The Unitary State, The 13th Amendment & Tamil Civil Society: Rejoinder To Guruparan

By Dayan Jayatilleka -April 24, 2013 |

Dr Dayan Jayatilleka

“Don’t it always seem to go

That you don’t know what you’ve got till it’s gone?”

- Joni Mitchell, ‘Big Yellow Taxi’ (1970)

Winston Churchill famously said that democracy is the worst system there is except for all the others. My position with regard to the 13th amendment and the Provincial Council system is roughly the same. My answer to all its critics is yes, true, but it may the worst there is– except for all the others which are less feasible and more politically problematic.

I contradicted Mr Guruparan’s criticism that the 13th amendment was drawn up in a hurry, pointing that it was the culmination of a protracted process of several years. Mr Guruparan’s counterargument isn’t really one because all it proves is that the Tamil political leadership found the draft insufficient and also felt that they had been left out of the loop at certain points. Neither of which prove his case that the 13th amendment was drafted in a hurry nor disproves mine that it was not. Perceived insufficiency and lack of participation are not evidence of ‘a hurry’.

Mr Guruparan then says that I have not responded to his detailed criticisms of the 13th amendment. This reminds me of the conversation reproduced by US Col Harry Summers in his book ‘On Strategy’. He says that at an intermission in the negotiations after the Vietnam war on POWs and MIAs, he challenged a North Vietnamese Communist military officer , saying that “you never defeated us in a set-piece battle”, to which the North Vietnamese replied, “that may be so but it is also irrelevant”. I haven’t bothered to respond to Mr Guruparan’s detailed criticisms of the 13th amendment because even if true, they are also irrelevant. One of the reasons is that this is the best deal feasible for the Tamil people of Sri Lanka, since it was the result of an overt role by the one of the continent’s most powerful states, and the one with the biggest concentration of Tamils in the world. It was also against the backdrop of a fierce armed struggle by the Sri Lankan Tamils and furthermore, took place when there was a strong pro-devolution Left in the Southern polity. It is because some of those conditions no longer obtain, that many Sinhalese want to abolish the 13th amendment and it is now hanging by a thread.

There may be better solutions in the abstract, but Mr Guruparan obviously hasn’t heard of the phrase that the best should not be the enemy of the good, nor of the simpler one that a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. Prof Lakshman Marasinghe has long since pointed out a pathway to improve on the 13th amendment without a referendum, while Asanga Welikala has presented a coherent argument and roadmap on the re-engineering of the concurrent list, both of which I commend to Mr Gurparan but neither of which I see the need to repeat in this rejoinder.

Mr Guruparan writes that “I do not know what Dr. Jayatilleka means when he says that I confuse the issue of seeking the democratic consent of the majority of one’s fellow citizens, with the question of the legitimacy of the state. Is Dr. Jayatilleka trying to suggest that the citizenry of the Sri Lankan state is devoid of ethnic affiliation? I also do not understand what point he seeks to make by resorting to hair splitting between ‘state apparatus’ and ‘state’. ”

OK Guru, let’s make it as simple as I can. Of course the citizenry is not devoid of ethnic affiliation, but what is your point? Are you saying that the ethnic diversity of Sri Lankan citizens means that there is no such legitimate category as the citizens of Sri Lanka—as stated in your passport– over and above their ethnic differences, and that the democratic consent of the Sri Lankan citizenry taken as a whole should not be ascertained by constitutionally prescribed means (which also happen to be the universally recognised means) of a referendum? Are you saying that only the consent of the Tamil citizens should be sought in the matter of a drastic restructuring of the Sri Lankan state which goes beyond both the 13th amendment and the unitary state form?

As for the difference between state ‘apparatus’ and state ‘formation’ –i.e. the state as a political unit or community– let’s see if I can explain it to you. When you want the army out, it is the state ‘apparatus’ that you want out. If you want to change the existing borders of Sri Lanka, that’s the state ‘formation’ you want out of. Everything you say about the Sinhala Buddhist character of the state may well be right, but those are not the issues on the table at this time, and no state actor in the world system has raised issues of such dimensions. There is no international political and diplomatic support for those issues to be raised. The acceptance of the 13th amendment in no way precludes placing those issues on the agenda, once trust has been built over a generation, a new social consciousness has evolved and new dynamics have been unleashed.

Mr Guruparan accepts that he is “arguing for a reform which goes beyond the unitary state framework itself”. He contests the analogy with Northern Ireland. Let’s concede that, except for the reminder that the Sinn Fein/IRA was not crushed to a pulp as the Tigers were– which kind of offsets the specific points about officially unitary UK not being quite unitary. What then of the Mindanao Accords and the unitary Philippine state, or Aceh and Indonesia?

More fundamentally, does Mr Guruparan think that the proposal to abandon the unitary framework of the Sri Lankan state has a chance in hell of obtaining the endorsement of a single political formation with a significant mass base in the South, and more basically, anything more than a few percentage points at a countrywide referendum? Does he think such a proposal can carry a democratic majority with it? And if he isn’t referring to a countrywide referendum but a Northern or Northern and Eastern one, is he not then talking about a decision which affects the entire state and citizenry for generations to come, being restricted to the consent of a minority of its citizenry? Does this sound like democracy, or even sanity?

Guruparan admits a comprehension problem when he says “I do not understand Dr. Jayatilleka’s questions about my articulation for a transitional administration”. OK, Guru, transitional means it is in transition from something to something else. You have already said your desired settlement is not only beyond the existing 13th amendment but also beyond the unitary state framework. So, what is the transitional administration in transition to? Where precisely does the transition stop? What is the final status settlement or the ceiling? Please don’t talk only in vague terms of justice, but continue to talk in terms of state form as you have so far, when you object to a unitary state. If you reject the unitary state, what state form beyond the unitary state will your proposed transitional administration take you, the Tamil people and all of us to, in terms of state structure and form?

In his quote-buttressed accusation that I have come round to support the 13th amendment in purely strategic/instrumentalist terms, Mr Guruparan obviously fails to recognise – and here too he shares much with the Sinhala hawks—that a solution which provides an irreducible yet moderate measure of autonomous self government to provincially based ethnic communities, is both intrinsically fair and desirable as well as strategically prudent. This is the school of thought known as Ethical Realism, which (as Kalana Senaratne’s review critically observes) is an important component of my outlook and perspective.

Mr Guruparan’s closing line is a ringing “If questioning the dominant view is considered to be ‘troubling’, the Tamil Civil Society and I will proudly plead guilty”. This further illustrates the problem of comprehension. When someone says ‘the trouble with’ something is such and such, it is combination of a criticism and a figure of speech, none of which means that he/she finds it troubling. It means that there is a problem with that argument, entity or phenomenon. For instance if a doctor were to say ‘the trouble with your lungs according to these tests results is’ or an academic were to remark ‘ the trouble with your tutorial is’, it doesn’t mean that he/she finds it troubling. Indeed he/she may not give a rat’s – or deceased ferociously carnivorous striped animal’s —rear end about it.

Related posts;

For Whom Is The ‘Tamil Civil Society View’ Causing Trouble? A Response To Dayan’s Rejoinder - By Kumaravadivel Guruparan

The Trouble With Mr Guruparan’s ‘Tamil Civil Society’ View - By Dayan Jayatilleka

Much Ado About Nothing - By Kumaravadivel Guruparan

Clarifications on Genocide

by Izeth Hussain

( April 24, 2013, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) I began my article “Genocidal anti-Muslim racism” in the Island of April 1 by remarking that the term “racism” had in recent times suddenly come into vogue, and that there is now recognition among the Sinhalese that there could be racists within their own ranks. The obvious example is the BBS which is widely recognized as racist. I saw that recognition as a step or even a great leap forward holding out promise for the future. It might have seemed to many readers that I was being absurdly euphoric. I believe on the contrary that I am proceeding on a very sound principle. It is that to solve a problem you must first of all be able to recognize the problem. Formerly, it seemed to me, that very few Sinhalese were willing to recognize that at the root of our ethnic problems there was Sinhalese racism, or at least that that was part of the problem. Now, in connection with the BBS’s anti-Muslim campaign, there seems to be a widespread recognition that Sinhalese racism is in this case the real problem. That recognition could lead to more realistic thinking about our inter-ethnic relations.

In any case the racism paradigm, as I have been arguing for some time, affords a much better grasp of what is involved in so-called ethnic problems than the ethnic paradigm. Racism is seen as coming from the drive to treat the Other as inferior. There are three recognized ways of doing that, one of which is to confine a targeted ethnic minority to inferior positions in a hierarchically ordered system. That was being done to our Tamils, in a systematic way, for decades. That was also being done to our Muslims in the State sector, as I can attest from personal first-hand experience as a Foreign Service officer. I have details to show beyond contest that the 1977 UNP Government practiced racist discrimination against Muslims in the foreign relations sector to an extent that was probably the worst in the world – all under a bizarre Muslim Foreign Minister who was used to legitimate that discrimination – a record that did not really surprise me as I have long regarded the UNP as a quintessentially anti-Muslim racist party, much more so than the SLFP.

The two other recognized ways of treating the Other as inferior is to exclude them or to subject them to genocide. Exclusion could take a mild form or be quite intolerable. For instance the Chinese in the Philippines are not welcome in the State sector nor do they want any significant place there, thriving as they do in the private sector where in fact they have more status than the Bhumiputra Filipinos who strut about in the State sector. I have long believed that that could be a model for inter-ethnic accommodation in Sri Lanka, but for the time being the Sinhalese racists seem to be adamantly averse to allowing their legitimate place to the minorities both in the State sector and the private sector. In a way, what has proved successful with the Chinese in the Philippines is a limited form of apartheid, quite successful and acceptable because it is founded on the ancient principle of an ethnic division of labour that is to be found all over the world. Systematic apartheid on an extended scale is of course the most intolerable form of exclusion. It came a cropper in South Africa and is bound to do so in Zionist Israel as well, no less than Kissinger forecasting that in ten years’ time there will be no more Israel.

Exclusion can sometimes slide into genocide. Sri Lanka provided a splendid example when the LTTE drove out a hundred thousand Muslims from the North, an act which has come to be regarded internationally as a horrendous act of genocide. We SL Muslims, however, have never committed genocide during the entirety of our existence in this island of over 1,400 years, for which I can give a convincing explanation: we lacked the means to do it. But we too have done our mite to show that we are solidary with our Sinhalese and Tamil brothers when it comes to the matter of genocide: at the height of the war Muslim Homeguards got together with the STF to drive out Tamils from around seventeen villages. It was certainly an act of exclusion with a genocidal touch to it. The most notorious act of genocide through exclusion in the last century was committed during the First World War by the Turks when they drove out their Armenian minority. It inspired what in my view is one of the great novels of the world, Franz Werfel’s The Forty Days of Musa Dagh. I must add that the Sinhalese are internationally recognized as having committed genocide of the conventional order in 1983.

I must now define what is meant by genocide. But before doing that I must provide a clarification. The drive to treat the Other as inferior is so widespread that it can be regarded as practically universal. It is a drive that can erupt anywhere under certain conditions, and it can take a genocidal form anywhere, including in the most civilized countries – such as in Nazi Germany. In fact genocide is a commonplace phenomenon in history. The Kuveni legend points clearly to an act of genocide against the original inhabitants of a country, and so does the fact that a great many dominant majorities in the world are not indigenous to the territories where they are today bossing the show over the minorities. A realistic appraisal of the present situation in Sri Lanka requires our taking into account the possibility that the Sinhalese racists may want to commit genocide against the Muslims. Anyone who regards that idea as being insulting to the Sinhalese can be fairly regarded in one of three possible ways: he is a fool, he is an ignoramus, or he is both.

For the definition of genocide I turn to Pierre-Andre Taguieff’s book Racism. The term “genocide” was created by the jurist Raphael Lemkin in 1944, and it has come to be used in two ways. In a narrow technical sense, it is used to mean the systematic extermination, in accordance with an ideological conception, of a human group regarded as deserving it. In the second and wider sense, it is used to mean actions taken with the objective of destroying, wholly or in part, a racial, national, ethnic, religious or other group. The 1983 “riots” against the Tamils were clearly genocidal in the second sense.

The big question preoccupying many Sri Lankans is whether there will be another 1983, this time against the Muslims as had been anticipated by many Tamils and Muslims after the 1983 pogrom. It is assumed that in that event we will have another ethnic conflict on our hands. It is arguable that it was not anti-Tamil discrimination but the State terrorism after 1977, mounting to a genocidal crescendo in 1983, that ignited the Tamil armed rebellion. Likewise, in the case of the Muslims, mass violence against them could become the catalyst for armed rebellion. It is difficult to imagine a more submissive – indeed abjectly submissive – minority than our Muslims. But changes are taking place, as suggested by the spectacular success of the Eastern Province hartal organized by Azath Sally and Mujibur Rahman. Reportedly that provoked the anger of the Sinhalese extremists, and some believe that the attack on Fashion Bug was their riposte meant to demonstrate Muslim vulnerability to the Sinhalese majority.

There are hard facts that seem to favor an anti-Muslim pogrom. Hardly anyone today doubts that the Government has been complicit with the BBS. The police blatantly play the role of spectators while anti-Muslim action is going on, and the Government takes no action against them. On the other hand, when Buddhist moderates engage in a peaceful candle-light vigil, the police immediately arrest them. Some conclusions might be drawn, rightly or wrongly: the Government wants no opposition to the Buddhist extremists, and as for the Muslims they are beneath and outside the Law, a people who should not expect the protection of the State when Buddhists target the Muslims. The reason for this position is of course that the Government’s power rests mainly on Buddhist support. It is a consideration that applies to all the other political parties as well, except for the minority ethnic parties. The Muslims can expect no meaningful support from the Opposition. Nor can they expect such support from the civil society, which is simply not dynamic enough for that purpose. As for the people, they need a scapegoat and the Muslim is the ideal candidate for that role as I argued in my last article.

In brief, everything points to a genocidal anti-Muslim pogrom which can be carried out with total impunity. Fortunately President Rajapakse is obviously against that, and very probably there is an understanding with the BBS that the anti-Muslim program can proceed merrily but without violence. I believe that his reason for taking up that position is concern about possible foreign reactions. I must also say that I have come to suspect more and more strongly that behind the nonsense about halal and the anti-Muslim program sinister foreign forces have been at work.

Boston bomb explosions reminds MaRa of Jayaraj murder while people are reminded of Police SP Cooray

(Lanka-e-News -23.April.2013, 10.00PM) MaRa the chief of the SL Rajapakse regime had sent a message to the US President in connection with the bomb explosion by terrorists in America during the marathon race in Boston city.

In the message dispatched by MaRa it is stated that the Boston city bomb explosion is reminiscent of the bomb explosion in SL caused by a terrorist suicide bomber in he month of April 2008 at the commencement of the marathon race which claimed the life of Minister Jayaraj Fernandopulle . When MaRa is reminded of the death of Fernandopulle following the bomb explosion , the people of the country are being reminded of the events beyond the suicide bomber ., that is people are reminded of Gampaha SP Lakshman Cooray who brought the suicide bomber Kirubaran to the scene of the murder . During the investigations into Jeyaraj’s murder these facts came to light. Accordingly Laksman Cooray was kept in custody in Boosa based on the orders to arrest him. 

As investigations were progressing , it was confirmed that Kirubaran was in the group with Karuna who left the LTTE. Now , even after 5 years , why is Lakshman Cooray being held in custody without a trial ?. Following our inquiries about a month ago , it was confirmed that Lakshman Cooray is enjoying super luxury comforts. A most sophisticated phone, a latest TV, Fridge , Fan , cooker etc . are provided for him , and he is having the best of comforts at a super luxurious location in the Boosa TID detained center.( if anyone has doubts about our revelations , Boosa can be visited to get first hand information). Why is he given all this? Is Jeyaraj murder an LTTE act? Or was it the regime’s act as part of their agenda to exterminate enemies ?

Like how DIG K P P Pathirane who transported Karuna’s suicide bomber from Trincomalee in the murder of General Janaka Perera was appointed as the Presidential advisor after his retirement , will Lakshman Cooray be exonerated of all charges via the Attorney General and be made a Presidential advisor?

Though the common factor in the bomb explosions in America and SL is the marathon , we cannot remember a common factor between the two countries in the instance where a murderer is elevated to the position of a chief Minister or being allowed to create and operate an NGO , which happens only in SL with the blessings of a murderous regime. We also cannot remember any similarity in the instance , where even after knowing very well the individual who brought the suicide bomber for the murder , that individual being pampered and mollycoddled keeping him in the Boosa camp. We also certainly do not remember any similarity in the unique instance where the wife of the deceased who fell victim to terrorist suicide bombing is sharing the bed with the same terrorists who killed her husband. These are happenings only in SL made possible by the one and only barbaric regime in the world.

Audio: Govt. molly-coddling former terrorists: SF WEDNESDAY, 24 APRIL 2013 The Government has permitted separatists and terrorist leaders to contest the upcoming elections, DNA Leader Sarath Fonseka said today.  He was referring to the news item that Daya Master will contest on the ruling UPFA ticket. ‘Daya master was a known terrorist leader, who surrendered to the military during the final stages of the war,” Mr. Fonseka said and added that the Government was protecting culprits and terrorists by taking them to its side. It is safeguarding the terrorists and preventing them from facing criminal charges. “The government is protecting criminals. A minister and a former chief minister, both former terrorists, are being molly-coddled by this government, which has now given the permission to Daya Master as well. Very soon even KP will also be allowed to contest elections or may be appointed to parliament through the national list,” he said. Mr. Fonseka said this kind of behavior by this Government had affected the judicial procedure of the country. “The government is maintaining files on those who are against it while protecting anyone who supports it. This is the message the government is giving the international community today,” he said. (Sanath Desmond) Gota meets Daya Master in Jaffna

By Ananth Palakidnar-2013-04-24 Secretary of the Ministry of Defence and Urban Development, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, has met former LTTE media head, V. Dayanithy alias Daya Master and 23 others in Jaffna over the Northern Provincial Council polls to be held later this year, informed sources said. The meeting was held on Monday at the 52 Division Headquarters in Varani, where the Defence Secretary had a detailed discussion over the Northern Provincial polls and also on the possibilities of spearheading the political and the development activities through a possible UPFA-led Provincial Council, sources said. The meeting had also focused on the candidatures for the Northern Provincial polls where Rajapaksa had outlined that by contesting alone, the UPFA could work out its own strategies towards the development activities in the North, sources added. The UPFA is planning to field several new faces at the Provincial polls, sources explained. Meanwhile, informed sources said Daya Master is most likely to contest the polls under the UPFA. The UPFA's coalition partner, Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP), which had earlier contested in the parliamentary polls under the betel symbol of the UPFA, has still not taken any decision on aligning with the UPFA in the provincial polls, sources said. In the meantime, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) has also embarked on working out its provincial polls strategy, despite the differences over registering the TNA as a political party. The old guards in the TNA, including its leader R. Sampanthan and Mavai Senathiraja are not for registering the TNA as a political party and they prioritize the main constituent party, Illankai Tamil Arasu Katchi (ITAK), instead of the TNA, sources said.

2013-04-24

Jayatilleka, Cold Peace And The BBS Trend

By Kalana Senaratne -April 24, 2013 

Kalana Senaratne

After what seemed to be a brief but palpable and conspicuous absence from serious public engagement (in late 2012), Dr. Dayan Jayatilleka has returned from Paris; a return marked by his characteristic interventions in the press and the release of a book, titled ‘Long War, Cold Peace: Conflict and Crisis in Sri Lanka’ (Vijitha Yapa, 2013). The book, his second major publication on Sri Lanka, brings together most of his writings on Sri Lankan affairs which were published in the papers during the past few years.

This is a timely intervention; not only because the author was a former diplomat who had staunchly and successfully defended the country overseas, but mostly because his views on numerous domestic and foreign policy matters seem to run counter to the dominant ideological positions adopted by the present regime. The confluence of these factors makes Jayatilleka’s intervention a coruscating and critical one, with the delightful (or dangerous?) potential of irking the regime; especially a firm and unflinching political administrator like Mr. Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, than a seemingly indecisive political leader like PresidentMahinda Rajapaksa.

But how does Jayatilleka’s approach differ from the regime’s, on some of the critical problems confronting the country? Is there a mismatch in these two approaches, or is it a mere chimera?

Armed conflict, investigations and human rights

The regime’s understanding about the consequences of the armed conflict, about what had to be done to avert international pressure, was always problematic. Its propagandists considered the bloody and necessary confrontation with the LTTE to be a ‘humanitarian mission’, with zero-civilian casualties; therefore, investigations were considered wholly unnecessary, and calls for human rights protection were often dismissed. But these were never going to be convincing arguments in the diplomatic arena, especially in the long term. The conflict was, at best, only partly ‘humanitarian’, and a policy of ‘zero-civilian casualties’ was simply that, a policy.

Jayatilleka, to be sure, was a staunch defender of the crushing of the LTTE. He had advocated the need to defeat the LTTE for a long time (even in his 1995 book, ‘Sri Lanka: The Travails of Democracy). And he argues in his latest book, rather unsurprisingly, that “at no time were civilians wittingly targeted as a matter of policy” and that issues pertaining to “accountability will be dealt with by each society at its own pace” (p. 348). But Jayatilleka begins to adopt a different and useful stance when he advocates the need to carry out investigations into specific incidents or allegations of crimes (as he once informed Radio France Internationale). The war, as the LLRC Report showed, was not squeaky clean; and Jayatilleka has had no problem in endorsing it. This is unlike the regime’s approach; a regime which is determined to undermine the relevance of the LLRC. Ironically, the regime has decided to appoint a member of the LLRC as Jayatilleka’s successor to Paris at a time when the country is being censured for not properly implementing the LLRC’s recommendations.

Jayatilleka also rejects cultural relativism. He writes: “Human rights are not a Western invention or booby-trap, to be decried and shunned like the devil. Though there is a constant attempt to use human rights as an instrument to undermine national sovereignty, the answer is not to shun human rights or to pretend that these are intrinsically inscribed in our culture and therefore automatically observed, but to protect them ourselves and to maintain verifiably high standards of human rights observance nationally” (p. 351). Therefore, there is support for “a strong, independent Commission on Human Rights, Equality and Elimination of Discrimination headed by a person with international credentials and of acknowledged international stature” (p. 349). Furthermore, Jayatilleka seeks to uphold international law while continuing to regard state-sovereignty and sovereign states as the cornerstones of the world order (an approach similar to the late Lakshman Kadirgamar’s).

Sri Lanka, the West and the UN

The current regime has a dubious relationship with the West, wherein the latter configuration is often regarded as an ‘enemy’. The regime despises the West, but it also wants to impress them. Sri Lanka is part of the UN, but it is also famous for its mindless and insipid attacks on the UN and its representatives, who come to be often viewed as ‘terrorists’ or their foreign representatives.

Jayatilleka is an anti-imperialist – a strong admirer of Che and Castro – and a believer in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). He was also a most forceful critic of the West’s attempt to pass a resolution against Sri Lanka at the UNHRC in May, 2009. Yet, he advocates the need to avoid being polarized on Western-centric and isolationist lines, and thereby attempts to chart a middle course which is globalist (especially in its outlook on politics, security and culture). Adopting a more pro-NAM, pro-Asian approach, he argues for a “successful project of Sri Lankan social democracy” which needs to synthesize Asian concerns with uneven development into “an Asian social democracy, which is marked by a communitarian inflection, not a deracinated transplant of pro-Western liberalism” (p. 64).

More importantly, Jayatilleka recognizes that the West does not constitute an ‘enemy’; however divergent the views and interests of Sri Lanka and certain members of the West may be. This approach has many advantages. It helps the country to be both critical of the West or the UN, but not be seen as an ‘enemy’; to be mindful of the politics of its representatives, but without relapsing into inelegant and unnecessary attacks which antagonize them; to be critical of selective, Western-inspired, attempts to hold Sri Lankan leaders accountable, but also be clever to ensure that by rushing to hold the Commonwealth Summit it is only attracting increased scrutiny and attention (as Jayatilleka has pointed out in a recent interview). There is, in such an approach, a realistic appreciation of the strength of the country, its size and place in the world; an appreciation that is totally lacking at present.

India and 13th Amendment

Sri Lanka and India are currently in a tensed relationship. Sri Lanka believes that China will be there to rescue her, even if it means that China has to jeopardize its relationship with India; but what Sri Lankan policy makers fail to realize is how deluded they are, or how more intelligent China is. Furthermore, the regime’s views on devolution are confusing; wittingly or unwittingly. The President promises the full implementation of the 13th Amendment, while Mr. Gotabhaya Rajapaksa rejects the need to do so; and at present, it is inconceivable how the President of the country can override the wishes of the Secretary of the Defence Ministry. The regime’s current policy is to remind India about how it provided arms and training to the LTTE and other groups promoting secession in Sri Lanka in the 1980s; a useful reminder no doubt, but not in the form of a daily mantra.

Jayatilleka’s, to be sure, has been a very contrasting approach; which is partly why he got sacked from Geneva. He has not denied India’s responsibility for exacerbating the armed conflict in Sri Lanka, and there is a useful critique of the understanding of the Sri Lankan conflict by Indian diplomats and policy makers such as JN Dixit (p.167-77). Yet, Jayatilleka believes strongly in the continuing relevance of India’s goodwill, and the need to ensure that the Indian centre does not capitulate to the whims of Tamil-Nadu. He understands more clearly the dangers confronting the country, in the context of BJP’s threatening stance and the 2014 Indian elections. For Jayatilleka, this is a diplomatic game which needs to be played with the 13th Amendment; i.e. by implementing it, not simply by promising to do.

Jayatilleka correctly acknowledges that Sri Lanka “is the only homeland that the Sinhalese as a collective, have” (p. 365). But he also points out: “What we must prevent is the break up of the country based on monopolistic ethnic ownership of the North-east… we cannot deny the Tamils right to co-ownership, and such recognition is the only means to prevent separate ownership” (p. 263). It is necessary to have a Sri Lanka “which remains unitary but contains an irreducible autonomous political space for the Tamil people of the North and East” (p. 265).

Within this overarching plan, Jayatilleka believes that the “struggle to implement the 13th Amendment fully remains as progressive a task as it ever was” (p. 267) – that the implementation of the 13th Amendment is to be regarded as a progressive task perhaps tells us where we are. Adopting a realistic and practical approach, he notes that his support for the 13th Amendment is largely because “it is already in place and does not have to be (re)negotiated” (p. 268). Why? “Anything else would be too risky. Open up the issue again and the Sinhalese may offer less, the Tamils may ask for more and the world may see an even more divided island” (p. 271).

But Jayatilleka is not blind to the nature of Tamil politics which, according to him, has failed to adopt a realistic approach. Given the TNA’s dismissal of the 13th Amendment and its belief that a solution even within a united Sri Lanka may not be possible, he argues for “both the retention of the 13th amendment and the freeze, pause or slow-motion movement of the electoral process to the Northern Provincial council unless and until there is verifiable proof of a change of paradigm on the part of the ITAK/TNA” (p. 297). If there is a greater threat, it would even be necessary to dissolve the Northern council; as he points out in a recent article (‘TNA President’s Avurudu Gift to the Hawks’, Daily Mirror). It is only later then that there can be any compensation for the loss of the de-merger by suitably amending the concurrent-list (p. 420).

And, such a policy has to be implemented only in a way that safeguards Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; a matter which is non-negotiable by any means whatsoever (p. 298). Security, therefore, is of utmost importance; reform of the Sri Lankan State should be “underpinned by a prior guarantee of security” (p. 65).

Sri Lankan Identity

Finally, what of Sri Lanka and its identity-crisis? Here again, the regime cuts a pathetic figure given the political patronage it provides for groups such as Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) which are increasingly whipping upanti-Muslim hatred. The regime is confused on the question of how a Sinhala-Buddhist majority should accommodate the minority communities within the country.

Jayatilleka is opposed to the present trend; he was never your Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist, anyway. Therefore he has been comfortable in critiquing the BBS, and usefully so. And in broader terms, Jayatilleka points out that “‘we’ had failed to become ‘us’”; therefore, building an “overarching Sri Lankan identity” and belonging to “an extended Sri Lankan family” needs to take place “while we belong to our particular ethno-national ones” (p. 23). The inability to build a truly Sri Lankan identity, Jayatilleka believes, is “the key, the most crucial problem” confronting Sri Lanka today (p. 429); with the “only pathway to build a successful Sri Lankan identity” being “equality of citizenship” – “the idea that Sri Lanka belongs equally to all of its citizens” (p. 432). Here too, Jayatilleka’s attempt has been to tread a middle course, between what he often describes as Sinhala chauvinism and Tamil chauvinism.

Realist approach

Jayatilleka’s, then, is a ‘progressive realist’ approach, and he believes that a “progressive Realist must work with what exists, not what might have existed – and he/she must do so precisely in order to transform that reality for the better or to avoid its turn for the worse” (p. 294). In adopting such an approach, Jayatilleka strives to show consistently the “reality within which one [has] to situate oneself and work” (p. 296). It is such a realist perspective that he urges the Left to adopt: a “radical realism” which is also ethical.

But Jayatilleka is also a pragmatist; and there seems to be much of Rortyan pragmatism in his work. Perhaps he would agree that apart from Antonio Gramsci, a critical and more pragmatic left and/or social democratic formation would do well to read Richard Rorty too. And one reaches the zenith of Jayatilleka’s realist-pragmatic approach when he writes: “the Tamil ethnic/national question can never be resolved. It can only be addressed and managed i.e. partly co-opted, partly accommodated, partly contained, partly confronted and combated” (p. 424). It is a statement which throws up a number of questions that cannot be discussed here, even though it is one statement of the book which I fully endorse.

Limitations and concerns

The first limitation of Jayatilleka’s account is also his strength: the realist approach, one which he is extremely fond of. The problem here is that like most ‘realist’ approaches, Jayatilleka’s too is one which is constructed and determined by his own political preferences. Now, this is fine; for no political approach is neutral or objective (and any political analyst who calls himself ‘neutral’ or ‘objective’ should not be trusted). But given the uncertainties of politics and the flexibility with which a realist-approach needs to be constructed, such an approach will tend to be seen as an ever-shifting one.

This is perhaps best exemplified in an important essay titled ‘Tamil politics’ (p. 278-301); wherein Jayatilleka advocates the implementation (and freeze) of the 13th Amendment (p. 297), but also goes on to advocate a policy of ‘LLRC first, 13th Amendment second’ (p. 301) [I believe this has happened due to the fact that this particular essay is a synthesis of a series of articles Jayatilleka wrote about the TNA, and the two policies came to be highlighted in two different articles]. Also, Jayatilleka was somewhat supportive of the government’s intention to establish a Parliamentary Select Committee to address the Tamil question (p. 277); a policy which he may view with greater suspicion today than he did when serving in Paris.

If then, what is necessary is not the abandonment of a realist-approach; rather, it is to realize that there is no inherent advantage in adopting the realist-approach given that it needs to constantly shift in an ever changing political environment. Jayatilleka’s claim that his is a realist-approach therefore need not be uncritically endorsed, however alluring the call for ‘realism’ tends to be.

Secondly, even though Jayatilleka is perhaps the best foreign minister President Rajapaksa never had, he was one of the best diplomats the latter had. This, however, reminds one how marginal Jayatilleka’s voice has been, even unsuccessful, in bringing about any kind of serious reform of the regime’s domestic and foreign policies. That even the likes of Jayatilleka who were close to the powers that be have failed in this regard reminds one of the unimaginably complex and gargantuan task of reformation that confronts the people.

Thirdly, this in turn suggests that Jayatilleka now has to take his critique to another level wherein he will need to argue that this current regime is indeed unable and unwilling to reform itself. But here, I admit that Jayatilleka has initiated such a critique; the best piece of evidence being his speech at the seminar organized by the Young Journalists Association in which he both critiqued the regime and noted the impending necessity of a possible (peaceful) regime change at the next election.

Yet, wouldn’t Jayatilleka’s advocacy of regime change be conditional? And understandably so, because any serious claim for regime change would need to be mindful of, for example, the kind of opposition that confronts the regime, the kind of threats the country confronts especially from external forces, and whether the oppositional formation is to be perceived as being in a better position to meet such challenges than the current regime. It might even be necessary to factor-in the hopeless choices one gets to make during election time. What, also, of the schisms within the regime itself? Given, for example, the way in which certain Sinhala-Buddhist nationalists seem to be rallying behind Mr. Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, would Jayatilleka feel that the first call needs to be for a change within the regime and not the regime itself, given also the hopelessness that has come to define the opposition? These are perhaps questions that can only be answered as and when they arrive.

Conclusion

Dr. Dayan Jayatilleka is one of Sri Lanka’s most prominent and eloquent political analysts; a scholar who has also made a useful contribution to the global debate on ethical violence. And engaging with Jayatilleka’s work has been an interesting and challenging enterprise. I have supported some of his views, while also critiquing him on certain occasions; an approach I will continue to adopt. As with the writings of any analyst or political commentator, vigilance, or constant revaluation, is required when following Jayatilleka’s work. As is the case with many of us, he too has come to change some of his views over the years, and might continue to do so in the years to come.

Yet, ‘Long War, Cold Peace’ is a useful reminder that one can, while defending the defeat of the LTTE, still adopt realist and pragmatic approaches to problems confronting the country which are different from those adopted by the current regime. Jayatilleka’s critique, in a sense, unmasks the mediocrity that has come to define this regime. But precisely because it does so, the title of the book might also define the very nature of Jayatilleka’s relationship with the current regime. It might not be a long war, but most certainly a cold peace, as always.

For now, however, Jayatilleka is back after a few years of thankless service in the diplomatic arena, back in Sri Lanka where it all began, and perhaps back with the feeling: this is how the ship sinks.

*This is an edited version of a review which has been carried in the newspapers and elsewhere online

It Would Not Be Long Before The People Take To The Streets – Samarasinghe

• The current system must be changed to solve crisis-Wednesday, April 24, 2013

President of the Inter Company Employees’ Union (ICEU), Wasantha Samarasinghe says that the people are now feeling the economic crisis faced by the country. He noted that the government has failed to properly administer the economy. “The country’s economy is now defunct and the people are being burdened as a result,” he said, adding that the US proposal to cut 20 percent of its aid to Sri Lanka would have an impact on other countries’ approach to Sri Lanka as well.

Following are excerpts of the interview:

Q: What do you have to say about the current state of the country’s economy?
A: I can’t explain it in one line. It is not easy to say. The country is functioning without any idea of what is going on and what is to be expected. The Cabinet and the persons handling the country’s economy do not have a proper sense. This is a capitalist crisis and Sri Lanka is facing a severe fall in its economy. The country has been pushed into a great debt trap. The production process has declined and the people’s purchasing power has also declined. The capital market is being used to cover state debt. Our country is still not based on a production economy. The economy mostly depends on the farmer’s produce and other businesses for its survival. The government has failed to properly administer the economy. People have to pay more for fuel when the global oil prices are on the decline. The Public Utilities Commission had granted permission for an electricity tariff revision when about 95 percent of the country has opposed it. The country’s economy is now defunct and the people are being burdened as a result. We believe that the crisis is due to the market economy.

Q: Do you think that the people are aware of the real state of the economy?
A: Since 1948, people have appointed governments to free the country from foreigners, but not to bring freedom to themselves. Successive governments since 1948 have handled the economy using different methods. As a result, people are now dressing differently and are using telephones, but the core issues remain unchanged. However, people have been very complacent thinking that is their fate. Nevertheless, I feel that the people are now feeling the economic crisis. The farmers have lost their seed paddy and the market to sell their produce. A kilo of paddy is sold between Rs. 22 and 24, which sometimes doesn’t cover their costs. They have to buy a loaf of bread by selling three kilos of paddy. The working masses, the self-employed and farmers are facing the pressure of the economic downfall. Their responses to the problems have shown their frustrations. The school has become a business institution and so is the health sector. When you go to a state hospital you find that most of the facilities are assigned to the private sector. It is the responsibility of social movements to rally the people and take the issue to the forefront. It is a problem with the current system and that needs to be changed. Given the current situation, it would not be long before the people take to the streets and demand for a change in the system.

Q: What impact do you think the proposed 20 percent aid cut by the US would have on the country’s economy?
A: Various members of the government make different comments. The Cabinet says the economy is well planned and strong, the Central Bank Governor says there’s no problem and the Finance Ministry Secretary says there’s a problem but it could be resolved. Some countries give aid to Sri Lanka while some other give loans and some give monies in both these forms. However, the government’s stances with regard to the economy should be serious. The government thinks that the people are still enjoying the thrill of winning the war in 2009. But the country lost the GSP Plus concession that is valued at US$ 1.5 billion. It was value to our exporters. The government is now speaking of earning US$ 1.5 billion through tourism in the future after losing the same amount in a different sector. The government devalued the rupee following an IMF condition. Look at the impact the country is faced with by the government’s actions? When you speak of the aid cut, you must look at the impact. Such action would have an impact on other countries’ approach to Sri Lanka as well. The government has to find monies for all monies that are borrowed. All this would have an impact on the ordinary people in the country. This situation could have been avoided if the government had closely monitored its policies and repercussions. The government would have been able to foresee such an eventuality. It seems like the government is trying to live with an isolated mentality.

Q: How will the JVP intervene in addressing this issue?
A: The JVP criticism is that the government does not have a solution. The situation now is like a flu turning out to be pneumonia. Now a surgeon is needed to address the issue. The US has slashed aid to Sri Lanka mostly because of the crisis in that country. Many countries in the world are experiencing several economic downfalls. It is evident that it is the fault of the system. Therefore, Sri Lanka is also affected. The government is trying to find a solution to the crisis by implementing policies of Regaining Sri Lanka part by part. The government is trying to get away by imposing all the burdens on the people. The electricity, fuel, transport bills are being increased. Mahinda Rajapaksa is playing the second innings of the market economy started by JR. Rajapaksa is now finding it hard to save the wicket. There’s no solution to the crisis in the current system. The government has been making wrong decisions. When the world was going into an economic crisis it started an aviation company, Mihin Lanka, which is now being maintained at a loss. However, when the crisis deepens the officials might actually flee the country.

Q: What impact has the loss of the EU’s GSP Plus had on the economy?
A: The loss of the GSP Plus has resulted in a huge problem with some companies moving out of the country. They have shifted to other countries in the region. By December last year, some companies had closed down their operations in Sri Lanka because they were losing their markets in the EU. Market prices are decided by many conditions related to the sector. When Sri Lanka lost the GSP Plus, the price of the goods manufactured in Sri Lanka also increased. However, an industrialist cannot face such a scenario since he would lose the market. It is people who are unaware of the real impact of the loss of the GSP Plus that make foolish comments saying it would not have an impact on the economy. The current situation in the country does not help attract investors. How many foreign direct investments have reached the country last year? Were any new factories that employ over 1,000 persons opened in the country recently? The loss of the GSP Plus has resulted in the loss of investments, industries and jobs. The import and export figures show the real situation of the country. Exports and imports have declined and the authorities have failed to conduct a proper study to determine the reasons for such a situation and address it.

Q: The government has resorted to taking commercial loans. How do you see this development?
A: The country’s production process is dependent on the private sector. Therefore, the manufacturers and investors work closely with the country’s banking sector. It is the banks that lend to the private sector to carry out their businesses. The private sector use the monies borrowed from banks for the production process. However, the government has now taken Rs. 410 billion at a 17 percent interest rate from the banks. These monies borrowed by the government are not used for any production purpose. They are mostly used to pay state sector salaries. Banks then don’t have money to lend to the private sector. The government and institutions like the CPC and CEB have taken loans from the banks and even cashed in on fixed deposits. For example, Lanka Mineral Sands Limited had a Rs. 1,250 million fixed deposit that gave the company Rs. 75 million as annual interest and it was used to pay the staff salaries. This fixed deposit was taken and the company is now heading towards a financial crisis.

Q: How do you think the country can overcome the current economic crisis?
A: Mahinda Rajapaksa and the family cannot overcome the crisis. The crisis would be pushed further. If you are really keen in finding the answers to the crisis, you can. But the government is not in the mentality of finding the answers. You cannot fool everyone all the time. Inflation is increasing and the country is on a debt trap and the people are feeling it. The monthly expenditure of a family of four is estimated at Rs. 47,800, but a public sector worker’s minimum salary is Rs. 20,088 and a private sector worker is Rs. 8,625. Families are finding it hard to survive even with two members being employed. Using loans to build roads is not sufficient. Monies should be used for the production process. The government has estimated its revenue to be at Rs. 1,274 billion and the loan and interest payments at Rs. 1,196 billion. Only Rs. 80 billion will be remaining. The government has to spend Rs. 396 billion for annual public sector salaries and Rs. 150 billion for health. Every person in the country is in debt to the tune of Rs. 65,000 as a result of the loans taken by the government. The per capita loan is over Rs. 400,000 now. One must see where the country is heading? In order to salvage the country from the current crisis, the country’s production process must be strengthened, the people must be involved in the development process and the people should enjoy the benefits of development. But the economy at present is functioning according to the needs of one family. The current system must be changed and the JVP has a properly planned programme that would help increase the production process and get the people involved in it.

Internal auditing almost non-existent at CEB – PUCSL Chief 

By Shamindra Ferdinando-April 23, 2013

Chairman of the Public Utilities Commission of Sri Lanka (PUCSL) Dr. Jayatissa de Costa, yesterday alleged that internal auditing was almost non-existent at the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) though it remained one of the state enterprises under fire for waste, corruption and irregularities.

Asked whether the PUCSL was taking measures to tighten internal audit mechanism in the wake of persistent allegations of mismanagement, Dr. Costa revealed that there were only six internal auditors, in spite of the CEB having 18,000 employees.

Had there been a proper internal audit the CEB wouldn’t have been in such a financial mess, Dr. Costa said, alleging that the institution was being controlled by what he called a powerful Mafia bent on making personal profit at the country’s expense. The bottom line was that those at the helm of vital operations weren’t accountable to anyone, the official said, underscoring the urgent need to subject the enterprise to both internal and external audits.

The senior lawyer alleged that those running the bankrupt institution had acted irresponsibly and extravagantly, though they knew the CEB was in deep financial crisis and couldn’t afford to engage in wasteful expenditure. Could there be anything as shocking as preparing an estimate Rs. 40 billion in excess than the required amount, Dr. Costa said.

"When the CEB estimated the funds it required at Rs. 268 billion, the PUCSL after having closely studied its requirements, reduced Rs 40 billion from that amount. Much to our surprise, the CEB accepted the drastic cut," Dr Costa said.

In fact those demanding an explanation from the PUCSL for authorizing a sharp increase in electricity tariff should ask the CEB to explain the circumstances under which it prepared its latest estimates, Dr. Costa said. Responding to another query, the PUCSL chief pointed out that the situation could have been much worse if the PUCSL didn’t intervene to cut the CEB budget.

Dr. Costa said that the CEB management should realize that it served over 5.5 million familier and couldn’t run the institution according to the whims and fancies of a few.

Govt. website hacked

WEDNESDAY, 24 APRIL 2013 

The government Information Department’s official website www.news.lk was hacked by a group identifying itself as Sultan Brain this afternoon.

However, the Director General of the Information Department Dr. Ariyaratne Athugala told the Daily Mirror Online that the website was not hacked but the internet firewall had been compromised and the maintenance of the site was underway.