the Victory Day even from receiving the maximum publicity it deserved and was also a black mark for the Navy.

Rear Admiral Jayantha Perera would have to retire in June since he has been holding his current position for four years, which is the maximum an officer in the Navy, could hold the post. Perera has therefore set his eyes on the post of Navy Commander and is now engaged in various tactics to get the current commander ousted from the post.

Rear Admiral Jayantha Perera is now a close lackey of the Defence Secretary and has volunteered to look after the Secretary’s pet dogs.

Sources close to the Defence Secretary say that the Secretary has decided to change the commanders of the army and air force as well.

Prime Minister’s Office starts hunting workers

Thursday, 23 May 2013
he Prime Minister’s Office had sent a letter with the signature of Prime Minster’s Secretary, S. Amarasekera to all secretaries, chief secretaries and district secretaries to prepare and hand over a report on the state employees who report to work at 9 a.m. and after 10 a.m. on the 21st. The Prime Minister’s Secretary’s letter had been numbered 01/110/01/2013.

Trade union leaders say that the motive behind the letter is to hunt down the workers who participate in the nation wide token strike that was held on the 21st against the increasing cost of living and the increase of electricity tariffs.

Trade union leaders said that despite attempts by the state to introduce various regulations to prevent workers from participating in the strike demanding the withdrawal of the electricity tariff hike, the workers had participated in the strike action.

The Coordinating Committee for a Joint Trade Union Alliance said that over 900 trade unions and 15 political parties had participated in the strike.

Head of the National Trade Union Center K.D. Lalkantha said that the strike action was a success with many schools and private sector companies in the country coming to a standstill as a result of the strike.

He said that workers had struck work at the Sri Jayewardenepura Hospital from morning till 12 noon, the Peradeniya University (excluding the engineering faculty), Open University, Moratuwa University and the Sri Jayewardenepura University (excluding the medical faculty).